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PRECIS 
This thesis is a study of the interaction between two weak 
states and their superpower patrons through the application of a 
theoretical analysis of the 'power of the weak' to the study of the 
political and military conduct of relations between Israel, Egypt, the 
United States and the Soviet Union in the period from 1962 to 1973. 
The thesis establishes some of the conditions under which 
lesser powers, engaged in a protracted conflict and dependent upon the 
military, economic and political support of the superpowers, could 
nevertheless resist and thereby influence the policies of their patrons. 
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In the Arab-Israeli context, the thesis examines the effect that 
the politics of patronage have had on the conduct and settlement of the 
conflict and analyses the successes and failures of Israeli and Egyptian 
diplomacy in securing the support of their superpower patrons while 
resisting the imposition of an order inimical to their own interests. 
This thesis is my own original work. 
Martin Indyk 
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PREFACE 
In January 1975, I stood in a Cairo street watching the masses 
surge past to a riot in Tahrir Square; a year earlier I had watched a 
weary Israeli soldier - returning from the Yom Kippur War - dragging 
himself and his gun through Jerusaler.i's Zion Square. Their fixed stares 
reflected the same anxiety, despair, confusion and weariness. They 
reflected the human tragedy which has afflicted the Middle East for 
thirty years. 
The intractability of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its potential 
for engulfing the world have caused many students of international 
relations to focus their attention on the problem of a settlement; some 
have put forward their proposals, others have tried to implement them. 
And yet, despite the attention which has been paid to this tragedy, it 
still defies solution. By now the causes of the conflict are well 
understood. The struggle for survival, independence and modernity, 
the conflict of nationalisms, the contest over territory and rights, and 
the competition for the region's strategic resources, have been analysed 
at length. But such analysis fails to explain the dynamics of the 
conflict: why war broke out when it did in 1956, 1967 and 1973; why Israel 
and its Arab neighbours enjoyed (or suffered) relative stability and 
tranquillity from 1957 to 1965, and from 1970 to 1973; and what process 
could bridge the gap between the minimum demands of each side in the 
conflict. In my search for a suitable focus for this study of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, it became clear that not enough attention had been paid 
to the politics of the conflict and therefore the political conditions 
which might be conducive to a settlement. 
In examining the dynamics of the conflict, it also became evident 
that the interaction was complex in the extreme, occurring on different 
levels as well as between these levels. First, of course, was the conflict 
between the Arab states and Israel; second, the conflict between Israel 
and the Palestinians; third,the inter-Arab conflict; fourth, the conflict 
between external powers for influence in the region; fifth, the conflict 
between external powers and the states of the region, be they clients or 
adversaries; and sixth, the domestic conflict within each of the parties 
to the dispute. Unable to analyse all of these interactions adequately, 
it became necessary to give the study a particular focus. 
Since the superpowers fuelled the conflict with their economic and 
military assistance, their actions and policies did much to determine 
its course and the prospec~for its settlement. However, in looking at 
the contemporary history of the superpower involvement in the Middle 
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East, I was struck by the little influence and less control these giants of 
international relations actually possessed. Their experience in the 
Middle East seemed to militate against the conventional wisdom that 
the system of states was dominated and controlled by those at the top, 
who maintained order by sacrificing the interests of those at the bottom. 
This phenomenon was not of course unique to the current conflict in the 
Middle East; the impotence of the great and the power of those considered 
weak has been remarked upon in other areas and at other times. However, 
the idea that the tail could wag the dog seemed to be particularly 
applicable to the problems involved in reducing or settling the Arab-
Israeli conflict and curiously lacking in detailed analysis. 
I suspect that one of the reasons for the lack of such analysis is 
the understandable tendency of those who choose to study the role of 
the superpowers in the Arab-Israeli conflict to approach this topic from 
the perspective of the superpowers and to treat the regional combatants 
as the objects of their policies. Consequently, although the inability 
of the superpowers to influence their clients is often remarked upon, the 
underlying reasons for this phenomenon are not within the realm of such 
studies. They are concerned with the power of the great, not their 
impotence·, with relations between the superpowers, not between patrons 
and clients; and with the influence of the strong, rather than the 
resistance of those presumed weak. 
For this reason, I decided to make the most significant regional 
combatants - Israel and Egypt - the subject of this study, to adopt their 
perspective of relations with the superpowers, and to focus the analysis 
on their abilities to resist the policies of their superpower patrons. 
The thesis thus became a study of the 'power of the weak' in relations 
between the superpowers and their clients on either side of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. 
Part One of the dissertation provides the theoretical introduction 
to the analysis. Its length is occasioned by the need to outline the 
sources of power for weak states in general and Israel and Egypt in 
particular. However, because this is a study of two particular weak 
states, engaged in a protracted conflict, in their relations with the 
two superpowers, during a specific period, the theoretical analysis 
concentrates on the sources' of power relevant to their circumstances. 
Some of their capabilities are unique, others will be possessed by 
similar weak states in conflict within a bipolar superpower environment, 
and still others by weak states in general. But I should emphasise at 
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the outset that the principles outlined in this section are deduced from 
an examination of Israel and Egypt in their relations with the superpowers. 
Insofar as that makes some contribution to the theory of the 'power of 
the weak', it is a particular rather than a general contribution. No 
attempt has been made to compare or contrast their capabilities with 
those of other weak states, for that would be a thesis in itself, and 
hardly suited to the purpose of examining the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. I am hopeful, however, that the conceptual framework developed 
here will have applicability to other weak states involved in regional 
conflicts. 
Part Two analyses relations between Israel, Egypt and their superpower 
patrons in the period from 1962 to 1967; Part Three analyses the period 
from 1967 to 1973. Because I am concerned with cases of resistance and 
influence - with the politics of patronage - I have not attempted 
to analyse or relate all the events which occurred during these periods. 
Instead, I have concentrated on those events which best illustrate Israeli 
and Egyptian strengths and weaknesses. In this regard, 1962 was an 
important year because it marked the beginning of the arms relationship 
between Israel and the United States, the warming of relations between 
Egypt and the Soviet Union after the heated disagreements of the period 
from 1959 to 1961, and the first test of relations between Egypt and its 
new American patron over Egyptian intervention in Yemen. Thus, Chapter 
One analyses Israel's success in overcoming the American arms embargo and 
ChapterTlrreeexamines Nasser's failure to maintain American patronage while 
resisting its influence. Chapters Two and Four examine the Nay-June 1967 
crisis from the perspective of the politics of patronage, in an attempt 
to explain the strategies of the two clients and the reasons for the 
political outcome of that crisis. 
The first two chapters of Part Three analyse the period of the 
War of Attrition, which was above all else a battle for patronage. 
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Chapter Three analyses the differing effects of the development of detente 
on relations between the superpowers and their Middle Eastern proteges, 
explains why the avowed principles of detente did not conform to the 
practice in the Middle East, and examines Egypt's decision to go to war, 
and Israel's decision to await the Arab attack, in terms of their respect-
ive abilities and willingness to resist the policies of their patrons. 
Finally, Chapter Four discusses the behaviour of the patrons and clients 
in the October 1973 War and explains how the interaction of superpower 
influence and weak state resistance in this crisis affected the outcome. 
Most of the events which I have dealt with have been recounted, by 
others; there is no shortage of secondary material on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In conducting the research, however, I have relied for the 
most part on primary sources - public statements, newspaper reports, 
radio broadcasts and published documents. These have been supplemented 
by the cautious use of the biographies of decision-makers and the 
accounts of people who can claim inside knowledge of the events, or have 
had access to classified documents. In 1975 I conducted fieldwork in 
Beirut, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, New York and Washington. 
Beyond the collection of material which was unavailable in Canberra, I 
conducted interviews with high officials and government advisors, who 
occasionally revealed something which was not a matter of public record, 
but who we.re more valuable in providing me with the necessary 'feel' for 
the subject. 
The task of producing a thesis is an agonising one, particularly 
when the preoccupation lasts for a period of over three years. In that 
period I have come to depend on many people for support, guidance, 
inspiration and encouragement. Although what follows is my own work, 
it could not have been written without them. 
As my supervisor, and Head of the Department of International Relations 
Bruce Miller provided not only wise and sensitive counsel on all the drafts, 
but also an extremely conducive environment in which to work and contemplate 
I am indebted to him, the Department, and the University for enabling me 
to carry out fieldwork in the Middle East, England and the United States. 
Geoffrey Jukes, as my principal supervisor, provided guidance, 
encouragement, criticism and lessons in English expression; in short, 
he safeguarded the thesis. 
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Among the many people who have influenced my thinking, Hedley Bull 
has perhaps had the greatest impact. The general intellectual inspiration 
which he provided while in the Department of International Relations, and 
his critical comments on the theoretical aspects of the dissertation, 
considerably improved the quality of this work. 
The incisive, thorough and merciless criticism of Steven Rosen and 
David Vital, although hard to take at the time, did much to distil my 
own thoughts. In particular, David Vital provided the inspiration for 
the focus of the thesis and Steven Rosen encouraged its application to 
the chapters on the October 1973 War. Critical comments from Jim 
Richardson, Robert O'Neill, John Vincent, Carsten Holbraad and Astri 
Suhrke enabled me to rethink and develop the key concepts used. 
My research in Beirut and Cairo was greatly assisted by Mr Ghassan 
Tueni and Dr Yehiya Eweiss. I am particularly grateful to Shimon Shamir 
and Itamar Rabinovitch for making the considerable resources of the 
Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv 
University available to me, and to Daniel Dishon for enabling me to use 
the unpublished drafts of the Center's Middle East Record for 1969/1970. 
In the United States I benefited greatly from the assistance of 
Richard Ullman, who helped to open doors for me in the State Department, 
John C. Campbell for critical comments on my early drafts, and William 
Quandt. 
I should also like to record here my gratitude to the many officials 
and academics in Lebanon, Egypt, Israel, England and the United States 
who gladly gave their time, thoughts and recollections to a student who 
could only repay them by doing them justice in this thesis. Their 
names are recorded in the Bibliography. 
On a personal level, in the course of researching and writing this 
thesis I came to depend upon many good people for intellectual, emotional 
and material sustenance. In this regard, I would like to acknowledge my 
greatest debts to: Peter Spearritt, Nancy Viviani, Roland and Sabena Rich, 
Simon Cowen, Daryl Feil, and Sonia Collier in Canberra; Hotti Amzel, 
Hannah Greenberg, Shlomo Dinur, Hannah and Michael Engelman and Alec Meyer 
in Israel; and Dan and Joanna Rose in New York. 
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To my family I owe much more than gratitude for their unity, love, 
encourageme;nt and guidance; and an apology for allowing the thesis to 
keep me away from them. 
To Jill Collier, who loved, supported, tolerated and advised me, 
and who, moreover, insisted on assuming the mammoth task of typing the 
manuscript, I would like to. record here my love and my appreciation for 
sharing the burden and for making even the pain a pleasure. 
Finally, to my grandfather, Hilel Korman, I dedicate this thesis 
as testimony to the principles he lives by and has passed down. 
Canberra, 
September, 1977 Martin Indyk 
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PART ONE 
THE POWER OF THE HEAK 
One of the first notions; I shouZd say even the basis 
of contemporaneous poZicy is and shouZd be tranquiZZity ... 
If the principaZ Powers ... adopt this principle the smaZZ States, 
which can hardZy stand afone, must adopt it also, 1;Jhether they 
Zike it or not. J 
- Count Metternich to Emperor Francis, 1817. -
On the poUticaZ pZane it has been found that smaU and medium 
sized countries can, if they wish and if they are determined, 
regain their usurped rights. They can bypass the network 
of compZicated internationaZ reZations and the 
rapprochement agreements concZuded bet1;Jeen the Big P01Jers; 
can decide their own fate, can take war decisions afone. 
- President Anwar Sadat, 1974. 2 
The contradiction between the attitude of Metternich and the claims 
of Sadat cannot simply be explained by pointing to the one hundrec and 
forty-seven years which have elapsed since Metternich's efforts to 
establish order in Europe. Although the international systen has 
undergone marked transformations in this period, Hetternich's 
conception of the role of small or weak states in international affairs, 
as the mere vassals of the principal powers, has survived. Thus, 
writing in 1975, Hedley Bull expressed what is still the conventional 
1. Cited in William E. Rappard, "Small States in the League of Nations", 
PoUticaZ Science QuarterZy, Volume XLIX, Ho. 4, 1934, p. 548. 
2. Speech of Anwar Sadat on the Occasion of the Fourth Anniversary 
of the Death of Carnal Abdul Nasser, Egyptian Gazette, 29 September, 
1974. 
wisdom about the balance of power between the strong and the weak: 
Because states are grossly unequal in power certain international 
issues are as a consequence settled, the demands of certain 
states (weak ones) can in practice be left out of account, the 
demands of certain other states (strong ones) [are] recognised 
to be the only ones relevant to the issue at hand ..• The 
inequality of states in terms of power has the effect of 
simplifying the pattern of international relations, of 
ensuring that some states will prevail while others will go 
under •.• 3 
Of course the conventional wisdom can draw on many examples from 
history to testify to the operation of this principle: the partition of 
Poland, the division of the Balkans, Hitler's absorption of Czecho~lovakia, 
and the operations of the superpowers in Hungary, Czec:hoslovakia, the 
Dominican Republic and Chile in more recent times. As Johan Galtung 
has noted about the contemporary system, "international politics is big 
power politics" and "it is only the USA and the USSR that really count, 
the other countries are of little or no importance" 4 This view of 
superpower predominance and weak state subservienc~ is strongly held by 
those who argue that the United States and the Soviet Union should impose 
a settlement on the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their belief 
in the efficacy of either a superpower condominium or a Pax Americana in 
the Middle East is predicated on the assumption that the superpowers 
will prevail and that Israel and Egypt will submit. 5 
How then is it possible to reconcile the claim of Egypt's President 
Sadat, that the weak can defy the strong and decide their own fate, with 
the historical and conventional wisdom? On the theoretical level, the 
purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that the orthodox 
picture of the present international order, painted as it is from the 
perspective of the great, is oversimplified and does not take account of 
3. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order ?.,n World Politics, 
London, 1977, p. 206. 
4. Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Journal of 
Peace Resea~ch, Volume 8, No. 2, 1971, p. 168. 
5. George Ball has been a persistent proponent of this argument, but he 
is certainly not alone. See George W. Ball, "How to Save Israel in Spite 
of Herself", Foreign Affairs, Volume 55, No. 3, April 1977, pp. 453-471; 
Edward R.F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger, A Secret History 
of American Diplomacy in the Middle East, New York, 1976, Chapter 14; 
Z. Brzezinski, F. Duchene and K. Saeki, "Peace in an International 
Framework", Foreign Policy, No. 19, Summer 19,75, pp. 3-17; George Ball, 
2 
"The Chill Realities of Middle East Peace", Newsweek, 5 November 1973, p. 21. 
3 
a number of factors inherent in this complex system. By focussing on these 
factors, which contribute to what has been labelled, rather paradoxically, 
11 11 6 
as the power of the weak , it is possible to develop and test a number 
of different and even counter-intuitive hypotheses about relations 
between the great and the weak in the contemporary international system. 
Stated simply, these hypotheses are: 
i) the demands of certain weak states, which possess the 
power of resistance, cannot always or easily be left 
out of account; 
ii) if the superpowers wish to maintain their dominance of 
the system through the promotion of tranquillity and 
stability then they will have to take account of the 
demands of these states; 
iii) while the great may indeed prevail on issues which 
directly affect the central balance of power, their 
preponderance does not mean that they will succeed in 
imposing their will on issues which affect relations 
between the weak and the great. 
Although these hypotheses have wider applicability they will only 
be tested in regard to relations between the American and Soviet 
superpowers and two conflicting weak states in a specific time period. 
Because the dissertation is primarily a study of the conduct of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict during a period of changing superpower relations, 
the theory of weak power - superpower interaction which will be 
developed will only be based on a study of this conflict and the 
conclusions to which the analysis points may not be applicable in other 
7 
contexts. In other words, this is an analysis of the effect that the 
politics of superpower patronage have had on the conduct and settlement 
of a conflict between two particular weak states during the development 
of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
6. The term appears to have been coined by Arnold Wolf ers in his 
Discord and Collaboration~ Baltimore Maryland, 1962, p. 111; see also 
Erling Bj¢1, "The Power of the Weak", Cooperation and Conflict~ No. 3, 
1968. 
7. However, in developing the theoretical framework, concepts which have 
been developed in regard to the Korean and Vietnam conflicts have been 
utilised, suggesting that there certainly are similarities in relations 
between other weak states and the superpowers, although such comparisons 
will always be hindered by the unique circumstances surrounding a 
particular conflict. 
In constructing the theoretical framework which will be used to 
analyse relations between Israe~ Egypt and the superpowers, it is first 
necessary to explain why Israel and Egypt have been defined as "weak" 
states. The fact that both countries have military forces which rival 
those of the European middle powers would suggest that if strength were 
measured in military terms alone, Israel and Egypt would not be 
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considered weak. If strength were measured in terms of material wealth, 
of GNP per capita ($250 for Egypt and $2720 for Israel in 1973), then 
Egypt might be considered weak while Israel would stand with the 
developed nations; measured in terms of population, Egypt might be 
considered strong (38 million) while Israel would certainly be amongst 
the weakest (3.5 million); in territorial terms Israel would be considered 
small (some 80,000 square kilometres, including occupied territories), 
while Egypt would be judged large (some 940,000 square kilometres 
presently under its control); yet if strength were measured in terms 
of the state of a nation's indebtedness both countries would be classed 
as weaker than most (Israel's foreign debt exceeded $6 billion while 
Egypt's debt exceeded $6.8 billion in 1974).* 
I:t is precisely this definitional problem which has plagued analysts 
of small states, leading one reviewer of the literature to conclude 
that "whatever criteria is adopted, small states form too broad a 
8. The following table illustrates the point. Naval combat vessels 
have been excluded because of their non-comparability. 
CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES, 1974/1975 
Country Armed Forces Tanks Combat Aircraft 
Israel 400,000 1,900 4661 
Egypt 323,000 2,000 568 
Britain 354,600 1,080 500 
France 502,500 2,020 431 
W. Germany 490,000 3,560 468 
1. Including about 100 in storage. 
Source: IISS, The Mi"lita.ry Balance, 1974/1975, London, 1974. 
* For an attempt to define small states according to population, 
military and economic capabilities, see R.P. Barston, "The External 
Relations of Small States'', in A.Schou and A.O. Brundtland (eds.), 
SmaU States in International Relations, Nobel Symposium 1?, New 
York 1971, pp.50-55. 
4 
f h f 1 . 11 9 category or t e purpose o ana ysis . For this reason, and because 
neither Egypt nor Israel fits easily into the category of "small states", 
the use of that term has been eschewed. 
However, in their attempts to define the class of small states 
some analysts have pointed to the common weakness of these states and 
it is this concept which has been utilised in placing Israel and Egypt 
in the heirarchy of states. Robert Rothstein has observed that the 
small state is one "which recognizes that it cannot obtain security 
primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely 
fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or 
10 developments to do so". Similarly, Annette Baker Fox defines small 
states as "those whose leaders ... recognise that their own state's 
political weight is limited to a local arena, rather than the global one, 
that they are dependent upon outside political forces for much of their 
security, and that their particular state's interests may be dispensable 
f 11 11 f h in the eyes o one or more great power In ·act bot writers, in 
their attempts to define the small state have instead defined the weak 
state. For it is precisely this dependence on external forces for 
security and survival which distinguishes the weak from the classes of 
stronger states. 
Thus it should be possible to construct a spectrum of dependence to 
determine a country's status in the hierarchy of states. At one extreme 
of the spectrum stand the weakest states which are completely dependent 
upon external support for the achievement of their basic objectives of 
physical and economic survival. At the other extreme stand the strongest 
9. Peter R. Baehr, "Small States: A Tool for Analysis?", World Politics., 
Volume 27, No. 3, 1975, p. 466. Niels Arnstrup, in a more comprehensive 
review of the literature on small states, also concluded that "the mere 
factor of size does not discriminate various types of foreign policy 
behaviour in a very satisfactory way". See N. Amstrup, "The Perennial 
Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts", Cooper>ation and 
Conflict., Volume XI, 1976, p. 178. 
10. Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Po1Jer's., New York, 1968, 
I. P• 29. 
11. A.B. Fox, "The Small States in the International System, 1919-
1969", International Journal., Volume XXIV, No. 4, 1969, p. 752, fn. 
5 
states which can secure their physical and economic survival, if they must, 
independent of external support. This is not to suggest that the 
superpowers which stand at this extremity are absolutely independent of 
the rest, for clearly they depend upon lesser powers for strategic and 
economic resources, trade and investment outlets, and the political, 
military and ideological support necessary for the pursuit of their global 
objectives. But it is to suggest that the superpowers can secure the 
resources which they do not possess by virtue of their physical and 
economic strength. 
On the other hand, weak states are dependent upon stronger powers, 
particularly the superpowers which have the resources to spare, for 
economic aid, trade and investment; for military and technical assistance; 
and for security. Lacking the independent strength of the great, the weak 
must rely on the good intentions of other states in the international 
system to secure the resources necessary to their survival. In other 
words, although all states are dependent on others to some degree, the 
dependence of the superpowers is of a 'second-order' nature because they 
can absorb or mitigate the costs of a drastic alteration or termination 
6 
of the relationship with the states on which they depend, whereas the 
dependence of the weak states makes them unable to absorb the costs of such 
a shift and only able to mitigate the effects of such a redefinition by 
transferring their dependence to another state or states. 12 In short, 
the great can dispense with the interests of the >Jeak, while the weak can 
only secure their interests with the support of the stronger states. 
Where are Israel and Egypt situated on this spectrum of dependence? 
Clearly, in the period under examination in this thesis (1962-1974), 
they both depended heavily upon external economic and military assistance 
for the achievement of their basic objectives of growth, industrial 
development and military strength. 
12. See Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Power and Interdependence", 
Survival, July/August 1973, p. 160; Astri Suhrke, "Gratuity or Tyranny: 
The Korean Alliances", fr'orld PoUticD, Volume X.,'{V, July 1973, p. 351; Oran 
R. Young, "Interdependence in World Politics", International Journal, 
Volume 24, No. 4, 1969, pp. 746-8. 
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I - THE WEAKNESS OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT 
a) Economic Dependence 
With a population of only 2.3 million in 1962 growing to 3.2 million 
in 1974, with a land area of only 20,700 square kilometres (pre-1967 borders) 
almost half of it arid desert, with limited water supplies and only minor 
natural resources,with a small domestic market limiting economies of 
scale, with a diverse population of inunigrants who had to be absorbed and 
integrated into a national entity, and within an environment of economic 
as well as military hostility, Israel was highly dependent upon an 
13 import surplus to promote its aim of rapid economic development. 
Between 1962 and 1965 Israel's GNP grew at an average annual rate of 
10.25% in real terms, but this clearly could not have been achieved withoilt 
the massive capital inflow of $184 million from the American Government, 
$628 millidn from the West German Government and $1. 3 billion from world 
Jewry. As the summary tables illustrate, during this period Israel's 
import surplus contributed an average of 16.5% to the economy's total 
resources and the balance of payr.ients deficits which it caused were only 
financed by the capital inflow from world Jewry, West Germany and the 
14 United States. Moreover, while world Jewry made the greatest 
13. See D. Patinkin, The Israel Economy: The First Decade, Jerusalem, 
1969' p. 43. 
14. Capital inflow from world Jewry comprised: private transfers; 
institutional transfers through the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National 
Fund and a host of other philanthropic, educational and welfare 
institutions; the purchase of State of Israel Bonds;and private investment. 
Over 65% of these funds come from American Jews. Capital inflow from 
West Germany comprised reparation payments to the Israeli Government and 
personal restitutions to the victims of Nazism. Reparation payments ended 
in 1964 and since then the payments have consisted only of personal 
restitutions. U.S. Government aid included technical assistance 
grants and low-interest hard-currency loans under the aegis of the 
Agency for International Development. See Michael Brecher, The Foreign 
Policy System of Israel, Setting, Images, f>l0ocess, London, 1972, 
pp. 103-109. 
Figures cited here are based on the br.ilance of payments tables in the 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Sta:t1:st;ical Abstract of Israel, Nos. 15-25, 
Jerusalem, 1964-1974 (S.A.I. ). 
contribution to Israel's capital inflow, most of this money came from 
American Jews whose donations and interest receipts were tax 
15 deductible. · 
The 1967 war struck the economy at a time when the government had 
already imposed an artificial brake designed to reduce Israel's mounting 
balance of payments deficit. The deficit had reached its high point 
of $572 million in 1964, at a· time when American grants and German 
reparation payments were being terminated. Thus Israel's dependence on 
what appeared to be decreasi~g external support necessitated a policy of 
restraint which reduced the growth in GNP to less than 1% in 1966 and 
to 4.4% in 1967. However, in the aftermath of victory, Israel experienced 
an economic boom with GNP growirtg at an average rate of 10.8% per year 
in real terms in the period from 1968-1972. Yet again, this rapid growth 
depended upon massive capital inflow from world Jewry, West Germany, and 
increasingly, from the American government. 16 During this period 
capital inf low from these sectors financed an import surplus which 
8 
17 
contributed an average of 18.7% per year to the economy's total resources. 
The October 1973 Har and its aftermath put a decisive end to the 
economic boom. The lengthy mobilisation of Israel's citizen army and the 
heed to reequip the armed forces caused severe dislocation to the economy: 
growth in GNP dropped to 6.3% in 1973 and less than 1% in 1974; defence 
expenditure leapt from $1.5 billion in 1972 to $3 billion in 1973. Just 
as the boom period was financed by external sources, so too was the economy 
kept afloat through the economic recession which it now experienced by 
external support. The import surplus jumped from $1.5 billion in 1972 to 
15. For a discussion of Israel's economic growth during this period see 
Nadav Halevi and Ruth Klinov-Malul, The Economic Development of Israel, 
New York and Jerusalem,1968, passim. 
16. See Brecher, op.cit., pp. 98- 103; Shaul Zarhi, "The Impact of the 
Six Day War on the Economy of Israel", llew Outlook, Volume 16, No. 4, 
May 1973, pp. 9-12; Shaul Zarhi, "The Galloping Foreign Debt", New Outlook, 
Volume 15, No. 6, July/August, 1972, pp. 12-17. 
17. As Table II shows, the U.S. Gbvernment contribution towards 
financing the import surplus increased from an average of 8.8% before 
1967 to an average of 18.8% in the period after 1967. This inflow 
comprised, almost entirely, long-term military credits, although there was 
a grant fol;" the absorption of Soviet Jewry in 1972. As a result the ratio 
of unilateral transfers to long-term capital on Israel's capital account fellf 
3.2:1 in 1968 to 2:1 in 1972, further increasing Israel's indebtedness. 
Th~ ratio rose to 2.8:1 in 1973 as a result of a jump in unilateral 
transfers from world Jewry after the war and the unprecedented provision 
of grants by the American government. Based on S.A.I., Table vii/4. 
$3.3 billion in 1973, financed by a proportional increase in Israel's 
dependence on contributions from world Jewry and a disproportional increase 
in economic grants and loans from the American government. 18 Thus, 
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although Israel had achieved rapid industrialisation by the end of the period 
under study, the economy depended, more than ever, on external support, most 
of which emanated from the United States. There could be no better 
indication of this growing dependence than Israel's external debt 
obl'igations which grew from $800 million in 1962 to over $5 billion in 1973. 
At that stage some 30% of the debt was owing to the United States 
19 Government. 
Finally, the direction of Israel's trade during this period reinforced 
its dependence upon the United States and Western Europe. Over half 
Israel's imports came from the United States, England, and West Germany 
while these three countries accounted for only 37% of Israel's exports. 
This meant that while Israel's export markets were diverse, its sources 
of imports tended to be concentrated,making it more dependent upon these 
three countries. This is illustrated by the fact that the United States, 
England, and West Germany accounted for over two-thirds of Israel's trade 
d f . . 20 e lClt. 
18. Defence imports_, as a proportion of total imports, increased from 
14.5% in 1972 to 23% in 1973, and by 1975 still accounted for 20% of 
total imports. See David Kochav, "The Economics of Defense-Israel", in 
(Louis Williams, ed.) Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict_, 
Tel Avi~ 1975, p. 181. 
19. Debt service was estimated at $170 million in 1962, rising to 
$690 million in 1973. SAJ Table vii/ 6, and U.S. Congress House of 
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, EmcY'gency Security Assistance 
Act of 19?3_, Hearings_, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 
30 November and 3 December 1973, p. 51. 
20. For a breakdown of Israel's trade with each of these three 
countries see Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel's Foreign TY'ade, 
General Sumrzary_, 19?4, Jerusalem, 1975, Special Series, No. 498. 
TABLE I 
TOTAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE ISRAELI ECONOMY_, 
1.962-1966t 
($m) (%) 
G.N.P. 29 66 83 .'5 
IMPORT SURPLUS 585 16.5 
TOTAL RESOURCES 3551 100.0 
"!-Annual averages 
1967 
( $m) (%) 
3896 87. l 
579 12.9 
4475 100.0 
1968-.1972-'r 
($mJ (%) 
5377 81. 3 
1238 18.7 
6615 100.0 
10 
1973 
($m) (%) 
8949 72. 9 
3327 27.1 
12276 100.1 
SOURCES: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts of Israel_, 
1963-1975_, Resotirces and Use of Resources Tables. 
TABLE II 
FINANCING ISRAEL'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT_, 
1D62-1966-'r 1.967 
( $m) (%) ($m) (%) 
D:EFICIT c:~ 
GOODS & SERVICES 490 100.0 531 100.0 
CAPITAL INFLOW: 
WORLD JEWRY 320 65.3 603 113. 6 
u. s. GOVT. 43 8.8 31 5.8 
W.G. GOVT. 147 30.0 122 23.0 
OTHER MOVEMENTS -20 -4.l -225 -42.4 
"!-Annual averages 
1962-1973 
1.968-1972 
( $m) (%) 
1018 100.0 
662 65.0 
191 18.8 
201 19.7 
-36 -3.5 
SOURCES: S.A.I._, 1.963-1.97.5_, Balance of Payments Tables. 
1.9 7 3 
($m) (%) 
2597 100.0 
1651 63.6 
1057 40.7 
264 10.2 
-375 -14.5 
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TABLE III 
ISRAEL'S DIRECTION OF TRADE_, 1962-1973 
1962-1966t 1967 1.968-1972t 1973 
( $m) (%) ($m) (%) ($m) (%) ( $m) (%) 
~'< 
IMPORTS FROM: 
U.S.A., U. K. , 
W.G. 418 54.7 405 52.1 791 51.1 1573 52.2 
OTHERS 346 45.3 373 47.9 756 48.9 1lf39 47.8 
TOTAL 764 100.0 778 100.0 1547 100.0 3012 100.0 
~'< 
EXPORTS TO: 
U.S.A., U .K., 
W .G. 144 37.2 219 39.4 327 38.5 544 37.3 
OTHERS 243 62.8 335 60.6 523 61. 5 915 62.7 
TOTAL 387 100.0 554 100.0 850 100.0 1459 100. 0 
TRADE BALANCE: 
U.S.A., U .K., 
W.G. -274 72. 7 -186 83.0 -464 66.6 -1029 66,2 
OTHERS -103 27.3 -38 17.0 -233 33.4 -524 33.8 
TOTAL -377 100.0 -224 100.0 -697 100.0 -1553 100.0 
·rAnnual averages 
~'<Imports and Exports of goods and services 
SOURCE: I sY'ae l 's F OY'e1:gn TY'ade _, GeneY'al SummaY'y_, 1974. 
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While Israel sought.rapid industrialisation to provide the economic 
base for its security and for the absorption of large numbers of migrants, 
Egypt, under Nasser, sought rapid industrialisation to raise the Egyptian 
masses out of their poverty and to assert the nation's independence from 
its colonial past. However, with only one-tenth of its land area cultivable 
with few natural resources, with a burgeoning population to feed (growing 
from 26 million in 1960 to 30 million in 1966 to 35 million in 1972), and 
with its leadership devoting large sums to military budgets and engaging 
in costly foreign exploits, the Egyptian economy could provide neither 
the raw materials, nor the domestic savings necessary for industrialisation. 
Accordingly, Egypt's dependence was merely transferred from the former 
colonial powers to the new superpowers. 
As Table IV shows, in the period of the First Five Year Plan 
(1959/60 - 1964/65), Egypt depended heavily on capital inflow to cover its 
investments and to compensate for the lack of domestic saving. Table V 
illustrates Egypt's dependence on capital inflow to finance its growing 
import surplus which, in turn, provided the raw materials and intermediate 
products for its industrial development, as well as the grain provisions 
for its burgeoning population. The bulk of this assistance came from the 
United States and the Soviet Union: from 1962-1966 Egypt received some 
$770million in economic assistance from the United States (mainly PL 480 
aid) and some $600 million in economic credits and finance for the Aswan 
Dam from the Soviet Union. 21 As a result, in the period of the First Five 
Year Plan, Egypt experienced an annual growth in GDP of 5.5% in real 
22 terms. However, in 1966, with the continual rundown in foreign reserves 
21. Egypt also received an estimated $1 billion during this period from 
China, Eastern Europe, West Germany, the World Bank and Kuwait. See 
Eliyahu Kanovsky, "Does the Expansion of Arab Financial Resources Imply 
Economic Development?", in the Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and. 
African Studies, Occasional Papers, Tel Aviv, December, 1974, p. 4. 
22. Official estimates put the growth rate in real terms during this 
period at 6.4% but Bent Hansen has cast doubt on the accuracy of these 
figures because of the unreliability of price indeces. He argues that 
a more accurate figure is 5.5%. See Bent Hansen, "Planning and Economic 
Growth in the U.A.R., 1960-5", in P.J. Vatikiotis (ed.), Egypt Since the 
Revolution, London, 1968, p. 26. 
and the curtailment of American economic assistance Egypt was forced to 
rein in its economy. No longer able to finance its chronic balance of 
trade deficit, Egypt was forced to restrict severely its imports, reduce 
its investment rate and go further into debt. 23 
13 
In the following five years the average annual growth in GDP dropped 
to 3.5%. There was a clear link between this downturn in growth and the 
b 1 f d f . . f l" 24 I h d E I a ance o payments e 1c1ts o ear 1er years. n ot er wor s, gypt s 
dependence upon external support had a marked impact upon its economic 
development. Moreover, the 1967 Six Day War exacerbated these tendencies 
because the closure of the Suez Canal, the loss of the Sinai oilfields 
and the disruption of Egypt's tourist industry were estimated to have 
cost the economy some $380 million per year in badly needed foreign 
exchange earnings. Although these losses were partly offset by an 
increase in Egypt's dependence upon the oil-rich Arab states, who committed 
themselves to annual contributions of some $270 million, 25 
23. In 1966 Egypt's foreign currency reserves dropped from $19 5 million to 
$173 million while its foreign liabilities rose from $170 nillion to $240 
million. At that stage Egypt sold $46 million of gold. International 
Monetary Fund, United Arah Republic - 196? Article XIV Consultation, 
22 December, 1967 (mirneo, in the possession of the author). 
24. See A.I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arah World, The Elements of Foreign 
Policy, London, 1976, p. 86; and R. Mabro, The Egyptian Economy, 1952-1972, 
London, 1974, pp. 166-7. 
25. As Table V shows, transfers from Arab governments provided over 70% 
of the finance necessary to cover Egypt's deficit on goods and services. 
The 1973 October War caused these unilateral transfers to jump to $529 
million, enabling Egypt for the first time in over a decade to build up 
its foreign currency reserves. 
it was also necessary to seek continued economic assistance from 
Moscow to help keep the economy afloat between the wars. 26 
Preparations for the October 1973 War increased Egypt's defence 
burden and as the deficit.in the balance of payments continued to grow 
(from $462 million in 1970 to $1.1 billion in 1974), despite a sporadic 
improvement in the terms of trade, Egypt's foreign debt mounted. In 
1967 the foreign debt was already $2.2 billion, 35% of which was owed to 
the Soviet Union, but by the end of 1974 the foreign debt had risen to 
$6.8 billion, 76% of which was owed to the Soviet Union. While 
in 1967 debt servicing was estimated to cost $240 million per year, in 
1974 it was estimated to cost $1.9 billion; some 53% of Egypt's 
GNP had been mortgaged in debts. 27 
Finally, in 1974 President Sadat announced his new "open door" 
economic policy designed to attract foreign investment from the West 
and from the oil-rich Arab states. Although the plan envisaged some 
$2.7 billion of foreign investment in 1975, to produce a target growth 
rate of 12.6% per year (sic), less than one half of this amount was 
actually committed. 28 Nevertheless, Egypt continued to place its hopes 
26. By 1972, according to Egyptian data, the output of industrial 
enterprises set up in cooperation with the Soviet Union accounted for 
30% of the total output of all the Egyptian enterprises which commenced 
production in the latter half of the 1960s. Egypt's dependence on 
Soviet technology is illustrated by the fact that Egypt headed the list 
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of importers of spare parts from the Soviet Union, accounting for some 14% 
of Egypt's imports from the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the industries in which the 
Soviet Union invested were those whose products would be exported to the 
U.S.S.R. in order to pay for the investment. In Harch 1971 new trade 
and aid agreements were signed in Moscow which provided for 376 million 
rubles in economic and technical aid. Soviet conunitments to expand 
Egypt's largest industrial enterprises and construct new industries formed 
the basis for Egypt's Five Year Plan for 1971-75. See Yaacov Ro'i and 
David Ronel, The Soviet Economic Presence in Egypt and its Political 
Implications, Soviet and East European Research Centre, Hebrew University, 
Jerusalem, 1974. 
27. Middle East Economic Digest, 13 February 1976, pp. 11-12. 
28. In 1974 domestic savings amounted to only 8% of GNP, illustrating 
Egypt's dependence on foreign capital to give a boost to its development. 
See Fuad Mursi, "The Theory and Trends of Economic Development", 
al-Talia, November 197 5, reprinted in JoU:t'nal of Palestine Studies, 
Vo1umc 5, Nos. 1 & 2, Autumn 1975/Wintcr 1976, pp. 224-232. 
for economic development on foreign capital and without such external 
support, on a huge scale, the rate of population increase would quickly 
d 1 . . 1 d 1 . . 29 cause a ec ine in a rea y ow per capita income. 
Egypt's trade tended to reinforce its dependence in that it 
15 
maintained a favourable trade balance with the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europ 
which was used to repay its obligations to Moscow and from which it 
earned no hard currency, while it ran up a trade deficit with Western 
Europe and the United States. In other words, it depended upon the Soviet 
bloc for its export market and on the West for its imports, making it 
vulnerable to Soviet economic policies and exacerbating its balance of 
payments problems. Thus, although the economic development and material 
wealth of Israel and Egypt had little in common, both countries were 
weak states in economic terms because they depended on the financial 
support of the superpowers and their more wealthy Jewish and Arab 
brethren to achieve their basic economic goals. 
29. In 1974 Egypt received economic assistance worth just under $1 
billion from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the Gulf emirates; $250 
million from the UniteJ States (which grew to $750 million in 1975); 
and $200 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. Egypt needed over $1 billion in foreign currency just to 
pay for the import of food for its people. See, "If the poor should 
do more than grumble", Economist~ 13 November 1976, pp. 83-5; 
Bent Hansen, "Middle East Development Prospects - What they Look Like in 
1973", in A.S. Becker, B. Hansen and N.H. Kerr, The Eeonomics and 
Politics of the M1:ddle East~ New York, 1975, pp. 14-19. 
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TABLE IV 
GROSS INVESTMENT AND GROSS SAVINGS AS PERCENTAGES OF 
EGYPTIAN GNP_, 1961/62 - 1966/67 
YEAR GROSS INVESTMENT GROSS SAVINGS 
1961/62 16.6 10.9 
1962/63 17.8 11.6 
1963/64 19.7 12.5 
196l1/65 17.8 14 .1 
1965/66 19.6 13.7 
1966/67 15.7 15 .1 
SOURCE: Galal Amin, The Modernisation of Poverty_, Lieden, 1974, p. 53 
TABLE V 
FINANCING EGYPT'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT_, 1962-1973 
1962-1966-'r 1967 
( $m) (%) ( $m) (%) 
DEFICIT ON GOODS 
AND SERVICES 268 100 .0 286 100.0 
CAPITAL INFLOW: 
GOVER..~MENT 
TRANS:F'ERS 2 0.7 122 42.6 
OTHER CAPITAL 
INFLOW'~ 183 68.3 94 32.9 
MONETARY MOVE.MENTS 83 31.0 70 24.5 
t Annual averages 
'~ Government and private capital 
SOURCE: U.N. Statistical Yearbook_, 1965_, 1970_, 
1976. 
1968-1972-'r 
( .$m) (%) 
379 100.0 
275 72.6 
76 20.0 
28 7.4 
1973 
( $m) (%) 
464 100.0 
529 114.0 
43 9.3 
-108 -23.3 
1975_, New York, 1966' 1971, 
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TABLE VI 
EGYPT'S DIRECTION OF TRADE, 1962,.-1973 
1962-1966t 1967 1968-1972 t . 1973 
($m) (%} ($m) (%) ($m) (%) ($m) (%) 
* IMPORTS FROM: 
U.S.S.R. and 
E. EUROPE 206 21. 7 300 37.9 236 30.2 239 26.1 
U.S.A. 227 23.9 69 8.7 52 6.6 l15 12.6 
E.E.C. 257 27.1 130 16.4 192 24.5 271 29.6 
ARAB LEAGUE 62 6.5 51 6.4 58 7.4 80 8.8 
OTHERS 197 20.8 242 30.6 244 31.3 209 22.9 
TOTAL 949 100.0 792 100.0 782 100.0 914 100.0 
* EXPORTS TO: 
U.S.S.R. and 
E. EUROPE 243 44.5 256 45.2 401 53.5 582 52.1 
U.S.A. 21 3.8 13 2.3 10 1.3 17 1.5 
E.E.C. 103 18.9 66 11. 7 82 10.9 178 16.0 
ARAB LEAGUE 38 7.0 46 8.1 66 8.8 80 7.1 
OTHERS 141 25.8 185 32.7 190 25.5 260 23.3 
TOTAL 546 100.0 566 100.0 749 100.0 l117 100.0 
TRADE BALANCE: 
u.s.s.R. and 
E. EUROPE +37 +9.2 -44 -16. 5 +165 +500.0 +343+169. 0 
U.S.A. -206 -51.1 -56 -21.0 -42 -127.3 -98 -48.3 
E.E.C. -154 -38.2 -64 - 24.1 -llO -333.3 -93 -45.8 
ARAB LEAGUE -24 -6.0 -5 -1.9 +8 +24.2 
OTHERS -56-13.9 -·57 - 21. 5 -54 -163.6 +51 +25.1 
TOTAL -403 -100.0 -226 -100.0 -33 -100.0 +203 +100.0 
t Annual Averages 
* Imports and Exports of goods and services 
SOURCE: U.N. Ycca0 book of International Tr•ade Statistics, 1965, 1970, 1975, 
New York, 1967' 1972, 1977. 
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b) Military Dependence 
On the military level, while Israel and Egypt must be ranked, 
because of the strength of their forces, with the middle powers of 
Europe, these forces were equipped and generously subsidised by their 
respective superpower patrons. Not only did the United States and the 
Soviet Union supply them with the weapons of war, they also proffered the 
weapons on favourable terms, and, on occasion, provided outright grants of 
military equipment. There could be no more vivid illustration of the 
military dependence of these two countries than the resupply operations 
mounted by both superpowers during the October 1973 War, each supplying 
30 
some $1 billion of materiel in less than eight weeks. 
By 1968 Israel and Egypt were spending proportionally, almost twice 
as much of their budgets on defence as any other nation31 ; they would 
have found it difficult to do so without the economic and military 
. f h . 32 assistance o t eir superpower patrons. 
30. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Security Assistance 
Act of 19?3., p. 5; and Jon D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs., The 
Soviet Union and flar in the Middle East., Baltimore, Haryland, 1975, 
p. 146. 
31. See IISS, The Military Balance., 1973-1974., London, 1973, pp. 74-75. 
32. David Kochav, the Chief Economic Adviser to Israel's Hinistry of 
Defence,has pointed out: " ... a good part of our defence expenditures 
are not actually borne by the economy of Israel - but to some 
extent by U.S. assistance .•. the economy of Israel on its own is 
really unable to cover the entire defense requirements". See Kochav, 
op.cit . ., p. 180. 
TABLE VII 
ISRAEL AND EGYPT: MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 
MILITARY EXP. 
($million per 
year) 
GNP 
($million per 
year) 
MILITARY EXP. /GNP . 
1962-1966-r 
Is. Eg. 
306 414 
3186 4970 
(Percent) 9.6 8.3 
'f Annual averages 
1967 
Is. Eg. 
636 645 
3896 5750 
16.3 11.2 
1963-1973 
1968-1972-r 
Is. Eg. 
1202 ll43 
5383 6782 
22.3 16.8 
1973 
Is. Eg. 
3953 284Lf 
8706 8794 
45.4 32.3 
NOTE: ACDA estimates were used for the Israeli figures on military 
expenditures and G~P. SIPRI figures for Israeli military expenditures 
tended to be lower and IISS marginally higher. ACDA figures for 
Egyptian GNP were used, but after 1966 its estimates of Egyptian 
military expenditures appeared to be considerably understated in 
comparison with both the SIPRI and IISS figures which were in 
fundamental agreement about the size of military expenditures after 
1966, although not about the proportion of Gi.'lP. Accordingly, SIPRI 
and IISS figures were used for Egyptian military expenditures after 
1966. 
There is some doubt whether Soviet military assistance is included in 
the Egyptian figures. The 1967 figure almost certainly does not 
include replacement of War losses. See Gur Ofer,"The Economic Burden 
of Soviet Involvement :in the H.E. ", in H. Confino and S. Shamir (eds.), 
The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East, Jerusalem, 1973, p. 232. 
SOURCES: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1963-1.97 3, Washington D. C., 1975; 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, f./orld Armaments 
and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1976, Stockholm, 1976; and 
International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 
1966/67 - 1975/?6, London, 1966-1975. 
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In the decade from 1963 to 1973 Egypt is estimated to have 
received over $2.6 billion in military assistance from the Soviet Union. 33 
Arms were supplied at cut-rate prices with repayment spread over ten years 
after a grace period of one to three years, at 2-2 1/2% interest. Barter 
arrangements were also organised so that in the mid-1960s Egypt was 
repaying the equivalent of $20 million per year in the form of cotton 
exports. When this repayment burden proved too heavy Moscow agreed to 
reschedule or postpone the military debts. ACDA also estimates that 40% 
of the value of the equipment was being written off as grant aid during 
h . . d 34 t is perio • 
Until the October 1973 War the United States considered that Israel 
was capable of paying for its military equipment. Nevertheless, Foreign 
Military Sales Credits under the Foreign Assistance Act were extended to 
Israel from the inception of American arms deliveries in 1964. In fact, 
from 1964 to 1973 Israel received over $1.4 billion in military credits, 
which were to be repaid over a ten· year period at a concessional interest 
rate of 1-2 1/2%. By 1972 Israel had repaid only $183 million (including 
interest payments). Under the Emergency Security Assistance Act of 
20 
1973 Israel was provided with a further $2.2 billion in military assistance 
to enable it to replace its war losses and further strengthen its armed 
forces. For the first time the American Administration decided to 
provide $1 billion of this sum in outright grants. 35 
The growing financial dependence of both Israel and Egypt for the 
equipping of their forces in the period from 1962 - 1973 is illustrated 
in Table VIII. Military assistance from the superpowers assumed an ever 
increasing proportion of both countrie~ defence budgets. By 1974 
American assistance provided over one third of Israel's defence budget 
33. This ACDA figure should be regarded as the minimum estimate because it 
values Soviet arms at official rather than free-market exchange rates. More-
over the weapons were known to be supplied at cut-rate prices. Thus 
AZ Ahram reported in 1972 that the Soviet Union had supplied Egypt with 
$5 billion worth of equipment and the IISS reported in 1971 that Egypt had 
received $4.5 billion of military equipment, at free market prices, from the 
Soviet Union during the period 1967 - 1970. See Nez:J York Times_, 31 March 
1972 and IISS, Strategic Survey 19?0_,London, 1971, pp. 46-50. 
34. See Roger Pajak, "Soviet Arms and Egypt", Survival_, July/August 1975, 
p. 165; ACDA, The International 1'ran.sfer of Conventional Ar>rns_, Uashington 
D.C., 1973. 
35. For figures in this paragraph see U.S. Senate Conmittee on Foreign 
Relations, Emergency Military Assistance for Israel and Cmnbodia_, Hearings_, 
93rd Congress, 1st Session, 13 December 1973, pp. 108-109; and Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973. 
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TABLE VIII 
SUPERPOf1/T'R MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL., 1963 -1973 
1963-1966t 1967 1968-1972t 1973 
SOVIET MILITARY 
ASS I STANCE TO 
EGYPT: 
($million per 
·k 
year) 106 204 310 480 
AS PERCENTAGE 
OF EGYPTIAN 
DEFENCE BUDGET 25.6 31. 6 27.1 16.9 
U.S. MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO 
ISRAEL: 
($million per ll. 
year) 43 7 197 16001( 
AS PERCENTAGE 
OF ISRAELI 
DEFENCE BUDGET 14.1 1.1 16.4 40.5 
tAnnual averages 
*This figure does not include the cost of resupply during the war because the 
Soviet Union was reported to have demanded hard cash for this equipment. 
#This figure includes $1 billion spent by Israel during and after the war 
which was later written off as a grant. 
SOURCES: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Tvm'ld Militar'y 
Expenditures., 1963 - 1973., pp. 70, 89 and 97; Agency for International 
Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International 
Organisations; Obligations and Loan Authorisations., July 1., 1945 - June 30., 
1972, Washington D.C.,1973; Gur Ofer, "The Economic Burden of Soviet 
Involvement in the Middle East", in M. Confino <J.nd S. Shamir (eds.), The 
U.S.S.R. and the Middle East., Jerusalem, 1973, pp. 216, 222-3, 233; and 
Gur Ofer, "Soviet Military Aid to the Middle East - An Economic Balance 
Sheet", in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Soviet Economy 
in a New Perspective: A Compendium of Papers., Washington D.C., October, 
1976, p. 221. 
and although the military assistance relationship between Egypt and the 
Soviet Union was all but terminated in the wake of the October War, 
Egypt's military deo~s to the Soviet Union were estimated at $3 billion 
by the end of 1974. 36 
This military dependence can also be demonstrated by examining the 
origin of the weapons in the Israeli and Egyptian arsenals. Table IX 
illustrates the fact that in .the period under examination, the Soviet 
Union was Egypt's sole source of supply, except for a few British tanks 
and naval vessels. A further indication of Egyptian dependence on the 
Soviet Union was the presence in Egypt, after 1967 and until July 1972, 
of more than 15,000 Soviet military advisers, and missile technicians and 
four squadrons of Soviet-pilot~d aircraft. Egypt's attempt to diversify 
its arms sources in 1972 met with no success and even in 1976, after two 
years of concerted effort to gain arms from the West, Egypt had only 
managed to deploy 38 French Mirage III fighter-bombers. 37 
Before the 1967 War Israel had tended to depend on arms supplied 
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by Britain and France, although it received Hawk missiles from t11e United 
States and American tanks, first through West Germany and then directly. 
After that war Israel faced a French arms embargo, so that while Britain 
continued to supply tanks, Israel came to rely on the United States for 
almost all its front-line equipment. Although Israel had invested heavily 
in its own arms industry, it only began to deploy its fast patrol boat 
(the Reshef, carrying the Israeli designed Gabriel missile) and fighter-
bomber (the Barak) in 1973,and did not deploy the more sophisticated 
Kfir fighter-bomber and the Jericho surface-to-surface missile until 
the end of 1974~8 ·In fact, indigenous defence production in the 
period before 1974 was more important for its overhauling of obsolete 
British Centurions and captured Russian tanks than for the production of 
Israeli-developed weapons. 
36. MEED, 13 February 1976. 
37. More arms were of course on order, including 44 Mirage F-ls, 
100 British Hawk fighters - to be produced in Egypt under licence -
and nine fast patrol vessels. Yet none of these were expected to be 
deployed in the Egyptian forces until 1979. See IISS, The Military 
Balance, 1976/?7, London, 1976; and SIPRI, .Yearbook 1976, Stockholm, 
1976, pp. 254-5. 
38. Since then Israel has developed a tank (the Merchava or Chariot), 
some sophisticated guidance and radar equipment and an air-to-ground 
missile. However, Israel's arms industry still remains dependent 
ur.on the import of intermediate goods such as aircraft and tank engines 
and titanium. See Jerusalem Post, International Edition, 31 May , 1977. 
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It is also important to note, in assessing the dependence of these two 
weak powers, that once they stocked their armed forces with Soviet and 
American equipment they also became dependent upon the superpowers for 
training, replacements, spare parts and much of the sophisticated ordnance 
and support equipment. 
TABLE IX 
THE COMPOSITION BY SOURCE OF THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI ARMED FORCES, 
196? and 1973t 
1967 1973 
Israel Egypt Israel Egypt 
SOURCE 
TANKS: 
U.S.A. 400 750 
U.S.S.R. 910 1880 
U.K. 250 30 600· 
Israel 350 1 
AIRCRAFT: 
U.S.A. 255 
u.s.s.R. 358 420 
France 290 161 2 
Israel 24 3 
MISSILES: 5 
U.S.A. 48 60 lj. 
U.S. S.R. 150 934 
NAVAL VESSELS: 
u.s.s.R. 23 48 
U.K. 6 2 4 5 
France 12 6 
Israel 2 
i" Pre-war figures 
1 250 British Centurions overhauled in Israel and refitted with French 
105 rnm guns arn;l 100 Russian T54/ 55 tanks captured in the Six Day War, 
overhauled in Israel and refitted with 105rnrn guns. 
2 Includes 23 Mystere IVA Fighter bombers held in reserve. 
3 The Israeli Barak fighter. 
lJ. Numbers were probably higher because of the unknown quantities of SAM-6s. 
There were reported to be 130 SAM sites. 
5 Surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. 
6 Includes 5 SAAR patrol boats taken from Cherbourg in France in 1970. 
SOURCES: IISS, The Military Balance, .19?3-74, London, 1973; Nadav Safran, 
From Wa.r to War, The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-196?, New York, 1969; 
Jon Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, The Soviet Union and War in the Middle 
East., Baltimore, Maryland, 1975. 
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Thus in terms of material strength both Israel and Egypt, despite 
the differing structures of their economies, must be classed as weak states 
because whatever strength they possessed in economic or military terms was 
heavily dependent upon the support of stronger states. In the specific 
context of relations between weak states and the superpowers which dominate 
the international system, Israel and Egypt clearly fitted into the "weak" 
category, not only because they were weak relative to the material strength 
of the superpowers, but also because the achievement of their basic goals 
of economic development, military security or political power were 
dependent, in large measure, on the patronage of the superpowers. 
Now, because they depended on superpower patronage and because the 
support they received was mostly extended to them on the basis that such 
assistance would improve the respective positions of the superpower rivals, 
either in the Middle East or elsewhere, Israel and Egypt became the objects 
of superpower influence. However, whether the dependence of the weak 
could be translated into influence for the great would be determined not 
merely by the intentions of the superpowers, but also by the objections of 
the weak states. For, as the targets of superpower policies, Israel and 
Egypt had the common aim of cultivating patronage but resisting any 
influence which they found inimical to their interests. In other words, 
while they needed the support of the superpowers, they also wanted to 
retain their independence of action, and therefore sought to minimise 
the effects of their dependence by directing the power which they did 
possess towards resisting the incompatible influence of their patrons. 
Of course, where resistance or independent action by these weak states 
succeeded in forcing the superpowers to alter their policies, Israel 
and Egypt might claim to have influenced their patrons. However, to the 
extent that weak states can be said to influence the superpowers they 
only tend to do so as a result of their ability to resist successfully 
their patrons' influence. For just as the lesser animals may indeed lead 
the elephant to which they are yoked, they only do so as a result of their 
ability to resist the elephant's haul. 
Interaction between the great and the weak can be characterised 
in this simplified form of influence (on the part of the 
great) and resistance (by the weak). 39 In this context, the "power of 
the weak" should be understood as the ability of a weak state to resist 
the policies of a superpower where the dictates of that state's perceived 
interests conflict with the imperatives of the superpower's perceived 
interests. 40 Whereas most studies of the interaction between the great 
and the weak in the Middle East have tended to concentrate on the ability 
of the superpowers to influence their weak clients, this study adopts 
t~e perspective of the weak and focuses upon their ability to resist t~e 
. fl f . 41 1 l . l . h . in· uence o · tne sup.erpowers. Consequent y, t1e questions w11c. nave 
to be addressed tend to be the obverse of those questions which are 
normally addressed by analysts of superpower influence. Whereas a study 
of influence will concentrate on the effect that superpower policies have 
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39. These concepts of influence and resistance do not encompass inter-
action between the weak state and its superpower patron when their interests 
converge. In this case the weak state will be pursuing objectives irl1ich 
its patron prefers and whic:1 it also would have opted for hac it been 
in possession of independent means. Consequently, the issues of 
superpower influence and weak state resistance are not relevant. Neither 
state prevails nor submits. However, if a weak state fulfils one 
.superpower expectation in order to relieve itself of the burden of aµother 
. superpower expectation, then the patron can be said to have influenced the 
client and the client can also be said to have resisted its patron. Both 
will have prevailed and both will have submitted, although the issues may 
not have been of equal importance. A weak state may also gain influence 
over a sup~rpower as a result of successful resistance on the part of 
another weak state. These facets of the bargaining relationship will be 
discussed below. Cf. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, nAssessing Influence as a Problerr: 
in.Foreign Policy Analysis", in Rubinstein (ed.), Soviet and Chinese 
Influence in the Third fvorld_, New York, 1975, pp. 11-13. 
40. Conversely, the power of the great in their relations with the weak 
can be defined as their ability to induce other states to follow lines of 
conduct or policy which they might not otherwise pursue. David Vital, 
The Inequality of States_, London, 1967, p. 87. 
41. Of those who have written on the superpowers in the ~'Iiddle East during 
the period analysed here, the following are notable for adopting the 
perspective of the superpowers: Lawrence Whetten, The Canal Plar_, Four 
Power Conflict in the Middle East_, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974; T.C. Bose, 
The SuperpovJers and the Middle East_, Bombay, 1972; Nadav Safran, From f'1ar 
to War_, The Ar•ab-Israeii Confrontation, 1948-67_, :Tew York, 1969, Ch. III; 
J.C. i-J:urewitz, "Superpower Rivalry and tl.1e Arab-Israeli Dispute: Involvement 
or Commitment?", in N. Confino and S. Shamir (eds.), 7'he U.S.S.R. and the 
Middle East, Jerusalem, 1973, pp. 155-169; Abrairnm S. Becker, "The Super-
powers in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1', in Becker, Hansen and Kerr, The 
Economics and Politics of the Middle East, Part III. 
There has also been a host of other studies of either Anerican or Soviet 
relations with their Israeli or Egyptian clients whic:1 also adopt the per-
spective of the superpower patron. The more notable are: J.S. Badeau, 
'The Ame1°ican AppY'oach to the Arab florid, i1ew York, 1968; Jon D. Glasslllan, 
Arms for tJie AY'a,;Js; M<:tlcolm K.err, •isoviet Influence in Egyptt', in 
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had on the behaviour of the weak client states, this analysis concentrates 
on the effect that the behaviour of the weak clients has had on the policies 
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of the great. Thus the focus will be on the reaction of Israel and 
Egypt to the policies of their superpower patrons and an attempt will be 
made to answer the following questions: 
i) How have Israel and Egypt, as weak states, been able to 
resist the inimical policies of the superpowers? 
ii) How have Israel and Egypt been able to cultivate anicable 
superpower policies or maintain patronage when their own 
policies were opposed by their patrons? 
iii) In what circumstances have Israel and Egypt prevailed over 
their superpower patrons and in what circumstances have 
t~ey been forced to submit? 
iv) Hm1 have asymmetries in the patronage relationships 
affected the outcomes of these conflicts? 
v) How has the development of relations between the 
superpowers affected the resistance capabilities of their 
Israeli and Egyptian clients? 
vi) Finally, what then are the prospects for a superpower imposed 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict? 
To answer these questions it is necessary to outline the sources 
of power for weak states in their relations with the superpowers and 
apply this theoretical exposition to the powers of Israel and Egypt in 
their interaction with the United States and the Soviet Union. 
41. (cont'd) Rubinstein (ed.), Soviet and Chinese Influence, pp. 38-108; 
Walter Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East, London, 1969; Hilliam 
R. Polk, The United States and the Arab fVorld, (Revised edition) Cambridge, 
Mnssaehusctl:s, 1969; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Moscow <ind C;-iiro: Currents of 
Influence", P1'oblems of Communism, July/August, 1974, pp. 17-28; Steven 
L. Spiegel, The Patron Meets the PiJgmies: U.S. Trials 1:n the Arab-Israeli 
Theater, California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, September, 1973. 
Conversely, there are relatively few studies of weak power resistance in 
the Hiddle East. David Vital, in his The Survival of Small States, 
·(London, 1971), provides a general analysis of Israel's ability to resist 
its Soviet adversary; Yair Evron, in his The Middle East: Nations, 
Super-Powers and Wars, (London, 1973) briefly discusses some of the levers 
which Israel and Egypt can command in their dealings with the superpowers; 
and Gabriel Scheffer, in his "Independence in Dependence of Regional Powers: 
The Uncomfortable Alliances in the Middle East Before and After the 
October 1973 War" (Orbis, Volume XIX, No. l:., 1976, pp.1519-1538), discusses 
some of the tactics utilised by Israel and Egypt during the Occober 1973 
War period. 
4-2. Cf. Rubinstein, "Assessing Influence ... ", p. 7. Alvin Rubinstein's 
Red Star on the Nile (Princeton, New Jersey, 1977), which discusses the concep 
of influence and applies them to an analysis of Soviet-Egyptian relations, was 
only received after the final drafts of this chapter had been written. I have 
incorporated some references to it in later chapters. 
II THE SOURCES OF POWER FOR THE WEAK 
Although we have distinguished between the power of the strong and the 
power of the weak, the sources of power for both remain the same; the 
difference lies in the composition of the power resources. Thus, while 
the strong will tend to have an abundance of physical, economic and 
military resources, the weak will tend to lack such capabilities - that 
is precisely ~tat distinguishes the weak from the strong and that is 
also why the strong seek to use these abundant resources to influence 
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the weak while the weak, lacking such resources, seek to resist rather than 
influence. On the question of the composition of power, Clausewitz has 
argued that the power of resistance comprises two components: the "strength 
of the will" UliUensk:raft) and "the sum of tl1e available means. 43 While 
it is certainly true that the power to influence also consists of these 
two components, the distinction is particularly important for the power 
of the weak, since what the weak lack in available means may be 
compensated, to some degree, by will-power. 
(a) Will-power 
The importance of the strength of the will in international relations 
should not be under-estimated since, no matter hm,1 abundant the other 
sources of power, without the necessary will a state would be unable to 
bring these physical resources to bear in a given situation. As 
Clausewitz suggests, the strength of the will is primarily determined 
by the intensity of interest (the strength of tlte motives) which a state 
h , . h h. f . b. . 44 N b may ave in t e ac ievement o certain o Jectives. ow, ecause 
the weak state is primarily concerned with local matters, which are 
crucial to its survival or the pursuit of its goals, it will tend to have 
a greater intensity of interest in these matters than the superpower, 
concerned as it is with global affairs and the balancing of its 
superpower adversary. From the Congress of Vienna - when the great and 
the weak were characterised as states with "general interests" and states 
with "limited interests" - to the present day, the structure of the 
international system has ensured that the weak, by nature, will have a 
different, narrower perspective than the great. As Annette Bak.er Fox 
has observed, and as almost every analyst of small states 
43. Car?, von CZausewitz: On fvar, (Anatol Rapoport, ed.), Ringwood.. 
Victoria, 1968, pp. 104-5; Erling Bjitll, "The Pm·1er of the Weak",foc.cit.,p.160 
44. Ib1:d. 
h f . d 45 as con irme : 
The primary difference [between great powers and small states] 
and it holds true regardless of time, situation or states involved -
wDS the scope of their attention. Great power leaders had to 
broaden their gaze to sweep the whole international arena ... 
The leaders in the small states, on the contrary, were 
primarily concerned with their own fate, regardless of the 
larger constellations of power over which they could have 
no control.46 
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The importance of this difference in perspective for the weak state's 
ability to resist the influence of the great lies in the asymmetry it tends 
to impart to the intensity of interest and thus to the strength of will. 
Matters of far-reaching importance to the weak, which are at the same time 
of secondary or peripheral importance to the superpower,. tend to provide 
the weak state with a stronger will to resist than the will of the 
superpower to bring to bear its more powerful r.ieans. 
However, while intensity of interest is a necessary ingredient in 
a nation's will-powe~ it is not sufficient. Quality of leadership, 
especially the leaders' readiness to take risks and their courage and 
resolve to face powerful opposition, is necessary if the people's will is 
to be translated into the state's determination. Conversely, the leaders 
must be able to imbue their colleagues and their people with their own 
self-confidence, if their own intensity of interest is to be translated 
45. See Erling Bj61, "The Small State in International Politics", in 
A. Schou and A.O. Brundtland, (eds.) SmaU States in International Relations; 
R.O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies", Foreign Policy, No. 2, 
1971, p. 163; R.P. Barston, (ed.) The Other Powers, Studies in the Foreign 
Policies of SmaU States, London, 1973, p. 16; Arnold Wolfers, Discord 
and CoUaboration, pp. 111-112; Robert Rothstein, Alliances and SmaU 
States, p. 28; Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: A 
Test of Two Models", World Politics, Volume XXV, July, 1973, p. 560; 
William E. Paterson, "Small States in International Politics", 
Cooperation and Conflict, No. 2, 1969, p. 121; r.aimo Vayrynen, non the 
Def lnition and He;1surement of Small Power States", Cooperation and 
Conflict, No. 2, 1971, pp. 96-97. 
46. A.B. Fox, The Power of Small States, Chicago, 1959, p. 181. 
Henry Kissinger made a similar observation after his attempts to negotiate 
a settlement of the Vietnam conflict: 
... what we face here is one of the problems great 
powers have in dealing with their clients, 
that the client looks at problems from its own 
regional or national perspective, while the great 
powers may take action in a much wider one. 
(Washington Post, 10 Hay, 197 2) .· 
. h ' · 11 . 4 7 into t e state s wi to resist. Moreover, internal unity, a common 
perception of external threat and the willingness of the people to 
accept the costs as necessary and therefore absorb them, are also 
essential ingredients for successful resistance. On the one hand, if 
these elements are missing the leadership will face internal dissent 
which will undermine its will-power. On the other h.:rnd, the superpower 
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will not hesitate to exploit internal differences to subvert the legitimacy 
of the leadership and thereby not only further undermine the weak state's 
will-power, but even cause the leadership to be replaced with those more 
willing to acquiesce in the superpower's design. 
However, provided that there is internal cohesion, that the 
leadership enjoys legitimacy, and that a level of political, social and 
economic organisation sufficient to maintain the state's viability exists, 
the leadership will generally find it easier to sustain its strength of 
will than will the leadership of a superpower. This is because the 
leadership of the weak state can reduce external problems to the question 
of national survival and induce a siege mentality which the latter 
would find difficult to do because of the essential security which its 
1 . 48 peop. e enJ oy. 
While the interests and motivations of Israel and Egypt were rather 
different, they both tended to possess the strength of will necessary 
to attempt to resist their patrons. Israel's will-·power is derived, 
in part, from the commonly perceived threat which Arab hostility posed 
to .the very survival of the Jewish state. This threat served to unite 
the people, raised their willingness to absorb the human and material 
costs of war and gave them the ultimate motivation - surviva1. 49 
47. Cf.' D. Vital, The Inequality of States~ p. 37. 
Czechoslovakia's collapse in the face of Hitler's demands in 1939 is 
a notable exai;nple, since Benes demonstrated negligible ivillenskraft. 
As Vital observes this lack of will was the result of the sudden collapse 
of twenty years of policy and came close to the abrogation of statehood 
and sovereignty by the leadership. See Vital, The Survival of Small 
States~ Chapter 2. 
48. A notable example of the triumph of will-power based on internal unity 
was North Vietnam's victory over a deeply divided American polity which, 
among other things, essentially lost its will to bring its more powerful 
means to bear. See Andrew Nack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The 
Politics of Asymmetric Conflict", World Politics~ Volume XXVII, No. 2, 
January, 1975, pp. 175-200; Vital, '.l'he Inequality of States~ pp. llO, 191. 
49 .. Thus David Ben-Gurion has remarked: "I knew that we would be vastly 
outnumbered ... But I also knew that our will would prove stronger ... 
because we are fighting for a .cause and because defeat for us would 
mean national destruction". Ben-Gurion Looks Back in Talks Flith Moshe 
Pearlman~ New York, 1970, p. 12. 
The unique history of the state of Israel, recreated after over seventeen 
centuries of dispersion, born into a hostile environment, and rebuilt 
by refugees from persecution and holocaust in Europe and from oppression 
in the Arab world, gave profound meaning to this concept of survival. 
It was commonly perceived that if the Jewish state were again destroyed, 
not only the future of Israeli Jews, but also the future of the Jewish 
people the world over, would ·be placeq in jeopardy. 50 Although Israel 
had to absorb large numbers of migrants with diverse cultural backgrounds, 
and although a significant number of Arabs lived in the Jewish state and 
51 
a much larger number in the territories occupied during the Six Day War, 
the state was still able to ensure social cohesion, internal tranquillity 
and an extremely effective political; social and economic organisation to 
underpin ·its will to survive and to enable its leadership to demand 
52 
considerable sacrifices from the people. Because the state was a 
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thriving democracy the government's legitimacy was unquestioned and, although 
Eshkol's will to act decisively was placed in.doubt during the 1967 
crisis and the quality of Meir's and Dayan's leadership and their lack of 
imagination.were the cause of criticism before as well as after the 
October War, all Israel's leaders possessed a strong, even stiff-necked, 
determination to pursue the objectives of survival and security. 53 
50. See Brecher, Foreign Policy System of Israel, Chapter 11; Golda Meir, 
My Life, Jerusalem, 1975; Abba Eban, My Country, The Sto1~y of Modern 
Israel, New York, 1972; and Simon N. Herman, Israelis and Jews, The 
Continuity of an Identity, New York, 1970. 
51. These causes of internal dissention are more salient today than they 
were in the period under examination. This is because of the growing 
radicalisation of Israeli Arabs and the active dissent which is being 
expressed in the occupied areas of the West Bank. Moreover, the social 
gap between Western and Oriental Jews (the Ashkenazim and Sephardim), 
which emerged as a significant problem in the 1970s, could increasingly 
effect internal cohesion as the recession continues and if the external 
threat is reduced as a consequence of the settlement process. 
Nevertheless, these factors did not seriously affect Israel's strength 
of will in the period from 1962-1974. See A.S. Becker, Is.rael and the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories: Military-Political Issues in the 
Debate, Rand Corporation, December 1971, R-882-ISA. 
52. Israelis have had to bear the highest average tax burden in the 
world - over 60% of their incomes - as well as three years of full-time 
military service for men and up to two years for women and reserve 
duty until the age of 55. 
53. See Brecher, op.cit., Chapters 12-14 and Conclusions. 
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Egypt could not r.iatch Israel's motivation of survival since at no 
time during the period did the people of Egypt perceive a threat to the 
existence of the state. Nevertheless, if there was an asymmetry between 
Israel and Egypt in this respect, there were a number of factors which 
served to enhance Egypt's strength of will and to reduce the asymmetry. 
First, the unbroken unity of the state over some six millennia of history 
resulted in a remarkably homogeneous population. s4 Second, the charismatic 
leadership of Nasser, who based his legitir.iacy on the achievel11ent of 
foreign triumphs and blamed any setbacks on external forces, unified the 
Egyptian masses against the external threats of "imperialism" and 
"Israeli aggression" SS Third, the regime's elimination or suppression 
of almost all of its political rivals, from the Moslem Brotherhood to 
the Communists, its confiscation of property from the landowning class, 
its crippling of the private sector through nationalisation, its control 
of the media and educational institutions,ancl the extrer:ie effectiveness 
of its security forces, ensured that there would be little if any internal 
. 56 dissent. Finally, the fact that almost ninety per cent of Egypt's 
large population lived in or on the margin of poverty ensured that the cost 
of resistance, in human and material terms, could be spread so that it did 
not add significantly to the considerable hardship which the masses were 
already experiencing. Moreover, what the people lacked in motivation, 
Nasser made up for with his own determination to resist external 
influence and to lead the Arab world to unity under Egyptian hegemony. 
Nasser's strength of will was determined by factors which encouraged 
its continued application in Egyptian foreign policy: his perception 
of Egypt's role of leadership in the Arab, African and Islamic worlds; 
his successful utilisation of will-power in the past to defy Britain 
and France at Suez, the United States over the Baghdad Pact and the Aswan 
Darn and the Soviet Union over the direction of his revolution; and, 
perhaps most ir:1portantly, his understanding that proud defiance of external 
S4. Egyptians are ethnically homogeneous and almost 8S% of them follow 
the Sunni sect of Islam. A. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab rvorld_, p. 80. 
SS. See R. Hr:iir Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasser_, A Study in Pol?:tical 
Dy1w111ics_, London, 1972, Chapter 10; and John P. Entelis, "Nasser's 
Egypt: The Failure of Charismatic Leadership", Or,bis_, Volume XVIII, 
No. 2, Summer, 1974, pp. 4SS-4S9. 
S6. Dawisha, op.cit., pp. 91-9S; Robert Springborg, "Patterns of 
Association in the Egyptian Political Elite'', In G. Lenczowski, (ed.) 
Political Elites in the Middle East_, Washington D.C., 197S, pp. 83-107. 
pressure endeared him, not only to his own people, but also to the Arab 
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masses throughout the Middle East. In fact, as we shall see, Nasser 
had a tendency to substitute his will for the too slow process of 
structural change in Egypt and in the Arab world. His setbacks in the 
sixties, culminating in the 1967 defeat, left their mark on Nasser's 
belief in his own will and by the time of his death he had, for the most 
part, given himself over to a.fateful acceptance of the constraints on 
E . 1. 58 gyptian po icy. 
32 
Nevertheless, the Six Day War had provided the Egyptian people, the 
army, and the leadership with two new motivations which strengthened their 
resolve: first, revenge for the humiliating defeat inflicted on the army; 
second, the regaining of Egyptian land now occupied by Israel. However, 
Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, had the reputation of a calculator rather 
than a leader and, lacking the charismatic authority of his predecessor, 
he seemed incapable of utilising these motivations. Moreover, his own 
authority was challenged by others in the collective leadership who 
.regarded themselves as the rightful heirs to Nasser's legacy. It was 
not until mid-1971 that Sadat was able to consolidate his authority by 
eliminating his opposition within the leadership, but by this time his 
regime was experiencing serious dissent within the army and amongst the 
people. By 1972 the increasing economic hardships and Sadat's apparent 
indecisiveness in the conflict with Israel led to demonstrations and 
disillusionment. 59 It was not until his dramatic expulsion of the 
Soviet advisers in July 1972 that he was able to restore his people's faith 
in his leauership (especially amongst the army) and it was not until his 
launching of the surprise attack in October 1973 that his determination to 
regain Egyptian territory and reassert Egypt's strength of will was 
57. Dekmejian, op.cit.; Entelis, op.cit.; Jean Lacouture, The Demigods,, 
Charismatic Leadership in the Third Wo1~ld,, ·London, 1970, pp. 119-135. 
58. See James Eayres, Fate and Will in Fo1>eign Policy,, Toronto, 
1973, passim. 
59. Sadat faced considerable dissent from university students who were 
finding that their years of study had left them without suitable jobs. 
Their demonstrations in January 1972 illustrated some of the problems he 
£.::iced. Moreover, he had promised his people that 1971 would be "the year 
of decision" in the conflict with Israel, but the year passed without any 
political or military progress on the level of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Sadat now faced dissent within the army as well. See P.J. Vatikiotis, 
"Egypt Adrift: A Study in Disillusion", New Middle East,, No. 54, March 
19 7 3 ' pp . 6-7 • 
demonstrated to all who had doubted it. GO 
Thus while the basis of Israeli and Egyptian will-power differed 
in some important respects, they both tended to possess the necessary 
internal unity, the quality of leadership, the willingness to absorb 
costs, and the intensity of interest in a given outcome, to provide them 
with the strength of will to resist inimical policies and to enforce 
threatened action on issues which affected their vital interests. Now, 
in the interaction between weak and great, the weak, as already noted, 
tend to enjoy the advantages inherent in the general asymmetry between 
their intensities of interest and those of their patrons, between their 
ability to forge national unity and their patrons' abilities, and in 
their willingness to absorb costs on matters of vital interest to them 
but of peripheral interest to the superpower patrons. In other words, 
Israel and Egypt, as weak states, were able to maintain their commitment 
in matters of fundamental and far-reaching ir:iportance to thel"'lselves, but 
of secondary or peripheral interest to the superpowers. In such natters 
the will of the weak tended to be greater than the will of the great 
and thus the will to resist was usually greater thati the will of the 
superpower to bring to bear its more powerful means. To paraphrase 
Yeats: in situations where the great lacked all convictions while 
the weak were full of passionate inten$ity, the weak could 
indeed prevail. 
·However, this general asymmetry between the will of the weak and the 
will of the great (and therefore the advantage which the weak have in 
their interaction with the great) tends to decrease as the local issue, 
l . h l l . . . . f. 1 61 w1ic concerns tle weat, increases in signi icance to tle superpowers. 
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In other words, where the local issue begins to affect the vital interests 
of the superpowers, they too will tend to have the necessary intensity of 
interest; internal consensus and willingness to absorb costs, which will 
provide them with the necessary will-power to bring their more 
60. Thus Sadat declared after the October 1973 \far: "The important thing 
is the will of the Arab nation. It is the one safeguard. Before 
October 6 we had no other safeguard. Talk of war arousec ridicule, no 
one believed that we should fight and cross [the Canal]. Nor did anyone 
believe t:iat this nation would give expression to its unity in the way 
that it did ... How were all these forces released? By the Arab will -
and this will still exists." (Egyptian Gazette, 6 February, 1974). 
61. Cf. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 62. 
62 powerful means to bear. In such a situation the great will indeed tend 
to prevail and the weak may find it wiser to submit voluntarily than to 
bring on a clash of wills and be forced to submit. 
The operation of this principle is illustrated by the establishment 
of superpower spheres of influence. Such areas, are recognised, by 
strong and weak alike, to be of primary importance to one of the superpowers. 
Accordingly, that superpower -will tend to be prepared to protect its 
interests by bringing its more powerful means to bear. Thus weak states in 
geographic proximity to one of the superpowers,or in possession of 
strategic assets of importance to one of the superpowers will tend to 
become part of that superpower's sphere of influence. Weak states 
unfortunate enough to be in such positions have two choices: either they 
recognise the superpower's intensity of interest and modify their 
behaviour accordingly, or they confront the wrath of the superpower and are 
usually forced to modify their behaviour to conform to the superpower's 
63 preferences. On the other hand, weak states situated on the periphery 
of a superpower's sphere of influence, or in an area where both 
superpowers have interests and are competing for influence, will tend 
to enjoy greater independence, provided that they have a greater will to 
. h h · 11 f h . h . . fl 64 resist t ant e wi o t e superpowers to exercise t eir in. uence. 
Fortunately for Israel and Egypt, during the period under analysis, 
neither the Soviet Union nor the United States possessed vital interests 
in the Middle Eas~ but the region was significant enough to both for them 
to compete for influence there, and attempt to deny influence to each 
other. Situated at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa, the Middle 
East region provided essential land, sea and air communications between 
62. Quality of leadership has been omitted at this point because it 
would appear to be independent of whether a state, large or small, 
has to confront momentous issues of vital importance to its 
well --iieing. 
63. Finland's strict neutrality, Yugoslavia's cautious non-alignment 
and Burma's acquiescense are examples of voluntary modification; the 
invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Dow.inican Republic are 
examples of the forced modifications of behaviour. See Alvin 
Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Non-aligned IVorld, Princeton, NeH Jersey, 
1970, Chapter I; Ralph Pettman, Small Power Politics and International 
Relations in South East Asia, Sydney, 1975; D. Vital, The Survival of 
Small States, Chapter 4; Trygve Mathisen, The Functions of Small States 
in the Strategies of the Great Powers, Oslo, 1971. 
64. See A.B. Fox, "Small State Diplomacy", in J.D. Kertesz and M.A. 
Fitzsimmons (eds.), Diplomacy in a changing fvorld, Notre Daw.e, Indiana, 
1959, p. 349;and her, The Power of Small States, Chapter VII. 
these continents. The region was, at the one time, regarded by the 
Soviet Union as its "back door" and by NATO as its "southern flank"; 
from the seas which surrounded the region the United States could strike 
at the Soviet heartland with its Polaris missiles; from the air bases 
and ports of the littoral states the Soviet Union could supply the 
necessary air cover and maintenance facilities for its Hediterranean 
squadron. Horeover, in the sands of the Middle East lay the oil 
deposits which fuelled the industries of Western Europe and Japan, 
and although the control of these deposits was not perceived to be 
vitally significant to either superpower before the 1973 oil eY.ibargo, 
security and stability of supply were important to the United States and 
therefore also of interest to the Soviet Union. 65 
However, while these interests provided both superpowers with 
sufficient incentive to cultivate their positions of influence in the 
region, with the waning of the Cold War and their preoccupation 
elsewhere, neither had sufficient interest in the region to Y.iake this 
a vital priority. 66 Instead, before 1967, both the United States and the 
Soviet Union tended to focus most of their attention on Europe, the 
Caribbean and South East Asia, shifting their focus to the Middle East 
when tension there threatened to involve them in conflict, as it did 
in 1967. After the Six Day Har, the Soviet Union paid closer attention 
to the region because developY.ients in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
threatened its prestige and position in the Arab world. On the other 
hand, the United States remained preoccupied with the war in South 
65. For elaborations on the strategic importance of the Middle East to 
the superpowers see: J. S. Badeau, The American Appr•oach to the Arab 
World, Chapter II; T.C. Bose, The Superpowers and the Middle East; J.C. 
Eurewitz, "Origins of the Rivalry", in Hurewitz (ed.), Soviet-American 
Rivalry in the Middle East, pp. 1-17; W. Laqueur, The Struggle for the 
Middle East; G. Lenczowski, United States Interests in the Middle East, 
Washington D.C., 1973; Arnold Becker and A.L. Horelick, Soviet Policy in 
the Middle East, Rand Corporation, R-504-FF, September, 1970, Part One; 
W. Polk, The United States and the Arab World, pp. 315-6; Ciro Zoppo, 
"The American-Soviet Mediterranean Confrontation and the ·Middle East", 
in W.A. Beling (ed.), The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy, 
Albany, 1973, pp. 201-236. 
66. While the Soviet Union sought to organise the Arab 'progressive' 
states into an anti-imperialist, pro-Soviet force, this ranked in 
importance below its activist European policy, its accelerated support 
for North Vietnam and its strategic build-up. See Lawrence L. Hhetten, 
The Arab-Isr•aeli Dispute, Great Power Behaviour, Adelphi Papers 
No. 128, December, 1976, p. 2. 
35 
East Asia and did not turn its full att~ntion to the Middle East until 
mid-1970 wi.1en \Jashington began to consider that its own position of 
influence in the region was under tiireat from the Soviet Union. 
Following the Jordanian crisis of 1970 both superpowers sought 
stability in the region to ensure that conflict there did not disrupt 
their own relations at the superpower level. This stability, which 
lasted until the October 1973- Har, enabled the superpouers to place the 
11iddle East on the backburner while they concerned themselves with the 
. 67 development of detente, and their interests in other regions. After 
1973 the intensity of American interest increased significantly, not 
only because of the \Jest's dependence on Middle Eastern oil, the supply 
and price of which was no longer under its control, but also because 
of new opportunities to develop American influence in the Arab world. 
Heanwhile the Soviet Union tended to shift its attention to other 
regions - notably Africa while cultivating relations uith states \1!-lici1 
were on the periphery of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Libya, Sorialia, 
and Ethiopia). 
In other words, in the period from 1962 to 1974, neither 
superpower maintained a high intensity of interest in developments 
in the Middle East, except when conflict between prot~g~s threatened 
to involve both superpowers in a confrontation ·which could cause 
severe disruption to their relations on a global level. Thus in 
1967, 1970 and 1973, when wars were waged between Middle Eastern clients, 
botl.1 superpowers demonstrated a high intensity of interest in avoiding 
a superpower confrontation while protecting their mm interests in the 
outcome of the fighting. Consequently, during these crisis periods the 
superpowers tended to possess the strength of will to bring their 
powerful means to bear, if necessary. 
Nevertheless, except when the Arab-Israeli conflict threatened 
confrontation between the superpowers, Israel and Egypt possessed an 
advantage over their patrons in that they both maintained a higher 
intensity of interest in the outcome of their conflict than did the 
superpowers. Thus in most cases both clients possessed greater \·;ill-power 
than their patrons possessed in exercjsing control over them. For 
what was often a question of survival, security or sovereignty for these 
weak states was usually more marginal to the superpowers. 
67. These developments will be discussed in detail in the ensuing 
chapters. 
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However, while these weak states tended to enjoy the advantages of 
the general asymmetry between the will of the ueak and tl1e uill of the 
great on local issues, will-power could be of little use in the 
resistance process in t:1e absence of the political, CTilitary and 
economic resources which enabled the t1ill to be applied. For just as 
"ti1e available means" would not be brought to bear in a particular 
situation without the necessary will-pm1er, neither would strength 
of will alone have any impact on that situation if the state lacked the 
power resources to which its will could be applied. For if the 
lesser animals lack the power to lead the elephant, t:1eir will to do so 
could not budge him. 
(b) The Available ~1eans 
The weak state, by its very nature, will possess feu political, 
economic and military resources in comparison with the superpower's 
command of an abundance of these means of influence. However, whatever 
intrinsic resources it does possess, in terms of geography, deCTography, 
ideology, military and economic capability or natural resources, may 
be supplemented from tt·10 sources: 
i) the power which the weak state derives from its ability 
to command the support of other states in the inter-
national sys.tern and their resources; 
ii) the power which the weak state derives from its ability 
to gain the support of inportant groups within the 
domestic system of the superpower and their resources. 
Moreover, in the context of relations between the weak and the great, 
the value of these intrinsic and derived resources will be determined 
by their importance to one or both of the superpowers rat:1er than their 
inherent worth to the weak state itself. In turn, this contingent 
value of the weak state's resources will be determined by the roles 
which the resources are perceived to play, or can be made to play, in 
superpower politics on three levels: 
i) in relations between the superpowers; 
ii) in the competition between the superpowers for 
influence in the weak state's region; 
iii) in the domestic politics of the superpower. 
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The term contingent is used advisedly because it reflects the 
conditional nature of the utility of these power resources in relations 
between the great and .the weak. As noted at the outset, the superpowers, 
by virtue of their strength, retain, in the final analysis, an ability 
to restructure the relationship between themselves and their clients. 
Moreover, developments fa relations between the superpowers, changes in 
t:1.e conduct of their competition in the weak state's region, or 
suppression of the weak state's supporters within the domestic system 
of the superpower, constitute events which are beyond the control of the 
weak state but very much within the power of its patron. Thus 
whatever leverage the weak state acquires from t:1e value placed on its 
resources is contingent upon factors which are often beyond its ability 
to control, factors which may only exist in the short-term, and factors 
which can be affected by developments in other regions of the world. 68 
Nevertheless, the weak state which is fortunate enough to have a 
high contingent value placed on its inherent or derived resources will 
be in command of a number of levers which it can utilise to resist the 
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influence of its superpower patron. Whether this leverage is used 
effectively will <l6pend up6n the leadership's awareness of its existence, 
its will to apply it in the cause of resistance, its skill in doing so, and 
its calculation of the effect that utilisation now will have on the 
contingent value of the resources in the future. 
Just how effectively Israel and Egypt used their contingent leverage 
will be the subject of most of the dissertation, but it is necessary here 
to illustrate the nature of the levers which these two weak states 
commanded. ·As we· shall see, both Israel and Egypt were indeed fortunate 
to possess or acquire resources of considerable importance to their 
superpower patrons. Some of these levers were unique - particularly in 
Israel's case - others were based on their involvement in a regional 
conflict, and still others resulted from the particular characteristics 
of the competition between the superpowers for influence in the 
Middle East. Thus the comparability of their leverage with that of 
other weak states will depend on the degree to which their particular 
circumstances reflect the circumstances of other weak states in their 
relations with the superpowers. Nevertheless, the framework which is used 
for the analysis of the sources of this contingent leverage should be 
applicable to an analysis of the power of weak states in general. 
68. Cf. David Vital, The Survival of SmaU States~ p. 9. 
THE CONTINGENT VALUE OF INTRINSIC RESOURCES 
i) Geo-Strategic Position 
Despite the thawing of the Cold War and the development of detente 
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the period under 
examination, both superpowers continued their competition and conflict, 
seeking unilateral advantage~ in the pursuit of their national interests. 
This competition tended to centre on the areas situated on the 
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peripheries of tl1e superpowers' respective spheres of influence. Thus a 
weak state \rl1ich was situated in such an area of superpower competition 
found that its geo-strategic position could be of considerable importance 
to both of the superpowers. This strategic position between the 
superpowers provided the weak state with a source of power, since it could 
threaten to transfer its allegiance and favours from one superpower to the 
other, or from non-alignment to one of the poles, thereby providing the 
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superpower's adversary with a strategic advantage. 
Egypt's geographical position at the hub of the Middle East, its 
control of the Suez Canal (which constituted the only direct sea link 
between the Indian and Mediterranean Oceans) , its proximity to the oil-rich 
Persian Gulf and to North and East Africa, and its control of the 
largest eastern Mediterranean port (Alexandria), gave its geo-strategic 
position considerable value for the superpowers. 70 Thus the Soviet Union 
69. This tactic, which has been referred to as the "power of blackmail" 
became the basic bargaining ploy of the nonaligned states whicl1 emerged 
in the 1950s. See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, p. 112; 
L.W. Martin (ed.), Neutralism and Nonalignment, New York, 1962, 
Introduction. 
70. Thus writing in 1964 and "reflecting an official assessment of primary 
American interests in the Middle East", William Polk stated: "The Suez 
Canal is one of the world's greatest arteries of commerce and communication ... 
Closure of this area to ... sea traffic would present the United States and 
the Atlnntic Community with serious economic and military problems which, 
whjle solvable by sea traffic diversion around the Horn of Africa ..• 
would be a serious blow to Western interests". However, writing in 1968_, 
Polk concluded that the closure of the Suez Canal "has cost us little" and 
was no longer a basic interest. Nevertheless the Suez Canal remained 
important for America's European allies and also for the Soviet Union. 
However, after 1967 Egypt no longer controlled the Canal and its reopening 
depended on Israel. See W. Polk, The United States and the Arab ',forld" 
pp. 315 and 317. 
was particularly interested in securing access to Egypt's Mediterranean 
ports (not only Alexandria but also Mersa Matruh)for the maintenance of 
its navy, and access to Egyptian air bases for the aerial protection 
which its Mediterranean squadron lacked. On the other hand, although 
the United States was not interested in securing the same access for its 
strategic forces, Washington was concerned to deny access to the Soviet 
Union, particularly after Mos~ow moved combat forces into Egypt in 1970. 
As Henry Kissinger, then U.S. National Security Advisor, observed at the 
time: 
The danger that arises from the persistence of a Soviet 
combat base in Egypt is that the Eastern Mediterranean 
may become a Soviet lake as a result. It may become 
very difficult for our fleet to operate in that area in 
the face of short-range Soviet bases. What is more 
important ... is that the oil supplies of the Middle East 
may become totally at the mercy of the Soviets and their 
radical clients ... We are trying to expel the Soviet 
military presence, not so much the advisors, but the 
combat pilots and the combat personnel, before they 
become so firmly established ... What they are doing in 
the Middle East ... poses the gravest threats in the 
long term for Western Europe and Japan and therefore 
for us.71 
Egypt's gee-strategic value to the superpowers was further enhanced 
by the role which its position played in the competition between the 
superpowers for influence in the Middle East (i.e. level (ii)). With the 
Soviet Union seeking polarisation in the region as the most appropriate 
means for spreading its influence, Egypt's position was pivotal to the 
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entire operation. Military support for Egypt, especially with Nasser at 
the helm, enabled the Soviet Union to pressure, by proxy, the Western 
clients in the Middle East. Egypt was in close proximity to the 
conservative Arab states of Morocco, Tunisia and Libya (before the fall of 
King Idris) in the West; to the sheikhdoms of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
in the East; and to Hashemite Jordan and Israel across the Sinai. Thus, 
through support for Egypt, Moscow was able to sustain tension in the 
region on three axes: between Egypt and Israel; between Egypt and the 
conservative Arab states; and between Egypt and the West. 72 And precisely 
71. Henry Kissinger, Background Briefing at the fvestern Whii:e House~ 
San Clemente, California, June 26, 1970, pp. 22-24 (mime~ in the possession 
of the author). 
72. See Arnold L. Horelick, "Moscow's New Time of Troubles in the Middle 
East", in Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict~ pp. 109-118. 
because Egypt's geo-strategic position was so valuable to the Soviet 
Union, it was also valuable to the United States, since Washington 
sought the relaxation of tension, the promotion of stability and the 
depolarisation of the region as the most appropriate means for 
73 
cultivating its position in the Middle East. 
Furthermore, the value of Egypt's geo-strategic position was also 
enhanced by the fact that some groups within the domestic political 
systems of both superpowers advoc~ted support for Egypt on the grounds 
of its strategic importance. This was certainly the case in the U.S. 
State Department where the bureaucrats involved in handling policy 
towards the Middle East perceived a primary American interest in the 
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wooing of Egypt because it would lessen the threat to the conservative 
sheikhdoms and deprive the Soviet Union of a base for promoting instability 
in the region. Because they perceived themselves to be the trustees 
of American security interests in the Arab world they promoted the 
strategic importance of Egypt in Washington. 
While it is difficult to find evidence of dissension within the 
Russian hierarchy over Soviet policy towards the Middle East, nevertheless 
there are indications that the critics of Soviet actions based their 
charges on the unreliable and non-progressive nature of Soviet clients 
in the Middle East. One of the answers which the proponents of Soviet 
involvement could have given to these charges might have been that the 
strategic importance of Egypt for Soviet naval deployments outweighed 
75 the impurity of its ideology and the cost of Soviet support. 
Thus a high contingent value was placed on Egypt's geo-strategic 
position by both superpowers and this in turn provided Egypt with a 
73. See J.C. Hurewitz, "Superpower Rivalry and the Arab-Israel Dispute: 
Involvement or Commitment?", in The U.S.S.R. and the Mid.dle East_, 
pp. 155-169. 
74. See J.S. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World_, Chapter II; 
Joseph Kraft, "Those Arabists in the State Department", New York Times 
Magazine_, 7 November 1971. 
75. Uri Ra'anan has constructed an imaginative analysis of how both Defence 
Minister Grechko and Admiral Gorshkcv might have defended Soviet 
involvement in Egypt on the basis of its strategic importance. He also 
constructs arguments which might have been used by the opponents of Soviet 
support for Egypt. However, Ra' anan provides no evidence to suggest tlrn t 
these arguments were actually used within the Kremlin decision-making 
process. On the other hand, Ilana Dimant has assembled evidence which 
demonstrates opposition to Soviet support for Egypt on ideological and 
cost-effective grounds. See U. Ra'anan, "The USSR and the Middle East: 
Some Reflections on'the Soviet Decision-Making Process", Orhis., Volume 
XVII, No. 3, Fall 1973, pp. 946-977; Ilana Dimant, Pravda and Trud -
Divergent Attitudes Towards the Middle East_, Soviet and East European Research 
Centre, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Research Paper No. 3, June, 1972. 
considerable source of leverage in its relations with its Soviet and 
American patrons. Before 1967 Nasser was able to play one superpower 
off against the other by using the lever of Egypt's capacity to facilitate 
Soviet interests and disturb Western ones. 76 In this way, Egypt became 
an important client for the Soviet Union to cultivate with economic 
and military assistance, as well as a regional troublemaker for the 
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United States to appease with economic aid. After 1967, Soviet 
dependence on Egypt for its strategic position in the Middle East enabled 
both Nasser and Sadat to threaten a shift in Egypt's allegiance to bolster 
Soviet support for Egyptian policy. And when Sadat failed to elicit this 
support he was able to force a change in Moscow's policy by expelling 
the Soviet combat forces while maintaining the Soviet port facilities, 
thereby punishing the Soviet Union while giving credibility to the threat 
of further punishment in the form of a complete denial of Egypt's strategic 
. . l s . u . 77 position to tie oviet nion. 
While Israel is situated geographically at the point of convergence 
between the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa, its position was of little 
value to the United States and the Soviet Union in the conduct of-their 
relations on the superpower level. With its small size and pariah status 
in the Middle East, Israel's potential as a strategic base was limited. 
The United States Sixth Fleet had facilities in southern Europe while the 
Soviet Union sought bases in the Arab world. Thus Israel, as a weak 
state with little or no strategic importance to the superpowers, had 
78 little or no ability to play one off against the other. 
Israel experienced the same problem on the level of superpower 
competition in the Middle East because support for the Jewish state brou~1t 
with it hostility from the Arab states which could cause a deterioration 
in the positions of the superpowers in the strategically important Arab 
world. In strategic terms, Israel was only attractive to those external 
76. Malcolm Kerr, "Egyptian Foreign Policy and the Revolution", in 
P.J. Vatikiotis, (ed.), Egypt Since the Revolution, London, 1968, p. 125; 
cf. Alvin Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, Chapter VII. 
77. Soviet port facilities were finally closed in 1976 in an attempt 
by Sadat to persuade the Soviet Union to reschedule Egypt's huge 
outstanding debts. By this stage, however, Moscow had cultivated a new 
client in Libya making it less dependent on Egyptian port facilities. 
78. Cf. Trygve .Mathisen, "Factors Promoting Spheres of Influence 
Relationships", Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3, 1968, p. 159. 
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powers which were themselves opposed to Israel's neighbours. Accordingly, 
Israel was of strategic importance to France and Britain in their 
opposition to Nasser in 1956, and when relations between the United States 
and Egypt deteriorated in the mid-1960s, Washington found support for 
Israel efficacious in containing Nasser. Thus Israel's geographic 
position between the Arab states had contingent value to a superpower 
which sought to prevent Egyptian hegemony in the Arab world or to a 
superpower whose position in the Arab world was enhanced by Arab hostility 
towards Israel. However, this leverage was not something which Israel 
could control because it was determined by external factors: Arab 
hostility towards the Jewish state and superpower attitudes towards that 
hostility. Thus, while the Soviet Union gained an advantage from this 
hostility (in that the Arabs came to depend on Moscow to provide them 
with the wherewithal to express their belligerency) , Israel could hardly 
threaten the Soviet Union by refusing to respond.to that hostility. By 
the same token, Israel could not threaten the United States by refusing to 
contain Nasser, since this was something which it would have done without 
American support because it was in its own basic interests. 
However, after 1967 the contingent value of Israel's geo-strategic 
position increased for two reasons: its acquisition of Arab territory; 
and its role in a region now polarised between the two superpowers. On 
the superpower level, the fact that Israel now sat firmly on the east 
bank of the Suez Canal imparted a geographic dimension to Israel's position 
in the Middle East which it lacked within its pre-1967 boundaries. The 
Suez Canal had been closed during the fighting and it could not now be 
opened without Israeli consent. This gave Israel 1 s position a contingent 
value in superpower relations because, while the United States lost little 
advantage in strategic terms as a result of the closure, the Soviet Union 
found it more difficult to supply its North Vietnamese protege from 
its warm water ports, and this suited American interests.79 
The United States attached far greater importance, at least in the 
short term, to the contingent role which Israel could now play in 
preventing what was perceived to be the expansion of Soviet influence in 
a region which had become polarised between the two superpowers. While 
the United States had only managed to maintain its position of influence 
79. Defence Minister Moshe Dayan was reluctant to allow the Israel 
Defence Forces to advance to the Canal in 1967 precisely because he 
understood that this would "globalise" what had been a local conflict, 
and thereby increase Suviet involvement. See Shabtai Teveth, Moshe Dayan_, 
Jerusalem, 1972, pp. 333-5. 
in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the Soviet 
Union had consolidated its position in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq 
and was perceived to be threatening the pro-American regimes in Jordan 
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and Saudi Arabia. One of the most important factors in the Nixon 
administration's attempt to contain Soviet influence and promote the 
depolarisation of the area was Israel's strategic position in the heartland 
of the Soviet Union's protege·s. Thus Israel was able to play an 
important role in deterring Syria during the 1970 Jordanian crisis and, 
more significantly ,was able to exert pressure on the Soviet position in 
Egypt. As we shall see, Israel's ability to deter Egypt with American 
supplied arms, together with Soviet reluctance to become further involved 
in the local conflict, forced Sadat to break the deadlock by expelling 
h S . f 80 t e oviet orces. 
However, once Israel had helped to promote the decline of the Soviet 
position in the Middle East heartland, lts strategic importance to the 
United States also declined. For, when the United States succeeded 
in depolarising the area, after the October War, through its cultivation 
of Egypt and then Syria, American policy turned full circle and Israel's 
strategic importance on the superpower level was devalued to its previous 
low point at the beginning of the Kennedy era. Nevertheless, Israel had 
not failed to take advantage of the temporary appreciation of its strategic 
position to secure a massive increase in American military assistance, 
while resisting American pressure for greater flexibility in its attitude 
towards the Arabs. 81 (As we shall see, however, the Israelis did not 
understand the contingent nature of this leverage at the time.) 
However, while Israel's strategic importance depreciated when the 
United States began to succeed in depolarising the area, its geographic 
position in the occupied territories compensated for this loss of leverage, 
just as it had enhanced Is.rael' s capabilities during the period of 
polarisation. Because the ability to persuade or force Israel to withdraw 
from these territories could enhance the position in the Arab world of 
whichever superpower r,. 1as able to achieve such a feat, Israel was able 
80. Cf. A.S. Becker, "The Superpowers in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
1970-1973", Zoe. cit. 
81. See Steven L. Spiegel, The Patron Meets the Pygmies: U.S. Trials 
in the Arab-Israeli Theater~ California Arms Control and Foreign Policy 
Seminar, September, 1973. 
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to bargain the territories for superpower support. Thus, American 
support for Israel's maintenance of its occupation, and Soviet inability 
to use its political or military means to budge Israel, persuaded Sadat 
that Washington alone possessed the means to pressure Israel to withdraw 
that the United States held 99% of the cards. Accordingly, he turned 
Egypt away from the Soviet Union after the October War and sought 
improved relations with Washi·ngton. However, it would have been more 
accurate to say that 99% of the cards were in Israel's hands, since 
Jerusalem controlled the occupied territories. Israel was therefore 
able to bargain pieces of the Sinai for increased American support. 
Of course there were constraints on the use of this leverage with 
Israel's American patron, because Israel sought both to use the occupied 
territories to bargain for peace with the Arabs, and to retain some of 
those areas to guarantee its own security. Accordingly, Israel exhibited 
considerable reluctance to trade the territories for American support, 
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in the absence of significant concessions from the Arab states towards a 
final peace settlement. And Israel also refused to accept the principle of 
the return of all, or even most, occupied territories even though this might 
have relieved many of the strains in relations with Washington. Yet the 
very fact that the United States recognised the importance which Israel 
attached to the occupied territories in its settlement negotiations with 
the Arabs enabled Jerusalem to charge a higher price in terms of 
American patronage for giving even parts of them up. Thus Israel was 
able to convert an inherent disadvantage - Arab hostility - into a 
contingent advantage by virtue of its geo-strategic position in the Middle 
East after the Six Day Ttlar. 
On the level of American domestic politics, as the Jewish state recreated 
in its ancient homeland, Israel enjoyed the strong support of many of America' 
six million Jews. Israel's image as the Holy Land,the land which God promised 
to Abraham for the Jewish people, ensured that it received the political 
support of those Americans - essentially Baptist fundamentalists -
who took trw word of the bible 
82. As Mos~Dayan noted during the Suez Crisis of 1956 (but it 
was equally applicable to Israel 1 s position after 196 7): "I am becoming 
more and more convinced that the principle .force of tli.e United States 
States when she seeks to influence developments in the Middle East ... 
lies in her pressure on us ... ". See Moshe Dayan, D·"tw"y of the Sinai 
Campaign~ 1956~ London, 1967 (Sphere Books edition). p. 75. 
. 1 83 serious y. Moreover, its position in the heart of the Middle East 
enabled American conservative opinion to argue that Israel was not 
only a bastion against communism, but also the front line against Soviet 
domination of the Middle East. 84 Israel was portrayed, with considerable 
effect, as the only permanent and reliable ally in a region of great 
t t . . t t th w t . t d f . . b. l' 85 s ra egic impor ance o e es - a region no e or its insta i ity. 
Within the bureaucracy, .the State Department desk officers with 
responsibility for the Middle East argued vehemently against the concept 
of Israel's strategic importance in the Middle East. On the contrary, 
they said, support for Israel would only drive the Arabs into Soviet 
arms and this would be far more serious strategically because "it could 
86 
mean a major shift in the balance of power". As far as these officers 
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83. 'Si' Kenen, the Congressional lobbyist for the America-Israel Public 
Affairs Committee, stresses this point: "What counts with the Congressmen 
is not our power in terms of votes or money. It is their own traditions 
and heritage. It is in some cases a Baptist fundamentalism - the Bible 
says the Holy land is for the Jews and now that the Jews have got it, they 
don't want to see it taken away. This biblical tradition is important ••. 
The Congress came out with a Zionist statement in 1891 - years before 
the Zionists did." Interview with I. L. Kenen, Washington D. c., Tuesday, 
17 June, 1975. President Carter has been able to use his Baptist beliefs 
to persuade the leaders of the American Jewish community that he would 
and could do nothing to harm the Jewish state. In this way he has been 
able to deflect some criticism of his Middle East policy. Interview with 
Allen Pollack, Executive Member of the Jew.ish Agency, Melbourne, 25 
April, 1977. 
84. Thus, as House Minority Leader Gerald Ford stated that "a strong Israel 
is the main guarantor of the survival of responsible governments in the 
oil-rich lands of the area", Jerusalem,Post Weekly, 20 August, 1974, p. 5. 
Rep. Thomas R. O'Neill, when he was House Democrat leader, argued that 
"Israel is the only thing preventing Russia from spreading her influence 
and power from her own territory, through the Urals, across Asia Minor 
to the entire northern portion of Africa", Near East Report, Volume XVII, 
No. '20, May 16, 1973, p. 78. 
85. Thus former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene 
Ro stow has recently argued: " ••• Israel [is] a bulwark whose presence and 
strength discourage imperial impulses on the part of Egypt, Syria or Iraq ••. 
only Israel prevented Egypt under Nasser from conquering Saudi Arabia and 
the Persian Gulf states. And if we face, as we may, a showdown some day 
with the oil-producing states, Israel would be an indispensable ally. In 
addition Israel is the only sure access point we have between Western Europe 
and our partners in the Far East, Australia, New Zealand, Korea and Japan. 
From the security point of view, this is a fact of cardinal importance 
in many perspectives". See E.V. Rostow, "The American Stake in Israel", 
Commentary, April, 1977, p. 37. 
86. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World, p. 22; Interview 
with Harold Saunders, former Assistant Secretary of State for Near East 
and South Asia, Washington, 17 June~ 1975. 
were concerned Israel was to be regarded as a liability rather than an 
asset for the United States. The civilian side of the Defense Department 
tended to agree with this formulation of American national interest, but 
the military side - the Joint Chiefs of Staff - argued that Israel was 
strategically important because American support required the maintenance 
of the Sixth Fleet at full strength, and because of the importance to 
h f 1 · 1. 1 1 . 1 . 87 t em o t e mi itary supp y re ations1ip. 
In the White House, the attitude of the President and his advisors 
tnwards Israel's strategic importance tended to vary with the circumstances 
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of the conflict with the Soviet Union on the superpower level and in the 
Middle East. Thus President Kennedy's support for Israel was based on 
factors which haci little to do with Israel's minor geo-strategic value during 
his term of office. 88 On the other hand, one of the factors in the pro-
Israel stance of President Johnson and his advisors was Israel's ability 
. l . E d l S . U . 89 A d f d to contain anc constrain ·gypt an t1e oviet nion. n or Presi ent 
Nixon, Israel, after 1970,became strategically irr~ortant for deterring 
what he perceived to be Soviet expansion in the Middle East. 90 His 
National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, also viewed Israel in this 
light, after 1970, but his advocacy of Israel's strategic importance 
served a further purpose as a means for undermining Secretary of 
State Rogers in his bid for complete control of the conduct of American 
foreign policy. Rogers naturally advocated the State Department view 
that America's strategic interests lay in the Arab world and not with 
87. Intervie1;J with Robert J. Pranger., former Assistant Secretarv of Defense 
for International Security Affairs, Washington, 12 June, 1975; See also 
Statement of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. Congress Senate Armed ~ervices 
Committee, United States Military Posture for FY 1975., Hearings., 93rd 
Congress, 2nd Session, 5 February, 1974. 
88. Despite Kennedy's commitment to Israel he was only prepared to sell 
Israel defensive weapons and preferred to assist Israel in purchasing 
its equipment from Europe. 
89. In 1966 Johnson had called for a special study of Soviet penetration 
in the Middle East, which revealed ''a pattern of serious Soviet advances, 
sparked in large part by emotions generated in the Arab-Israeli confrontat-
ion ... " In part to b.::ilance this penetration Johnson decided to sell Isr.::iel 
offensive weapons: Skylwwk A-4 attack aircraft and Pat ton tanks. See 
Lyndon Baines Johnson, 'l'he Vantage Point., London, 1971, p. 288. 
90. Nixon was the first American president to enter into a long-term arms 
supply agreement with Israel. He argued that to maintain a balance of 
power in the Middle East, it was necessary to tip that balance in Israel's 
favour. 
91 Israel. 
Thus Israel's geo-strategic position was valued differently by 
domestic and bureaµcratic groups depending on their perception of their 
own interests, which in turn determined their perceptions of America's 
national interest. The task for Israel in this situation, as we shall 
see, was to play one group off against the other and avert bureaucratic 
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opposition by wooing advocates at a higher level in the U.S. government. 
ii) Demography 
A superpower's perception of the v~lue of a weak state may depend 
in part upon the size and situation of that state's population. Clearly, 
the fact the Egypt was the largest state in the Arab world, and the fact 
that the vast majority of its population lived in poverty, affected 
superpower evaluations of its importance in the region. First_, the sheer 
discrepancy between the size of Egypt's population and the size of other 
Arab populations gave it a centrality in the ~yes pf the superpowers 
93 
when seeking influence in the Middle East. Second, the economic 
condition of these people made Egypt inherently unstable; if their plight 
were not alleviated Egypt's leaders might look elsewhere for palliatives -
especially to their oil-rich, but under-populated, neighbours. This 
prospect caused the United States concern because of its interests in 
the security of these small neighbours as well as its interest in general 
stability in the region. Thus in the early sixties, and again after the 
October 1973 War, the United States provided economic assistance to Egypt 
on the premise that such aid would encourage its leaders to look inward 
and concern themselves with the alleviation of their people's misery rather 
than seek relief through external conflicts. 94 
91. Interview with William B. Quandt, formerly on the staff of the 
National Security Council, ·New York, 3 June, 197 5. For some 
interesting insights into the Kissinger -Rogers relationship see "Excerpts 
from Second Segment of Frost's Television Interview with Nixon", Ne1'1 Yorl<. 
Times, 13 May, 1977. 
92. Interview with Amos Eran, Counsellor, Embassy of Israel in Washington, 
(1968-1972), Tel Aviv, 7 March, 1975; Intervie11' with Shaul Ben Haim, Press 
Attache, Embassy of Israel in Washington, (1968-1972), Tel Aviv, 23 March, 
1975. 
93. In the period under study 27% of the total population of the Arab 
world was Egyptian. See A. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World, p. 183. 
94. See J.S. Badeau, The Amm:'ican Approach to the Arab fvorld, pp. 67-80; 
Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and the World, New York, 1963, Chapter XIII. 
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The third factor in superpower evaluations of Egypt's demography lay 
in the potential which this huge population had for making Egypt 
economically and militarily dominant in the Middle East. If economic 
development could be achieved, Egypt could become the most important 
industrialised nation in the Middle East with its abundant and cheap 
labour, and it could also become an important export market for the 
economies of the industrialis'ed world. On the military level, its 
population could provide it with the largest army in the Arab world, 
making it an important client for a superpower which sought to spread 
its influence in a region where conflict and tension tended to be the 
95 
norm. Thus Soviet economic and military assistance was directed towards 
strengthening Egypt to give Moscow a formidable long-term capacity to 
influence events in the region. Without its large population Egypt would 
not have figured so importantly in Soviet plans. 
Apart from the lever of economic weakness, which will be discussed 
below, Egypt's demography provided it with no direct leverage with its 
superpower patrons. However, these factors further enhanced Egypt's 
importance on the geo-strategic and politico-ideological levels and 
thereby contributed indirectly to its ability ·to woo both superpowers. 
In contrast, the size of Israel's population counted for little in 
its relations with the superpowers. However, the fact that it was so 
overwhelmingly outnumbered by its Arab adversaries gave it a bargaining 
lever with the United States, since Israel could argue that it needed 
qualitative military superiority to match Arab quantitative superiority. 
Thus Henry Kissinger noted in 1970: 
The Israeli problem now is this: 2 1/2 million or 3 million people 
cannot possibly hold off 80 million people unless they are 
militarily superior ... Under normal conditions if these were two 
opponents with roughly equal strength you would say you want to 
bring about a military balance, but a military balance is death 
for Israel ... So the Israelis have to aim for superiority. It 
is in the nature of their condition.96 
95. In 1967 and 1973 the ratio of Egyptian armed forces to the combined 
armed forces of Jordan and Saudi Arabia was 2.6:1; to the combined armed 
forces of Iraq and Syria was 1.3:1. See IISS, The Milita:ry Balance~ 1967/ 
1968; 1973/1974~ London, 1967 and 1973. 
96. See Background Briefing by Dr Henry Kissinger~ pp. 21-22. 
Moreover, the Jewishness of Israel's population gave the state 
a unique importance in the policies of the superpowers. In the United 
States, the widespread identification with this "nation of immigrants" as 
it struggled to rebuild the land, as well as the moral responsibi.lity felt 
towards these people who had suffered so much in Europe 
and yet had made so large a contribution to Western civilisation, ensured 
that support for the survival of Israel was deep-seated in the American 
liberal psyche. This moral commitmentto the survival of Israel has 
so 
been reinforced by the fact that, since the American Congress expressed 
its unanimous approval of the Balfour Declaration in 1920, through 
President Truman's crucial role in the establishment of Israel in 1948, to 
the present clay, every administration and every Congress have constantly 
supported Israel's right to exist. 97 
The recent struggle by Soviet Jewry to gain the right to emigrate to Isr 
boosted this image of Israel as the Jewish homeland at a time when the 
memories of the Jewish post-war experience were fading. It thereby 
enhanced Israel's moral standing in the minds of many Americans. In 1973 Sov: 
restrictions on Jewish emigration became salient in superpower relations 
with the introduction of the Jackson-Vanick-Mil1s Amendment to the 
Trade Bill, which would have made the granting of Most Favoured Nation 
status to Soviet exports to the United States conditional on the granting 
to Soviet citizens of the right to emigrate. Israel was not directly 
involved in the ensuing battle between the Nixon administration and Congress, 
but the fact that the critics and opponents of detente used the issue of 
Soviet Jewry to bolster their cas~ put the Jews, and therefore Israel, 
in the middle of a fight between the two sections of the American polity 
(i.e. conservatives and liberals) which had both traditionally supported 
Israel. 98 There is no evidence that the injection of this new element 
into support for the survival of the threatened Jewish state affected 
American support for Israel during the period under examination, but the 
identification of support for Israel with American conservative interests 
97. As Eugene Rostow expressed this moral commitment: "It is unthinkable 
that the international community could stand idly by ... if Israel were in 
danger of destruction. The moral and political convulsion such an event 
would engender is beyond calculation. It could spell the end, not only 
of the Atlantic Alliance, but of liberal civilisation as we know it''. See 
Rostow, "The American Stake in Israel", op.cit . ., p. 46. 
98. See William D. Korey, "The Struggle Over Jackson-Mills-Vanick", 
American Jewish Year> Book., 1.974-75., New York, 1974, pp. 199-234. 
may, in the longer term affect the basic and fundamental support which 
Israel enjoyed in the United States because of its Jewishness. 99 It 
was this essential American commitment to Israel which provided the 
foundations of the patron-client relationship and, as we shall see, 
helped Israel to resist American policies. For Israel was able to 
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gain increased support within the United States when its survival was 
perceived to be threatened, and could argue that to bow to the administration 
wishes would affect its very prospects for survival. 
iii) Ideology and Political Structure 
Because of their antithetical political and economic systems, 
ideology is a factor which plays an important, if secondary, role in the 
competition and conflict between the superpowers. Although this 
ideological factor tended to be more central to the superpower conflict 
during the Cold War than it did during the cold peace and the developing 
detente of the period considered here, the United States continued to take 
seriously 'the defence of democracy' and the proliferation of Western 
democratic values. On the other hand, even though Realpolitik tended 
to guide Soviet foreign policy in this period, Moscow continued to take 
its communist ideology seriously and justified its aid for national 
liberation movements and the emerging nations of the Third World in 
terms of their 'anti-imperialist' and 'progressive' aspirations. Thus, 
in terms of their own prestige, the United States felt obliged to defend 
'threatened democracies' while the Soviet Union felt it necessary to 
promote the non-capitalist path to economic and social development as 
a means for combat ting 'the forces of imperialism'. Israel and Egypt 
both benefited from the commitment which the superpowers' ideologies often 
forced them to make to the maintenance of their clients, although the 
leverage which they enjoyed differed in some important respects. 
For Egypt in the early 1960s, the leverage it gained was the 
political equivalent of the leverage which it had acquired from its 
geo-strategic position. By stressing his socialist principles, by taking 
measures to weaken the capitalist sector of the Egyptian economy and 
strengthen the state's control of the means of production, and, most 
importantly, by stressing the anti-imperialist nature of the Egyptian 
99. The evidence suggests that Nixon and Kissinger warned the Jewish 
leadership that if the Jackson-Mills-Vanick amendment went through, the 
Soviet Union might be less cooperative in the Middle East. In other words, 
the administration tried to use support for Israel as a lever to defeat 
the amendment, rather than vice versa. Ibid . ., and In-terv-ieu un:th Rah bi 
Arthur Hertzber9 _, Preside.nt, American Jewish Congress, Sydney-Canberra, 
28 ·.July, 1975~ 
revolution, Nasser endeared himself to his Soviet patron. On the other 
hand, by stressing his independence from all foreign ideologies (including 
Marxism), by incarcerating Egyptian communists and suppressing their 
counterparts in Syria, and by emphasising the nationalist motives of the 
Egyptian revolution, Nasser was able to provide evidence to an eager 
American administration that Nasserism was_ an Arab ideology which differed 
markedly from corrununism. Thus, in the early period of the study, when 
Nasser played the superpowers off against each other on the strategic 
level, he was at the same tine playing thera off on the political level by 
encouraging each to believe that its support would keep Egypt out of the 
100 
other's ideological camp. 
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However, Nasser's pan-Arab policy soon clarified Egypt's ideological 
position. In combatting his conservative Arab adversaries Nasser launched 
a campaign against Western 'imperialism' and its Arab 'pawns', thereby 
alienating the United States on the political level while he threatened 
American interests on the strategic level. While this cost Egypt the 
support of the United States, it nevertheless endeared Nasser to the 
Soviet Union where he was hailed as a "revolutionary democrat" who 
understood the necessity of transforming the anti-colonial revolution into 
101 
an anti-capitalist one. Thus when Egypt was defeated by 'the forces 
of imperialism' in 1967, the Soviet Union's ideological commitment to 
protect its 'progressive' client played a significant part in the decision 
to reequip the devastated Egyptian forces, even though it had not been an 
important enough consideration to encourage Soviet support during the war. 
While Nasser could no longer play the superpowers off against each 
other, since he was now well and truly in the Soviet camp, he still 
retained leverage over his Soviet patron on this ideological level. For 
if Nasser's regime collapsed, a serious blow would be dealt to S_oviet 
prestige as Egypt succumbed to the 'forces of reaction'. More importantly 
for the Soviet position in Egypt, Nasser's successor might not have the same 
ideological affinity and might therefore be less committed to Soviet-
Egyptian friendship. 102 Moreover, because the Soviet position was linked 
to Nasser, he could claim a binding public opinion in Egypt as a means for 
resisting a policy which would cost him his domestic legitimacy. And since 
his domestic legitimacy depended upon success in foreign policy, if the 
100. See Jaan Pennar, The U.S.S.R. and the Arabs, The Ideological 
Dimension, London, 1973, Chapter III; A. Yodfat, Arab Politics in the 
Soviet Mirror, Jerusalem, 1973, Chapter 2. 
101. Pennar, ibid., p. 69. 
102. See Robert E. Hunter, The Soviet Dilerrona in the Middle East Part I: 
Problems of Commitment, Adelphi Papers, No. 59, September, 1969, p. 17. 
Soviet Union wanted to maintain him in office, it could not pressure him 
into accepting a compromise settlement with Israel which his people 
would not accept. 
In other words, Nasser could credibly threaten political collapse, 
either as a result of external force or as a consequence of internal 
dissent, in order to resist his patron and alter its policy. This was 
illustrated in the War of Attrition when both Moscow and Cairo perceived 
that Israel and the United States sought Nasser's demise. Heikal reports 
that when Nasser went to Moscow in January 1970 to seek a Soviet-manned 
air-defence system, he told Brezhnev: 
If we do not get what I am asking for everybody will assume 
that the only solution is in the hands of the Americans ... 
Egypt is an anti-imperialist outpost in the Middle East, if 
Egypt falls to American-Israeli force the whole Arab world 
will fall .•. I shall go back to Egypt and I shall tell the 
people the truth. I shall tell them that the time has come 103 
for me to step down and hand over to a pro-American President. 
While the Soviet Union may have had some doubts about the true 
ideological direction of Nasserism, Moscow was soon given reason to rue 
the day that Sadat took command. Not only was Sadat a deeply religious 
man, he was also willing to negotiate with the United States without 
consulting his Soviet patron, to remove the Ali Sabri group (which 
included prominent members of the Nasserite Left who were knovm for their 
close ties with the Soviets) from office,and to assist President Nurneiry 
• 1: • f . b l d . l S d l04 Th in lis suppression o a communist- ac ze coup in t -ie u an. us, 
although Sadat appended his name to the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship and 
Cooperation Treaty in May 1971, and although the Soviet Union declared 
its appreciation of his determination "to follow the progressive, 
anti-imperialist road to which Gamal Abdul Nasser had adhered", he was 
SJ 
in fact unable, and perhaps unwilling, to convince the Soviet Union of his 
ideological steadfastness and this was one of the causes for the reduction 
105 in Soviet support before 1972. Having lost the political leverage which 
Nasser had possessed by virtue of his ideology, Sadat had to rely on 
Egypt's strategic importance in his bargaining for Soviet weaponry. 
103. Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan~ London, 1975, p. 87. 
lOl1. See Malcolm Kerr, "Soviet Influence in Egypt, 1967-1973", in 
Rubinstein (ed.), Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World~ p. 100-102. 
105. Ya'acov Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement~ A Documentary Study 
of Soviet Involvement in the Middle East~ 1945-1973~ Jerusalem, 1974, 
pp. 548-550, and 559. 
He could hardly threaten collapse because the Soviet Union might well 
have preferred to see him replaced by someone more amenable to Soviet 
policies. Nor could Sadat point to internal dissent as a reason for the 
Soviet Union to increase its support, since internal dissent was one 
means by which Moscow could exert pressure on Sadat. 
However, once Sadat renewed diplomatic relations with the United 
States and declared his willingness to enter into peace negotiations 
with Israel, he immediately acquired the leverage of threatening collapse 
since, if the United States could not prevail on Israel to withdraw in 
the face of Sadat's 'moderation', he might be replaced by someone with 
. d h s . d . 106 more extremist an per aps pro- oviet ten encies. 
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Israel's resources on the ideological and political level stemmed 
from the free, open and democratic nature of its political system. This 
structure enabled Israel to touch on a fundamental nerve in the American 
psyche - the defence of democracy. The liberal evangelism which has been 
at the foundation of much of American foreign policy ensured thot Israel's 
survival would be supported by every odministration, every Congress, and 
a majority of the American public. This ideological affinity between the 
United States and Israel reinforced the support which Israel received 
as a result of its unique nature as a Jewish state. Thus President Ford 
recently expressed to Prime Minister Rabin what other American leaders 
have often stated: 
Both of our nations have had a very painful birth as well 
as growth. As havens for men and women fleeing persecution, 
both of our nations find their vitality as well as their 
strength today in a commitment to democracy and the spirit 
of free peoples.107 
106. In his interview with Frost, Nixon revealed that he was concerned 
for Sadat's survival during the October War, i.e. before the American-
Egyptian rapprochement: "The destruction of the Third Army would have 
brought about a coup or worse as far as Sadat was concerned. Somebody 
would have come into power in Egypt, probably worse than Nasser, oriented 
toward the radical point of view. Egypt would have become a total Soviet 
satellite ... ". See "Nixon Says He Saved Sadat", Near East Report~ Volume 
XX I , No . 2 0 , 18 May, 19 77 , p . 7 9 . 
' 
107. Jerusalem Post International Edition~ 3 
George McGovern has stated that "the survival 
secure Israel should stand as the cornerstone 
Middle Eost. .. Isroel is not Vietnam. It is, 
of Vietnam ... Israel is a democratic nation". 
Volume XVI, No. 23, 7 June, 1972, p. 99. 
February, 1976. Senator 
of a democratic, thriving and 
of our policies in the 
in fact the very opposite 
Cited in Near East Report~ 
SS 
This ideological affinity is further reinforced by the fact that none 
of the Arab countries which surround Israel have provided the same freedom, 
justice and democratic expression for their citizens. Thus support for 
Israel, in the minds of most of the American public, is support for 
much that they hold <lea~ and this may go a long way towards explaining 
why Israel enjoyed strong public backing, far out of proportion to support 
108 for the Arabs. 
However, unlike Egypt under Nasser, Israel's politico-ideological 
structure did not provide it with the power of blackmail. Israel's leaders 
could not threaten "to go communist", partly because such a threat was 
not credible given the minute support which the Israeli Communist Party 
·enjoyed, and partly because the Soviet Union was not much interested in 
such a development given its more important interests in the Arab world. 
On the other hand, the Israeli government could credibly threaten collapse 
if Washington attempted to push it beyond the limits acceptable to the 
Israeli public. Because of the existence of a right-wing and harder-line 
alternative to the ruling Labour Alignment, and because Israel's democratic 
instituti.ons ensured the articulation of public opinion, an American policy 
which proved unpopular with a majority of the Israeli people could well 
produce a government less willing to cooperate with Washington. Particularly 
on matters which affected Israeli security, the government could therefore 
claim that public opinion prevented it from bowing to the wishes of the 
United States, and if Washington refused to accept this argument, then 
it might have to be prepared to put up with the alternative of an even less 
compliant government.109 
108. In 1967 polls showed that while S6% of American public opinion 
"sympathised with Israel" only 4% sympathised with the Arabs. In 1969 
support for Israel dropped to 50% but support for the Arabs only rose to 
5%. In December 1973 support for Israel increased to 54% while support. 
for the Arabs increased to only 8%. See Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Western 
Partisanship in the Middle East", The Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 
XXXIII, No. 4, Winter, 1969, pp~ 627-640; George E. Gruen, "U.S. Middle 
East Policy and Diplomacy", American Jewish Year Book, 1974-75, p. 197. 
109. This was particularly the case in the negotiations which broke down in 
April 1975 over a Second Sinai Disengagement. Rabin was able to claim that 
the Israeli public would not accept the proposal which Kissinger wanted him 
to put to them. Golda Meir was also able to use the threat to gain increased 
American support immediately before the December 1973 elections and to 
postpone the substantive settlement negotiations until after these elections. 
Rabin developed the threat into a more binding form by announcing, after the 
1975 disengagement, that any plan for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank 
would be taken to the polls. With the election of Likud, this leverage 
may be enhanced in some ways but reduced in others. Prime Minister Begin 
may be better able to claim a binding public opinion against withdrawal from 
Thus the leaders of both Egypt and Israel were able to reduce the 
scope of their own authority when their domestic public committed them 
to positions which they could not compromise without the certainty of 
losing their jobs. On these occasions the leverage of these weak states 
was increased and the ability of their patrons to influence them was 
reduced. For, as Thomas Schelling has argued: 
If a binding public opin-ion can be cultivated and made 
evident to the other side, the initial position can 
thereby be made visibly final.110 
iv) Military Capability 
56 
Israel, with the strongest armed forces in the Middle East, and Egypt, 
with the strongest armed forces in the Arab world, derived their greatest 
means of influence from these military capabilities. Given the Hobbesian 
state of nature in which these two adversaries existed, their respective 
military capabilities did much to determine the course of events in the 
region and for that reason proved to be important to the superpowers, in 
their quest for regional influence. However, the fact that much of 
the military strength of these two weak states depended upon the arms 
which were supplied by their superpower patrons (a fact which was 
demonstrated at the outset), did not give the patrons control over the use 
of these arms; nor did they prove able to exercise control over their 
clients by withholding the arms so necessary to their military capabilities. 
The explanation for this apparent impotency of the superpowers again lies 
in the importance which they attached, at different times and in varying 
degrees, to the military potential of their Israeli and Egyptian prot~g~s 
in their quest for influence in the Middle East, in the conduct of relations 
at the superpower level, and in the interaction between domestic groups 
within the superpowers. 
On the level of superpower competition for influence in the Middle 
East, the military capabilities of their respective prot~g~s were 
important because of the existence of a bitter regional conflict, which 
109. (continued) the West Bank. On the other hand, Washington may calculate 
that a clash with Begin on this issue might lead to the collapse of his 
government and the reelection of the Labour alignment. Of course if Begin 
proves inflexible and uncooperative, a future Labour government's threat of 
collapse will be even more credible than it was in the past, since 
Washington will have experienced the alternative. 
llO. Thomas Schelling, 'The Strategy of Conflict~ London, 1971, p. 28. 
erupted periodically into war, and which had the potential for threatening 
or enhancing the positions of the patrons. The United States wanted to 
avoid war because, if Israel were threatened, Washington might be forced 
to align itself with this state, since it was committed to Israel's 
security and survival, and since the defeat or the destruction of the 
Jewish democracy would damage the American reputation and raise serious 
57 
d b b h 1 f . . 1 h 111 s f 1 ou. ts a out t e va ue o its. commitments e sew ere. up port · or Israe 
during a war in the Middle East would alienate America's Arab clients and 
could polarise the region between the superpowers, thereby promoting the 
influence of the Soviet Union. Thus American interests were clearly 
better served by the avoidance of overt conflict between Israel and the 
Arab states, and in this, Israel's military capability came to play a 
crucial role by the mid-1960s. For if Israeli military preponderance 
could be maintained then the Arabs might be deterred from attack and 
this would obviate the dilemma involved in supporting Israel while 
seeking friendly relations with the Arab world. 112 
Israel's military capability also came to play an important role 
in America's long-term strategy for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
For if Israel remained capable of defeating its Arab adversaries on the 
battlefield, sooner or later the Arabs would recognise that Israel was a 
permanent factor in the Middle East and reconcile themselves to living in 
. h h J . l 113 M 1 l d S peace wiL t e ewis1 state. oreover, as ong as t1e Unite tates 
provided Israel with weapons to enhance its qualitative superiority over 
111. Reputation is a particularly important consideration for a superpower 
for its actions in one area will be judged by those with whom it deals in 
other HLeas. As Ikl~ has suggested, influence (or bargaining strength) will 
depend not so much on what the attributes of the state really are as on what 
others believe them to be. See Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate~ 
New York, 1964, Chapter 6; Schelling, ibid.~ pp. 30ff; and Oran Young, 
The Politics of For'ce~ Princeton, New Jersey, 1968, pp. 35 and 263. 
112. Thus President Nixon stated in July 1970: '' ... once the balance of 
power shifts where Israel is weaker than its neighbours, there will be a 
war. Therefore it is in U.S. interests to maintain the balance of power 
and we will maintain that balance of power ... once it is upset we will do 
what is necessary to maintain Israel's strength vis-a-vis its neighbours. 
Not because we want Israel to be in a position to wage war ... but that is 
what would deter its neighbours from attacking it". New York Times~ 2 July, 
1970. 
113. As Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush argued in supporting the 
President's request for $2.2 billion in emergency military assistance to 
Israel in 1973: "We must make it clear to our friends in Israel and those 
who have opposed her in the past that we will see to it that Israel has the 
weapons to defend herself effectively. This is particularly important as 
we look ahead to a round of negotiations which hopefully will lead to a 
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the Arabs, this would obviate the need for American intervention to defend 
this state - the Vietnam experience ha:d discouraged any such involvement. 
Nixon's Guam Doctrine had applied in the Middle East, tacitly rather than 
explicitly, since the 196 7 War and this ensured that, as long as Israel 
was capable of defending itself, the United States would supply Israel 
with the necessary equipment. In short, to the extent that Israel's 
military capability served American interests in the Middle East, the 
contingent value of this military capability would be high. 
On the other side, Egypt's military capability was important to the 
Soviet Union because it sought the very polarisation which the United 
States wanted to avoid. By supplying Egypt with arms, substance would be 
lent to Egypt's promotion of tension and instability in the region. In 
this way, the Soviet Union could force the United States to increase its 
supply of arms to Israel, thereby identifying Washington with the Zionist 
presence in the eyes of the Arabs. At the same time, by boosting Nasser's 
preponderance over his conservative adversaries in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, 
the Soviet Union could force the United States to protect these regimes, 
thereby identifying Washington with the forces of reaction in the Arab 
world. For these purposes, Egypt had to be kept militarily strong, not 
only because it promoted the polarisation of the area but also because 
this process could easily lead to the outbreak of war in the Middle East, 
and a defeat for Egypt would be a defeat for Soviet prestige and reputation 
as well. 114 
113. (continued) permanent peace in the area. The people of Israel must be 
convinced that we will provide them with the weapons needed to maintain the 
military balance in the area. The Arab nations must be aware of this as 
well." See Statement of Hon. Kenneth Rush, in House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Emergency SecUX'ity Assistance Act of 1973~ p. 2. 
114. This is highlighted by a discussionaenry Kissinger is reported to have 
had with De Gaulle. The French President asked him: "Why don't you get out 
of Vietnam?" Kissinger responded, "The credibility of the United States is 
important not only to us but to our allies. We keep our commitments". 
De Gaulle then asl:ed wl10rP else were America11 commitments so important and 
Kissinger pointed to the Middle East. De Gaulle shook his head ... "In the 
Middle East it is your enemies that have the credibility problem, not you". 
Cited in William Safire, Before the Fall~ An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate 
White House~ New York, 1975, p. 124. 
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In this way, the superpowers fuelled the Middle East arms race: 
the United States underwriting Israel's military capability to maintain 
the balance of power in favour of American. clients in the region; the 
Soviet Union supporting Egypt's military capability as a means for 
disrupting this balance of power. Consequently, by serving American 
interests in stability and the maintenance of the status quo, Israel could 
secure the arms it required for deterrence and defence. And by serving 
Soviet interests in tension and instability, Egypt could secure the arms 
necessary for the pursuit of pan-Arabism or the conflict with Israel. 
However, once the arms were supplied to these clients, the patrons 
found that they could exercise little control over their use, since the 
clients were the ones whose fingers were on the triggers. And as the 
superpowers soon discovered, while arms supplied to their proteges might 
increase the dependence of these weak states and bolster the positions of 
the superpowers in the region, these arms also enabled the proteges to 
resist and act independently of their influence. The contingent value 
assigned by both the United States and the Soviet Union to the military 
capabilities of their Israeli and Egyptian clients locked them into place 
and reduced their ability to convert military dependence into political 
. fl ll5 in uence. 
In Israel's case, the United States supplied it with arms to maintain 
its preponderance and thereby prevent the outbreak of war. However, 
Washington's maintenance of this balance of power was an interim measure 
designed to provide stability in the absence of a just and lasting 
settlement to the deep-felt grievances of both sides of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The very presence of these grievances, lurking beneath the 
surf ace calm, ensured that maintenance of the balance of power was not an 
entirely effective way of preserving stability. For one thing, the 
regional arms race encouraged the belief in the Arab world that Israel 
did not have military superiority and that its claims to preponderance could 
therefore safely be put to the test. For another thing, conventional 
military preponderance could not effectively deter the guerrilla operations 
of the fedayeen. In both cases Israel's security doctrine was clear: when 
115. See J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East PoUtics: The Military Dimension, 
Chapter 24; Geoffrey Kemp, "Dilemmas of the Arms Traffic", Foreign Affairs, 
Volume 48, No. 2, January, 1970, pp. 278-9. 
116 deterrence failed, an offensive became necessary. Thus in 1967, 
Israel launched a pre-emptive strike when its military strength failed to 
deter Nasser from remilitarising the Sinai and infringing Israel's right 
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to free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba; in 1970, Israel launched its 
deep-penetration raids into Egypt because its deterrent strength had failed 
to persuade Nasser .to keep the peace; and, throughout the period under 
consideration, Israel conducted a policy of "massive retaliation" against 
the countries which sponsored the fedayeen raids, to persuade them to 
exercise control over the guerrillas. 
Unable to prevent these disruptions to stability, the United States 
was forced to choose between Israeli military action or American 
intervention to suppress or alleviate the causes of instability. In all 
cases during the period, Washington eventually realised that Israeli 
military action was preferable to its own intervention, but the 
consequence was of course less stability and further polarisation. Thus 
arms supplied by the United States to promote stability could be used by 
Israel to compound the instability and Washington would be forced to 
. f f . bl 1 . . 117 acquiesce or want o a via e a ternative. · 
However, Israel also faced a dilemma in this situation because its 
ability to deter the Arab states from attacking, or supporting fedayeen 
attatks on its territory or people,was based not only on amassed weapons, 
but also on repeated demonstrations of this military capability in the field, 
especially at times when the arms levels of its adversaries appeared 
to be rising too rapidly. Thus, on the one hand, its contingent value to 
the United States lay in its potential for preserving stability, but on 
the other hand it found it difficult to maintain stability without 
demonstrating its strength and causing instability. And because of its 
dependence on American support for its defence and deterrence capabilities, 
Israel had to be continually concerned that in resolving its dilemma it 
did.not provide its patron with sufficient reason to halt arms deliveries 
and adopt a different policy towards the region. 
116. See Michel I. Handel, Israel's Political-Military Doctrine, Occasional 
Papers in International Affairs, No. 30, Harvard University, Center for 
International Affairs, July, 1973, Chapter VII. 
117. See Yair Evron, The Middle East; Nations, Superpowers and Wars, 
pp. 17 8-180 . 
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Nevertheless, there were a number of considerations which reduced the 
possibility of the United States deciding to restructure the relationship 
and to abandon Israel's military requirements, and these factors made it 
easier, though no less traumatic, for Israel to risk the ire of its 
patron. First, if Israel did not receive the arms necessary to maintain 
its preponderance, it could quite credibly threaten to go to war as an 
alternative means for preventing the balance of power from tipping 
against it. 118 The United States might then be forced either to intervene 
in support of the Jewish democracy, were it about to be defeated on the 
battlefield, or to protect Israel from Soviet intervention causerl by an 
Israeli victory over Moscow's Arab clients. Second, if Israel were facing 
the prospect of an American arms embargo, it could also credibly threaten 
to construct and deploy nuclear weapons to compensate for its prospective 
loss of a conventional deterrent. Since Washington relished neither the 
prospect of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, nor the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons to 1.Q_th' countries, it could be forced to maintain 
119 Israel 1 s conventional deterrent strength. Third, an arms embargo on 
Israel r:light disrupt t11e long-term American plan for a settlement between 
Israel and its Arab neighbours by encouraging the Arab states to believe 
that it would eventually be possible to upset the balance of power and 
defeat Israel on the battlefield. And as well as encouraging intransigence 
on the Arab side, an arms embargo would increase Israel's feelings of 
insecurity and make it less flexible and forthcoming in the settlement 
. . 120 
negotiations. 
Thus, having underwritten Israel's military capability, the United 
States became the captive of its client and discovered that its ability 
118. See Steven J. Rosen and Martin Indyk, "The Temptation to Pre-empt 
in a Fifth Arab-Israeli War", Orbis> Volume 20, No. 2, Summer, 1976, 
pp. 265-285. 
119. See Simcha Flapan, "Nuclear Power in the Middle East", New Outlook> 
Volume 17, No. 6, July, 1974, pp. 52-3; Aubrey Hodes, Dialogue fVith Ishmael> 
Israel's Future in the Middle East> New York, 1968, Chapter 13; and Donald 
G. Brennan (ed.), The Implications of Precision Weapons for American 
Strategic Interests> Hudson Institute, January, 1975, HI-2204-RR, pp. 28-33. 
120. Thus Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs, Joseph Sisco, argued for military aid for Israel in terms of 
encouraging Israeli flexibility: " ... I can't conceive of any peace settle-
ment that will not involve some giving up of territory on the part of Israel. 
Therefore, the kind of confidence that we can give to the Israelis in terms 
of the kind of military support that we think will be necessary over the 
coming months ... I think this is important in terms of giving the Israelis 
self-assurance and confidence, that its security will be supported''. See 
Statement of Hon. Joseph J. Sisco, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973> p. 44. 
to influence Israel's conduct in the Arab-Israeli conflict was limited. 
As Secretary of State Rogers noted in 1969: 
It is interesting to me that we have had a study made 
of how many times we have been able to influence 
the policy of another government by withholding 
military aid, and we find that it has not been 
successful in any instance.121 
The Soviet Union fared just as badly in its relationship with Egypt. 
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While Egypt's utilisation of its military capability to promote tension and 
instability in the region served Moscow's purposes, there was a strict 
limit beyond which instability could be counter-productive for Soviet 
interests. War between Egypt and an American client in the Middle East 
could cause a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union; 
that sort of instability was certainly not in Moscow's interests. 
Moreover, a defeat for Soviet arms in such a war would damage the reputation 
and prestige of the Soviet Union, not only in the Arab world but also in 
other regions where the currency of Soviet influence was its military 
assistance. Just as Israel retained control over the use of its military 
capabilities, so too did Egypt, and this ensured that the timing of 
Egypt's challenge to the balance of power would not be determined by the 
Soviet Union. 122 And just as the United States found that withholding arms 
did not increase its influence over Israel's policy, so too did the Soviet 
Union discover that Egypt retained a number of levers which enabled it 
to resist the strategy of withbolding. 
First, if the Soviet Union refused to supply Egypt with the arms 
necessary for war, Egypt could threaten to go to war regardless. This 
threat of defeat was the military equivalent of the political threat of 
123 
collapse. Faced with such a threat, Moscow wouJd have to 
121. See "Secretary Rogers' News Conference of December 23, 1969", 
Department of State Bulletin, 12 January, 1970, pp. 27-8. 
122. See Malcolm H. Kerr, "The Persistence of Regional Quarrels", in 
Hurewitz (ed.), Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East~ pp. 228-241. 
123. Schelling calls this bargaining capability "coercive deficiency", 
"the paradox that in bargaining weakness is often strength and freedom may 
be freedom to capitulate". For examples of how the threat of collapse 
forced the hand of great powers in 19th century Europe, see A.J.P. 
Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery ?,,n Europe~ London, 1954, pp. 29-30. 
Cf. Evron, op. cit.~ pp. 186-191. 
decide whether its interests were better served by allowing Egypt to 
be defeated and leaving itself open to the charge that it had deserted 
its client when the chips were down, or by intervening to save its 
client from defeat and risking a superpower confrontation as a result. 
Since neither alternative could serve Soviet interests, Moscow could be 
forced to abandon its strategy of withholding arms. For· if Egypt were 
determined to go to war, better that it go well-equipped and capable of 
lasting the distance than it be allowed to suffer a defeat which would 
d l . . f s . . . 124 enigrate tle Russian reputation or ·orce a oviet intervention. 
The second lever which Egypt could employ to ensure Soviet backing 
for its military capability, was the threat of capitulation to American 
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and Israeli pressures for a settlement of the conflict. Such a possibility 
was worrisome for the Soviet Union because it would mean that Egypt would 
no longer depend upon it for military equipment, would no longer be a force 
for instability, and would enjoy better relations with the United States. 
In Soviet eyes it was better to have an uncooperative client in Egypt 
than to have no client at all. However, the threat was not entirely 
credible, because in swapping patrons Egypt would also have to be prepared 
to compromise on its demands in the conflict with Israel and to renounce 
the military option. Washington would hardly be prepared to supply 
Egypt with the arms which Moscow had refused if these were to be used 
against Israel or other American clients. Nevertheless, it was a 
possibility which the Soviet Union had to take into account in attempting to 
influence Egypt by withholding arms, especially in Sadat's case because 
Moscow had reason to suspect that ideologically his sympathies lay with 
125 
the West. 
124. See Roger Pajak, "Soviet Arms and Egypt", Survival" July/August, 1975; 
Y. Ro'i, "The U.S.S.R. and Egypt in the Wake of Sadat's July Decisions", 
Slavic arid Soviet Studies" No. 1, September, 1975. 
125. Sadat has declared that the Soviet Union was concerned that the United 
States might have been behind his decision to expel the Soviet advisers in 
July, 1972. Fears of a shift in Egyptian allegiance played a role in arms 
decisions in 1971 also. See William B. Quandt, The Arab-IsY'aeli Conflic:t in 
American Foreign Policy" l96?-l9?3" ShLloah Center for Middle Eastern and 
African Studies, Tel Aviv University, December, 1974. For Sadat's account 
of arms negotiations with the Soviet Union see his speech to the Egyptian 
Students Union, Alexandria University, 1Jr'itish l!roaclcastinu CoY'por'al;ion" 
Swnmary of fforld Broadcasts" Part IV (BBC/SFIB)" ME/4569/A/l - A/10, 5 April, 
197L'f. 
Thus considerations of the effect of Egyptian military action on 
Soviet reputation, prestige and position of influence in the region 
committed Moscow to support for its client's military capability, even 
when its use caused damage to Soviet interests. As Nasser demonstrated 
64 
in 1967 and 1970, and as Sadat demonstrated in 1973, Egypt was able to 
acquire considerable, even "massive", military support from a not always 
enthusiastic Soviet patron by using the levers of collapse and capitulation 
in the regional conflict. 
Precisely because the superpowers both found it difficult, if not 
impossible, to control the military actions of their clients in the 
i1iddle East, Egyptian and Israeli military capabilities assumed an 
importance to the superpowers beyond the context of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The development of <:1 nuclear balance of terror, with its 
concomitant danger of mutual assured destruction for the United States 
and the Soviet Union, encouraged the superpowers to seek ways of 
insulating their bilateral relations from their involvement in areas where 
local rivalries could drag them into a superpower confrontation and 
126 threaten the nuclear peace. But because of their inability to exercise 
effective control over their clients in the Middle East, the task of 
insulating superpower relations from the consequences of their involvement 
there became a difficult one, especially once Soviet forces were 
stationed in Egypt. 127 
As henry Kissinger was wont to point out: 
The danger of the Middle East situation is that you have two 
groups of countries with intense local rivalries and with an 
overwhelming concern for their grievances or their security ... 
both backed by major countri~s but not fully under the control 
of the major countries confronting each other. This is the 
sort of situation that produced World War I. What we are 
attempting to bring about is a situation in which events do not 
get almost automatically out of control. We do not want to 
leave to the local rivalries the future of peace and war on 
a global scale. 128 
126. See Stanley Hoffmann, "Notes on the Elusiveness of Modern Power", 
International Journal_, Volume XXX, ~fo. 2, Spring, 1975, p. 192; and 
Alistair Buchan, The End of the Postwar Era_, A New Balance of f'1orld 
Power_, New York, 1974, pp. 28ff. 
127. See John C. Campbell, "American Search for Partners", and Pi1ilip 
Mosely, "Soviet Search for Securityn, in Hurewitz (ed.), Soviet American 
Rivalry in the Middle East_, pp. 198-227. 
128. Background Briefing at the fmite House_, San Clemente, California, 
24 August, 1970, p. 14 (mimeo, in the possession of the author). 
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To prevent events from getting "almost automatically" out of control, 
129 the superpowers developed techniques of crisis management. And, as 
detente between them progressed, President Nixon and Secretary-General 
Brezhnev also undertook to do their utmost to avoid military confrontations 
and declared that "efforts by either to obtain unilateral advantage at the 
expense of the other, directly or indirectly, were inconsistent with the 
b f h d . b f 1 " 130 . o jectives o ac ieving accornmo ation y peace u means • But crisis 
management and the Basic Principles of Detente notwithstanding, the United 
States and the Soviet Union continued to compete for influence in the 
Middle East by supporting opposite sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
And because they soug:1t to maintain their influence through the purveying 
of arms, but had little control over their use, both superpowers remained 
vulnerable to the threat of a superpower confrontation. ·whether there was 
detente or not, a defeat for Soviet arms could force the Soviet Union to 
intervene,while a victory for Soviet arms might lead to American intervention 
and vice versa. 131 From intervention there was but a short step up the 
1 dd ··1 . f . b h 132 a er to mi itary con rontation etween t e superpowers. Thus, at a 
time when both superpowers sought a relaxation of tension in their own 
relations, the danger that their competition for influence in the Middle 
East could involve them unintentionally in a military confrontation, made 
the task of insulating their relations from their support for the opposing 
sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict not only important but urgent. 
129. See Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis, London, 1971. 
130. "The Soviet-American Summit, May 1972. Communique of Hay 29, 1972 
and Basic Principles of Relations", reprinted in Survival, Volume XIV, 
No. 4, July/August, 1972, pp. 190 and 191. 
131. Thus Kissinger told Heikal, editor of Al Ahram, after the October 
1973 War: ;'My thinking was on the following lines. The Egyptians had 
embarked on a dangerous adventure ... but Israeli military force would now 
crush them without mercy. What would happen after that? Egypt would turn 
to the USSR to rescue her, and there were two possibilities; that the 
USSR would intervene in a way that would oblige us to intervene too, 
which would confront us with a terrible possibility - us and them together; 
or the Soviets would not intervene but would enter Egypt in such a way that 
they would never leave it. This too was a possibility we did not want". 
In Al-Anwar, November 16, 1973, reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies, 
Volume III, No. 2, Winter, 1974, pp. 212-3. 
132. The danger of nuclear confrontation was particularly great because, 
while both superpowers had the capability to intervene in support of their 
clients, the United States, at least, had no contingency plan for fighting 
a full-scale conventional war with the Soviet Union in the Middle East. 
InteI'View with Robert J. Pranger, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs (1968-1970), Washington, June 1975. 
The respective military capabilities of Israel and Egypt became 
central to this superpower attempt at insulation or 'decoupling', for if 
a regional balance of power could be struck which served the interests 
of stability and tranquillity, it might be possible to establish an order 
of sorts in the Middle East which would prevent the disruption of 
superpower relations. Conversely, if weak clients could subvert or resist 
this order, the superpowers would be unable to insulate their relations. 
In this process, Israel's preponderant strength proved to be valuable 
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to both the United States and the Soviet Union because, insofar as it 
deterred the Arabs from attack, it could impose stability in the region. 
We have already noted that the United States supported this stability for 
the protection of its regional interests, but the fact that this stability 
served its global interests as well, added a new dimension to the value of 
I l ' ·1· b"l" 133 Ad h. f h h db h srae s mi itary capa i ity. n t is was urt er en ance y t e 
fact that once the Soviet Union had become operationally involved in 
Egypt in 1970, it too began to seek stability in the Middle East. So 
Moscow also valued Israel's preponderance and refused adequately to 
support Egypt's military capability lest this cause a disruption of the 
134 
superpower rapprochement. 
Conversely, even though Egypt might have lacked the ability to 
disrupt the balance of power, it could still resist the imposition of 
a superpower determined order, which was inimical to its interests, by 
escalating the conflict and threatening disruption to superpower relations. 
Nasser demonstrated his understanding of Egypt's contingent importance in 
this context during the war of Attrition when he turned on the tap of 
hostilities to threaten a disruption in superpower relations and thereby 
forced them to consider establishing an order in the region more favourable 
to Egypt. The fact that after the ceasefire of 1970 this lever was no 
longer operative for Egypt demonstrated the advantage of Israel's potential 
for imposing stability; Israel was able to secure a noticeable increase in 
military support from ci1e United States during the period 1970-1973. 135 
Egypt was then only able to reclaim the leverage of instability by launching 
133. See Becker, "The Superpowers in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1970-1973", 
Zoe. cit. ; and Quandt , op. cit. _, p . 18 . 
134. See Roman Kolkowicz, "The Soviet Policy in the Hiddle East", in 
Confine and Shamir, (eds.) The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East_, pp. 77-87. 
135. U.S. military credit sales to Israel rose from $30 million in Fiscal 
Year 1970 to $545 million in Fiscal Year 1971. In 1972 the Nixon administ-
ration entered into its first long-term military supply agreement with 
Israel. 
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war in October 1973, a war which presented a serious threat to Soviet-
American detente as a result of the superpower confrontation which developed. 
By demonstrating Egypt's disruptive capability, Sadat was able to secure 
greater American support for the settlement of Egypt's grievances after 
that war. On the other hand, Israel continued to enjoy support for its 
stabilising potential as a means for keeping the Arab states interested 
in a political rather than military settlement of the conflict. 
Nevertheless, both Israel and Egypt had to exercise circumspection 
in the use they made of the leverage conferred on them by the contingent 
importance to the conduct of superpower relations of their military 
capabilities. Because war in the Middle East had the potential for 
superpower confrontation, it increased the interest of the superpowers 
in finding a stable solution to the conflict and made them more willing to 
impose control on their clients while absorbing the costs of forcing the 
clients to submit. Thus Nasser's War of Attrition resulted in the imposition 
of an order based on Israel's deterrent strength which certainly did not 
suit Egypt's interests, but which the Soviet Union was prepared to uphold 
' 136 by restricting the supply of arms to Egypt. And Israel's attempt to 
defeat Egypt in the October 1973 War resulted in the imposition of a 
cease-fire which certainly did not suit Israel's interests at that stage, 
but which the United States was prepared to enforce by threatening 
· t t• · t i·ts cli·ent. 137 I t1 d th th t in erven ion aga1ns . no 1er wor s, e reat o 
superpower relations posed by their inability to prevent the outbreak of 
war in the Middle East could rebound to the disadvantage of one or both 
of the clients, and it therefore had to be used with great caution and 
skill by the weak states. 
Finally, Israeli and Egyptian military capabilities were also valued 
by various groups within the domestic polities of both superpowers. The 
Defence Departments tended to have the greatest interest in a continued 
military relationship between client and patron because it could help 
136. Note, however, that the Soviet Union's interest in stability did not 
exceed its interests in maintaining its position of influence and its 
bases in Egypt. The expulsion of Soviet advisers in July 1972 raised the 
cost of stability beyond Moscow's tolerance. 
137. In his interviews with Frost, Nixon describes how he used 'Godfather' 
tactics on the Israelis to force them to submit: "We gave them an offer 
they couldn't refuse". The United States argued that forcing the Egyptian 
IIIrd Army to surrender would not serve Israel's interests in a peace 
settlement. The Israelis did not agree, but were forced to submit to 
the wishes of their patron. As Dayan told the Knesset: "wnoever proposes 
that we conduct this war in a split with the United States is ... suggesting 
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justify increased defence production, and the maintenance of an intervention 
capability as well as providing an all-important testing-ground for their 
weapons under "real" conditions. 138 
This was particularly the case for the military side of the Pentagon, 
during the period examined here, because support for Israel justified the 
maintenance of the Sixth Fleet at full strength, obviated the need for 
American military intervention in the Middle East at a time when the 
United States was preoccupied with fighting a war in Vietnam, and provided 
. f Am . 139 f f -victories or erican arms. In testi ying on Department o Defense 
appropriations in 1974, Admiral Thomas Moorer argued that support for 
Israel, which was a "vital interest" of the United States, justified the 
construction of the C-SA transport plane, the maintenance of the Sixth 
Fleet, the building up of military stockpiles in the United States and 
in American bases overseas, and the establishment of politically secure 
forward bases for intervention or the resupply of a client (i.e. Diego 
G . ) 140 arcia . 
One can only surmise that the Soviet military also had an interest in 
maintaining the supply relationship with its Egyptian client for similar 
reasons and advocated Egypt's cause in the Kremlin. Those who argued that 
the Soviet Union needed to develop the capability to support and protect, 
by military means, a coterie of clients in key areas of the Middle East, 
would probably see military support for Egypt as justifying such developments. 
137. (cont:iuued) that we wUl not be able to win thi:3 war. We have bitter 
pills to swallow ... ". See "Television Interview with Nixon", Zoe.cit.; 
Defence Minister's Reply in the Knesset to Motion on Israeli PX'isoners of War 
in Enemy Hands~ Israel Government Press Office, 30 October, 1973, pp. 1-2. 
138. See Robert Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies", Foreign Policy~ 
No. 2, Spring, 1971, pp. 161-182. 
139. In the early 1970s Congress was keen to cut the Defense budget. 
Senator McGovern, in his 1972 Presidential campaign, had called for a 
reduction in the size of the Sixth Fleet. On the other hand, Congress was 
predominantly pro-Israel (including Senator McGovern), so that if the Defense 
Department could justify military expenditures in terms of support for 
Israel it had a better chance of getting more of its budget through the 
Congress. 
140. See Statement of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Senate Armed Services 
Conunittee, United States Military Posture for FY _7975~ Hearings~ 93rd 
Congress, 2nd Session, 5 February, 1974. 
Resentment in the Pentagon over allegations that Israel had cannibalised 
American military technology, over competition for arms sales to other 
countries, over Israel's campaign against sale of arms to Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia, and over the fact that Israel had received priority in the supply of 
some weapons over American forces, did not surface until 1974 and did not 
affect Israel's relationship with the Pentagon during the period examined 
here. 
They could also Argue that this capability required air bases and naval 
facil:i.ties in Egypt which would have to be adequately protected by Egypt's 
military forces. Others with responsibility for particular operations in 
Egypt (such as P.V.O. Strany - the Air Defence Forces) might see their 
prestige linked to the continuation of these operations. In other words, 
the Soviet military might have had good reason for supporting the military 
. 141 
supply relat~onship with Egypt. 
On the other hand, they might also have had good reason to want to 
limit this relationship. First. the E?,VP tians faced a formidable 
adversary in the American-supplied IDF and the defeat of Soviet equipment 
on the battlefield must have been as unwelcome to them as it was welcome 
to the Pentagon. Second, since they were responsible for training the 
Egyptians, their own prestige was at stake when the Egyptian forces were 
defeated. Third, the credit for any victory over the Israelis would go to 
142 the Egyptians rather than to their Soviet patrons. Fourth, the 
69. 
deployment of front-line Soviet equipment in Egypt increased the risk that 
it would fall into American hands - in fact just about everything, from radar 
systems, to missiles, to advanced aircraft, was captured by Israel and passed 
on to the United States. Fifth, they faced the ultimate humiliation of 
a tactical defeat inflicted 6n their own forces by the tiny state of 
143 Israel. And finally, a defeat for Egypt might reduce their influence 
in the Kremlin as those leaders who were accused of adventurism or too 
costly cormnitments turned to the military organisations for explanations 
and scapegoats. So, while it is by no means certain, logic and knowledge 
of American bureaucratic politics would suggest that some within the Soviet 
military supported the military relationship with Egypt, while others 
141. See Ra'anan, op.cit.~ pp. 956~9. 
142. Egyptians often complained about the inadequacy and obsolescence of 
Soviet equipment in defeat, but in victory Sadat claimed that one of the 
reasons he had expelled the Soviet advisors was so that nobody would charge 
that the Soviet Union had been responsible for the crossing of the Canal. 
143. In January 1970 Israeli commandos had occupied an Egyptian Island in 
the Gulf of Suez and had absconded with a complete Soviet radar system. 
In July 1970 the Israel Air Force ambushed and shot down five Soviet-piloted 
MIG-2ls. The military attache at the Israeli Embassy in Washington was 
apparently given a triumphant reception by the American generals in the 
Pentagon. In/;er'Viez,J 1,n:Lh Shaul /Jen !fa-im, Te 1 1'.viv, 23 ~ 1 ;1rc.;i, 19 7 5. 
70 
opposed it; and that this changed over time with opposition increasing as 
the stakes went higher and as their client's military performance declined. 
Egypt may have benefited from the support it received from its advocates 
in Moscow but it seems unlikely that it would have been able to exploit 
144 that advocacy to gain increased support. 
On the other side, Israel could use the fact that it received forthright 
support for its arms request from the military within the Pentagon to help 
thwart the almost inevitable opposition it faced in the State Department 
and the civilian sections of the Department of Defense. ~fuile State might 
set the political framework within which arms negotiations were conducted, 
there was still considerable room for manoeuvre where the support of the 
military could be extremely useful: testimony on the Hill; advice to the 
lfuite House; information about the positions adopted by Israel's adversaries 
in the bureaucracy; support for the often important technical issues where 
decisions might depend upon the expettise of the military (e.g. what type 
of aircraft best suited Israel's needs); and general cooperation in tl1e 
Pentagon 1 s implementation of the arms agreewents. 
Opposition to Israel's arms requests was strongest in the State 
Department, where Near East desk officers tended to argue, at first, that 
arms supplies to Israel would drive the Arabs into the embrace of the 
Soviet Union and confirm Nasser's charge that the United States had become 
the new "imperialist" in the region; then, after 1967, that such supplies 
would escalate the arms race in the region; then, after the Soviet Union 
intervened in the air-defence of Egypt, that American arms to Israel had 
caused that intervention; and, in 1970, that arms supplies would disrupt 
the delicate negotiations for a cease-fire and settlement. 145 These officers 
tended to discount Israel's contingent strategic importance in a polarised 
Middle East and blamed domestic politics for the Presidential consent 
144. Alexander Dallin concludes: "There is assuredly no evidence - surmises 
to the contrary notwithstanding - that Soviet policy in the Xiddle East is 
being made in Hoscow or on the spot by the military". See Dallin, "Domestic 
Factors Influencing Soviet Foreign Policy", in Confine and Shamir (eds.), 
The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East~ pp. 47-51 . 
.145. J.S. Badeau, The American Approach to the /J.rab fvorld~ pp. 187-8; 
Intervie11J 11n:th Robert; tl. Pr'an!Jer; Jnf;erV1:ez,) 1,n:-th Harold Saunder;;~ Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and Soutli L\sian A(f.'.:lirs, 
Washington, 17 June, 1975. 
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146 
to the arms sales which they had opposed. However, their opposition 
was not always consistent, nor monolithic, because some co4ld see indirect 
advantages in the relationship with Israel. First, sales to Israel could 
assist them in their battle to sell arms to the conservative Arab states -
as long as they could persuade Israel, and its American supporters, not to 
object, as a quid pro quo for its arms. Second, some believed that, if 
Israel felt secure in its relationship with the United States, it would be 
more flexible in negotiations; and, if it were heavily dependent upon the 
United States, then more pressure could be brought to bear to ensure this 
flexibility. 147 Third, while they blamed Israel's deep penetration raids 
for Soviet intervention in 1970, some could see that supplying arms to 
Israel was a cheap way of increasing the costs and the risks of Soviet 
involvement in the Middle East. And finally, if Israel were going to get 
its arms from the United States despite their objections, better that it 
get them in one go than in dribs and drabs, which would continually complicate 
their diplomacy in the Arab world. 148 
Nevertheless, the opposition to Israel's arms requests, which existed 
in the bureaucracy, could be overcome by the support which Israel enjoyed 
at higher levels in the administration and by Congressional pressure on the 
President. The White House did not ~lways support arms. sales to Israel, 
but the President and his advisors had different concerns and perceptions 
than the officers of the State Department. Johnson believed that Israel's 
military capability was important in containing Nasser and felt some 
responsibility for not coming to Israel's assistance during the 1967 crisis. 14 
Nixon went along with the State Department policy until its collapse in 1970, 
but then his concern for Soviet involvement in the Middle East, his 
appreciation of the role that Israel could play in stabilising the conflict 
146. Pranger and Saunders, ibid.; Interview with Sam Hoskinson., Head, Middle 
East Desk, Central Intelligence Agency, McLean, Virginia, 18 June 1975. 
147. See page 61, footnote 120. 
148
· Thus Deputy Secretary of State Rush argued, that: 
"Authorising a lesser amount now could necessitate our asking for an 
additional authorisation at a time in the future when such a request could 
have an unsettling effect on efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution to this 
dispute ... The world knows that this is what we have asked for, and we have 
taken all the heat, one might say, that one can take for asking for $2.2 
billion". Emergency Security Assistance Act of 19?3; pp. 2 and 7. On State 
Department attitudes in general towards the Middle East, see Joseph Xraft, 
rrThose Arabists in the State Department, Zoe. cit:. -
149. See Henry Brandon, The Retreat of American Power, New York, 1972, 
pp, 112-3. 
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and his admiration for Israeli "moxie", led him into providing unprecedented 
f I 1 , · 1 · b · 1 · . l 50 K. . h. N . 1 support or srae s mi itary capa i ities. issinger, as is ationa 
Security Advisor, was persuaded to adopt a low profile on the Middle East 
before 1970. But with rising concern over Soviet actions, and his own 
desire to undercut Secretary of State Rogers in the one area of policy he 
still controlled, Kissinger took a more active role in persuading the 
President that support for Israel's deterrent strength was more important 
than attempting to force a diplomatic settlement on unwilling adversaries, 
which, he argued, assisted the Soviet Union to solidify its position in the 
. 151 
region. 
If Presidential support for Israel's military capability could not 
always be taken for granted, Congressional support almost certainly could. 
Across the spectrum of political opinion, the issue of arms for Israel 
invariably met with a favourable consensus. Many Congressmen believed that 
the Unit.ed States should supply Israel with the arms necessary to defend 
itself against Arab hostility. Those who were concerned that the United 
States not become involved on the ground in the Middle East, as it had in 
Vietnam, saw military support for Israel as making such involvement 
152 
unnecessary. uthers, who saw the Middle East as a battle-ground for American 
and Soviet proxies, were concerned that Israel, as the American bastion, 
not be defeated by Soviet arms. As Senator Jackson stated in a report to 
the Senate Armed Services Committee in December 1970: 
... the Israelis are determined to provide for their own defense, 
even under adverse conditions, and ... they have the skill, determination 
and courage to do so. The frontline of Western defense is manned 
by the men and women of Isra~l, ~10 ask only for assistance in 
obtaining the tools with which to defend themselves ... All tlrnt is nsked 
of us is help in getting the esc;ential means in adequate quantities 
with which they can do the job.153 
150. See William Safire, Before the Fall, p. 567 and 577. 
151. See Bernard and Marvin Kalb, Kissinger, New York; 1975 (Dell Books 
Edition), pp. 217-226. 
152. Defence Minister Dayan's statement on the eve of the Six Day War, that 
"if somehow it comes to real fighting I would not like American boys to be 
killed here", symbolised the difference for Americans between Israel and 
Viecnam. Thus in a poll taken dm·ing the October 1973 War respondents opposed 
by 68% to 14% sending American troops to the Middle East. However, 75% 
supported the supply of military aid to Israel to enable it to defend itself. 
Congress reflected this public sentiment. See George E. Gruen, "U.S. Middle 
East Policy and Diplomacy", Zoe.cit.; Saad Ibrahim, "American Domestic 
Forces and the October War", Journal of Palestine Studies, Volume IV, No. 1, 
Autumn, 1974, pp. 55-60 . 
. 153. See The Middle East and American Security Policy, Report of Senator 
Henry M. Jackson to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, 
December, 1970, pp. iv and 12. 
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The overwhelming support of Congress provided Israel with important, 
though not decisive, leverage in its arms negotiations with the U.S. 
government. While it was up to the administration to decide, Congressional 
support for the maintenance of Israel's military strength ensured that the 
requests, once approved, received speedy passage through both Houses and 
that, unlike other military assistance programmes, arms supplies for Israel 
received widespread public endorsement. Thus, in 1970, when the future 
of the foreign aid bill was in doubt, because of Congressional opposition 
to the war in Vietnam, Senator Jackson introduced an amendment to the 
Defense Procurement Act which contained an open-ended authorisation for 
military credits to Israel. Congress later appropriated $500 million for 
that purpose and, despite continued wrangling over military aid to Vietnam 
and Cambodia, Israel was able to purchase military equipment with these 
. 154 long-term credits. When, in October 1973, the Nixon administration 
sought an unprecedented $2.2 billion in military assistance for Israel, 
within two months of the request the authorisation and appropriation bills 
were passed by an overwhelming 364 to 52 vote in the House, and by a 66 to 
9 . 1 s 155 vote in t1e enate. 
On the other hand, at times when the administration seemed unresponsive 
to Israel's requests, considerable Congressional pressure could be brought 
to bear to help persuade the President to alter his policy. Since the 
administration needed the cooperation of Congress to govern effectively, 
and since Congressmen reflected the opinion of the electorate at large, 
the President had to take notice of such expressions of support for Israel. 
Thus, when the administration held up arms supplies to Israel in April 1970, 
75 Senators and 239 Congressmen sent letters to the President and the 
Secretary of State expressing their conviction that the United States "should 
now announce its intention to provide Israel with the aircraft so urgently 
needed for i. ts defense" . 156 A · · M 1975 1 h d · · · ,gain in ay . , w1en tea ministration 
was holding up arms supplies to Israel while it 'reassessed' its Middle 
East policy, 76 Senators wrote to President Ford to express, in strong terms, 
their expectation that he would be responsive to"Israel's urgent military 
154. See Near East Report, Volume XIV, 1970, p. 126. 
155. See Ibid., Volume XVII, 1973, pp. 202 and 206. 
156. Ibid., Volume XIV, 1970, p. 122. 
and economic needs". 157 
Thus Israeli diplomats in Washington faced a mixture of supportive 
and opposing bureaucratic and political groups and, if they were adept, 
could play them off against each other and woo advocates at the highest 
levels by pointing to the strategic, political and bureaucratic value of 
supporting Israel's military capability. 158 
v) Economic Capability 
The economic capability of a weak state is, by definition, slight, 
74 
and dependent upon external assistance. If this weakness and dependence is 
exacerbated by a lack of natural resources, then the contingent value to 
the superpowers of the state's economic capability is likely to be small 
also. Weak states in this situation should be most vulnerable to economic 
159 pressure exerted by their patrons. However, unless the patron is ready 
to restructure the relationship and abandon its protege, economic pressure 
is an unreliable and often counterproductive method for exercising political 
influence over a client. For, rather than breeding gratitude and compliance, 
economic aid often encourages mistrust towards the motives of the donor and 
an extreme sensitivity towards the dependent state's own vulnerability. Any 
sign of pressure aimed at changing the political behaviour of the weak state 
can produce an aggressive reaction, expecially from a leadership anxious to 
160 demonstrate its independence from its colonial past. In such cases, the 
weak state may decide to resiructure the relationship itself and bear the 
economic consequences. This will of course only be.possible if an alternative 
patron exists, willing to provide economic assistance without explicit 
political strings. Conversely, the state which has no value to alternative 
patrons may.find that it either has to accept the political strings attached 
to the aid it receives, or abandon its plans for development. 
157. Ibid., Volume XIX, 197 5, p. 95. The letter said, inter> alia: "Cooper-
ation between the Congress and the President is essential for America's 
effectiveness in the world ... Withholding military equipment from Israel would 
be dangerous, discouraging accommodation by Israel's neighbours and encouragin 
a resort to force. Within the next several weeks, the Congress expects to 
receive your foreign aid requests for fiscal year 1976. We trust that your 
recommendations will be responsive to Israel's urgent military and economic 
needs." 
158. This was certainly the strategy adopted by Ambassador Rabin during his 
time in Washington. He wooed Kissinger, the President and top officials in 
the Pentagon,· while his staff took care of Congress. Interview with Amos Er•an, 
Shaul Ben-Haim_, and Robert J. Pranger. Cf. Kalbs, Kissinger, pp. 219 and 239-• 
159. See David Vital, The Inequality of States. 
160. See Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers, Chapter 6. 
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On the other hand, there are a number of factors which inhibit the 
superpowers from attempting to use economic aid for political purposes. 
First, there is an understanding of the reactions this pressure can evoke; 
unless the patron has decided that further assistance is just good money 
after bad, it will tend to prefer to use economic aid as a means for 
creating a long-term dependence relationship, rather than dissipate whatever 
goodwill it has paid for over-minor political issues. Second, the prestige 
and reputation of the patron could be damaged considerably by any such 
attempt at heavy-handedness, since its other clients will also tend to be 
sensitive about the possibility of the patron applying economic pressure 
on them for political purposes. Finally, the patron may be reluctant to lose 
the investment it has already made in the economy of the client by 
precipitating a break in relations - nationalisation of the patron's propertie 
abrogation of the client's <lebt obligations, and loss of trade, are all 
possible costs which the patron would have to weigh against the benefits 
to be gnined from the exercise of economic pressure. This is hardly to 
suggest that the superpowers have not used economic pressure to promote 
compliant behaviour. But it is to suggest that their experience in this 
regard has encouraged both of them to see in economic assistance a means 
for promoting economic ties and cultivating long-term dependence, which 
might provide solid foundations for a relationship that is likely to be 
bl l 1 . · 1 1 1 161 Th. . h . · 1 d h k unsta eon t1e po itica eve . is in turn as pr1v1 ege t e wea 
states by making it easier for them to resist economic pressures. 
Egypt epitomised the problems which both superpowers have experienced 
in their relations with economically dependent states. Egypt possessed 
fewnatural resources and its importance as a trading partner was relatively 
minor. But, the value of Egypt's economic capability - mo112precisely, its 
lack of economic capability - lay in its size, its position at the forefront 
of the Third World, and its status as a newly independent, less developed 
country. As such, it mattered to both the United States and the Soviet 
Union whether the Egyptian economy developed along the lines of the capitalist 
or socialist model. Thus, both were prepared to provide Egypt with 
extensive economic assistance, not only to enhance their prestige, but also 
161. J.S. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World3 pp. 67-75; Y. Ro'i 
and David Ronel, The Soviet Economic Presence in Egypt and its Political 
Implications 3 The Soviet and East European Research Centre, Hebrew University 
of Jerusafem, Research Paper No. 9, September, 1974. 
to turn Egypt into an example for the other developing countries which 
were deciding on the structure of their economies and the direction of 
their dependence. The Aswan Dam, which was built with Soviet technical 
and financial resources after the United States had refused to honour its 
commitment to do so, vividly illustrates the prestige involved in 
assisting the Egyptian economy. Visiting Aswan in 1963, Richard Nixon 
called it: "America's greatest mistake. It broke my heart when I saw 
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the Russian flag flying over the High Dam, and if it had not been for 
Dulles it could have been the American flag flying there11 • 162 Brezhnev, 
Podgorny and Kosygin, in a message to Egyptians on the eve of the official 
opening of the Dam in January 1971, called it: 
One of the most grandiose edifices of the twentieth 
century ..• a true symbol of Arab-Soviet friendship, 
a convincing proof of how effective and fruitful 
is the cooperation of youn~ developing states with 
the socialist countries.16 
If Egypt's economic development was valued by the superpowers on 
the level of their global competition, it was also important on the level 
of their competition for influence in the Middle East. The United States 
government perceived that economic aid to Egypt could be an effective 
means for encouraging its leadership to concentrate on the development of 
the domestic economy. As the largest and strongest Arab state, with the 
most difficult economic problems to overcome, if Egypt could achieve economic 
development, this might reduce tensions in the region, persuade the 
Egyptian leadership to moderate its foreign policy, and provide an example 
to the rest of the Arab world of the benefits which would come from friendly 
relations with the United States. The Soviet Union viewed its economic 
assistance in a similar light: it could stabilise its position of influence 
in Egypt by cultivating long term economic dependence on Soviet capital, 
technology, raw materials and spare parts; it could demonstrate the advantages 
of the 'non-capitalist' path of development; and it could be ''the strongest 
cement for the brotl1erhood of the Soviet people and the people of the United 
A . fl 164 rah Republic . Both superpowers were therefore prepared to assist in 
162. Cited in Heikal, The Cairo Docwnenl;s, p. 190. 
163. Cited in Pennar, 'J.'he U.S.S.R. and the Aral)[;, p. 68. 
164. Khrushchev, in a speech after his return from Cairo in 1964, cited in 
ibid., p. 71. 
165 Egypt's economic development. · However, neither could claim success in 
converting economic dependence into political allegiance, for Egypt was 
always capable of transferring its dependence, despite the cost, from one 
to the other. 
Thus in the 1950s, the United State~ was prepared to provide economic 
assistance on the condition that Egypt remain in the Western camp. Nasser 
refused and turned instead to· the Soviet Union to provide the finance and 
technology which the West had promised. Unlike the United States, the 
Soviet Union was more prepared to tolerate Egyptian behaviour, but then 
there was also a greater compatibility in the political objectives of 
patron and client. When political differencesdid emerge over the role of 
communism in the Arab world, Soviet economic assistance was not suspended. 
However, at one stage in their verbal battle, Khrushchev warned Nasser 
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that finance for the Aswan Dam might not be forthcoming if anti-Soviet 
behaviour persisted~ 66Nasser responded by turning back to the United States, 
which was now prepared to provide PL 480 aid because of the Soviet-Egyptian 
split. Soviet aid was never suspended and, when relations improved in the 
early 1960s, after Nasser had taken nationalisation measures which were 
hailed as 'progressive', additional aid was provided and much of the Egyptian 
167 debt to the Soviet Union was erased. · 
In the meantime, American assistance, in the form of PL 480 food aid 
(which was paid for in Egyptian currency and this money was then relent for 
Egyptian development projects), as well as development finance from 
168 Western institutions, began to flow into Egypt. However, this aid was 
predicated on the understanding that it would moderate Nasser's behaviour 
towards Egypt's neighbours. ·when this behaviour did not materialise, 
Congress began to express strong reservations about the wisdom of providing 
aid which enabled Nasser to divert other resources to arming Egypt and 
causing trouble for the United States in Yemen, the Congo, Cyprus, Libya 
165. U.S. economic assistance to Egypt from 1952 to 1966 amounted to 
$1.2 billion. Soviet economic assistance from 1954 to 1973 has been 
estimated at $2.4 billion. 
166. See the correspondence between Khrushchev and Nasser cited in Heikal, 
op.cit.~ pp.144-6. 
167. During his visit to Cairo in 1964 Khrushchev pledged an additional 
$277 million in economic assistance. When Nasser visited Moscow in 1965 
the new leadership erased an Egyptian debt of $460 million. See Ro'i and 
Ronel, op.cit.~ p. 10. 
168. American aid amounted to some $770 million in the period 1962-1966. 
West Germany provided $200 million in loans and export credits, while the 
IMF provided Egypt with $40 million in 1964 to cover Egypt's foreign currency 
debts. See Part Two, Chapter Three, below. 
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Jordan and Israel. Rather than change his policy, Nasser chose to defy his 
American patron, so that when the aid agreement expired in 1966 it was not 
renewed. Of course Egypt paid the price in terms of a slow-down in the 
development of the Egyptian economy and increased dependence upon the 
Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Nasser was able to show that economic assistance 
would not alter Egypt's foreign policy; it may have been a quixotic gesture, 
but it demonstrated that desp·ite Egypt's economic weakness, it could still 
survive without American aid. 
By the time of Nasser's death in 1970, the Soviet Union had achieved 
its aim of cultivating a long-term Egyptian dependence on Soviet economic 
aid. As Egypt's Aswan Darn, Alexandria dockyards, power stations and its 
iron and steel industry were completed, new projects were undertaken with 
Soviet backing: the expansion of the steel industry, land reclamation, and 
the construction of aluminium and phosphate industries. Soviet aid 
conunitments played a central role in Egyptian economic planning; exports 
to the Soviet Union dominated the trade balance. And as political relations 
deteriorated with the Sadat regime, this economic assistance was maintained. 
New aid and tr.ade agreements were signed in 1971 and 1972, reflecting the 
Soviet desire to maintain its ties with Egypt on the economic level to 
169 
compensate for deterioration on the political level. 
However, despite its dependence on the Soviet Union, it was Egypt that 
restructured its economic relat{ons, after the October 1973 War, by turning 
back once more to the United States and the anti-Soviet Gulf states (led 
by Saudi Arabia) for the aid necessary to set the Egyptian economy back on 
the road to economic development. Abandoned by its client, the Soviet Union 
now turned Egypt's .economic dependence into a lever for improving 
political relations by refusing to renegotiate Egypt's huge debt. Sadat has 
so far resisted this pressure by increasing Egypt's dependence on its new 
patrons, demonstrating yet again that economic pressure will not change 
E I l" . 1 b h . 170 Tl h h. f E. I • gypt s po itica e aviour. 1us, t e istory o - · gypt s econor.nc 
. relations with its patrons suggests that aid has tended to be a counter-
productive political lever. The existence of an alternative patron ensured 
that when political objectives became incompatible economic pressures could 
not succeed in bridging the gap by altering Egypt's behaviour. Although 
the Egyptian economy suffered most in the process, Egypt's ability to shift 
patrons enhanced its power of resistance. 
169. Ro'i and Ronel, op.cit., pp. 14-30. 
170. While still refusing to renegotiate the debt, the Soviet Union entered 
into a new trade agreement with Egypt at the beginning of 1977, reflecting 
its interests in maintaining economic ties as a means for promoting dialogue. 
79 
On the other side, Israel's ability to resist the economic pressure 
of its American patron was much more limited, simply because it could not 
turn to an alternative patron. However, the nature of Israel's vulnerability 
to economic pressures was somewhat different to Egypt's. Until the 1973 
October War, Israel depended on the United States government 
not so much for economic assistance, but rather for the granting of 
tax exempt status to donations from American Jewry and, more importantly, 
for permission to transfer this capital to Israel. The U.S. government 
had provided some development grants and loans, as well as PL 480 aid, 
but this economic assistance amounted to less than 40% of the massive 
171 transfer of capital from American Jewry. Moreover, the United States 
received some compensation for American economic assistance in that 
Israel's impressive record of economic development served as an excellent 
example to newly independent states of what a small, Western-oriented 
country could do with its economy, despite the hostility of its physical 
and political environments. Israel demonstrated the advantages of its 
model of development to these stat es by sharing with them the techniques · 
d · 1 · · h · h · l d · d 172 rn. 'l l · an socia organisations w ic it 1a pioneere . w111 e t is may not 
have produced much tangible economic: assistance from the United States, 
partly because such assistance was not really necessary, it reinforced the 
American-Israeli relationship by demonstrating the shared values of the 
two states. 
However, because Israel depended on the economic assistance of world 
Jewry, and because the bulk of this assistance came from American Jewry, 
it was vulnerable to the threat of suspension of private capital transfers. 
Only on one occasion has the United States government actually threatened 
economic sanctions, including the suspension of private transfers, but it 
was an effective measure. Israel's decision in 1956, to accept the principle 
of withdrawal from Sinai, and its decision to withdraw its troops in 1957, 
were both taken in the face of overt threats from .Eisenhower and Dulles to 
171. In the period from 1949 - 1972, Israel received $1 billion in loans 
and $270 million in grants from the United States in the form of economic 
assistance. In the same period American Jewry donated $1.9 billion to 
Israel and purchased $1.6 billion worth of State of Israel Bonds. See Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Emergency Military Assistance for Isr•ae"l 
and Cambodia, pp. 57 and 60. 
172. By 1972 Israel was operating technical assistance programmes in 27 
African countries, 10 Asian countries and 19 Latin American countries. 
At the same time Israel had trained some 18,000 of their people in courses 
in Israel. See Michael Curtis and Susan Aurelia Gitelson, (eds.) Israel in the 
Third T-lor"ld, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1976. 
80 
d b l 1 d . . 173 suspen ot1 governmenta an private assistance. Although the threat 
was never repeated in the period under examination here, nor was it the 
only consideration in the decision to withdraw, the traumatic impact which 
the threat had on Israeli decision-makers made them sensitive even to the 
possibility of such sanctions. Unlike Egypt, Israel had no alternative to 
its dependence on world Jewry and the American government. In other words, 
should push have come to shovl'3 at any time during the period, Israel would 
have been unable to transfer its dependence to another patron, since there 
was no other patron willing to foot the bill. Conceivably, Israel could 
have taken the decision to go it alone, but the issue would have had to be 
so vital to Israel 1 s security that it would have been prepared to absorb 
the costs in terms of a drastic alteration to its economy and its internationE 
relations. On the other hand, the application of sanctions would have been 
in itself such a drastic measure, that the United States would have only 
done so had it been prepared to abandon its Israeli client. The fact that 
the policies of patron and client were never allowed to diverge to that 
extent was testimony to the importance of Israel's other resources in the 
relationship as well as its skill in applying them to the task of resisting 
American policies. 
I II - THE DERIVED RESOURCES OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT 
Throughout this analysis of Israel's and Egypt's available means, there 
has been a noticeable asymmetry in the nature of the relationship between 
each weak state and its patron. While Egypt's ability to resist was 
determined by its position between the superpowers and its importance to 
both of them, Israel's ability was determined by its importance to only one 
of the superpowers. Thus, to gain patronage and resist influence, Egypt 
could play the superpowers off against each other, in different ways on the 
various levels of their interaction, while Israel could only play the 
United States off against itself, or play one interest of the United States 
off against another. This asymmetry is also noticeable in the sources of 
derived power for these two states. Egypt could acquire importnnce to both 
superpowers from its ability to the lead the Arab world, wl1ile Israel could 
only depend, beyond its own capabilities, on the power it acquired from the 
presence and effectiveness of American Jews in the domestic politics of the 
United States. 
173. See Brecher, Decisions i-n Israel's Foreign Policy_, Chapter 6. 
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However, these derived resources contributed in similar ways to t!w 
power of resistance of both weak states by adding, to their intrinsic 
resources, the extrinsic resources of other states or groups. The 
advantage to their powers of resistance lay in the fact that, if the 
leadership of a superpower perceived that a given policy would be met, not 
only by the determined resistance of the client at which it was aimed, but 
also by the concerted opposition of other states in the international 
system, or significant groups within the domestic system, then the 
superpower's determination to pursue that policy would be undermined. 174 
And of course, the extent to which the policy was undermined - the extent to 
which the weak state could increase its power of resistance as a result 
of these derived resources - depended upon their contingent value to the 
superpower. Were Egypt supported in its stance by Yemen alone, it would have 
less power than if it were supported by a united Arab world; were Israel only 
supported by the Zionist Organisation of America, it would have less power 
than if it were supported by a united American Jewish community articulating 
the opinion of a majority of the American public and using its influence 
to gain majority support from Congress. 
However, because these additional resources were derived from external 
support, the weak state could not always be sure of its control over them. 
It might in fact find that the superpower's influence over thee was greater 
than its own, and might therefore discover that these resources were less 
reliable than its own capabilities. So, just as the weak state had to be 
cautious in its utilisation of its own capabilities and its application of 
will-power, lest its contingent value be depreciated or its patron decide to 
restructure the relationship, so too did the weak state have to be careful 
in applying its derived resources, lest it lose its supporters or force 
the patron to restructure its relationship with those states or groups. 
For if the lesser animals attempt to lead the elephant in different 
directions, they may only succeed in helping him to divide and lead them all. 
i) Egypt's Derived Resources 
... I always imagine that in this region in which we live, there 
is a role wandering aimlessly about seeking an actor to play it. 
I know not why this role ... should at last settle down ... on our 
frontiers beckoning us to move, to dress up for it and to 
perform it, since there is nobody else who CiJn do so. 175 
174. Cf. Arthur Lall, Modern International Neuotiat'i,on_, New York, 1966, 
p. 168ff. 
175. Gmnal Abdul Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution_, Buffalo, 1959, 
p. 61. 
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Rhetoric aside, when Nasser wrote those words in his Philosophy of the 
Revolution he was well aware of the reasons why the Arab 'role', in search 
of its actor, should turn to him to don the robes of leadership. For 
Nasser perceived his country to be at the centre of the Arab, African 
and Moslem worlds, and he believed that under his leadership Egypt had 
the ability to become the hub of a unified Arab nation with its spokes 
reaching out to the African and Muslim rims. 176 Nasser believed that 
under him, Egypt could achieve an eminent position in international society. 
There is a certain ambivalence in Nasser's statement: was the actor 
Egypt or himself? The answer is probably both, for the country and its 
leader together possessed the capabilities to dominate the Arab world. 
Egypt's centrality has already been remarked upon in discussing its 
geo-strategic and demographic resources. With the strongest army, the 
largest population, a level of economic, technical and industrial development 
matched only in part by Lebanon and Syria, and located in the heartland 
of the Middle East, astride the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, it 
was only natural that Egypt should be the focus of efforts to unite the 
Arab nation. Moreover, Egypt had the cultural and human resources to 
spread its influence throughout the Arab world. Its educatio~al 
institutions had trained most of the Arab elites; its teachers, professionals, 
businessmen and journalists, who were often unable to find suitable 
employment in an over-crowded Egypt, took up positions in neighbouring 
countries; its Al Azhar University was the oldest and most influential 
institution in the Moslem world; its large bureaucracy was capable of 
undertaking the administrative tasks involved in the unification process; 
and Cairo Radio could be heard by the masses in every corner of the Arab 
177 
world. Thus in each Arab country an appreciation of Egypt's primacy 
could be cultivated and it was generally understood by the elites in 
these countries that there could be no Arab unity without Egypt. 178 
176. Ib1:d., pp. 74-7. 
177. See Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and the fvorld, Nasser's Arab 
Nationalist Policy, New York, 1963, pp. 92-7; Malcolm H. Kerr, Regional 
Arab Politics and the Conflict z,Jith Israel, Rand Corporation, October, 1969, 
RM-5966-FF; Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World, pp. 77-83. 
178. Thus t'i:ichel Aflaq, one of the founders of the Syrian Ba' ath Party, 
argued that there could be no Arab unity without Egypt because "she could 
and would successfully oppose any movement towards Arab unity which 
excluded her". Cited in Dawisha, 1:b-id., p. 7 6. 
As Daniel Dishon has noted about the centrality of Egypt after 1967, and 
it was equally true of its situation before then: 
... when Egypt's credibility was high and she believed herself 
capable of acting - she immediately became the very focus of 
activity ... when, due to weakness, domestic problems or marked 
inferiority in the conflict with Israel, Egypt was rendered 
incapable of taking the lead in inter-Arab affairs, there was 
no one else to take her place.179 
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This centrality provided Nasser with the power base for the development 
of his charismatic, revolutionary and nationalist leadership of the Arabs. 
His anti-imperialist triumphs endeared him not only to his own people but 
to the other Arab masses as well. Through his expulsion of the British, 
his reception at Bandung, his conclusion of an arms deal with the Soviet 
Union, his nationalisation of the Canal, his diplor.!atic triumph over the 
British, French and Israelis in 1956, his campaign which doomed the Baghdad 
Pact, and his crowning achievement of union between Egypt and Syria, Nasser 
h d "f A b . . f . d d d · 180 a come to personi·y ra aspirations or in epen ence an unity. 
Consequently, he came to speak to, and for, the Arabs qua Arabs, over the 
heads of their own regimes. And because Nasser was leader of the Arabs 
rather than just leader of Egypt, the superpowers had to take greater note 
of him. As his confidant, Heikal, has noted: 
Inevitably Nasser had more leverage because his voice was heard 
over the whole Arab world: what Nasser chose to say could affect 
Soviet relations with, perhaps, Iraq; and this was important, 
particularly in the perennial arguments over arms supplies. By 
his influence, Nasser extended the frontiers of Egypt. If you 
deal with either of the superpowers from the context merely of 
your own frontiers, well, you are one country much like 
another; but if you deal with them as a head of a movement, 
that confers much greater power.181 
Thus, when Nasser played one superpower off against the other, he was 
able to do so by threatening or promising to enhance their interests in the 
Arab world, rather than just in Egypt. However, the contingent value of 
this derived power depended on just how solid and unified his support in 
the Arab world was. For if Nasser's leadership were undermined by dissension 
and opposition in the Arab world, then his ability to threaten superpm'7er 
179. Daniel Dishon, Inter-Arab Relations~ 1967-1973. Paper prepared for the 
Colloqtiium on the Middle East Between 1967 and 1973, Shiloah Center for 
Middle Eastern and African Studies, December 1974, p. 16. 
180. See Lacouture, The Demigods~ pp. 82-135. 
181. Heikal, The Road to Ramadan~ p. 18. 
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interests bcyon<l Egypt's borders woul<l be cro<le<l. While Egypt under Nasser 
enjoyed primacy in the region, he could not succeed in exercising hegemony 
over his neighbours. In fact, the very attempt at hegemony provoked 
opposition from those Arab ruler.s who had hegemonic ambitions of their own 
182 
and from those whose regimes were threatened in the process. 
This inter-Arab rivalry did much to weaken the coalition which Nasser 
had assembled to oppose 'imp~rialism' in the 1950s. By 1962, the beginning 
of the period examined here, the aura of Nasserism had begun to fade, 
only to be replaced by fear of his subversive power. The ideological 
arguments with Kassem in Iraq, the Syrian secession from the United Arab 
Republic, and the war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the Yemen, all 
served to divide rather than unite the Arab world. Nasser still retained 
the ability to threaten Western'interests in the region and therefore the 
ability to promote Soviet interests, but the United States could respond by 
bolstering his opposition rather than by appeasing him, while the Soviet 
Union could seek other prot~g~s in the region without necessarily depending 
on Nasser. 
Increasingly frustrated by these setbacks, Nasser exacerbated the 
divisions by renouncing the concept of "unity of the ranks" and adopting the 
concept of "unity of aim": the Arab world was thus divided into "progressive" 
and "reactionary" camps, as Nasser assumed the role of a militant revolution-
ary dedicated to the overthrow of the conservative regimes in Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia. 183 Moreover, a common aim did not provide unity in the 
11 progressive" camp because of .the Syrian Ba' ath 's attempt to outdo Nasser 1 s 
1 . . l" 184 revo utionary nationa ism. 
Yet just as Egypt's isolation in the Arab world was mounting and its 
derived power was therefore diminishing, the issue of Israel was injected 
into inter-Arab rivalry. The common Arab perception of the Jewish state 
as an alien organism in the Arab body, a new extension of Western imperialism 
an obstruction to Arab progress and a means for keeping them divided, weak 
and backwards, ensured that an Egyptian policy of hostility towards Israel 
182. See Kerr, Regional Ardb Politics and the Conflict with Israel. 
183. Thus, in his speech on the occasion of Union Day, 22 February 1962, 
Nasser declared: "Unanimity about the goal is more important than unity of 
the ranks. We demand unity regarding the goal, but we regard with suspicion 
slogans calling for unity of the ranks ... What is the meaning of ranks about 
which they are talking today; unity between imperialistic stooges, and the 
liberated countries; the reactionary elements and the progressive elements? •.. 
We would never accept any unity of the ranks directed against the interests oJ 
the Arab nation". In Speeches by Pr•ern:dent Gamal Abdul Nasser•.; 1962.; U.A.R. 
Ministry of Information, State Information Service, p. 24. 
184. On this period see Malcolm H. Kerr, The AY'ab Cold vlar: Gmnal 'Abd 
al-Nasir and llis Rivals.; 1958-1970.; London, 1971 (Third Edition). 
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would meet with the backing of all Arabs. 185 Thus when Israel announced its 
impending diversion of the Jordan waters, Nasser called for an Arab summit 
to discuss how best to deal with the problem, and his arch-rivals travelled 
to Cairo from Damascus, Amman and Riyadh, to bury their differences. Nasser 
naturally dominated the summit meetings, held over the next three years, 
because without Egypt the other Arab states could not confront Israel's 
military strength. 
However, the fact that only Egypt could add substance to an anti-Israel 
campaign placed Nasser in a serious dilemma: on the one hand he aspired to 
an unchallenged position of leadership of the Arab world; on the other hand, 
given the opposition he faced from other would-be leaders, the only way that 
this could be achieved was by standing up to Israel, yet this could lead 
to disaster because Israel's strength was superior to Egypt's. Nasser 
attempted to sublimate the dilemma by focussing Arab attention on a long-term 
strategy for building the military strength of the states bordering Israel. 
However, by 1966, Syrian efforts to undermine this strategy by outbidding 
Egypt in its hostility towards Israel, and a Saudi Arabian challenge to his 
leadership (in the form of the Islamic Conference), forced Nasser to abandon 
this strategy, dissolve the Arab summit forum, and renew his political and 
d . 1 . . h l • • I 186 Th. . 1 . 1 ip omatic war against t e reactionaries _ is new iso ation not on y 
reduced Egypt's value to the United States, which found it more efficacious 
to support the 'reactionaries' and Israel; but it also reduced Egypt's 
value to _the Soviet Union, which used its leverage over him to encourage 
a closer alignment with its new Syrian protege. Finally, in 1967, Nasser's 
desperate effort to end Egypt's isolation and combat the challenge from 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan led him back again to hostility towards Israel. 
The remilitarisation of Sinai and the eviction of UNEF did serve to unite 
the Arabs, as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as the I . I progressives in 
Syria, Iraq and Algeria, joiried in the call for jihad (holy war). However, 
this momentary unity proved to be an inadequate lever with either of the 
superpowers during the ensuing crisis, concerned as they both were to avoid 
f . 187 a con rontation. 
185. See Malcolm H. Kerr, "The Arabs and Israelis: Perceptual Dimensions to 
their Dilemma", in Willard A. Beling, (ed.), The Middle East: Quest for• an 
American PoUcy, p. 7; David Vital, The Survival of SmaU Sta-tee, p. 63; cf. 
Y. Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Im1 ael, Jerusalem, 1972, Chapters 3 and 6. 
186. Kerr, 'The A-i•ab Cold ~lar, Chapters 5 and 6. 
187. On Nasser's attempt to use the support of the other Arab states against 
the United States during the 1967 crisis, see Part Two, Chapter Four. 
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The division between ' progressives' and ' reactionaries' was mended in 
the wake of the 1967 defeat as Egypt joined with Jordan and turned to Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Libya to finance its political and military campaign aimed 
at "eliminating the traces of (Israeli) agression". Ideological conflict 
and hegemonic competition had been submerged in the face of the Arab 
humiliation, for Nasser had lost, in the process, his desire to champion the 
cause of Arab unity. 
Yet, instead of encouraging unity in adversity, the defeat had caused 
a new divergence between Egypt and Jordan on the one hand, and Iraq, Syria 
and Libya on the other, because the former were prepared to consider using 
political means against Israel, while the latter, who had suffered least, 
wanted all-out war. Nasser was therefore unable to concert Arab pressure 
on Israel and consequently unable to convince the superpowers, using only 
Egypt's resources, of the need to impose withdrawal on Israel. Egypt had 
to fight the War of Attrition against Israel without the assistance of the 
other confrontation states and their backers, and yet when Nasser accepted 
a cease-fire in August 1970 these same states could accuse him of selling 
188 
out the Arab cause. This illustrated Egypt's difficulties in enhancing 
its diminished intrinsic resources by deriving power from Arab support. 
However, Sadat was better able to exploit Egypt's centrality because 
he did not generate, in other Arab regimes, the fear of subversion which had 
been part of Nasserism. Thus, while the potent combination of Nasser's 
charismatic leadership and Egypt's primacy were missing, they were replaced 
by a more cooperative Egyptian effort to lead the Arab world. As Sadat 
rebuilt Egypt's credibility in the Arab world, after some indecisiveness, 
he also began to establish close links with a more pragmatic Syria (under 
Assad's rule since 1970), and with a more forthcoming Saudi Arabia (following 
his expulsion of the Soviet advisers in 1972) . Now that Israeli withdrawal 
had become the decisive Arab question, rather than a side issue to be used 
in inter-Arab rivalry, the former antagonisms could be forgotten for the 
moment at least. While both the United States and the Soviet Union began 
to take greater notice of this emerging alliance, it was not until the 
October War and its concomitant oil embargo that the full potential of Egypt's 
derived support was realised. In fact this support had been a crucial part 
of Sadat's strategy for maximising the pressure on Israel on both the military 
and political levels. The 'third party war', waged by the Arab oil states 
188. See Daniel Dishon, op.cit. 
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against America's allies, did much to create a new American awareness of 
tl1e importance of placating Egypt now that it enjoyed the support of 
S d . A b . d . dd 1 · · 1 189 au i ra ia an its su en y important 01 • 
In short, the resources which Egypt derived from its ability to gain 
the support of other Arab states did not make any significant contribution 
to Egypt's intrinsic resources in the period between 1962 and 1973. Rather, 
Nasser found that relations with other Arab states were a liability in his 
dealings with the United States and a cause for pressure in his dealings 
with the Soviet Union. While Egypt's centrality in the Arab world was 
given due recognition in the policies of both superpowers, its ability to 
gain the support of the Arab world was not, because this backing was neither 
reliable nor constant. Conversely, in 1973, Sadat was able to increase 
Egypt's importance to both superpowers by putting together a powerful 
coalition of confrontation states and oil-rich backers, and by using both 
acquired weapons in the October War, at a time when the West was hungry 
for Middle Eastern oil, the Arabs could afford an oil embargo, and the 
superpowers wanted to avoid the disruption that war in the Middle East could 
cause to their own relations. The contrast between both superpowers' 
treatment of Egypt during the 1973 War (when the Soviet Union mounted a 
resupply operation and the United States prevented an Egyptian defeat) and 
their treatment of Egypt during the 1967 War (when the Soviet Union refused 
to resupply Egypt until after the war and the United States backed Israel's 
victory) was, in part, due to the different degrees of support Egypt 
received from its Arab brothers on these two occasions. 
ii) Israel's Derived Resources 
The re-establishment of the Jewish state after seventeen centuries of 
dispersion was a unique phenomenon in the history of mankind; a uniqueness 
reinforced by the fact that after the creation of the state only a minority 
of the Jewish people settled there. Yet the existence of one section of 
the Jewish people in a sovereign state, and another much larger section 
outside it, but lending the state support, considerably enhanced Israel's 
189. See Malcolm H. Kerr, "The Political Outlook in the Local Arena", in 
Becker, Hansen, Kerr, I'he Economics and Politics of the Middle East_, Part II; 
Jerome D. Davis, "The Arab Use of Oil: October 1973 - July 1974", 
Cooperation and Conflict_, Volume XI, 1976, pp. 57-67. 
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resources. This has particularly been the case in Israel's relations with 
its American patron, for the existence of a large Jewish community in the 
United States helped to ensure that what had been an American moral 
commitment was turned into tangible support for Israel's security, survival 
d 11 b . 190 an we - eing. 
Of course, were American Jewry the only group in American politics 
supporting Israel, its effectiveness would have been extremely limited and 
its contribution to Israel's resources prob;:ibly would have been restricted 
to capital transfers to the Jewish state - assuming of course that the 
U.S. government allowed sucb transfers. But support for Israel in American 
politics went far beyond the Jewish community, ensuring that, as Henry 
Kissinger has put it: 
.•. it has been a constant American policy, supported in 
every administration and carrying wide bipartisan support, 
that the existence of Israel will be supported by the 
United States. This has been our policy in the absence 
of any formal arrangement and it has never been 191 
challenged no matter which administration was in office. 
It was this widespread, deep-seated and historical nature of the American 
commitment to Israel's survival as a democracy, as a reliable friend in an 
important area of rivalry with the Soviet Union, as a "nation of immigrants", 
and as the Jewish state recreated in the Holy Land, which formed the 
foundation of the American-Israeli relationship. But there can be little 
doubt that the presence arid activities of the Jewish community in the 
U . d s l 1 d b · 1d l 1 . l . 19 2 nite tates ie pe to ui t1at re ations1ip. 
The political influence of American Jews finds its basis in the 
Jewish vote. Although Jews represent only 2.8% of the American population, 
their electoral importance far outweighs their numerical size. The Jewish 
tendency to settle in large cities has led to their concentration in seven 
of the largest states of the Union and, with a decentralised voting system, 
this has made them an important group in Presidential elections, since these 
190. In 1973, 41% of the World Jewish population resided in the United 
States, while only 19. 8% resided in Israel. See American Jeuish Yearbook" 
1974-5" p. 567. 
191. "Press Conference of Secretary of State Kissinger, Peking, 12 November, 
197 3", 1Ve1;J York Times" 14 November, 1973. 
192. As 'Si' Kenen, the Congressional lobbyist for Israel, has put it: 
'' ... Israel would not have been born if the United States was not a democracy. 
Nor would it have been able to develop without American assistance and 
without American Jews urging Congress and President to assist Israel". 
Interview un:th Isaiah Kenen" Executive Director, America- Israel Public Af £airs 
Committee, (1954-74), Washington, 17 June, 1975. 
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states, with their large electoral colleges, are the traditional 'battl~grounc 
where candidates focus their attention and where the elections are won or 
lost. 193 This electoral significance is reinforced by the fact that Jews 
turn out in large numbers on polling day, accounting for some 4% of the 
presidential vote. 194 But, most importantly for their influence in the 
American political system, their vote is a Jewish vote in the sense that 
it is determined by the issues which are important to them as Jewish-
J\mericans. 
However, it is important to note that the Jewish vote, traditionall,y, 
has not been a swinging vote determined by a candidate's support for Israel. 
Rather the Jewish vote has tended to be a liberal-internationalist vote; 
since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, American Jews have been "the most 
liberal and most Democratic white voters in the electorate11 • 195 What this 
193. In 1973, 83% of American Jews resided in the following eight states. 
Within these states over 75% of the Jews lived in the main cities. 
Connecticut and Ohio also have large Jewish communities. 
Jewish % of Total State Presidential 
State PoEulation PoEulation Electoral Votes 
New York 2,150,385 11.8% 41 
California 666,610 3.3 45 
Pennsylvania 470,655 4.0 27 
New Jersey 418,000 5.7 17 
Florida 300,000 4.0 17 
Massachusetts 217,340 4.7 14 
Illinois 269,000 2.4 26 
Maryland 226,610 5.6 10 
Source: American Jewish Yearbook_, 1974-75_, pp. 305-6. 
194. In New York City 79% of native-born Jews and 70% of foreign-born Jews 
claimed they 'almost always vote' in elections. This contrasts with a 59% 
response from 'all New Yorkers'. Columbia University Public Health Survey 
[no date], cited in M~rk R. Levy, and Michael S. Kramer, The Ethnic Factor_, 
How America's Minorities Decide Elections_, New York, 1973, p. 99. 
1% may not seem like much but it translates into 750,000 votes which is 
enough to be decisive in a close election, especially because that 1% is 
concentrated in large electoral colleges. See Stephen Isaacs, Jews and 
American Politics_, New York, 1974, p. 7. 
195. Levy and Kramer, ibid._, p. 244. Cf. Milton Himmelfarb, The Jews of 
Modernity_, New York, 1973, Part II: "Off the Graph". Himmelfarb notes 
that American Jews are unique because they are both liberal in matters 
relating to civil liberties and international affairs (middle-class 
liberalism) and liberal in their support for minimum wages and social 
security (working-class liberalism), p. 7 5; cf. D. J. Glazar, "American 
Political Theory and the Political Notions of American Jews: Convergences 
and Contradictions", Jewish Journal of Sociology_, Volume IX, No. 1, June, 
1967, pp. 5-24. 
meant in electoral terms was that if the Democratic Party candido.te was 
perceived to be liberal he would win the overwhelming majority of Jewish 
votes; even if the candidate was Jewish he was only likely to win the 
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f h . l" . ' h l'b 1 196 T.h 1 . d support o is co-re igionists were e a i era . e cone usion rawn 
by Lawrence Fuchs in 1956 is still true today: 
•.. the Jews constituted the only ethno-religious group in which 
differences in Democrati~-Republican strength could not be 
correlated with differences in occupational prestige, amount of 
income or education.197 
Because American Jews voted their "fixation" rather than their 
interest, the Jewish vote did not swing on the issue of Israel. Naturally, 
a candidate who was anti-Israel could not expect to win the Jewish vote. 
But, since the creation of the state of Israel, no presidential candidate 
has been anything less than supportive of the survival of the Jewish 
state. Thus a conservative candidate who promised stronger support for 
Israel than his liberal opponent was still unlikely to win anything more 
than a small percentage of the Jewish vote. In 1948 all candidates were 
committed to Zionism, but Dewey's pro-Israel effort won him only 12% of 
the Jewish vote, while Truman took 75%. In a landslide victory in 1952, 
Eisenhower - the general who had liberated the Nazi concentration camps -
won only 36% of the Jewish vote; in 1956, when Eisenhower had protested 
against Israeli actions in Sinai on the eve of the elections, he managed 
to gain a record 40% of the Jewish vote. In 1960, although Kennedy avoided 
the normal pro-Israel speeches in his campaign, he received overwhelming 
support from 82% of American Jews. His opponent, Richard Nixon, was the 
epitomy of all that they feared: a man who had served on McCarthy's House 
Un-American Activities Committee, who had smeared Helen Douglas, who was 
to many 'an archetypal Jew baiter'. In 1964 Johnson collected 90% of the 
Jewish vote; a reflection of Goldwater's arch-conservatism, rather than 
Johnson's support for Israe1. 198 
196. The case of Senator Javits is exemplary. The Jewish senator, running 
on a Republican ticket, lost the Jewish vote to Catholic Democrat James 
Donovan in 1962. In 1968 Javits increased his share of the Jewish vote 
by 20% because he was endorsed by New York's Liberal Party. See Levy and 
Kramer, ibid., p. 121; Lawrence H. Fuchs, The Political Behaviour of American 
Jews, Glencoe, Illinois, 1956, Chapter VIII. 
197. Ibid., p. 74. 
198. See Stephen D. Isaacs, op. cit., Chapter IX; Levy and Kramer, op. cit., 
Chapter 4; Nathaniel Weyl, The Jew in American Politics, New York, 1968; 
L.H. Fuchs, "American Jews and The Presidential Vote", in Fuchs (ed.), 
American Ethnic Politics, New York, 1968, Chapter 4. 
In 1968, Nixon captured onlyl7% of Jewish votes despite Humphrey's 
support of the Democratic administration's policies in Vietnam; policies 
which Jews more than any other ethnic group opposed. Nixon had made a 
strong statement to the B'nai B'rith about the need for America to tip 
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the balance of power in the Middle East in Israel's favour. Nevertheless he 
made an accurate prediction when he told his speechwriter, William Safire: 
You'll see there won't be a single vote in this for me. They'll· 
cheer and applaud, and ·then vote for the other guy, they always 
do. But we're right on the issue, and it wouldn't hurt to say 
so.199 
The 1972 elections represented an interesting confirmation of this 
record. The Campaign to Re-Elect the President, as we now know, was 
prepared to do everything and anything necessary to secure a second term 
for Nixon. As part of this campaign, a strategy for winning the Jewish 
vote had been devised and implemented. While the Democratic candidate, 
George McGovern, was accused of being 'soft on Israel', Nixon's support 
for Israel was portrayed as greater than any other President's. The Israeli 
ambassador, Yitzhak. Rabin, openly endorsed Nixon as Israel's preferred 
candidate. After a slow start, McGovern tried to respond by doing 
everything from visiting boards of Rabbis to issuing declarations about 
his intention to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, to alter 
his image. In the end Nixon did indeed double his Jewish vote, capturing 
some 35%, but analysts have noted that the vote did not swing on the issue 
of support for Israel. Rather, those Jews who defected to the Republican 
camp did so, mostly because of their fear of McGovern's policies on 
education quotas, which threatened to privilege blacks at the expense of 
Jews, and because of their fear of bussing and forced suburban integration. 
Some less well-to-do Jews who defected wanted a new brand of social justice 
which McGovern could not supply; some well-off Jews who defected, did so 
mostly because of the fear of McGovern's tax reform proposals. Being thought 
soft on Israel would not have helped McGovern's standing with these people, 
but the most important fact was that in a landslide election, when Nixon 
collected 69% of all white votes and 75% of votes from those who lived in 
200 high socio-economic areas, 65% of the Jews still voted for McGovern. 
The voting record of American Jews therefore suggests that as long 
as a candidate espoused pro-Israel policies he did not automatically lose 
the Jewish vote. But to win anything more than a small proportion of the 
vote, support for Israel had to be only one part of a package of liberal-
199. Safire, Before the Fall, p. 566. 
200. Isaacs, op.cit., Chapter XI; Levy and Kramer, op.ci·t., pp. 240-4. 
internationalist policies. The closer the Republican candidate came to 
espousing such a package, the greater were his inroads into the Jewish-
Democratic vote. Nevertheless, to make that inroad the candidate had 
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to appear supportive of Israel, since an anti-Israel image would lose him 
much of his Jewish support. What this meant for Israel was that in an 
election year the incumbent President could not afford to fight an open 
battle with Israel over diplomatic policy or arms supplies, for fear that 
he would be portrayed by his opponent as anti-Israel. He, or his party's 
preferred candidate, might then lose whatever potential they had for 
winning enough Jewish votes in states like New York and California; states 
where the Jewish vote could make the difference between victory and defeat. 
A candidate enjoying popular support might calculate that he could ignore 
the Jewish vote, but the dissension caused by an anti-Israel policy in 
domestic politics could damage more than just his ability to win the Jewish 
vote. In other words, the existence of a general consensus in the 
American electorate that the United States should support Israel, together 
with the role played by the Jewish vote in the elections, ensured that 
candidates would vie for the label 'more supportive of Israel' as part 
and parcel of their campaign strategy. And this in turn ensured that, since 
the establishment of an arms relationship with Israel in 1964, the Jewish 
ld . .bl d . 1 . 201. state cou expect to receive tangi _ e support uring an e ection year. 
The salience of Israel and the Jewish vote in presidential elections meant 
that, for at least one year in every four, Israel would not have to resist 
American pressure because it was unlikely that any would be forthcoming. 
The Jewish vote played a lesser role in Congressional elections 
because it only mattered in eight states of the Union. However, in these 
eight states the Jews again voted their liberal fixation rather than their 
socio-economic interest, exhibiting a penchant for ticket-splitting where 
they perceived that a Republican candidate was more liberal than the 
202 Democrat. More closely attached to a particular electorate and more 
concerned with opinion in that electorate than the presidential aspirants, 
201. In 1964, during the first official visit of an Israeli Prime Minister 
to the United States, Eshkol received assurances from Johnson about arms; 
in 1968 Israel was promised Phantoms; in 1972 Israel and the United States 
entered into their first long-term arms agreement; in 1976 President Ford 
announced, one month before the election, that Israel would receive Fuel 
Air Explosives and night-vision fighting equipment. 
202. See Fuchs, The PoZUicaZ Behaviour of American Jews_, Chapter VIII: 
Heyl, op. cit._, pp. 166-8. 
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the Senators and Congressmen from these eight states were attentive to 
Jewish concerns. Moreover, support for Israel played a more important 
role in Congressional elections because the candidates had limited ways 
of appealing to the Jewish vote. To vote against a bill in the Congress 
which would provide aid to Israel, or to refuse to sign a resolution 
urging arms supplies to Israel, would be portrayed as more anti-Israel 
than a presidential decision not to supply arms or aid. The president 
could claim that he was acting out of some wider national interest, the 
Senator or Congressman could not easily do so, since it was his responsibility 
to represent his electorate. It is not surprising therefore that the 
voting record of representatives from California, Florida, Illinois, 
Hassachusetts, ~Jew Jersey, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania, on issues whic;1 
affected I~rael, was consistently in favour of support for Israel. Eowever, 
while in presidential elections the Jewish vote in all these eight states 
could be crucial, in Congressional elections, the Jewish vote was 
restricted in its salience to those states, so that while it was effective, 
its potential for influencing Congressional opinion was limited. 
Yet the value of the American Jewish conununity as a derived resource 
for Israel went beyond the role of the Jewish vote at election time. For 
if that were not so, the president would have been free to conduct his 
Middle East policy as he pleased in the interim, and Congressional support 
for Israel might have been restricted to the Senators and Congressmen from 
those states where the Jewish vote was significant. The fact that the 
president's policy was constrained, and the fact that Israel enjoyed 
majority support in Congress was due, in large part, to the Jewish 
community's ability to orchestrate and articulate, in the period beth'een 
elections, the general consensus amongst the American public that the 
government should support Israel. Because of the existence of this 
consensus the Jewish community was able to lobby legitimately the Congress 
and the Administration, since support for Israel could be portrayed as 
support for the American national interest rather than support for 
l . 1 J . h . 203 paroc11a ewis, interests. 
203. The constant public refrain of Jewish leaders was that support for 
Israel served the national interest. See for example the statements of 
Dr Wexler,I~.Kenen, and Professor Bernstein in U.S. House Foreign Affairs 
Conunittee, Subcommittee on the Near East, The 11lear East Conflict., U.S. Foreign 
Policy for the 19?0s., Hearings., 9lst Congress, 2nd Session, July, 1970, p. 69, 
99, 175, 209; and the statement of Rabbi Bernstein in U.S. Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Emergency Military Assistance for Israel and Cambodia., 
pp. 110-llS. 
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The value of this lobbying effort to Israel, in its relations with the 
United States, depended on just how active and effective the Jewish conrc,unity 
was in pressuring the Congress and Administration to support Israel. In 
the period before 1967, when the relationship was entering a new phase of 
cooperation, lobbying activities were neither intense nor really necessary. 
However, the 1967 War catalysed the Jewish commLmity into active advocacy 
f 1 , . 204 6 o: Israe_ s cause; in the· period after 19 7 there was intense activity 
by the Jewish lobby at the slightest sign of a policy that was not fully 
supportive of Israel. l·foile one might expect that the most important 
time for lobbying was during the two wars, the Jewish community was in 
fact rather ineffective during these crisis periods. In part that can 
be explained by the president's preoccupation witl1 foreign policy rather 
than domestic politics at such times, and in part by the reluctance of 
Congress to appear as anything but supportive of t11e president during periods 
of crisis in the Middle East. 205 Thus Israel gained most from this derived 
resource in the period from 1967 to 1973 and then after the October 1973 War. 
There is an interesting contrast here, between Israel and Egypt, for while 
Egypt only tended to gain benefit from its derived resources during war, 
Israel tended to lose much of the benefit of its derived resources during 
these periods. 
The Jewish lobby operated on three levels: public opinion, Congress, 
and the Administration. On the first level, the fact that the Jewish 
community was highly organised into welfare, religious, ethnic civil rights, 
union, academic, student, teachers, fraternal, war veterans and women's 
groups, throughout the country, and the fact that these groups were active 
on a whole range of political issues, from civil rights through education 
to trade with the Soviet Union, meant that it was possible to establish 
contact with counterpart groups in the wider community and enlist their 
204. As Rabbi Hertzberg has observed: "Suddenly a brute sense was reevoked 
that the ult~mate line between 'us' and 'them' was the line between Jews 
and everybody else''. The threat to the security of Israel was perceived as 
a threat to the security of American Jewry as well. See A. Hertzberg, 
"Jewish Identification after the Six Day War", Jewish Social S·tudies 3 
Volume 31, 1969. 
205. Kenen related how he tried to get a resolution through the Senate 
during the October 1973 War which would have condemned the Arabs for starting 
the war and expressed staunch support for Israel. AIPAC sent out 98 telegrams 
with that purpose in mind. However, Senator Scott (the Republican leader in 
the Senate and a strong supporter of Israel in the past) checked with the 
Administration, was told not to assign blame, and thus introduced a resolution 
which called for a cease-fire without even mentioning Israel. Intervieu.! iJLth 
I.L. Kenen3 17 June, 1975. 
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support. Jews were part of 'coalition politics' in the United States 
and could therefore gain public support for Israel in exchange for their 
207 
support of other causes. Moreover, these Jewish groups could also be 
mobilised for letter-writing campaigns and demonstrations to bac'.z the 
lobbying efforts in Washington. 
On the Congressional level, lobbying was carried out by the America-
Israel Public Affairs Conunittee (AIPAC), a registered lobbyist, in 
coordination with the B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish Committee and the 
American Jewish Congress. The success of AIPAC's operations in securing 
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majority support for Israel on Capitol Hill depended upon its close contact 
with key Senators and Congressmen. These people, some i:vith presidential 
aspirations, others serving on foreign affairs and armed services comnittees, 
h d b . d. . . f . 1. 208 TT1 • 1 f I 1 a an a i ing interest in oreign po icy. wni e support or srae 
fitted into their world view AIPAC could provide the background information 
for the articulation of their views on the Middle East. AIPAC would often 
draft resolutions, letters and speeches for these Congressmen, who would 
then make it their business to secure the support of others in their party 
or on their committees. A IP AC also maintained contact with these Congressmen' 
staffers, many of whom were Jewish, to coordinate the footwork involved 
. . . . d c . 1 209 0 . 1 . in gaining wi er ongressiona support. n crucia issues ngressmen 
206. The Ameriean ,Iewish Yearbook (J.974-5) lists 26 community relations 
organisations, 33 cultural organisations and institutions, 10 overseas 
aid organisations, 61 religious institutions and organisations, 16 social 
and mutual benefit organisations, 24 social welfare organisations, 48 
Zionist and pro-Israel organisations, 19 women's organisations, and 24 youth 
and student organisations. These are national Jewish organisations. Fully 
95% of the American Jewish population is organised into communities which 
have some form of communal council or federation; these organisations are 
in turn affiliated with the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds. 
In 1973 there were 187 Jewish periodicals in the United States. 
207. Among those who spoke out in support of Israel in the wake of the 
October War were George Meany (AFL-CIO), Cesar Chavez (United Farm Workers 
Union), Christian religious leaders, and the leaders of the Polish, Irish, 
Italian, Greek, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Puerto Rican, Japanese and Black 
communities. See American Jewish Year Book~ 1974-75~ pp. 290-1. 
208. The key senators included: Ribicoff CD-Connecticut), Gurney CR-Florida), 
Bayh (D-Indiana), Muskie (D-Maine), Kennedy (D-.Massachuset ts), Humphrey 
CD-Minnesota), Mondale (D-Minnesota), Symington (D-Nissouri), Javits (R-New 
York), Schweiker CR-Pennsylvania), Scott CR-Pennsylvania), and Jackson 
CD-Washington). 
209. The staffers mentioned as part of the AIPAC network were: Richard Perle 
and Tina Silbert (Senator Jackson); Morrie Amitay (Senator Ribicoff, now 
executive director of AIPAC); Richard Siegal (Senator Schweiker); Mel Grossman 
(Senator Gurney); Danful Spiegel (Senator Humphrey); Jay Berman (Senator 
Bayh); Kenneth Davis (Senator Scott); Albert Lakeland (Senator Javit~; Mel 
Levine (Senator Tunney). See Isaacs, Jews and American Politics~ p. 255. 
96 
would also be lobbied by people in their constituencies after AIPAC, or the 
other Washington lobby groups, had contacted them. Because the individual 
Congressman was readily accessible to his constituents and was always 
interested to know their concerns and preferences, people who held a view 
with great intensity and conveyed this view to their representative 
were likely to have a considerable impact on him. 210 The Jewish penchant 
for political involvement, their prominence as donors to political campaigns, 
and their often important positions in the professions, business and the 
universities, provided them with access to their representatives in 
Washington and ensured that their views would be taken seriously. The 
inevitable result of all this activity was that at least seventy Senators 
and two hundred and fifty Congressmen could be mustered for Congressional 
action in support of Israel's arms and aid requests and its diplomatic 
. . 211 position. 
Much of the activity at the public and Congressional levels was 
directed at the administration, for it was in the White House and the 
State Department that American policy towards Israel was formulated and 
implemented. The president-as-politician always had to be concerned 
with the opinion of his electorate and, since the American public for the 
most part supported Israel, he had to listen to the concerns of the Jewish 
community when it articulated that opinion. He could attempt to outmanoeuvre 
the Jewish lobby, he could attempt to nullify it, or he could attempt to 
build a rival mass public which supported him on the issue, but he certainly 
could not ignore it. 212 The president-as-administrator had to listen to 
Congress when it expressed support for Israel because he was dependent upon 
Congress for the approval of, and appropriation of, money for his policies. 
The ability of the Jewish community to mobilise the support of Congress 
ensured that if the president were not responsive to what were perceived to 
be Israel's requirements on the political, economic and military levels, 
then he would face stiff opposition and criticism from the other branch of 
American government. 
210. See Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy-Making in Defense and 
Foreign Affairs, New York, 1971, p. 70. 
211. Intervie1JJ u.Jith I.L. Kenen; InterV?:ew with Kenneth fvollack, 
Congressional Liaison for AIPAC, Washington, 11 June, 1975. 
212. I-lilsman, op. c1:t. _, p. 103; Lester W. Milbrath, "Interest Groups and 
Foreign Policy", in James N. Rosenau (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign 
Policy, New York, 1967. 
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Moreover, beyond the orchestration of public and Congressional opinion, 
the Jewish community was also able to establish an institutionalised form 
of communication with the m1ite House. Access to the White House was 
particularly important because the president had the power to decide to 
whom he would listen. It was an indication of the importance whic~1 every 
president attached to the Jewish comr:mnity' s support for Israel that each 
one had a special counsel and channel of communication with the Jewish 
leadership: in Kennedy's time it was Heyer Feldoan; in Johnson's time it 
was Harry McPherson; and in Nixon's time it was Leonard Garment. To 
maximise the effectiveness of this channel of communication, and to ensure 
that the administration was unable to split the Jewish community and play 
one group off against another, the thirty-one national organisations which 
represented the totality of the organised Jewish community banded together 
in the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organisations. 
The Conference was an umbrella organisation which articulated a unified 
Jewish point of view in support of Israel; it met with the President, the 
Secretary of State and their advisors at least once a year, but more often 
21'. 
when it felt the administration was not being responsive to Israel 1 s needs. 
As one of the Presidents, Charlotte Jacobson, pointed out: 
We are engaged in an institutionalised dialogue with the 
administration and they know that we speak on behalf of 
American ~fewry, and that behind us is a wider 
consensus of Congress and public opinion. 214 
Beyond the Conference, the Jewish community also established a private 
form of communication with the Oval Office through individuals who had a 
'direct line' to the president by virtue of their friendship with him or 
their importance as campaign contributors. Johnson had a number of close 
Jewish friends, the most prominent of whor.1 were Abe Fortas and Arthur Goldbeq 
Nixon communicated with the Jewish conm1unity through Hax Fisher, a Detroit 
multi-millionaire who was a large donor to the Republican coffers and the 
organiser of Nixon's Jewish strategy in the 1972 elections. Because the 
Jewish community and its leadership were predominantly Democrats, the 
213. Interview un:th Rabb1: Israel Miller_, Chairman, Conference of Presidents 
of Major American Jewish Organisations, (1973-1975), New York, 28 May, 1975. 
214. Interview zvith Charlotte Jacobson_, Chairman, World Zionist Organisation 
American Section, New York, 29 May, 1975. 
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Republican administration also found it convenient to use Rabbi Arthur 
Hertzberg - the 'House Democrat' - as a channel of communication. Thus, 
with the president keen to maintain a consensus in favour of his policies 
in the Middle East, the Jewish community came to play an important role in 
communicating what were essentially Israel's concerns about American 
policy, but the concerns often had a greater impact on the president 
because they were voiced with an American accent. 
However, the American Jewish community laboured under several constrain 
which reduced their effectiveness as a derived resource in Israel's relation: 
with the American government. First, the Jewish organisations were by no 
means monolithic and differed sharply in their attitudes to a whole range 
of political, social and religious issues which concerned Israel. The 
only time that they were likely to reach a consensus was when the Israeli 
government took a firm stand and made its position clear. However, 
on issues such as final borders and the rights of the Palestinians the 
Israeli government was unwilling to take a stand, partly because of the lack 
of consensus in Israel on such questions. And, during times of crisis, the 
Israeli goverrunent was often unsure how it wanted to deal with the 
administration. 215 In such cases, the Jewish community was particularly 
concerned that the administration not be allowed an opportunity to play it 
ff . I 1 . . lf 216 S · 1 . f d o against srae , or against itse . i ence was sometimes pre erre 
to divided advocacy. Second, there was a general reluctance to challenge 
the administration or confront its policies because of the Jewish community's 
sensitivity to the charge of 'dual loyalty', and because of its awareness 
that, :Ln the final analysis, Jews comprised only 3% of the American 
. 217 population. Third, the structural position of the Jewish lobby in the 
decision-making process also constrained its effectiveness. Since it did 
215. A classic case in point was the role of the Israeli Ambassador, Simcha 
Dinitz, during the October 1973 War. Believing that Kissinger was on Israel' 
side and that the supply of urgently needed materiel was only being delayed 
by the Pentagon's reluctance, Dinits restrained the Jewish lobby groups and 
directed their attentions to the Pentagon. InterV?:ew zvith Kenneth WoUacl<. 
216. Consensus on a course of action is regarded as crucial to the effect-
iveness of the Jewish lobby. The leaders were particularly concerned that 
the Administration, and Kissinger in particular, would play them off 
against each other if they allowed their splits to show. Consequently a 
great deal of energy was expended on maintaining unity. Inte1~views with 
Rabbi Miller_, Rabbi Hei~-tzberg_, and Cha:Y'lotte Jacobson. 
217. 'Si' Kenan makes the point: "We are a very small minority - only 3% of 
the population - so we can't block the State Department and we can't overthrrn 
the Administration. We just don't have that power". Interview with I.L. 
Kenan. 
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not participate in the formulation of American policy, it could not initiate 
action, except on the Congressional periphery, and was forced to adopt a 
reactive posture. This meant that, when support was not forthcoming for 
Israel, the Jewish community's ability to orchestrate public and 
Congressional opinion could raise the domestic costs of such a policy, but 
it could not bury that policy and force the administration to abandon it 
in favour of increased support for Israel. The presence and effectiveness 
of the Jewish community in the United States could help Israel to resist 
American policy, could help ensure that the United States did not abandon 
Israel, but it could not prevent the American government from adopting 
policies which were perceived by Israel to be inimical to its interests. 
As Rabbi Hertzberg, the President of the American Jewish Congress, pointed 
out: 
We are like a dog which can bark loudly when the master 
hasn't made up his mind. And we are a strong dog and may 
be able to pull him in a certain direction. But once the 
master has made up his mind he can curb his dog. We are 
-capable of knocking heads, we can raise the cos ts to the 
Administration of a particular policy, but in the final 
crunch we can't deliver the goods - we can't deliver the 
United States fo21gsrael. What we can achieve is a better 
deal for Israel. 
IV - CONCLUSION 
It should be clear from this analysis of the sources of power for 
Israel and Egypt as weak states, that they possessed diverse but formidable 
means for resisting the effects of their weakness. What has been described 
here is essentially a relationship of interdependence, where the dependence 
of the weak is offset, to some extent, by the dependence of the strong on 
them for advantage in the competition for influence, either between the 
219 
superpowers, or between political groups within their domestic systems. 
Because of this dependence of the strong on the weak, the weak state's 
resources are given contingent value to the superpowers which will of ten 
make these resources worth more, in the resistance process, than they might 
be worth in other spheres of foreign policy. It has been emphasised that 
218. Interview with Rabbi Hertzberg., 28 July, 1975. 
219. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Power and Interdependence", 
Su:rvival., Volume 15, no. 4, July/August, 1973, pp. 158-160; Oran R. Young, 
"Interdependencies in World Politics", International Journal., Volume 24, 
No. 4, 1969, pp. 746-8. 
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this value to the superpowers is contingent because changes in the nature 
of the superpower competition and changes in the international environment, 
factors which are usually beyond the control of the weak state, will 
determine the worth of the resources to the superpowers at any 
particular time. Moreover, the value of these resources is also contingent 
because, in the final analysis, the superpowers will always retain the 
ability to restructur~ the relationship of interdependence and render these 
resources worthless in the cause of resistance. However, the analysis of 
Israeli and Egyptian resources has highlighted factors which can often 
compensate the weak for the asymmetrical nature of their relationships 
with their patrons. Prestige and reputation are factors which have made 
it difficult for the superpowers to abandon their clients because, in 
their competition for global influence, both superpowers have been concerned 
to show that they honour their corrrrnitments to lesser states, and that these 
220 
commitments are worth something to the clients as well as to the patrons. 
In Israel's case, the American commitment to support its survival, a comrnitmer 
which was reinforced, though not determined, by the presence of a politically 
effective American Jewish community, ensured that, during the period 
examined here, there was no consideration given to the idea of the patron 
abandoning its client. As one member of the State Department's Policy 
Planning Staff has observed: 
Israel is a very peculiar case in our relations because 
of the domestic support it commands. We have an 
historical connection with the establishment of the 
State of Israel and we have a moral comrnitment ... So we 
can't use the normal great power threat to a small 
client, that is; if push comes to shove we will 
lose interest and thus drop our support. With Israel 
we can't drop our support so that ultimate threat is 
not present.221 
However, if these factors helped to reduce somewhat the contingent 
nature of Israel's resources in its relations with the United States, the 
fact that Israel had no alternative patron to turn to, the fact that in the 
final analysis it was at least as dependent on the United States as this 
patron was conrrnitted to Israel, meant that the worth of Israel's resources 
220. For discussion of the role of prestige and reputation in superpower 
behaviour see Schelling, The Strate(Jy of Conflict~ pp. 30ff; Oran Young, 
'l'he Politics of Force; Bargaining DW'ing International Crises~ Princeton, 
New Jersey, 1968, pp. 35-6, 263; Sten Sparre Nilson, "Valuation: The 
Basis of Foreign Policy Decision-Making", Cooperation and Conflict~ No. 2, 
1969, pp. 99-118; Erling Bj¢1, "The Power of the Weak", Zoe.cit. 
221. Intervieh1 with Reginald Bartholomew~ Policy Planning Staff, 
Department of State, Washington, 9 June, 1975. 
depended almost entirely on the value which the United States attached 
to them. Consequently, the relationship between Israel and the 
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United States was, especially after 1967, particularly sensitive to any 
perceived or actual change in American policy. On the one hand, this tended 
to make Israel cautious in its application of leverage, on the other hand, 
the slightest cloud on the horizon of American-Israel relations could 
222 
cause a storm. 
On the other side, Egypt did not enjoy the same commitment from its 
patrons - when push came to shove, they could, and indeed did, abandon 
Egypt. However, Egypt's importance to both superpowers, in their 
competition for influence, gave it an advantage which Israel did not have, 
and which reduced the effectiveness of the ultimate threat of abandonment. 
For Egypt always seemed to have the ability to thwart the effects of 
abandonment by transferring its dependence from one patron to the other. 
Thus, unlike Israel, Egypt could afford to be daring in its application 
of leverage with its patrons, could afford to use more of the levers at 
its disposal, and in fact tended to possess greater leverage than did 
Israel. While Israel tended to ero.phasise its reliability as an American 
client and the contributions which it could make to American interests 
in the region, Egypt tended to emphasise its unreliability and the 
contributions wl1ich it could make to the interests of its patron's adversary 
in the region. 223 However, the more dependent Egypt became on one patron, 
and the less the opportunity it had to transfer its dependence to another, 
the more its leadership's behaviour would approximate Israel's emphasis 
on its reliability and its contribution to the relationship. 
In other words, the analysis of Israeliand Egyptian resources in 
their relations with their patrons has generated hypotheses about the 
behaviour of weak states in their relations with the superpowers, which 
can be added to the earlier hypotheses about who prevails in the contest of 
influence and resistance between weak states and the superpowers: 
222. Golda Meir has revealed the dilemma which this relationship often 
created for her: ''I regret that I cannot promise myself and the nation 
that, from now on, the U.S. will see matters exactly our way. But even 
a small nation has the right to insist on matters of vital interest to 
herself ... this is a great nation, confronted with the second great power, 
which is entirely opposed to us ... On the other stands the greatest power 
in the world; she does not do everything we would like her to do, but 
can we do without her?". Jerusalem Po.st, 2 December, 1973. 
223. Cf. Astri Suhrke, "Gratuity or Tyranny: The Korean Alliances", 
W01,zd Politics, Volume XXV, July, 1973. 
iv) the weak state which has no alternative patron will act 
with caution up to the point where it believes that it 
is about to be, or has been, abandoned by its patron; at 
that point it may take desperate measures to dissuade 
its patron, or to gain alternative patronage; 
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v) the weak state which has alternative patrons will act 
with daring up to the point where it believes that it 
will lose, or has lost, its alternative; at this point 
it will act with c~ution. 
Of course the behaviour of the weak states will do much to determine 
the outcome of the contest between clients and their patrons. These 
hypotheses suggest that the greater the degree of the client's dependence 
on one patron, the more cautious its behaviour. However, one should not 
conclude from this that the superpower patron will therefore prevail. 
For, as we have seen in the Egypt-Israel case, the ability of the patrons 
to resist the effects of their dependence upon their clients, and, in the 
final analysis, their ability to abandon their clients, was circumscribed 
by the determinants of their own behaviour. Thus the outcome of the 
contest between the superpowers and their weak clients depended upon the 
interaction between the two, and this interaction was in turn determined 
by the behaviour of the weak and the great - not the weak alone. For 
whether the elephant or the lesser animals lead will depend upon their 
relative strengths and weaknesses in the particular tug-of-war; whether 
one leads the others will depend upon its ability to transcend its own 
weaknesses and overcome the strengths of the others. 
The interaction between Israel, Egypt and their superpower patrons 
took place on three levels: between the weak states on the level of their 
own conflict; between the superpowers on the level of their global conflict; 
and between the weak states and their superpower patrons, or prospective 
patrons, (including interaction with groups within the domestic system of 
the patron). This thesis focuses on the last level of interaction, but it 
is clear that interaction on the other levels will affect the conduct of 
relations on this level. In particular, the contingent value of the weak 
states' resources will be affected by developments on the other levels of 
interaction, and this could do much to determine the outcome of a particular 
. 224 
contest between patron and client. Whether the patron or the client 
224. Failure to take account of the effect of interaction on other levels has 
led analysts to some rather erroneous conclusions about who prevails in the 
Middle Eastern contest. Thus Trygve Mathisen concluded: "The small rival 
parties need and seek the support of the great powers whose influence is 
thus increasingly extended to the region with ensuing reduction of the small 
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prevailed in this process was determined by the relative strength of the 
resources each could bring to bear, and the relative strength of will each 
possessed in applying them. And both the available means and the will-
power which were in fact brought to bear would in turn be determined by the 
prior demands of their activities on other levels and in other areas. 
The actual process of interaction involved the threat or application 
of punishments and the promise or fulfilment of rewards by both patron and 
client. In this process, the weak state's task was to resist the punishment 
its superpower patron could mete out, either by threatening to punish, or 
actually punishing, the superpower in response, or by promising the 
superpower something, or actually delivering something, which it valued 
more than the desired change in its client's behaviour. Conversely, if 
the superpower attempted to alter the client's behaviour by the promise 
of blandishments, the weak state's task was to acquire the blandishments 
while avoiding the attached conditions, by the same process of punishraent 
and reward. 
The perceptions that each state had of the other's determination 
(i.e. will-power) to fulfil its threats or promises could be decisive in 
determining who prevailed .. Thus if the weak state was expected to resist a 
threatened course of action with all its means, and accordingly the cost 
of imposing the superpower's pref er enc es was perceived to be too high, the 
superpower might alter its policy without applying the sanctions. By the 
same token, if a weak state's threatened action was made credible by the 
intensity of interest which it was perceived to have in the outcome, then 
the cost of such action would have to be taken into account by the superpower 
and it would have to weigh it against the perceived benefits which it 
expected to acquire from a given policy. Conversely, if the superpower 
misperceived the determination of the weak state to resist its policy, and 
therefore miscalculated the costs and benefits of this policy, it might 
carry out its threats or promises at high cost to both, but with little 
224. (continued) powers' scope of action. The Arab-Israeli conflict is an 
illustrative example ... of the way the small powers may in fact lose most 
of what independence they have in foreign affairs". Yair Evron reached 
a contradictory conclusion: "The essential dynamic of international 
politics in the Middle East, however, is that the local powers are, and 
in all probability will remain, for better or for worse, masters of their 
own fate". If they had taken account of the dynamics imparted to the 
interaction between great and weak by their conduct of relations on other 
levels, they would have found that in sor.i.e cases they were both right, 
while in other cases they were both wrong. See Mathisen, The Functions of 
Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers_, p. 237; Evron, The Middle 
East: NationD, Super f,>;:Jers and ~lars_, p. 227. 
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gain for itself. 225 By the same token, if the weak state's threats or 
promises lacked credibility, because. of a perceived weakness of will, then 
it might have to carry out its threatened or promised action to ensure 
22! that its interests and its determination were not discounted in the future. 
Thus, in the interaction between the weak and the great, the state which 
was more capable and more willing to absorb the costs of punishment and/or 
forgo the inducements of compliant behaviour, would prevail. If this 
contest were.merely one between the respective resources of the great and 
the weak, then the great would invariably prevail. But because it was not 
always an unequal contest of pure strength and weakness, because the weak 
often possessed resources which, in terms of their contingent value to 
the great, could increase their strength, and because they often possessed 
stronger will-power than the great to apply their available means, the weak 
could well prevail. In other words, the client was on some occasions more 
capable and willing than its patron to ·absorb the costs of a particular 
course of action, which it preferred, and to forgo the benefits of another 
course of action, which its patron might prefer; accordingly, on those 
occasions, it was able to resist the policy of its patron. 
That at least is the theory of weak power resistance. Whether, and in 
what circumstances, Israel and Egypt actually did prevail over their 
patrons depended, as we shall now see, on their awareness of the value of 
the resources.at their disposal, and their determination and skill in 
employing these resources in the cause of resistance. 
225. Thus the Soviet Union misperceived Sadat's will to resist its policy 
of limiting arms supplies and was accordingly forced to pay the humiliating 
price of expulsion and the deterioration of its position of influence in 
Egypt. On the other hand, Israel's determination to resist any encroachment 
of its rights during the 1967 crisis was correctly perceived by President 
Johnson and therefore the United States did not attempt to impose a 
compromise on Israeli claims to freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. 
226. Thus Sadat's threats of war were not taken seriously by his Soviet 
patron or by his Israeli and American adversaries, because he was perceived 
to lack will-power (as well as the means) and.it was therefore necessary 
to go to war, in part to restore Egypt's credibility in its relations with 
the superpowers. On the other hand, Israel's willingness to develop and 
even use nuclear weapons as a last resort if its survival were in jeopardy 
is regarded as a highly credible threat by the Uriited States and is one 
reason why the United States was, and is, prepared to supply Israel with 
a conventional deterrent. 
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PART TWO 
CHAPTER ONE 
ISRAEL'S ALIGNMENT - THE TRIUMPH OF WEAK STATE POLITICS 
I - INTRODUCTION 
Periodi': of relative regional stability, such as existed in the Middle Eas1 
between 1962 and 1967, provided opportunities for weak states to consolidate 
or diversify their sources of patronage as the superpowers attempted to build 
or cement their positions of regional influence. Fortunate indeed, in such 
a situatiori, was the prot~g~ which, because of its regional influence and its 
geo-strategic position, attracted the competitive attention of both super-
powers. For such a weak state the opportunities for increasing its support 
by balancing its patrons were manifold. However, a state which had little 
to off er the superpowers in terms of regional importance or strategic 
assets was likely to find itself at the end of the queue, receiving minor 
dispensation in proportion to its global and regional importance. Like the 
poor boy making good, such a state could only rely on its adeptness, its 
flexibility, its will to.survive, the good fortune it acquired from events 
outside its control, and the 'good intentions' of the dominant powers, were 
it to succeed in securing patronage and resisting the influence which came 
with it. 
At the beginning of the 1960s, Israel was very much at the end of the 
queue. The unremitting hostility of its Arab neighbours, which had come to 
be supported by the Soviet Union, had ensured the isolation of this weak 
state and made it dependent on the West for arms, aid and trade to secure 
its continued survival and well-being. While Israel had managed to gain 
French patronage after their cooperation during the Suez Crisis, there 
were now growing indications that this relationship would not last, as 
France began to negotiate with the FLN in Algeria and sought to improve its 
relations with the Arab states from which it had been estranged since 1956. 
The United States had also sought to reestablish relations with Egypt 
and was particularly concerned to avoid any new commitments to Israel, 
especially arms supplies, while there was some prospect that this effort 
might succeed. In the words of one of the practitioners of American policy 
in the Middle East at that time, "Israel needs to be viewed as a 
problem rather than an interest". 1 As Golda· Meir, then Israel's Foreign 
Minister, had noted: 
The rest of the world seems to be grouped into blocs 
that have sprung up because geography and history 
have combined to give common interests to their 
people. But our neighbours - and natural allies -
don't want to have anything to do with us, and we 
really belong nowhere and to no one, except to 
ourselves.2 · 
However, by the end of 1967 Israel appeared to have achieved a 
reversal in its fortunes. The Jewish state had secured an open arms 
supply relationship with the United States, had gained American 
acquiescence in its June pre-emption which had resulted in the 
devastating defeat of the Arab armies, and further, had ensured 
Washington's support for continued retention of terri_tories occupied 
during the 1967 war,until such time as a negotiated peace settlement 
could be achieved. The isolated state of 1960 had become the dominant 
military power in the Middle East and in the process had secured the 
political and military backing of the United States, the overwhelming 
support of Western public opinion,and the recognition of a significant 
number of developed and developing states. In short, Israel had 
transcended its regional isolation and in the process had secured 
3 
superpower patronage. 
Israel's surprising effectiveness in cementing its relationship 
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with the United States cannot be explained by simply pointing to the 
unique relationship which existed between the Jewish state and its 
American patron, for in the decade of the fifties, when the same moral 
commitment to Israel's survival existed in Washington, American decision-
makers not only rejected Israel's repeated requests for a security 
guarantee, but also refused to supply it with arms. When Israel launched 
a preventive war against Egypt in 1956 (with the support of France and 
Britain - America's allies) the United States demonstrated its 
opposition by pressuring Israel to withdraw from Sinai. Rather, the 
1. J. S. Badeau, The American Approach -to the Arab World_, p. 27. 
2. Golda Meir, My Life_, pp. 263-4. 
3. Cf. Abba Eban, "Reality and Vision in the Middle East; An Israeli 
View", Foreign Affairs_, Volume 43, 1965, pp. 626-638. 
explanation.for the reversal of Israel's fortunes in the sixties lies 
in its ability, during the period from 1962 to 1967, to exploit the 
changes in the global and regional environments by skilful utilisation 
of its contingent importance to the United States. Israel thereby 
translated an American moral commitment to its survival into tangible 
support for its policies and acti6ns. The examination of this 
bargaining process requires a division of American-Israeli relations 
into two areas: i) the arms supply relationship in the period before 
the Six Day War; ii) American acquiescence in Israel's pre-emption 
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and its subsequent political support for Israeli conditions for a 
settlement. In Loth areas it will be demonstrated that the combination 
of careful cultivation of relations, adept use of both tacit and explicit 
bargaining levers, and the application of will-power. enabled Israel to 
exploit favourable changes in the global and regional environment, to 
acquire American support and then to resist American influence. 
II. THE HAWK MISSILE NEGOTIATIONS 
In the face of Arab hostility and refusal to recognise the legitimacy 
of the Jewish state, Israel's decision-makers had made security the first 
priority in foreign policy. Having failed to gain a security guarantee 
from either the United States or Britain in the aftermath of the War of 
Independence, and having failed to encourage the great powers to maintain 
their arms embargo, Israel sought an open supply relationship with at 
least one Western power to maintain a balance of arms with its Arab 
neighbours. Both the United States and Britain sought to avoid 
identification in Arab eyes as arms purveyors to the Jewish state, and 
this concern became particularly acute following the Soviet-Egyptian 
arms deal of 1955, since such an identification was believed likely to 
encourage further Soviet ~enetratiod in the Arab world. 4 Despite 
this reluctance Israel's security policy remained clear: an arms 
balance would have to be maintained, sufficient to deter the Arab 
states from attac~ing Israel and, if deterrence should fail, sufficient 
5 to defeat the Arab armies .in war. The Soviet-Egyptian arms deal 
4. J.C. llurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension., New York, 
1969, p. 465. 
5. See Yigal Allon, The Making of Israel's A1"my., London, 1971, (Sphere 
Books Edition) pp. ?Off; Shimon Peres, David's Sling., London, 1970, p. 245. 
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seriously challenged this policy by raising the spectre of an arms balance 
tipped in Egypt's favour, following the introduction of IL-28 bombers and 
JS-12 tanks. However, Israel was fortunate indeed to find that the 
interests of France in North Africa and its opposition to Nasser in Egypt 
provided that country with the necessary incentive to enter into a tacit 
alliance with the Jewish state, supplying advanced interceptors as well 
as air defence during the 19S6 war. This war, fought by Israel in part 
to prevent the tipping of the arms balance against it, served to cement 
the Israeli-French arms relationship, which led to technical co-operation 
in the development of Israel's arms industry and its nuclear potential. 6 
Meanwhile, Dulles' post-war diplomacy, under the rubric of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, enabled the United States to avoid becoming a 
major arms supplier to the Middle East region by encouraging pro-Western 
Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon) to purchase their arms 
in London. On the question of arms supplies to Israel, American policy had 
now become formalised: the United States would seek to avoid becoming a 
major arms supplier to the region. However, the policy had undergone a 
subtle change as a result of the events of 1956-7. First, the United 
States had adopted a ~olicy of bolstering and protecting the status quo in 
the region - gone were the attempts to establish a Western defence alliance 
in the region, replaced by a policy of containment of the influence of the 
Soviet Union. Secondly, Washington had come to understand that Israeli 
fears of an imbalance in the arms equilibrium could lead to preventive war 
7 
and the consequent disruption of the status quo. Thus, while the United 
States refused to supply Israel with arms, it encouraged Israel to seek 
arms elsewhere, encouraged its allies to supply Israel with arms and in 
effect became the supplier of last resort if this proved to be the only way 
8 
to prevent a shift in the arms balance and a disruption of the stai:us quo. 
The challenge for Israel was to turn this policy of sympathetic detachment 
into an open commitment to Israel's security through the supply of American 
arms as the guarantee of Israel's deterrent strength. By the 1960's this 
6. On the Israeli-French relationship during this period see Sylvia 
Kowitt Crosbie, A Tacit Alliance_, France and Israel f1°om Suez to the 
Six Day l:Var_, Princeton, New Jersey, 1974. 
7. Abba Eban has noted that following the 1956 experience the United States 
had become more aware of the danger of neglecting Israel's security needs: 
"Washington now understood that embattled solitude was not the condition 
most likely to breed patient counsel in Israel 11 • Abba Eb an, My Count1~y _, p. 15E 
8. Hurewitz, op.cit._, p. 478. 
challenge had assumed some urgency for Nasser had embarked on a long-term 
policy of strengthening Egypt's arsenal and this forced Israel to seek a 
secure source for advanced and highly sophisticated weapons. 9 
By 1962 developments in the Middle East arms race had made the time 
opportune for an Israeli approach to Washington to alter its supply 
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policy. A request for Hawk air-defence missiles had apparently been placed 
by Ben-Gurion on his first visit to the United States in 1960. At the time 
the United States had encouraged him to seek arms from West Germany and, as 
we shall see, an agreement wa~ struck with Chancellor Adenauer, who met 
Ben-Gurion in New York during this visit, for the supply of helicopters, 
submarines, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank rockets, transport planes, spare 
parts, training devices and other equipment. However, West Germany could 
not supply an air defence system and for this Ben-Gurion turned to 
Washington. 10 He apparently received rio more than an assurance that the 
request would be looked at "with sympathy" as well as a "positive feeling" 
that Washington might provide development loan funds to assist Israel in 
11 paying for its arms purchases. However, in 1961 the revelation that both 
Egypt and Israel were embarking on missiles programmes raised fears in 
Washington that a new and dangerous arms race was developing which the 
United States would have to control. 
Nasser had initiated a programme to produce ground-to-ground missiles, 
employing German scientists to tap the expertise they had acquired in 
developing missiles during World War II. 12 Israel had been developing its 
missile technology with French assistance in strict secrecy, but the 
publicity given to Nasser's programme apparently forced a demonstration of 
Israel's capabilities as a means of maintaining the credibility of Israel's 
deterrent posture. Thus in July 1961 the Shavit II unguided, meteorological 
rocket was launched in the presence of the Prime Minister, Deputy Defence 
Minister, the chief of Staff and other high ranking security 
9. Crosbie, op.cit.~ pp. 227-30. 
10. Shimon Peres, who as Deputy Defence Minister negotiated Israel's arms 
deals, notes that the British Bloodhound was available but was not 
considered suitable for 1srael' s requirements. See Peres, op. c-it. ~ p. 77; 
Hurewitz, op.ci-/;.~ p. 477; Safran, Fr•om War to War~ pp. 167-169. 
11. IntervieuJ fvith Avrahcon Harman , Israeli Ambassador to Washington, 
(1960-67), Jerusalem, 13 April, 1975. 
12.See Lewis A. Frank, "Nasser's Missile Program", Orbis~ Volume XI, No. 3, 
Fall 1967, pp. 746-757. 
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personnel. 
Washington's fears about these developments were compounded by Ben-
Gurion's announcement, in December 1960, that what Washington had been led 
to believe was a textile factory was actually a large nuclear reactor under 
14 
construction at Dimona in the Negev desert. In the light of this 
announcement it was thought that the development of missiles could well be 
part of a nuclear weapons programme in Israel, matched by a similar 
15 development in Egypt. Although Ben-Gurion had declared that the 
development of the 24-megawatt nuclear reactor was intended for peaceful 
purposes only, the elaborate secrecy surrounding its construction and the 
fact that no details of the agreement with France for its construction had 
been released, created serious suspicions in Washington. President Kennedy 
put pressure on Ben-Gurion to allow the United States to inspect the Dimona 
site in order to determine whether a separation plartt was being constructed. 
Ben Gurion resisted this pressure, but after meeting with Kennedy in New 
York in May 1961, he agreed to regular inspections, the first of which 
16 took place shortly afterwards. 
Appare,ntly, the pressure Kennedy applied included a suggestion that 
refusal to allow inspection might lead to the termination of American 
assistance in the nuclear field. 17 Ben-Gurion's biographer states that 
the Kennedy administration used "sharply-worded notes, veiled threats and 
18 
allusions to measures that the United States might employ" , but 
it later became known that Washington had also used some positive 
13. The military significance of this meteorological rocket was emphasised 
by Peres when he told the press that the development of rockets had been 
given high priOrity because of ''grave defence problems". A government 
spokesman declared at the time that the rocket was meant to forestall the 
Egyptian missile programme. See Simcha Flapan, "Nuclear Power in the Middle 
East - the Critical Years", New Outlook, Volume 17, No. 8, October 1974, 
pp. 35-36; Fuad Jabber, Israel and Nuclear Weapons, London, 1971, p. 95. 
14. Ben-Gurion announced that the 24,000 kilowatt thermal reactor was 
scheduled to be completed in 1964. Ambassador Harman gave the Eisenhower 
Administration official assurances that Israel was not engaged in nuclear 
weapons production. See Jabber, ibid., pp. 34-5. 
15. The recruitment of German scientists had raised the suspicion that 
Nasser was also developing weapons of mass destruction. While Egypt did 
not have the capability to produce nuclear weapons it may have been develop-
ing chemical and bacteriological warfare. Flapan, op.c1:t., p. 36. 
16. Ben-Gurion permitted a second visit in the summer of 1962. The Arnericar. 
inspectors reported that no separation plant had been erected at Dimona. 
See Aubrey Hodes, Dialogue with Ishmael, Israel's Futu.re in the Middle 
East, New York, 1968, pp. 231-2. 
17. The U.S. had helped construct a much smaller reactor at Nahal Soreq 
which, although it could not provide enough plutonium for the construction 
of a bomb, was important in training Israel's nuclear scientists. See 
Jabber, Chapter 2. 
13. M. Bar-Zohar,The Armed Pr•cphet: A Biography of Ben-Gurion,London, 1966, 
p. 283. 
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inducements as a qu·id pro quo for inspection. Kennedy had sent Mike 
FeldmRn, his special advisor on the Middle East, to Israel in early 1961 
to pledge both the protection of the Sixth Fleet in the event of Arab 
aggression and the supply of Hawk missiles in return for inspection 
. h D. 19 rig ts at imona. 
It is unlikely that Ben-Gurion actually bargained for the Hawk missiles 
in exchange for a commitment ·not to go nuclear since there was, at the time, 
a reluctance to use Israel's nuclear potential as a bargaining lever because 
of its intrinsic importance. Moreover it appears that a decision not 
to build a separation plant, at that stage, had already been taken because 
the Cabinet had been persuaded to concentrate on building a conventional 
deterrent which would require a large investment in armour and air-power. 
20 Accordingly, the Government reduced expenditure on nuclear development. 
Nevertheless, the connection, however tacit, between Israel's ability 
to defend itself with conventional arms, and its ability therefore to forgo 
nuclear development, had been established in the minds of American decision-
makers and this had paved the way for the conclusion of the Hawk missile 
deal. 21 
The Amer icon decision, in principle, to supply Isroel with the 
Hawks was not announced until September 17, 1962, even though the 
commitment appears to have been made in 1961. 22 The Kennedy administr<l.tion' s 
desire to be seen to adhere to the principle of not becoming a major 
supplier of arms to Middle East states was clearly the reason for the delay. 
A new approach to the Arab world, with its focus on economic aid to 
Egypt, had been launched and the administration, particularly the State 
Department, wished to avoid jeopardising the development of these relations 
by becoming identified as Israel's protector and the opponent of the 
forces of change and modernisation in the Arab world. 23 
19. Feldman confirmed this in an interview in 1968. See 11 '61 Pledge 
to Israel by U.S. is Confirmed", New Yor•k Times, 16 June, 1968. 
20. Yair Evron, Nuclear Options in a Regional Sub-System: The Case of 
Isra(',l wi·th Some General Comparative References, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of London, 1971, Chapter III; Yigal Allon, op.cit., pp. 78-79. 
21. Cf. Leonard Beaton, "Why Israel does not need the Bomb", New Middle 
East, No. 7, April,1969, pp. 7-11. 
22. Apart from Feldman's confirmation of the offer of the Hawks, Peres 
states that he went to Washington in early 1963 to follow-up Ben-Gurion's 
request for these missiles. See Peres, op.cit., p. 93. 
23. Hurewitz, op.cit., p. 478; see Chapter 3 below for a detailed analysis 
of this approach. 
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However, developments in the arms race provided both the justification 
and the necessity for publicly announcing the decision in 1962. By that 
time the Soviet Union had supplied Egypt with TU-16 medium bombers, more IL-21 
light bombers, and MT.G-2,1 supersonic interceptors. Although Israel had 
purchased French Mirage III and Super Mystere interceptors to counter these 
supplies, the numerical superiority of the Egyptian deployment not only 
gave it the prospect of air superiority over the battlefield, but also 
24 provided a limited strategic threat to Israel. The United States 
recognised that the balance would have to be redressed and that the safest 
way of doing so was to supply Israel with purely defensive weapons. 
Moreover it could claim justification for selling Israel the Hawks "to 
achieve a balance again and to maintain an admittedly precarious peace in 
25 the area''. Further justification was provided by the launching of Egypt's 
first test missile on July 21, 1962. Shortly befoie the administration 
announced its Hawk decision Kennedy sent a message to Nasser which noted 
that the firing of the missile "was bound to accelerate the arms race" 
and informed him of the decision to supply Israel with a missile-defence 
system. Heikal, Nasser's confidant, notes that this manoeuvre tied Nasser's 
hands and prevented him from protesting the arrangement. 26 
The public outcry in Israel over Egypt's missile development also 
made it necessary to announce publicly the Hawk missile decision since 
the Kennedy administration apparently feared that the anxiety of Israelis 
might force the government to change its plans for nuclear development. 
The symbolic importance of American missiles would serve to allay Israeli 
concern while undercutting any justification that the government might 
27 have for proceeding with a nuclear weapons programme. 
24. See Glassman, Arms for the Arabs_, pp. 30-31; John H. Hoagland Jr. and 
John B. Teeple, "Regional Stability and Weapons Transfer: The Middle Eastern 
Case", Orbis_, Volume IX, No. 3, Fall 1965, pp. 714-719. 
25. Max Frankel, "U.S. will supply Israel Missiles in Policy change", 
New York :times_, 27 September, 1962. 
26. See Mohamed Heikal, :the Cairo Documents_, New York, 1973, pp. 207-8 
and 222. 
27. Sec Simcha Flapan, "Nuclear Power in the Middle East", New Outlook_, 
Volume 17, No. 6, July, 1974, pp. 46-54, for the public outcry in Israel. 
.i\mbassador Harman noted that the "symbolic imagery" of the missiles was 
important. The New York Times report of the announcement noted that although 
l!awks were designed for use against aircraft the U.S. army had proved that 
they were effective against offensive missiles,Interviez.u uJith Avraham HaY'171an 
and, New Yori< 7'imes_, Zoe. cit. 
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This fear also found expression in Kennedy's request, at the same time 
as he informed Nasser of the Hawk decision, to pledge that Egypt would not 
seek atomic weapons and that he allow American inspection of Egypt's 
28 
nuclear reactor. Since Egypt's reactor was clearly too small to produce 
weapons-grade plutonium in the necessary quantities (except over a long 
period of time), it seems fair to assume that the request for inspection 
was designed as a further means for allaying Israeli fears, as well as a 
quid pro quo for American inspection of Dimona. 
Washington's unpublicised actions in 1962 were also designed to 
strengthen Israel's confidence in its ability to maintain a 
conventional deterrent against Arab hostility. Ezer Weizmann, then 
conunander of the Israel Air Force, claims that Kennedy had declared that 
the United States was prepared to sell Israel "as many batteries of Hawks 
29 
as you need". Moreover, American development loans to Israel were 
boosted from $16 million in 1961 to $45 million in 1962 as indirect 
30 
assistance to pay for the arms deal. And as further assurance, Feldman's 
earlier commitment of the protection of the Sixth Fleet was reinforced by 
a Presidential assurance given to Foreign Minister Meir that "the United 
States was, in effect, Israel's 'ally', joined to her in a relationship 
f . 1 • . II 31 o specia intimacy 
28 .. Heikal, op.cit.> p. 208. Nasser's account of these requests puts 
their date at the end of 1963 rather than at the end of 1962. Either one 
of them has his dates wrong or the request was repeated in 1963. However 
it is clear from statements made by Kennedy and Harriman that 
representations had been made in Cairo on the issue of nuclear weapons well 
before the end of 1963. See "President Nasser's Address on the Eve of the 
Thirteenth Anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution", Arab Political 
DocW11ents> 1965> Beirut (n.d.), pp. 276-7; "Reply by President Kennedy to 
a Question Asked at a News Conference, April 3, 1963", and "Address by the 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs [Harriman], October 26, 
1963", in American Foreign Policy> Current DocUJ71ents> 1963., Washington D.C., 
1966, pp. 568 and 580. 
29. E. Weizmann, On Eagles' Wings> Jerusalem, 1976, p. 185. 
30. These loans were repayable over ten years nt an interest rate of 1-21/2%. 
A similar loan was made in 1963 to provide funds for Hawk purchases and for 
the training of personnel. Near East Report> Volume VII, 1963, pp. 26 
and 55; Interview with Avraham Harman. 
31. Eban, My Country> p. 156; Cf. Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's 
Foreign Pol-icy> London, 1974, p. 322. The United States also encouraged 
a reluctant West Germany to continue its arms shipments. See Peres, 
op.cit.> pp. 75-78. 
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From a position of detachment in the face of an accelerating 
arms race during the Eisenhower administration, Washington had reversed 
its policy, had become a significant, if not major, source of arms 
supplies for the Jewish state, and had given tangible assurances of 
An1erican support for its survival. Thus the long-term political and 
military significance of the Hawk deal should not be underestimated, even 
though the missile was a str:Lctly defensive weapon and not very important 
32 
to Israel's military strategy of preemptive war. As Weizmann notes, 
"the first time thLlt an American president decided to sell arms to 
Israel was, without doubt, a breakthrough of the first magnitude 11 • 33 
Its political significance lay in the fact that the pre-eminent superpower 
was now overtly supporting Israel's defence with supersonic weapons 
which had not previously been supplied to a nation outside the Western 
military alliances. Its military significance lay in the fact that the 
verbal principle of American support for a military balance in the Hiddle 
East had been converted into a tangible demonstration of its willingness 
to counter Russian shipments of sophisticated weapons to the region. 
Moreover, Israel had demonstrated that it could secure access to advanced 
and highly sophisticated weaponry, not available from its traditional 
sources of supply, to match Egypt's development of missiles and its 
d 1 f f 1 . s . . 34 ep oyment o rant- ine oviet equipment. 
In explaining this turn-around in American policy we have emphasised 
the role of Israel's nuclear development, the emerging missile race, and 
the Soviet escalation of the arms race as decisive factors which worked in 
Israel's favour. These levers were complemented by two other sources 
of leverage inherent in Israel's relationship with the United States. 
First, An1erica' s support for Israel's existence assumed greater importance 
during Kennedy's administration because the President "believed strongly 
32. Weizmann apparently argued that Israel should purchase only a 
rnillimum number of batteries since Israel would attack fj.rst and 
therefore needed offensive not defensive weapons. Weizmann, op.cit. 3 
p. 185; cf. Edward Lultwak and Dan Horowitz, 'i~c Israeli Anny3 London, 
1975, pp. 198-9. 
33. Ibid. 3 p. 181+. Peres, who was reluctant to seek arms from the 
United States, preferring to depend on Europe, agreed with Weizmann's 
judgement that the deal constituted a breakthrough in the American 
embargo. See Peres, op.cit.~ p. 99. 
34. Crosbie, lee.cit.; Weizmann, op.cit. 3 p. 18<'f; Interview w'ith 
Avr•aham Barman. 
in America's moral commitment to Israeli security1135 Golda Meir has 
described how she explained to.Kennedy that Israel "desperately needed 
arms", for, she argued, were Israel again to lose its sovereignty the 
Jews of the world would no longer be able to retain their identity - this 
time it would be lost forever. Kennedy is said to have replied 
solemnly: "I understand, Mrs Meir. Don't worry. Nothing will happen 
to Israel. 1136 
If Kennedy's moral commitment to Israel was important in the 
Hawk decision, so too was his concern for the Jewish vote in the 1962 
Congressional elections. In the 1960 campaign Kennedy had gained the 
largest proportion of Jewish votes of any presidential candidate, but 
historically Congressional voting had not been much affected by the 
popularity of the president. The administration needed extra Democrats 
in the Congress and the Jewish vote therefore assumed greater importance 
than it had in Kennedy's own campaign. Thus just as the administration 
backed away from the Johnson plan for settling the Palestinian refugees, 
partly because of its unpopularity amongst American Jews, so too did it 
ensure that the leaders of Jewish organisations were informed of the 
37 Hawk decision before it was publicly announced in September 1962. 
Just how important these two factors were in the calculus of the Hawk 
decision cannot be ascertained but it is clear that they reinforced 
the strategic arguments in favour of supplying the weapons. 
It is likely that the State Department opposed the decision on the 
grounds that it would jeopardise the administration's new approach to 
Egypt. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kitchen tended to confirm 
this in testimony to Congress in 1967: 
35. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days; John F. Kennedy ~n the 
White House, London, 1967, p. 451. 
36. Golda Meir, My Life, p. 259. 
37. See William B. Quandt, United States Policy in the Middle East: 
Constl~aints and Choices, Rand Corporation, RH -5980-FF, February, 1970, 
pp. 34-5; J.E. Johnson, "Arab vs. Israeli: A Persistent Challenge to 
Americans", Middle East ,Jour•nal, Volume 18, No. 1, Winter 196Lf; 
New York Times, 27 September, 1962. 
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First, the overriding consideration was for the United States 
not to be identified as a heavy or principal supplier to 
either of the antagonists in a potential conflict. Second, 
we wanted to maintain as much suasion as we could in the 
Arab countries. We felt that would have been decreased if 
we had become a large single source supplier to 
Israe1.38 
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Peres also states that on his visit to Washington in 1963 to finalise the 
arrangements for the purchase- of the missiles, he experienced 
bureaucratic hold-ups and made no headway until the President., 
Robert Kennedy and Mike Feldman intervened to clear away the State 
Department's objections. 39 Thus strategic arguments alone might not have 
been sufficient to secure the Hawks for Israel had they not been 
reinforced by the desire in the White House to sell the missiles to 
Israel. 
The conclusion of the Hawk missile deal, accompanied as it was by 
economic assistance and verbal assurances about the constancy of 
American support, represented a triumph for Israel's security policy. 
It was the first overt American arms commitment since the creation of the 
Jewish state. As such it illustrated the interplay of Israel's intrinsic 
resources (its capability to develop missile and nuclenr technologies), 
with contingent events beyond Israel's control (the Soviet provision of a 
limited strategic option to Egypt and Egypt's own development of missiles), 
and with factors derived from Israel's support within the American polity 
(the President's belief in the "special relationship" between the United 
States and Israel, the support of his advisors in the White House and the 
role of the Jewish vote in the 1962 Congressional elections). Thus, 
although Israel had some tough negotiating to do in New York and 
Washington, these other factors made the task much easier and enabled 
Israel to overcome the block.age in the State Department. The American 
policy of "supplier of last resort" had been converted into a tangible 
arms deal. 
However, the United States stressed that the sale of Hawks was 
an exception to its policy of not becoming a major supplier of arms to 
the region and Israel was told to continue to seek its arn1s in 
38. See Testimony of Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Politico-Military Affairs, in Committee on Foreign Relations, 
U.S. Senate, Arms Sales to Near East and South Asian Countries, 90th Congress, 
1st Session, Washington, 22 June, 1967, p. 98. 
39. Peres, op.cit., pp. 94-9. In the 1964 Congressional campaign 
Robert Kennedy declared that he had played an important role in getting 
Israel the Hawks. The Near East Report, in its eulogy of President 
Kennedy, described his role in the Hawk deal as "decisive". See New York 
Times, 28 September, 1964; Near East Report, Volume VII, 1963. p. 101. 
40 Europe. Thus the challenge to Israel's leadership now became to 
convert this "once-only" deal into an open and continuous relationship; 
to transform American policy from that of "supplier of last resort" 
to that of supporter of Israel's deterrent strength. 
III. ESHKOL'S QUEST FOR AMERICAN ARMS 
The U.S. State Department had found it relatively easy to 
neutralise the impact of the Hawk sale on American relations with the 
Arab world. Nevertheless, it had a significant stake in ensuring that 
further deals of this kind were avoided and especially in ensuring that 
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the United States did not become identified as the major source of arms for 
the Jewish state. The pursuit of the national interest had long been 
regarded as the preserve of the State Department; it was the role of 
the White House and Congress to concern themselves with domestic pressure 
in favour of particular foreign policies. While State did not ignore 
domestic realities, it saw as its role the articulation of the general 
national interest as a counter to what it regarded .as the parochial interests 
of domestic pressure groups. In the Middle East it was clear to the 
State Department that America's national interests lay in the cultivation 
of relations with the Arab world because of its strategic and economic 
importance; as far as State was concerned, support for Israel only 
hindered the pursuit of these interests. The fact that American public 
opinion called for the preservation of the Jewish state, and that both 
the President and Congress responded to this attitude, created a problem 
for ":Foggy Bottom" in its articulation of what it regarded as the pure 
national interest - a problem which could not be eliminated while the 
Arab-Israeli conflict continued, but it was hoped could be either 
neutralised or restricted in its impact on American foreign policy. 41 
40. See Current Docwnents, 1963, p. 580; Heikal, The Cairo Docwnents, p. 234. 
Lfl. An excellent example of the State Department view at the time was given 
by Ambassador Badeau upon his return from service in Cairo: "It needs to be 
made clear both in Congress and in sections of the general public that the 
American commitment to Israel is limited ... The basic consideration must 
always be what serves AJ:ierican interests in the Middle East. This 
principle is understood in policy-making circles in Washington and, in 
general, action accords with it. The difficulty lies in the sensitive 
domestic political situation ... It is too much to expect that all politicians 
will resist the temptation to drag Israel into their election campaigns as a 
vote-catching device ... but it would help if American policy decisions 
involving Israel could be kept out of election campaigns, thus underscoring 
their character as considered moves based upon American national interest 
and not merely election gestures". John S. Badeau, "U.S.A. and U.A.R. - A 
Crisis in Cmfidence", Foreign Affairs, Volume 43, 1965, p. 295, (emphasis 
in original). 
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This desire to neutralise the impact of domestic support for Israel 
had become crucial in the early sixties because of the opportunity, 
provided by an initiative from President Kennedy, to improve relations 
with the Arab world through a "new approach" to the forces of nationalism 
and modernisation in the region. Thus, in its attempt to build American 
influence in the Arab capitals, the State Department decided that the 
best way to deal with America·' s commitment to Israel was to place the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in the "ice-box" through an open recognition of 
the differences that existed between the Arab states and Washington and 
an emphasis on the areas of interest which both sides held in common -
American assisted economic development leading to peaceful and stable 
. 42 
evolution. Naturally arms sales to Israel were one sure way of 
removing the Arab-Israeli conflict from the "ice-box" and making it a 
salient point of divergence in relations with the Arab world, so the 
State Department could be counted on to oppose vehemently any new arms 
deals with Israel. 
On the other hand, while the White House listened to the counsel 
of the diplomats, it also had to consider Congressional and public 
opinion, which strongly favoured tangible support for Israel's security. 
So there was a basic divergence between the interests and policies of 
the diplomats in the State Department and those of the politician-
President in the ~1ite House. Herein lay the challenge to Israel in 
attempting to change American arms policy. Somehow Israeli leaders had 
to overcome the arguments of the State Department - that Israel should 
seek and could purchase its arms in Europe, and that the United States 
should remain the "supplier of last resort" in order not to interfere 
with the American approach to the Arab world. A sympathetic President 
and a supportive Congress were necessary but not, in this case, 
sufficient to overcome the 'elegant' arms embargo; Israel would have to 
present a convincing case· that American arms were necessary for the 
maintenance of American interests in the region, thereby Plec.ting the 
objections of the State Department. 
During Ben-Gurion's long tenure as Prime Minister and Defence :Minister 
this idea of securing an open arms relationship with the United States 
had not received much support because he believed that Europe could in 
fact meet Israel's requirements: Deputy Defence Minister Peres had indeed 
42. This approach is analysed in detail in Chapter Three. 
succeeded in securing arms from France, Britain and later West Germany. 
Although the Foreign Ministry under Sharett,and later Golda Meir 
understood the political importance of receiving arms from the United 
States, Peres had the support of Ben-Guiron for covert arrangements with 
Europe. Taking advantage of French sympathies for the victims of Nazism 
and antagonism towards Nasser because of his support for the FLN in 
"Algeria, Peres was able to secure French aircraft, particularly the 
supersonic Mirage, and French assistance in the development of Israel's 
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nuclear and missile technology. Although it was a politically explosive 
issue, Peres and Ben-Gurion also took advantage of Germany's special 
responsibility to the Jewish state to secure weaponry gratis. Because 
Peres' opinions carried weight in Ben-Gurion's cabinets, his view became 
accepted: Am_erican friendship would be limited by its desire for "Arab 
sympathy'', and by the dictates of its national interests. Further, he 
argued that while the Europeans were prepared to provide whatever was 
requested, if arms could be secured from the United States, they would 
1 d l 1 1 d . l . 44 come attac1e wit1 po itica strings an attempts to supervise tie1r use. 
However, in June 1963 Ben-Gurion retired and was replaced by Levi 
Eshkol as Prime Minister and Defence Minister. Eshkol did not accept 
Peres' argument tl1at Israel should seek closer ties with Europe and mount 
a drive to join the emerging European economic and defence comm.unities. 
Sceptical of the constancy of French policy and more suspicious of the 
"new" Germany than his predecessor, Eshkol was aware that, if an open arms 
supply r.elationship with Americ.a could be secured, it would represent a 
greater and more reliable source of security for an Israel which now 
needed sophisticated arms to counter the supply of Soviet front-line 
equipment to Egypt and Syria. His Deputy Prime Minister, Abba Eban, was 
a strong proponent of the American axis because he well understood the 
special nature of the relationship. He argued that, unlike Israel's 
relations with Europe, "the American-Israel partnership owes more to 
historical affinities reaching back into the national experience of both 
peoples than to any transient conditions of political harmony or 
international expediency' 1 • 45 Eshkol's Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, also 
43. See Crosbie, /l Tacit lllliance~ Chapter VIII. 
44. See Shimon Peres, "Outline for an Israeli Foreign Policy", 
Nez,1 Outlook~ Volume 4, September, 1963, pp. 14-19; Erecher, The Foreign 
Policy Sy.stem of Isr'ael~ pp. 339-343. 
45. Cited in Brecher, ibid.~ p. 331. 
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supported a new approach to Washington, both because she viewed the United 
States as the most important source of support, and because she sought 
a new foreign policy orientation to undercut Peres' influence and 
to prevent Ben-Gurion's legacy from passing to the 'youngsters' (i.e. 
Peres and Dayan). Eshkol himself perceived the same advantage because 
of the threat which l3en-Gurion's technocratic disciples presented to his 
own tenure as Prime Minister: 46 Thus Israel under Eshkol had decided, 
both for security and for domestic political reasons, to pursue relations 
with the United States, with the express purpose of gaining greater 
political and military support from this superpower patron. 
Clearly Israeli determination would hardly constitute a sufficient 
reason for Washington to abandon its detached approach, but it would 
provide the will-power necessary to employ the various means of leverage 
at Israel's disposal, to capitalise on the underlying connnonality 
of interests between the patron and its client, and to concentrate its 
efforts on surmounting the opposition of the State Department. In this 
regard, the leverage which Israel possessed stemmed not from its 
inherent strategic significance in the calculus of America's national 
interest, for that was small indeed, but rather from the contingent 
importance which its strategic position acquired from developments in 
the regional balance of power. These contingent factors enabled Israel 
to build, on the base of America's underlying commitment, an argument 
which the State Department was eventually unable to resist. 
Perhaps the most important development in this process was the 
foundering of the new, State Department engineered, approach to Egypt, 
already in evidence by the beginning of 1964. The argument that American 
assistance would encourage Nasser to concen.trate on economic development 
sounded hollow indeed as he refused to withdraw his troops from Yemen, 
bombed Saudi Arabian villages, stirred-up trouble in Aden, Libya and 
47 Cyprus and raised the spectre of war with Israel. While the State 
Department continued to defend the approach, there was a growing 
46. Under Ben Gurion, Peres had operated as "adjunct foreign minister" 
to the military estcJblishrnents of Europe, bypassing Golda. Meir and 
refusing to inform the Foreign Ministry of his negotiations. See ibid . ., 
Chapter 13; Amos Pcrlmut ter, "The l\cn-Gurion Lt~gacy and its Ch::illengcrs", 
M1:ddle E'ar;t ,Tournal, Volume 22, No. 4, Autumn 1968, pp. 415-!132. 
47. See Badeau, "U.S.A. and U.A.R.", lac.cit . ., pp. 287-290; and Chapter 
Three below. 
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sentiment in the Administration that stability might be better purchased 
by bolstering the strength of the 'conservative' Arab states and Israel -
the status quo forces in the region. Since the Soviet Union appeared 
determined to continue its arming of Egypt and its exploitation 
of the tension created by pan-Arabism, and since Nasser appeared 
determined to use this support as a means for spreading his influence 
throughout the region, a policy of containment gained increasing support 
in Washington over the policy of encouraging Nasser to turn his attention 
48 
away from foreign exploits to internal economic development. Thus, 
insofar as decision-makers in Washington might be prepared to see in 
Israel a force for stability and the containment of Nasser's influence, 
to that extent they would be receptive to Israel's requests for the 
weapons necessary to bolster its strength. Moreover, a strong Israel 
could serve the twofold purpose of deterring Egypt from attack, thereby 
helping to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 'ice-box', and also of 
reducing the temptation for Israel to pre-empt through fear of the balance 
of power tipping against it. Israeli deterrence was not a popular 
concept in the State Department, but the tacit threat, that Israel might 
pre-empt and thus cause instability if it did not have sufficient strength 
to deter or absorb an Arab first-strike, represented a danger which the 
diplomats well understood, and wished to avoid. 49 
Eshkol demonstrated his awareness of this leverage when he stated, 
iri his first press conference: 
... the best contribution the United States could make would be 
to take measures in order to prevent the creation of circumstances 
which may make a military attack on Israel possible.SO 
He also adopted a policy of restraint towards the Arabs, which was 
admittedly aimed at encouraging more moderate attitudes in Arab capitals, 
but which also served to bolster Israel's image as a force contributing 
to stability in the reg~on. Instead of pursuing Ben Gurion's policy of 
"massive retaliation" for guerrilla raids and border attacks, he held this 
48. Cit-ed.inBrecher, pp. 386-7. 
49. Thus in a State Department document which was drawn up in 1965 to 
explain American policy to the Egyptian Government the authors noted: 
" ... the key to the shaky peace in the Near East, therefore, may lie only 
in preventing imbalances to categories of arms that might lead to 
pre-emptive strike ... " Cited in Heikal, The Cairo Documents~ p. 235. 
50. Cited in Near East Report~ Volume VII, 1963, p. 62. 
policy in abeyance while seeking diplomatic support for Israel's 
territorial integrity. 51 Insofar as arms supplies would strengthen 
Israel's perception of its own security and encourage continued 
moderation, a strong case could be made in Washington that meeting 
Israel's arms requests served America's interests in stability and 
tranquillity in the Middle East. 
The Soviet Union's continued supply of weapons to its Arab 
clients provided a second source of contingent leverage for Israel. 
In June 1963 the Soviet Uni.on concluded a new arms agreement with 
Egypt, whose value has been estimated at $500 million, and whose 
contents included further shipments of TU-16 medium bombers, HIG-21 
supersonic interceptors and other aircraft, as well as large numbers 
of T-54B medium tanks. Similar but smaller deals were also 
52 
concluded with Syria and Iraq. As we have already noted, Israel 
was able to counter the supply of supersonic aircraft and strategic 
bombers by its purchase of the French Mirage III and the American Hawk 
missiles. However, the Soviet decision to equip two Egyptian armored 
divisions with its front-line T-54 tanks meant a significant qualitative 
improvement in Egyptian ground forces and therefore lent credence to 
Israel's requests for tanks capable of matching this deployment. The 
leverage which Israel acquired over the United States as a result of 
this new injection of Soviet arms might not have been significant if a 
European tank had been rolling off the production lines, for the State 
Department could have again argued that Israel should acquire its arms 
from Europe. However, disagreements between the French and Germans 
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at both the technical and political levels and a reduction in the German 
defence budget had delayed the production of a French-German tank, 
leaving the American Patton W-48) tank as the only viable alternative. 53 
51. See Fred J. Khouri, "The Policy of Retaliation in Arab-Israeli 
Relations", Middle East Journal, Volume 20, No. 4, Autumn 1966, pp. Lf35-455. 
52. See Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, pp. 24-27; Safran, op.cit., p. 214 
and 231; and John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, Arms to Developing 
Countr•ies, 1945-1965_, Adelphi Papers, No. 28, October, 1966. 
53. Peres, Dav-id's Sling_, p. 77; Zeev Schiff, A History of the Isr'ae"li 
Army_, (1870-1974), San Francisco, 1974, p. 259. 
Thus, if Washington was committed to ensuring an arms balance beti,,'een 
Israel and the Arabs, it would have to find a way to supply Israel with 
Pat tons. 
Moreover, in a more general sense, the Soviet arms deal gave Israel 
leverage over the State Department itself. This leverage arose as an 
indirect consequence of growing Congressional criticism of American aid 
to Egypt because of Nasser's "'trouble-making' in the region. By 1964 
the State Department found itself defending aid to Egypt against 
Congressional charges that this assistance enabled Nasser to divert 
E · S . . . . S4 I d 19 63 
·gyptian resources to oviet arms acquisitions. n mi -
amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act had been tabled in both Houses 
which called for an end to American assistance to nations acquiring 
Soviet weapons.SS In its final form the Foreign Assistance Act for 1963 
contained a provision which required that all aid under this or any 
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other Act be cut off to any country which the President determined had 
attacked or was preparing for aggression against the United States or any 
U.S. aid recipient ; the sponsors made it clear that this provision 
S6 
was aimed at Egypt. In defence of the aid policy, the State Department 
argued that to deny aid would only tend to increase tension "without 
curbing the priorities which are given to military preparedness''. State 
also sought to reassure Congress that "there is no question as to the 
reality and depth of the Department's attention to the integrity and 
II S7 
security of Israel . 
But were State to prove that its attention to Israel's security equalled 
its attention ·to Egypt's economic needs, it could not easily oppose Israel's 
acquisition of arms. If it opposed the suggestion of cutting economic 
assistance as a means of reducing Nasser's arms procurements it could 
S4. See T.C. Bose, The Superpowers and the Middle East_, pp. 64-71. 
SS. In tabling the amendment Senator Keating argued that "Congress 
certainly should reduce any aid programme for Nasser by at least the amount 
that Nasser feels able to splurge on Soviet equipment". Near' East Report_, 
Volume VII, 1963, pp. S9-60. 
56. Congressional Quarterly Almanac_, Volume XIX, 1963. In proposing 
the provision Senator Greuning also made it clear that he expected 
the State Department to change its attitude towards Nasser, otherwise 
Congress would write the law "so that there will be no discretion and 
no argument", Near East Report_, Volume VII, 1963, pp. 97-99. 
57. Letter from Assistant Secretary of Stat~ Philips Talbot, to Senator 
Javits, 20 Hay 1963, cited in Near East Rcpm't_, Volume VII, 1963, pp. 97-99. 
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not effectively oppose arms sales tolsrael as a counter to Egypt's build-up; 
State could only hope that Israel's arms request would be met by the 
Europeans. 
Further, Israel gained leverage with the United States as an indirect 
result of the impact of Soviet arms supplies on the inter-Arab conflict. 
The United States, i.n particular the State Department, had long felt the 
need to protect the 'conservative" states of Saudi Arabia and Jordan from 
the pressures of Nasser's pan-Arab nationalism and the need to prevent 
the spread of Soviet influence to these states through the proffering 
of Russian arms. Saudi Arabia, engaged in war with Egypt over Yemen, 
needed aircraft and missiles to defend itself from Egyptian bombing raids. 
Jordan, having joined the Egyptian-sponsored United Arab Command as a 
result of Arab summitry, was under pressure to equip its army and air-force 
with Soviet weaponry, which was offered at cut-rate prices and which would 
be paid for by the UAC. Thus, were the United States to protect Saudi 
Arabia on the one hand, and enable Jordan to withstand Egyptian pressure 
to purchase Soviet equipment on the other, it would have to ensure that these 
58 
states received arms from Western sources. Such action would indirectly 
create a further imbalance in the Arab-Israeli arms race since these 
weapons could also be directed against the Jewish state, so Israel could 
demand reciprocal treatment for its arms requests in order to maintain 
the balance. As we shall see, this contingent bargaining lever played 
an important role in Israel's acquisition of American tanks and Skyhawk 
tactical bombers. 
All these contingent factors, which were, for the most part, outside 
the control of Israel, were enhanced by Eshkol's use of the nuclear 
option, an intrinsic Israeli resource, as a tacit bargaining lever. Despite 
Ben-Gurion's assurances that Israel's nuclear development was designed 
for peaceful purposes, Washington remained perturbed about this development 
for a number of reasons: i) if Israel went nuclear, or was suspected of 
doing so, Egypt might seek and acquire nuclear weapons, adding a dangerous 
58. In the same State Department memorandum, the United States told 
Nasser: "Although the Arabs may not appreciate the danger, the 
alternative of Soviet arms in Jordan would mean a Soviet presence and 
influence in the area from which they had previously been excluded. 
Resultant dangers to stability of the entire Near East would threaten 
Arab as well as outside interests. The United States therefore 
decided it would sell arms to Jordan to prevent Soviet exploitation of 
the situation ..• ", Heikal, op.cit.,, p. 236; Hurewitz, Middle East 
Politics,, p. 483. 
and perhaps uncontrollable dimension to the Middle East arms rac.e; 
ii) if, in response to Israel's development of a nuclear option, 
Egypt gained either weapons or a nuclear guarantee from the Soviet 
Union, this would seriously undermine Washington's attempts to avoid 
polarisation between the superpowers in the Middle East; iii) since, 
as a result of mutual nuclear deterrence at the superpower level, 
both Mose.ow and Washington would be unlikely to become involved in 
nuclear war on behalf of their clients, nuc.learisation of the Middle 
East would inhibit Washington's ability to compete for the allegiance 
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of Soviet proteges, and would make its guarantees to its own proteges 
less credible; iv) a nuclear Israel would create doubts about the 
ability of the superpowers to control the spread of nuclear weapons, 
would reduce the credibility of a superpower umbrella and thereby would 
undercut Washington's role as guarantor of the independence of small 
nations, perhaps encouraging other states to seek a nuclear c.apability. 59 
Eshkol seemed to understand the leverage which this c.onc.ern could 
provide through linking non-development of Israeli nuclear weapons to 
the notion of conventional 'suffic.ienc.y''. However, the issue of 
nuclear deterrence, like the issue of where Israel should seek its 
conventional arms, created a divergence in the opinions of Cabinet members. 
Peres and Dayan argued that, given Israel's numeric.al inferiority, nuclear 
deterrence was essential for Israel's future independence and for 
effective deterrence of the Arabs. If Israel committed itself not to 
develop nuclear weapons then the deterrent effect of the nuclear option 
would be reduced. So, they argued, it was better to encourage Arab 
suspicions without actually going nuclear by maintaining ambiguity about 
Israel's intentions: "As long as their [the Arabs] aggressive policy is 
shrouded by clouds, we should not take the clouds away from our 
60 deterrent policy". 
59. See Lawrence Freedman, "Israel's Nuclear Policy", Survival., May I 
June, 1975, pp. 114-120. 
60. Cited in Evron, Nuclear Options in a Regional Subsystem~ p. 190. 
Bree.her cites an interview with Peres: "The nuclear policy of Israel 
is like a satellite in the sky - it must c.ommunic.ate without touching 
land", Bree.her, The Foreign Policy Sysi;em of Israel~ p. 344. 
For a summary of the Israeli arguments in favour of a deterrent see 
Flapan, "Nuclear Power in the Middle East", Zoe.cit.~ p. 52. 
Eshkol, with the support of Allon and Eban, felt that the nuclear 
option should be used as a lever to bolster Israel's conventional 
deterrent, while maintaining a certain ambiguity about the future of 
nuclear development. Thus in 1965 Allon declared: "Israel will not be 
the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. May I 
add that Israel will not permit any of its Arab neighbours to start this 
61 destructive race". And in a formal policy statement in 1966 Eshkol 
reiterated: 
... Israel does not have nuclear weapons and ... will not be the 
first to introduce them into the region. He ... who really 
wishes to take away from the people living in the Middle East 
the fear of the arms race ... should work for general disarmament 
in the Middle East ... while striking a reasonable balance ... 
inclusive of bans on the introduction of nuclear weapons into 
our region. 62 
By declaring that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear 
weapons, Eshkol could remove some of the anxieties of the United States 
and the Arab states. But, by suggesting that Israel would not be the 
second either, and that nuclear disarmament should be linked to 
conventional disarmament, he· was able explicitly to link the issues of 
nuclear and conventional deterrence. As long as a "reasonable balance" 
in conventional arms was maintained in the Middle East, Israel would not 
feel the need to go nuclear, but should the balance be upset, or should 
Egypt acquire or develop nuclear weapons, then Israel would exercise 
its option. In this way Israel could exchange assurances about nuclear 
development for American guarantees of its conventional strength. 
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All these factors taken together ensured Israel a serious hearing in 
Washington for its arms requests. However they might have been worth far 
less as bargaining resources in negotiations had no basic American 
cormnitment to Israel 1 s integrity existed. Without such a commitment 
the White House might have come to adopt State's view that Israel was a 
liability to its interests in the Arab world, rather than an asset in 
maintaining stability and containing Nasser's influence; without the 
commitment Washington might have been less interested in maintaining an 
arms balance between Israel and the Arabs. Israel's development of a 
nuclear option certainly endowed it with the ability to be a nuisance to 
61. JeuJish Observer and Middle East Revie1v~ 24 December, 1965. 
62. Cited in Evron, op.cit.~ p. 176. 
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both superpowers, but had there been no underlying American commitment it 
seems unlikely that the United States would have felt responsible for 
furnishing Israel with conventional 1 sufficiency 1 to prevent it from 
going nuclear. 
Moreover, this basic American commitment to Israel's survival 
increased in value with the accession of Johnson to the presidency and 
the notable decline of Americ·an influence in Egypt. Johnson's 
personal commitment to Israel can be dated back to his opposition in 
1957, as Majority Leader in the Senate, to Eisenhower's threat of 
sanctions against Israel and to his support, at the same time, for 
American guarantees against the renewal of blockades and boycotts in 
exchange for Israel's withdrawal from Sinai. 63 Kennedy had acted on his 
belief in the "special relationship" between Israel ancl the United 
States, but his support had been tempered to some extent by his desire 
to improve relations with Egypt. By the time Johnson became president 
this policy had begun to founder under the strain of Nasser's actions in 
Yemen, the buildup of Soviet arms in Egypt, and mounting Congressional 
criticism of the State Department approach. 
Furthermore, the President's preoccupation with American involvement 
in Vietnam, during this period (from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 
August 1964, to the escalating troop commitments and bombing raids of 1965 
and 1966), may have served indirectly to reinforce his disposition towards 
more forthright support for Israel. After all, the principles which 
motivated his policy in South East Asia might equally be applied to the 
Middle East: the combatting of aggression; the containment of communism; 
the defence of threatened democracies; and the keeping of American 
commitments. Thus, as a democracy threatened by what was perceived to be 
Soviet-supported Egyptian aggression, and as a country to whose survival 
the United States was committed, Israel fitted President Johnson's 
iv'eltanschauung far better than its Arab adversaries. And since Johnson 
had, in this period, relied on the counsel of his advisers and friends on 
questions of foreign policy, he would have found strong reinforcement for 
his support for Israel from Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, Under-
secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow, United Nations 
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, and Johnson's confidant, Justice Abe Fortas, 
63. See Near East Report~ Volume VII, 1963, p. 101. 
] 1 f '- f l J . l 6Lf a_ o whom were staunc11 supporters o t 1e ewis 1 state. 
Thus events in the regional and global environments, together with 
Israel's nuclear option and the support it could count on from the 
Johnson administration, provided this ';veak state with some important 
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resources to use or draw upon in its negotiations with a patron which was 
predisposed to support its independence. As we shall now see, Israel 
was indeed able to benefit from all these factors in an ultimately 
successful effort to alter the arms supply policy of the United States 
by overcoming the opposition of the State Department. 
An official invitation to visit Washington in June 196i'f provided the 
opportunity for Eshkol to press Johnson for a change in American arms 
policy. 65 Regional events since the conclusion of the Hawk deal in 
early 1963 had enabled Eshkol to prepare the ground well for his request. 
First, he was able to demonstrate Israel's interest in regional stability 
by referring, for the first time in many years, Syrian armistice 
violations to the United National Security Council rather than retaliating 
with force. Although the Security Council resolution criticising Syria 
was vetoed by the Soviet Union, Israel won praise from the United States 
for its moderation. 66 The link between moderation and deterrent strength 
was then underlined indirectly by the introduction of a new cause of 
tension as a result of Israel's diversion of the Jordan Waters. 
Since its inception the Israeli project had received the approval 
67 
and support of the United States. However, the completion of the project 
in late 1963 aroused Arab enmity and precipitated an Arab summit decision 
to oppose the Israeli project by diverting the headwaters of the Jordan 
6Lf. In his autobiography Johnson declared: "I have always had a deep 
feeling of sympathy for Israel and its people, gallantly building and 
defending a modern nation against great odds and against the tragic 
background of Jewish experience". See Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage 
Po-inty London, 1971, p. 297. For Johnson's view of American responsibilities 
in Vietnam see Chapters 6 and 11. Also Bernard Brodie, Tvar and Politicsy 
New York, 1973, Chapter 4; and for the views of Johnson's advisers, Michael 
Jansen, The United States and the Palestinian Peopley Beirut, 1970, pp. 157-8. 
65. It was the first official visit by an Israeli Prime Minister -
underlining Washington's greater preparedness to be associated with Israel, 
despite Arab O~)jections. See Near East Report, Volume VIII, 19GLf, p. 51. 
66. See Khouri, op.cit.y pp. 444-5. 
67. See Brecher, Decisions in Israeli Foriegn Policy, Chapter 5. 
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river. Since the American administration regarded Israel's diversion as 
legitimate and the Arab plan as unwarrented interference, and since 
Washington lacked the means, or the will, to prevent the Syrian diversion, 
it was predisposed to favour Israeli deterrence of Arab action as the 
most appropriate means for reducing the tension. Moreover, the efficacy 
of this approach received confirmation in Nasser's repeated declarations 
that the Arabs were not in a ·strong enough position to challenge Israel's 
d . . 68 iversion. 
Thus Washington could see in the combination of Israeli moderation 
and deterrent strength an effective way to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict 
in the' ice-box': bolstering Israel's deterrent strength might, at the 
one time, discourage Arab hostility (expressed in the form of raids and 
water diversion projects), while encouraging continued Israeli moderation. 
If Israel could demonstrate its need for arms to r.1aintain its deterrent 
strength and its moderation, Washington would have to view these arms 
requests with some sympathy. The rhetoric of Israel's decision-nwkers 
served to bolster this argl}ment by constantly reiterating their desire 
for a peaceful settlement, arms control agreements and stability, 
and through constant warnings of their determination to deter Arab 
h ·1· 69 osti ity. 
The American perception of Israeli moderation and stability was 
reinforced by the concurrent perception of an irascible Nasser with 
revisionist aims in the Middle East. His refusal to withdraw Egyptian 
68. See Chapter Three below. 
69. Thus in a public response toKhrushchev's call for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes Eshkol sugge~ted that all states in the Middle 
East should refrain fror.1 the threat or use of force, put an end to their 
belligerency and settle all disputes by negotiation, Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service_, Daily Report_, (FBIS) _, 31 January, 1964. Golda Meir 
proposed full and absolute disarmament with mutual inspection, FBIS_, 18 
April, 1964. In his Independence Day speech Eshkol called for the 
maintenance of Israel's deterrent strength "so our enemies will not 
conceive the criminal idea that it is possible to provoke a war with 
Israel'', and called on the great powers to compete in providing development 
assistance rather than in arms supplies, FBIS_, 16 April, 1964. In a 
speech to the Histadrut he declared ''any Middle Eastern country endangered 
by plotting from Cairo should know it will always find in Israel firm 
support for peace and stability in this region", FBIS_, 26 /\pril, 1964. 
Meanwhile Peres declared that Israel "must continue to strengthen itself 
in order to prevent a war ... ", FBIS_, 22 April, 1964. 
troops from Yemen, his attacks on American clients in the Arab world, 
his call for the closure of the American base in Libya, the belligerent 
content of many of his speeches, and his apparent rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union following Khrushchev's visit to Cairo in May 1964, raised 
serious doubts about Nasser's intentions and the validity of the new 
American approach to Egypt. Thus, for reasons external to Israel's 
relations with the United States, the Johnson administration began to 
place a higher contingent value on a strong and viable Israel, as one 
alternative means for dealing with Egypt, and containing both Nasser's 
influence and that of his Soviet patron. This altered attitude of the 
Johnson administration had been encouraged by continued Congressional 
criticism of American aid to Egypt. Meanwhile, influential Congressmen 
had been urging the Administration to maintain Israel's strength as an 
1 . . N 70 a ternative to appeasing asser. 
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Israel's nuclear option also played an iraportant role in softening 
Washington's resistance to Eshkol's approach for arms. We have already 
noted that the link between conventional military strength and the ability 
to delay a nuclear decision was established, however tacitly, in Ben-Gurion's 
negotiations with Kennedy. We have also noted Eshkol's desire to make 
this linkage explicit by exchanging a commitment to freeze nuclear 
development for ample supplies of conventional weapons. Perhaps as a 
lead-up to the June negotiations, this policy was publicly communicated 
to Washington in December 1963 when Professor Yiftach, Scientific Director 
of the Defence Ministry's development programmes, declared that Israel 
had no intention of building a separation plant and was therefore not 
. . D' I 1 . 71 J l d d anxious to exercise imona s nuc ear weapons option. 01nson respon e , 
in February 1964, by offering American assistance in the development of 
nuclear desalination techniques. The American purpose appears to have 
been twofold: to encourage Israel to concentrate on peaceful uses for its 
70. The Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Thomas E. 
Morgan, declared in May 1964: "If that alternative (of cutting aid to 
Egypt) cannot be carried out, then manifestly the Administration should 
consider the second alternative - make certain that Israel has the arms 
to defend herself''. Senator Hugh Scott called on President Johnsbn to 
"stop all aid to Egypt" and "to consider the possibility of providing 
military defence equipment to Israel - as we did in 1962 - to offset the 
dangerous advantage that both U.S. and Soviet aid has given Egypt". 
Addresses to the National Policy Conference of AIPAC, cited in 
Near East Report., Volume VIII, 1964, p. 39. 
71. See Bodes, Dialogue with Ishmael., p. 233. 
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nuclear technology, and to persuade Israel to place its nuclear reactors 
l IAEA . . 7 2 s l.T h . 1 1 d ff uncer ' inspection. o nas ington was c ear y prepare too- er 
Israel a quid pro quo for concessions on nuclear policy and this 
encouraged Eshkol to bargain for weapons in exchange for such concessions. 
According to Peres, beyond the general diplomatic purpose of 
demonstrating the close ties between Israel and the United States, Eshkol 
set four objectives for his negotiations in Washington: an American 
declaration to support Israel in the event of an Arab attack; American 
tanks; an agreement on the nuclear desalination project; and support 
73 for the emigration of Soviet Jewry. It is not possible to establish 
just what role in the negotiations the various sources of leverage played, 
but the evidence suggests that they were all utilised with some degree 
of success. Eshkol argued the need for weapons to enable Israel to 
defend itself by pointing to the imbalance created by Soviet arms supplies 
t E d E I d 1 f • · 1 74 • • • h h o • gypt an • gypt s ep oyment o 1n:1.ssi es. In negotiations wit t e 
Pentagon, Peres himself argued that the United States should openly 
support Israel's deterrent strength to prevent war: 
I added, Israel was interested not only in American tanks but 
also in receiving them from the American source, with all its 
political implications, for this would add to our deterrent 
power. The direct supply by the United States would contribute 
to the avoidance of war, and not only to our ability to defend 
ourselves if war broke ou~.75 
72. In his speech Johnson emphasised that "the International Atomic Energy 
Agency will play a very vital part. In this way we will demonstrate the 
constructive meaning of man's mastery of the atom". Another purpose of 
this proposal might well have been to underline American support for the 
diversion of the Jordan waters: "We will pursue our common quest for 
water, for water should never divide nwn; it should unite them (sic). 
Water should never be a cause of war, it should always be a force for 
peace ... ", see Near East Report, Volume VIII, 1964, pp. 13-14. 
73. Peres, David's Sling, p. 101. 
74. Ibid.; and Terence Prittie, Eshkol of Israel; the Man and the Nation,, 
London, 1969, p. 234. 
75. Ibid., p.104. Eshkol put a similar argument in public, calling for 
an arms control agreement between the superpowers, but emphasising that in 
the absence of such agreements Israel had to strengthen her defensive 
capabilities in order to deter aggression. The purpose of Israel's policy 
was "not to win a war, but to prevent one, to keep pushing off the danger 
of explosion and gain time for the counsels of reason to prevail", see 
Nea,r East Report, Volume VIII, 1964, p. 50. 
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Both in public an<l in his private talks, Eshkol stressed Israel's desire 
for peace and stability in the Middle East. He .also emphasised Israel's 
unique status as a Jewish state in much the same terms as Golda Meir had 
in her disucssions with Kennedy: Israel was ''not a state like other 
states, but a last refuge for her people", and Israel was "not afraid so 
much of losing of losing a whole people". 76 a war as 
The nuclear option came into play when Johnson emphasised American 
opposition to the proiiferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East 
and asked Eshkol to place the Nahal Soreq reactor under IAEA inspection. 
On the first point Eshkol is said to have implied that nuclear weapons 
would only be developed "if Israel could not obtain conventional arms 
77 
equivalent to Egypt's and felt it was being outstripped in the arms race". 
He apparently gave further assurances that the Dimona reactor would not 
be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium and backed these up by agreeing 
78 to further and regular American inspections of this reactor. On the 
issue of IAEA inspection of Nahal Soreq, Eshkol tvas reluctant to agree, 
allegedly because of the possibility of discrimination against Israel in 
this international organisation. He was eventually persuaded by two 
American offers: an agreement to proceed with the nuclear desalination 
project and an American commitment to provide Israel with 40 kilogrammes of 
. h d . 79 enric e uranium. 
Other outcomes demonstrated the strength of Israel's bargaining 
position in the negotiations. While Israel did not gain a public American 
commitment to its defence, Eshkol did receive Johnson's a.ssurance that 
the United States "stands four square behind Israel", that it would not 
remain idle were Israel attacked and that this was a "solemn and serious 
commitment11 • 80 The United States also agreed to helri Israel get Patton 
76. Prittie, Zoe.cit. 
77. Hodes, op.cit . ., p. 235; cf. Sirncha Flapan, "Israel's attitude towards 
the NPT", in SIPRI, Nuclear Proliferation Problem<>., Stockholm, 1974, p. 281. 
78. Hodes, ibid . ., p. 232. 
79. Peres, op.cit . ., pp. 105-6; Jabber, op.cit . ., p. 31. The fear of 
discrimination was based on the fact that the IAEA had its regional 
headquarters in Cairo. The inspection and uranium agreements were 
signed in 1966. 
80. Peres, ibid . ., p. 103. 
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31-tanks from West Germany and, if this failed, to supply the tanks directly. 
MacNamara is said to have promised personal attention to this problem, 
emphasising that it was a promise he intended to keep. Harriman 
briefed Eshkol and Peres on America's ability to intervene in regional 
conflicts, a move designed to emphasise that Johnson's assurances were 
82 backed by the presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. In 
this regard, Eshkol later revealed that his request for arms was met 
by the argument: "Don't spend your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet 
is here11 • 83 The public speeches and declarations, although pitched at 
the usual level of generality, reinforced these American commitments. 
Johnson noted Israel's desire for peace while emphasising that the United 
States and Israel "share many common objectives", and expressing the 
hope that "this visit will result in increased understanding between us 
and a strengthening of our already cordial relations". The joint 
communique made Washington's position a little clearer: 
[The President] reiterated to Prime Minister Eshkol U.S. support 
for the territorial integrity of all countries in the Near East 
and emphasiseq the firm opposition of the United States to 
aggression and the use of force or the threat of force against 
any country in the region.84 
Nevertheless, Israel had not received the arms which. Eshkol had 
sought and his critics in Israel were quick to charge that he had been 
too moderate in his approach and too willing to accept American assurances 
instead of tangible arms supplies. 85 However, the fact that Peres had 
accompanied Eshkol and participated in the negotiations was important 
in deflecting this criticism, for as Eban noted, Peres and his supporters 
could no longer underestimate "the significance and potentialities of our 
81. Schiff notes that the Pentagon concurred with the Israeli claim that 
the military balance was being tipped against Israel. Rather than supply 
offensive weapons directly, the Pentagon is said to have agreed to transfer 
300 M-48 tanks from U.S. Army units based in Germany t_o the German 
government which would in turn hand them over to Israel. See Schiff, 
op.cit._, p. 259. 
82. Peres, op.cit. 
83. See "Interview with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol", U. 8. News and World 
Report_, 17 April, 1967, p. 76. Following the visit to Washington, Israeli 
officials noted that Eshkol had been convinced by Johnson that the United 
States had both the capacity and the will to intervene in a matter of hours 
in case of aggression in the Middle East. See New York Times_, 24 June, 1964. 
84. Joint Communique Issued at Washington by the President of the United 
States and the Prime Minister of Israel, June 2, 1964, Amer1:can Foreign 
Policy_, Current Documents_, 1964_, Washington, 1967, pp. 703-4. 
85. New York Times_, 24 June, 1964. 
interests in the United States". 86 Peres himself admitted: 
This Washington visit ... did much to tear down America's 
'elegant arms embargo' against Israel .... it paved the way 
for the American supply of most types of weapons to 
Israel, and this enabled Israel to preserve the arms 
balance even after the arms embargo imposed by De 
Gaulle in the wake of the Six Day War.87 
There were two reasons for Washington's refusal to supply Israel 
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with tanks in June 1964. First, the United States did not accept Israel's 
arguments that Soviet arms supplies had .zet. created an imbalance against 
Israel; on the contrary, they argued, Israel enjoyed a clear advantage 
both because of the quality of its manpower and because Nasser's missile 
prograrrune was experiencing serious difficulties and could not yet be 
regarded as a significant threat. Secondly, the Americans still felt it 
was better for Israel to obtain the tanks indirectly from West Germany. 88 
However, by January 1965 events beyond Israel's control had intervened 
yet again and created the conditions which enabled Eshkol and Peres to 
build on the ground-work laid during the visit to Washington. 
The most important event to affect Israel's arguments was West 
Germany's decision, in January 1965, to cease all shipments of arms to 
Israel. As we have already noted, the Germans began supplying Israel 
with significant quantities of arms in 1959. By 1963 an arrangement had 
been concluded whereby they agreed to provide Israel with a further 
$80 million worth of arms. 89 From its inception the United States had 
encouraged this arrangement, with Kennedy himself intervening to allay 
the concern of the Social Democrats. In 1963 Peres had gained a 
commitment in principle from Adenauer and Strauss to supply Israel with 
second-hand Patton tanks until German tanks became available. When 
Erhardt replaced Adenauer the Germans became reluctant to fulfil the 
commitment because of the fear that the Arab states would retaliate by 
recognising East Germany. This fear was exacerbated by the publicity 
given to the arms deal in early 1964 and Erhardt decided to refer Israel 
to Washington for the tanks. As already noted, during Eshkol's visit to 
86. Cited in Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel_, p. 332. 
87. Peres, op.cit._, pp. 106-7. 
88. Ibid._, pp. 104-5; lVea:t' East Report_, Volume VIII, p. 45; Nell) York Times_, 
24 June, 1964. 
89. Safran points out that both Israeli and Egyptian reports of the arms 
deal with West Germany suggested that $80 million was only a nominal 
figure and that the deal was worth a lot more than that. See Safran, 
From ~lar to ~!cw_, pp. 168-9. 
Washington, the Americans argued that Israel should get the tanks 
from Germany. In the face of German reluctance, Peres devised a scheme 
whereby 150 tanks would be transferred from Germany to "another European 
country", overhauled and then shipped to Israel. The Germans, as a 
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result of American pressure, agreed to this scheme and tanks began to arrive 
90 in Israel towards the end of 1964. 
In January 1965 Nasser launched an attack on Germany for supplying 
arms to Israel, announced that East Germany's Ulbricht had been invited 
to Cairo, and threatened to recognise East Germany if Bonn refused to 
halt its arms shipments. Fearing that the implementation of Nasser's 
threat would deal a blow to the Hallstein doctrine and might well be 
followed by other Arab states breaking off relations, Bonn announced, 
91 
almost immediately, the suspension of arms shipments to Israel. By 
this time, the original arms deal was 80% complete; the most important 
items now outstanding were most of the tanks. Since the United States 
had pressured Germany into supplying the tanks and had assured Eshkol, 
during his visit to Washington, that the tanks would be supplied 
directly if they could not be obtained elsewhere, Israel appeared to 
have an irresistible case for American supply. Yet Eshkol still had to 
overcome State Department reluctance. The argument of the bureaucrats, 
that an open supply relationship with Israel would drive Egypt and 
other Arab states into Moscow's arms, polarising the Middle East and 
leaving Washington with only a pariah client, still carried weight in 
the White House. But again, events in the region weakened the State 
Department case and contributed to the eventual breakthrough. 
First, relations with Nasser had by now reached a new low as a 
result of his abuse of the United States, the burning of the U.S. Library 
in Cairo, and his support for the Congo rebels. This precipitated 
Congressional action designed to bar aid to Egypt unless the President 
determined that it was in the national interest, while seriously 
undercutting the State Department argument that cultivation of Nasser 
was in the interests of the United States. 92 Second, Lebanon and 
Syria had announced the commencement of their diversion projects which, 
if completed, would reduce the amount of water flowing into Israel and 
90. Peres, op.cit., pp. 76-82; New York Times, 18, 20 February, 1965. 
91. See Chapter Three below and H. Speier, Cris1:s and Catharsis in the 
Middle East, 1965 - A Chapter of German Foreign Policy, Rand Corporation, 
P-3615, June, 1967, 
92. See Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Volume XXI, 1965, pp. 425 and 
437. 
which therefor~ provoked Israeli declarations that it would act to 
. . 1 . . 93 u 1 . k protect its vita interest in water. n ess some action were ta en, 
a war over the Jordan waters could easily erupt, especially if, as a 
result of the cancellation of the German arms deal, Israel felt its 
long-term ability to defend itself would be jeopardised, and its short-
term policy of moderation was paying no dividends. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both Jordan and Saudi Arabia 
were seeking American arms - the former to resist Egyptian pressure to 
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h S . h 1 d f d . lf . E · k 94 pure ase oviet arms, t e atter to e en itse · against gyptian attac . 
Since the State Department believed that it was in America's interests to 
sell or supply arms to these ' moderate' Arab states, arms sales to Israel 
became attractive, if only because they provided justificatiori to Congress, 
the American public and Israel for the purveying of arms to Saudi Arabia 
and to Jordan. Conversely, arms sales to the Arabs provided the State 
Department with the justification that the provision of arms to Israel 
was consistent with a policy of 'even-han<lednes~, that the United States 
was not a partisan purveyor of arms but rather the balancer of Soviet arms 
supplies. 95 Thus the deterioration in relations with Nasser, the fear 
93. In January and February Eshkol, Meir, Peres and Chief-of-Staff Rabin 
all issued warnings that Israel would protect its vital interest in the 
Jordan waters. If its deterrent posture proved inadequate then "the 
strength necessary for success would be thrown into battle''. Within 
Israel the debate centred around the question of when, rather than whether, 
Israel should retaliate against the Lebanese and Syrian diversion projects. 
Dayan argued that it should be as soon as they commenced work; Eshkol 
suggested that Israel could afford to wait until the projects were actually 
completed. See FBIS (Israel Home Service), 15, 19, 29 January, and 6, 7, 
9 February 1965. 
94. John W. Finney, "Two Arab Lands To Get U.S. Arms", New York Times., 
29 April, 1965. 
95. Thus Heikal notes: "Because Johnson was giving an Arab country arms as 
well as the Israelis, Nasser was being forced into a position where he could 
not protest. The Americans could claim they were being evenhanded, that 
they were giving weapons to both sides", The Cairo Docwnents., p. 236. 
To prepare the case for arms sales to Israel the State Department, in an 
unprecedented move, announced that Saudi Arabia had received military 
assistance totalling $88 million, that Jordan had received $32. 6 million, 
and that both were negotiating for further military assistance. See Near 
East Report., Volume IX, 1965, p. 21; New York Times., 28 February, 1965. 
As Hurewitz points out: " ... the United States tried to balance sales -
not quantities but systems - to Israel and to these Arab states, and to 
announce the sales in such a way as to make clear that its policy was 
evenhanded. The announcement itself on each occasion seemed more important 
to the Department of State than the sales themselves", "Super Power Rivalry 
and the Arab-Israel Dispute: Involvement or Commitment?", in Confino and 
Shamir (eds.), The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East., p. 163. 
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that Israel might take precipitate action over the Jordan waters dispute 
if America reneged on its assurances, and the desire to supply Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia with arms, s0rved to persuade the State Department to drop 
its opposition to arms sales to Israel. 
In February 1965, immediately after Bonn's announcement of its 
decision to halt arms sales to "areas of tension", Averell Harriman was 
dispatched to Israel to negotiate an arms deal which would consummate 
Eshkol's efforts to obtain an open supply relationship with the United 
States. The negotiating te3In, comprising Eshkol, Heir, Peres and Chief-
of-Staff Rabin, sensing that they were in a strong position, were 
determined to drive a hard bargain: they sought both an American 
commitment to supply the arms necessary for Israel's defence and its 
strategy of deterrence and, specifically, tanks and the other items not 
yet delivered by Germany, as well as further tanks and aircraft to 
counter Western supplies to Jordan and Soviet supplies to Egypt. Harriman 
appears to have been authorised to meet their requests on two conditions: 
Israel would not protest the supply of arms to Jordan; and Israel 
would have to give a commitment that it would not take action over the 
Jordan waters dispute until and unless the Arabs took more than their 
allocated share (i.e. 60%). For four days and nights the negotiators 
argued over the deal with the Israelis reluctant to agree to either of the 
conditions which Harriman sought, and even more reluctant to see Jordan 
receiving advanced American equipment because of the vulnerability of 
Israel's border with the Hashemite Kingdom. As Peres has subsequently 
noted: "Israel found it hard to reconcile herself to the idea of American 
arms deliveries to a country who might use them against Israel in a time 
of crisis11 • 96 
Harriman apparently assured the Israelis that Hussein had commited 
himself never to send the tanks across the Jordan River. 97 He also 
argued that the issue was not whether or not Jordan should receive arms, 
but rather from whom was Hussein to get them - surely, he suggested, Israel 
96. Peres, David's Sling_, p. 108. See also W. Grnnger Blair, 11 1-larriman 
to See Israelis Today on Diplomatic Snarl in Middle East", New Yorl<. Times_, 
24 February 1965; and Neu) Yor•k Times_, 2 and 4 March, 1965. 
97. In 1976, Golda Meir revealed that she had objected to the snle of 
tanks to Jordan because "these tanks are on our threshhold". Harriman 
is said to have replied: "But Hussein said these tanks will never cross 
the Jordan River", See Near East Repor't_, Volume 20, No. 22, 1976. 
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would not want Russian arms in Jordan? 98 So the deal was finally struck: 
Israel would receive 150 M-48 tanks, and the other outstanding items 
99 in the German agreement. In response to the Israeli request for tactical 
bombers to bolster its deterrent strength, Harriman suggested that Israeli 
negotiators should put their case to the Pentagon and that it would be 
d . h h . ~1 h' lOO treate wit sympat y in vas ington. 
Harriman apparently also· gave Eshkol an assurance that the United 
States would continue to supply Israel with the arms necessary for its 
101 defence. This assurance was publicly affirmed by Secretary of State 
Rusk in a press conference given while Harriman was conducting the 
negotiations in Israel. Rusk stated that it was the continuing policy 
of the United States to help maintain a military balance of power in the 
102 Middle East Between Israel and the Arab states. 
98. Peres, op. ci-t;. Eshkol later explained, rather facetiously; "In fact 
the Americans had no need to ask us whether they should give those tanks 
[to Jordan] or not ... they are not yet our satellite.·Of course, they did 
not want us to cause an outcry and make protests. The President himself 
said: "If Eshkol says we should not give tanks to Husayn, but instead 
should send him to graze in foreign pastures - to receive tanks from Nasser 
or from Russia through Nasser - then we shall not give tanks to the 
Jordanians ... ", Davar, 24 January, 1969, cited in Quandt, United States 
Policy in the Middle East, p. 47 fn. 
99. This deal remained secret until February·l966 when the State 
Department announced that it had sold tanks to Israel. The announcement 
was prompted by publicity given to tbe supply of tanks to Jordan and 
demonstrated the State Department's use of arms sales to one side of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict as justification for supplies to the other side. In 
explaining the sale, the State Department also pointed to the need to 
correct the arms imbalance created by "massive" shipments of Soviet arms 
to Egypt, Syria and Iraq. See "U.S. Reveals Sale of Patton Tanks to 
Israeli Army", NmJ Yor•l<.. Times_, 6 February, 1966. 
100. Weizmann, On Eagles' Wings, p. 262. 
101. Prittie, Eshkol of Israel, p. 236. 
102. See John W. Finney, "Rusk Hints Backing for Israel on Issues 
of Mideast Arms Race", New York Times, 26 February 1965. 
In return, Israel apparently agreed not to protest the supply of 
American equipment to Jordan,and Eshkol gave some kind of assurance that 
Israel would take military action against the Arab states over their 
diversion projects "only if the Arabs took more than their share of the 
103 Jordan's waters, as allocated by the Johnston Plan". While Eshkol 
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publicly declared that "no strings" had been attached to the arms dea1, 104 
the absence of Israel:i. criticism when the Jordanian deals were announced, 
and the care taken to prevent Syrian border incidents from escalating 
to full scale war, demonstrated Israel's adherence to these commitments. 105 
On the American side of the bargain, in February 1966 a further deal 
was concluded in Washington, expressing America's intention to provide 
Israel with 48 Skyhawk (A-4) tactical bombers by November 1967. Although 
the tanks had been important both in strengthening Israel's defence 
and opening the doors of America's arsenal, the Skyhawks were even more 
significant for Israel's relationship with the United States. For the 
first time Washington had agreed to supply Israel with strictly offensive 
weapons, designed specifically to bolster Israel's deterrent strength 
rather than its defence. Although justified as a counter to the supply of 
Russian MIG 2ls to Egypt, Syria and Iraq, British Lightnings to Saudia 
103. Prittie, Zoe.cit. The first assurance was strictly adhered to. When 
the State Department confirmed that the U.S. was supplying tanks to 
Jordan, Mrs Meir responded by assuring Knesset members that the balance of 
power would not tip against Israel and that the government would take ";1Jl 
steps necessary in order to safeguard, nurture and even enhance the 
deterrent strength of the Israel Defence Forces", New York Times, 30 
December 1965. When the State Department announced the sale of F-104 fighter 
bombers to Jordan, the Government of Israel issued a statement declaring 
that it would maintain the arms balance and was "fully confident" that it 
would be able to maintain "an effective deterrent", New York T'irnes, 3 April, 
1966. 
104. W. Granger Blair, "Eshkol Confident on Arms", New York Times, 10 April, 
1965. 
105. Washington did not register any public protest over Israel's 
retaliation against Syrian bombardments, partly because they were strictly 
limited actions, partly because, having failed to get U.N. action when Israel 
took its complaints to the Security Council, Washington could not offer a 
viable alternative to Israeli retaliation, and partly because its own 
policy of reprisals in Vietnam made it difficult, it not hypocritical, to 
criticise Israel. In the main, Israel used its tanks in these actions 
to neutralise Syrian positions and to hit the diversion equipment. This 
obviated the need to employ artillery or the Air Force, both of which would 
have aggravated the chances of the incident leading to open war. Instead, 
the IDF pursued a policy of "locally restricted incidents". Apparently 
the Syrians were not sure whether their equipment had been destroyed by 
accident or deliberately. See Teveth, The Tanks of Tamrnuz, London, 1970 
(Sphere Books Edition), pp. 84-5. 
Arabia and American F-104s to Jordan, the sale of the A-4s to Israel 
was the first time Washington had agreed to sell strike, as opposed to 
fighter, aircraft to a country in the Middle East. 106 
Ezer Weizmann, the commander of the Israel Air Force, had persuaded 
the Pentagon of Israel's requirements in November 1965, using as his 
main argument the need to bolster Israel's deterrent strength as a way 
to ensure that Israel would not have to pre-empt an Arab attack. He 
told his American counterparts: 
... the weaker we were, meaning the more 
the greater would be our inclination to 
pre-emptive strike against our enemies. 
we were the less inclined we would be to 
arms we lacked, 
launch a 
The stronger 
do so .107 
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He argued that, because Israel could not hope to intercept the sophisticated 
aircraft now in the Egyptian and Syrian arsenals,if they attacked Israeli 
targets, the IAF required "a plane whose range permitted it to penetrate 
" 108 deep into enemy territory as a means for deterring such attack. The 
Pentagon accepted this argument and, in return, demanded only that Israel 
agree to restrict its use of American economic aid to purchase other 
military equipment. 109 Yet again the State Department opposed the sale 
because it feared that the slight improvement in relations with Nasser 
through 1965 would be jeopardised, but it only succeeded in ensuring 
that the deal would be kept a secret. Clearly Israel's arguments had 
struck a responsive chord in the White House because the President 
106. See G. Kemp, "Controlling Arms in the M.E.: Some Preliminary 
Observations", World Today~ July, 1967. 
107. Weizmann, op.cit.~ p. 262. Aiming high, Weizmann asked for sixty-
five Skyhawks and forty-five Phantoms. On the latter, he was turned 
down cold. 
108. Ibid.~ and John W. Finney, "Israelis Will Buy U.S. Jet Bombers", 
NevJ Yorl<. Times~ 20 May, 1966. 
109. Nez,i Yor•k Times~ Zoe.cit. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on May 11, 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara outlined the 
conditions attached to the sale of the Skyhawks as "very restrictive and 
tended to limit the degree to which that nation could acquire military 
equipment, either through grant aid or through sale and purchase from us 
or any other nation". He also restated Israel's argument in general terms: 
"I think the greatest danger of a war would occur when one nation or one 
group of nations acquire so much power in relation to neighbouring countries 
that they had the capability and, because of age old conflict, the desire 
to carry out aggression against those nations", Ne<lY' East Report~ Volume X, 
1966, p. 38. 
overruled State Department objections, ordered the Pentagon to draw up an 
agreement for the sale of fifty Skyhawks and agreed to the sale in a 
meeting with Foreign Minister Eban in February 1966 . 110 
With the announcement of the Skyhawk deal in May 1966, Israel could 
truly claim that it had achieved its aim of securing an open arms 
supply relationship with the United States. Not only that, it 
could feel secure in the knowledge that the Skyhawk deal also signified 
American acceptance of Israel's constant argument that it needed arms, 
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not only sufficient to defend itself, but also sufficient to deter the 
Arabs from attacking. In other words, Washington had tacitly accepted what 
it would, four years later, make quite explicit~ balance of power in the 
Middle East meant a balance tipped in Israel's favour so as to deter the 
Arabs from launching war. 111 Thus, in mid-1966, Eban had good reason to 
hail the American-Israeli partnership in these fulsome terms: 
We stand at a high point in the evolution of American-
Israel friendship •.• President Johnson has contributed 
in abundant measure to the reinforcement of Israel's 
strength and spirit. He has inspired our confidence 
in the sincerity of the American commitment to Israel's 
security. He has shown a perceptive understanding of 
our need to develop our defensive strength.112 
Through adept and determined manipulation of circumstances which 
bolstered Israel's case in Washington, Eshkol had been able to overcome 
the arguments of the State Department and build on the Administration's 
underlying commitment to secure an open and continuing arms supply from 
the United States. How different American policy now was to its stated 
position at the beginning of the sixties that it would not become a 
major arms supplier to the region. How forlorn was the State 
Department's aspiration of wooing Egypt and limiting American support for 
Israel. How surprising that a small state with so little intrinsic 
significance to America's national interest should become the recipient 
of such military aid from the United States. 
Although it was certainly not appreciated at the time (especially 
in Israel, where Eshkol was being accused by Ben-Gurion and others of 
110. Interview with Townsend W. Hoopes_, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense 
(1966-67), Washington D.C., June 1975; New York Times_, 20 May, 1966; 
Eban_, My Country_, p. 166. 
111. See Part Three, Chapters Two and Three. 
112. Cited in Nea:r' East Report_, Volume X, No. 14, 12 July, 1966. 
undermining Israel's security, 113 but also in Egypt, where Israel's 
military strength was about to be seriously underestimated) this change 
in American policy was one of the signposts of a new polarisation in the 
Middle East which would have a profound effect on the conduct of the 
regional adversaries and their superpower patrons. The Six Day War 
of June 1967 wa.s of course the catalyst for this polarisation, but the 
events of the preceding six years had cast the die and had ensured 
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that, as long as it followed the fundamental precepts of successful client 
behaviour, Israel would retain American patronage. In this way, Israel 
was able to gain both American acquiescence for its pre-emptive strike on 
Egyptian airfields on 5 Jure, 1967, and American political support for its 
peace terms once it had won a devastating military victory. Israel's 
success in securing American patronage helped to ensure this dependent 
client state of a dominant position during the next six years of the Arab-
Israeli conflict and, as such, must surely be regarded as a triumph of 
weak power politics. 
113. See Amos Perlmutter, Military and Poi1:tics in Israel,~ Nation-
Bui7.,ding and Rol,e Expansion~ London, 1969, Chapter VIII. 
PART TWO 
CHAPTER TWO 
ISRAEL'S DECISION TO PRE-EMPT IN 1967 
I - THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SUCCESSFUL CLIENT BEHAVIOUR 
Having examined the intricacies of the American-Israeli relationship 
and having demonstrated how adept bargaining had resulted in a closer 
alignment between patron and client, it is necessary now to widen the 
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focus of the analysis and paint, with broad brush strokes, the larger 
picture of the consequences, for both Israeli and American policies, of this 
closer alignment as the Middle East drifted unknowingly towards the 1967 
war. In this way it will be possible to understand how Israel was able to 
persuade the United States of the necessity for ·pre-emption in June 1967 
and how it was able accordingly to secure American support for its 
settlement terms after the war. 
As analysed in part one of this dissertation, American policy had 
three purposes: i) the containment of Soviet influence in the Middle East; 
ii) the maintenance and promotion of American influence in the Arab world; 
iii) the support of the continued existence of the Jewish state of Israel. 
The Arab-Israeli conflict,and the related inter-Arab conflict, presented 
the greatest obstacles in the way of the attainment of these objectives, 
so, as the United States assumed a primary role in the region, it had 
attempted to settle these conflicts. During the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
Administrations the United States had made several attempts to settle the 
underlying grievances in both conflicts by assisting the Arab states in 
their economic development and by attempting to find equitable solutions 
to the problems of the Palestinian refugees and the division of the area's 
1 
water resources. However, the failure of American settlement policy led 
to a realisation that the time was not yet opportune for solving the 
1. The Johnston nL:rn for the division of the Jordan woters will be 
discussed below ~see pp. 205-206 ). In 1961 Dr Joseph E. Johnson was 
sent tb the Middle East to negotiate a settlement of the Palestinian refugee 
problem. He recommended a plebiscite of the refugees to determine whether 
they wished to return or be resettled. Those who wished to return would 
be accommodated by Israel, while those who did not would be compensated, 
and resettled in Arab countries. The United States would finance the whole 
operation. Neither Israel nor the Arab states accepted the Johnson Plan, 
and it was quietly dropped by the Kennedy Administration in 1962. 
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underlying grievances. Instead, short-term measures were adopted to ensure, 
at the very least, some stability and tranquillity as the preconditions for 
an eventual settlement and, in the meantime, for the pursuit of American 
objectives. Thus, s'ince a settlement appeared beyond reach, the second-
best objective of stability, if achieved, would ensure maximum opportunity 
for the cultivation of American influence, minimum opportunity for Soviet 
'trouble-making' and, consequently, would reduce risk of a superpower 
confrontation arising from their competitive diplomacy. 
So, in pursuit of stability, the United States had sought to 'freeze' 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, and reduce the inter-Arab conflict, by 
encouraging Nasser to turn Egypt away from external adventures towards a 
concentration on internal economic development. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, both internal and external pressures on Nasser made it 
impossible for him to conform to this American expectation and caused the 
2 
collapse of this 'conflict reduction' approach. Consequently, the United 
States began to adopt a balance of power approach as a more appropriate 
means of stabilising the two conflicts; Washington sought to balance tl'le 
growing power of the 'revisionist' forces (the Soviet Union and its Arab 
clients - Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen) by bolstering the status quo forces 
in the region (Israel and the conservative Arab states of Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon). To maintain the balance of 
power between the conservative and radical Arab states, the United States 
placed greater emphasis on strengthening the internal legitimacy of the 
conservative regimes than on improving their defensive capabilities, for 
radicalisation (i.e. Nasserisation) was more likely to result from internal 
disruption than from external attack. However, to maintain the balance 
of power between Israel and its Arab adversaries the United States found 
it necessary to strengthen Israel's ability to deter Egypt from attacking. 
Hence, as we have already observed, Israel's closer alignment with the 
United States and Washington's growing acceptance of Israel's strategy of 
deterrence. Yet Washington could hardly lose sight of the fact that 
its interest was not in deterrence per se, but rather in the stability which 
Israeli deterrence would help preserve. 
2. Janice Stein has noted that patrons can play an important role in the 
process of reducing conflicts by creating an environment which facilitates 
negotiations. The American approach to Egypt in the early 1960s is a good 
example of this role, for the United States was attempting to induce Egyptian 
behaviour which would have facilitated, in the longer term, a settlement. 
See Janice Gross Stein, "War Termination and Conflict Reduction or, How Wars 
Should End", Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Volume 1, No. 1, 
Fall, 1975, pp. 1-27. 
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On the other hand, Israel's policy towards the conflict was based not 
on the desire for stability per se, but on the desire to prevent, by 
deterrence if possible, by compulsion if necessary, any Arab infringement 
upon its vital interests - its territorial integrity, its freedom of 
navigation, its fair share of the area's water resources and its right to 
live in peace. Thus Israel's policy was not always compatible with 
America's desire for stability because, if deterrence failed to prevent 
fedayeen incursions, Arab diversion of the Jordan waters, Syrian bombardments, 
Egyptian restriction of Israel's freedom of navigation or an all-out Arab 
attack, then Israel would feel it necessary to resort to force to compel 
the Arabs to desist from these activities and this would inevitably 
exacerbate tension and cause instability. 
Now, as a result of Israel's newfound American alignment, H:1en 
deterrence changed to compulsion, and caused instability, it also caused 
conflict and strain in relations between patron and client because of the 
divergence in their respective policies. Were Israel to ensure that this 
divergence did not lead to a reduction in the military, economic and 
political support of its now most important patron, it had to find some way 
of reducing the dissonance, either by adjusting its policy to American 
preferences, or by convincing Washington that its long-term interests were 
better served by some short-term instability. 
On the other hand, were the United States to ensure that its new 
military support for Israel's deterrent strength would not be used by 
Israel for compulsive purposes if deterrence failed, it would have to 
pursue its own methods of preventing Arab infringement of Israeli rights, 
while attempting to impose restrictions on the use of Israeli force. With 
these purposes in mind the United States had demanded, during the arms 
negotiations in early 1965, a commitment from Israel that it would not use 
force against the Arab states until and unless they took more than their 
3 fair share of the Jordan waters. Following this, the United States 
launched a diploma.tic effort to persuade t~e Arab states to de.sist from 
their diversion projects. On the issues of fedayeen incursions and 
Syrian bombardments, the United States urged Israel to refer its grievances 
to the United Nations where the United States attempted to get the 
Security Council to deal with the problem rather than have Israel resort 
to its policy of retaliation. 
3. See above, page 139 , footnote 103. 
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Now Israel learned, as a result of interaction with tl1e United States 
on these issues, that although the United States sought commitments from 
Israel, the closer alignment of patron and client involved the United 
States in reciprocal commitments to its protege. In other words, if 
Israel heeded American pressure and refrained from military action, it 
made the United States responsible for finding its own remedy to the 
Arab incursions. As long as ·the United States recognised that it had a 
responsibility, either to solve the problem or to remove its causes, it 
would act accordingly; and if it failed to provide a remedy, then it could 
not easily oppose Israeli action to deal with the situation on its own. 
Thus, Israel discovered that it could reduce the dissonance of divergent 
policies if it first obliged Washington to seek a solution to the problem 
by heeding American advice and delaying military action, and then allowed 
Washington time to learn that American diplomacy was ineffective in 
dealing with the problem. Once such a realisation dawned on American 
decision-makers they would find it difficult to oppose Israel's use of 
compulsive force, especially if such action was preferable to a more 
forceful American policy which might jeopardise American relations with 
the Arab world or risk superpower confrontation. 
In this way, after American diplomacy had failed to prevent Syria 
from implementing its diversion project, Israel was able to retaliate 
against Syrian bombardments by destroying the diversion equipment and 
forcing the movement of the project site further and further away from the 
border and the headwaters of the Banias river. The United States did not 
h . l" . 4 protest t is reta iation. As a result, in September 1965 the Arab summit 
at Cassablanca decided to confine work on the diversion projects to areas 
4. U.S. diplomacy may have succeeded in getting Nasser to oppose the diversic 
Following a visit from Assistant Secretary of State Philips Talbot, in which 
the diversion was discussed, Nasser announced that the Arabs were n~ither 
capable of attacking Israel, nor capable of protecting the diversion projects 
from Israeli retaliation, and recommended that the diversion work therefore 
be postponed until such time as it could be defended. Syria paid no heed to 
Nasser's advice, so Israel took the opportunity of Syrian attacks on Israeli 
tractors working in the demilitarised zone to hit the Syrian diversion 
project. On 17 March 1965 Israel destroyed Syrian earth-moving equipment at 
the headwaters of the Bani.as river. The Syrians moved their project to a 
new site, 4 kilometres away from the border, which was shelled on 13 May 
1965. The Syrians again moved the site further east to Almagor, which was 
shelled in August 1965 and again in July 1966. In March 1967, Chief-of-Staff 
Rabin observed that if Syria continued its project at the present rate "they 
might be able to finish the job in ten or twenty years ... " See Midd.le East 
Record, 1967, Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 
Jerusalem, 1971, p. 165; N. Bar-Yaacov, The Israeli-Syrian Armistice: Problems 
of Implementation, 1949-1966, Jerusalem, 1967, pp. 145-7; and Fred J. Khouri, 
"The Policy of Retaliation in Arab-Israeli Relations", Middle East Jou.rnaZ., 
Volume 20, No. 4, Autumn 1966, pp. 450-1. 
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beyond the reach of Israeli retaliation until Arab strength was sufficient 
to protect operations closer to the border; the summit es ti1:iated that it 
would require four years to reach the necessary stage of military preparcdnes. 
5 
so, effectively, the diversion was postponed until the distant future. 
The combination of Israel's deterrent strength and its limited use of 
compulsive force had prevented the diversion of the Jordan river and 
neutralised one cause of tension and instability. Because the United 
States had been unable to offer a viable alternative remedy, it acquiesced 
in Israel's use of force and discovered that its interests in stability 
were served, despite short-term disruptions. 6 
Again, in dealing with fedayeen activity, Israel was able to gain 
American acquiescence for its retaliation against Syria. At first, Israel 
ignored American advice to submit its complaints to the United Nations 
Security Council instead of retaliating with force, and found itself 
censured in that forum by American diplomats. 7 irowever, by submitting its 
case to the Security Council in October 1966, it was able to neutralise 
American opposition to its subsequent action because a mild resolution 
censuring Syrian activities was vetoed by the Soviet Union. After this 
debacle Washington apparently informed Israel that it would not intervene 
again if terror incidents recurred, and would instead let events take their 
8 
course. 
In this process of persuading Washington to accept Israel's use of 
compulsion to bolster its deterrent posture, Eshkol made one serious mistake 
which actually reinforced the policy of delaying military action until the 
United States proved incapable of redressing the situation by diplomatic 
means. Under increasing pressure from his critics to respond more vigorously 
to the fedayeen raids, in November 1966 he ordered an attack on the 
Jordanian village of Samu. The raiding forces were engaged by a Jordanian 
unit and bitter fighting left 18 Jordanians dead and 54 wounded. On the 
West Bank widespread unrest ensued and Hussein's regime was seriously 
5. Middle East Record, 1967, p. 107. 
6. In dealing with the diversion, Israel strictly limited its use of force 
so that the incidents did not escalate into a wider conflict. This reduced 
American trepidation at Israeli retaliation. See Teveth, The Tanks of 
Tammuz, pp. 84-5. 
7. See Statements of Joseph J. Sisco, Acting U.S. Representative to the 
United Nations, 29 July and 3 August 1966, in American Foreign Policy, 
Current Documents, 1966, Washington, 1969, pp. 522, 525-6. 
8. David Kimche and Dan Bawly, The Sandstorm, London, 1968, pp. 52-3. The 
United States was not really in a position to criticise Israel since it was 
pursuing a much more forthright policy of retaliation in Vietnam against 
Vietcong incursions. 
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threatened. This instability was precisely what the United States had 
sought to avoid, especially in Jordan, which was probably America's most 
loyal client in the Arab world. Consequently the United States publicly 
deplored the action and supported a UN resolution, passed with only one 
abstention, which condemned Israel and recommended consideration of economic 
sanctions in the event of further Israeli raids. U.S. Ambassador Goldberg 
stated that Washington regard·ed the raid as a "clear violation of the 
solemn obligations undertaken by Israel", and rejected Israeli explanations 
because "this large-scale military action cannot be justified, explained 
away, or excused by the incidents which preceded it ... ". 9 }foreover, 
the Israeli raid had other repercussions which must have caused further 
consternation in Israel. The United States announced that it was 
considering Jordanian requests for further arms; it airlifted defensive 
equipment to Jordan and expedited the delivery of already contracted F-104s~O 
Further, American ambassadors in some Middle Eastern posts took the 
opportunity to recommend the suspension of arms shipments to Israel and 
Eshkol found it necessary to assure Washington that American tanks had not 
been used in the Samu raid. 11 
As proof that Israel had learned the lesson of successful client 
behaviour, in January 1967 it deferred military action and instead referred 
Syrian and fedayeen attacks to the Security Council, while appealing to 
President Johnson and other Heads of State to halt Syrian "aggression" 12 
In response to an appeal from U Thant, Israel agreed to a cease-fire on 
the Syrian front and announced its willingness to attend meetings of the 
Israel-Syrian :Mixed Armistice Commission. Again in March, Israel complained 
to the Security Council about sabotage and terrorism, thereby emphasising 
its willingness to try diplomacy before using force. When these actions 
naturally failed to prevent Syria from sponsoring its "popular war of 
liberation" and Israel finally retaliated on April 7, shooting down six 
13 Syrian MIGs in the process, the United States expressed little concern. 
With Hussein weathering the storm in Jordan, with no possibility of 
deterring Syria by diplomatic pressure, and with Israel directing its 
9. American FoPeign Policy_, CuPrent Documents_, 1966_, pp. 532-3. 
10. New Ym'l< Times_, 23 December, 1966. 
11. John W. Finney, "Israel denies using tanks in Jordan Raid", New York 
Times_, 23 November, 1966. 
12. Nem' East Report_, Volume XI, 1967, p. 5. 
13. Ibid._, pp. 29-30. 
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retaliation only against Damascus, a Soviet client and the real source of 
support for the fedayeen, the United States had little reason to be 
dissatisfied with Israel's strategy. In fact Washington seemed to have 
good reason, at least on the surface, to feel that tension and instability 
14 
would be confined to the Israel-Syrian border. For the time being 
Washington's strategy of stability had converged with Israel's combination 
of deterrence and compulsion.· There seemed little reason to doubt the 
claims of Israeli leaders that Israel's strength would ensure a few more 
years of relative tranquillity, especially because Nasser had declared time 
15 
and again that the Arabs were not strong enough to attack Israel. 
Nevertheless Israel's experience in persuading Washington to accept 
use of force against Syria had proved instructive, and when, in May 1967, 
both the United States and Israel faced an unexpected and dangerous crisis, 
consequent upon Nasser's remilitarisation of Sinai and his closure of the 
Straits of Tiran, decision-makers in Tel Aviv were aware that Washington 
would only acquiesce in Israel's resort to force if it were first unable 
to redress the situation by diplomatic means. 
However, the proponents of this course of action in Tel Aviv had to 
dissuade those in the decision-making elite who called for immediate 
military action, were Israel to pursue diplomacy before resorting to force. 
At first this task did not prove too difficult, but as the pressure of 
the Arab military build-up on Israel's borders increased the arguments 
of the proponents of a pre-emptive strike gained greater and finally 
unanimous support in the Israeli Cabinet. However, by this time it had 
become clear to decision-makers in Washington that their diplomatic efforts 
could not redress the situation and that Israeli military action was 
preferable to America's use of force. Thus Israel was able to secure 
American acquiescence in its decision to pre-empt, starting a war which, 
initially, the United States had vehemently opposed, but the outcome of 
which it steadfastly supported. 
14. Washington ignored repeated warnings from its Cairo Embassy that Nasser 
was being forced into a corner and would have to escalate the conflict in 
Yemen, in Libya, or with Israel. Interview with Lucius D. Battle, 
Ambassador to Cairo (1964-1967); Assistant Secretary for Near East and 
South Asian Affairs (1967-1968), Washington, June, 1976. Cf. David G. Nes, 
'1.'he Sinai Accord, '1.'he United States and Egypt ( 1952-1975), International 
Symposium on October 1973 War, Cairo University, October, 1975. 
15. See below, Chapter Four. 
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II - ISRAEL'S FIRST REACTION TO THE MAY-JUNE 1967 CRISIS16 
For Israel the 1967 crisis began when Nasser announced, on the evening 
of May 22, the closure of the Straits of Tiran to shipping headed for the 
Israeli port of Eilat. Israel's decision-makers had reacted calmly to the 
build-up of events which led to this announcement, confident in their 
belief that Israel's deterrent strength would prevent war for at least 
another few years. Nasser's remilitarisation of Sinai was therefore 
interpreted as 'grandstanding' and although precautions were taken, it 
was felt that the tension would soon subside. The removal of the UNEF 
buffer from the Egyptian-Israeli border was regarded with some trepidation, 
but the closure of the Straits precipitated the crisis, for Israel had 
made it clear that such action would be treated as a casus belli and now 
Nasser was evidently intent upon challenging Israel's resolve to protect 
what it regarded as its rights. On the morning of23 May Israel's Ministerial 
Defence Committee met to decide on an appropriate response to Nasser's 
actions now that Israel's doctrine of deterrence had failed. 
From the outset of the crisis a military response was regarded as 
necessary for two reasons: i) the Egyptian mobilisation, combined as it 
was with growing Arab military backing and belligerent statements, appeared 
to be in preparation for an all-out attack on Israel, aimed, as Nasser 
declared, at "avenging the events of 1948 as well as 1956"; ii) even if 
this attack did not eventuate in the short term, the continued presence of 
large-scale Egyptian deployments on Israel's border and the continued 
blockade of the port of Eilat would'be proof of Israel's failure to 
deter an infringement of its rights and security. 
16. The May-June 1967 crisis has been analysed in great detail in a 
plethora of books. Much of the information in these secondary sources 
is based on interviews and classified information. In the analysis that 
follows I have drawn information from "i-:hat I believe to be either the most 
reliable sources, or the most privileged sources. I have, as far as 
possible, cross-referenced the details presented there. Because of the 
constant reference to the following books in the analysis, they will only 
be referred to by author: Michel Bar-Zahar, Embassies in Crisis, Diplomats 
and Demagogues Behind the Six-Day War, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970; 
Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy, London, 1974; Winston 
Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East, London, 1970; Theodore Draper, Israel 
and World Politics: Roots of the Third Arab-Israeli ~lar, New York, 1968; 
Abba Eban, My Country, The Story of Modern Israel, New York, 1972; Lyndon 
Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point, Perspectives of the ITesidency, 1963-1969, 
London, 1972; Walter Laqueur, The Road to fvar, The Origin and Aftermath of 
the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967-8, (Penguin Books edition), Ringwood, Victoria, 
1969; David Kimche and Dan Bawly, The Sandstorm, The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: 
While it soon became evident that Nasser intended, in the linmediate 
term at least, to await an Israeli first strike and allow it to incur 
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the onus of starting the war, Israel would have to force the demilitarisation 
of Sinai and the reopening of the Straits were it to prevent the balance 
of power, as perceived by the regional powers and the superpowers alike, 
from tipping in favour of the Arabs. Were Nasser allowed to get away with 
his fait accompli the balance· of power would have been perceived to tip 
in his favour as surely as a successful attempt to place Soviet missiles in 
Cuba would have be·en perceived as a tipping of the superpower balance in 
favour of the Soviet Union. For Israel would have proved itself too 
weak-willed to protect its vital interest, while Egypt might have been 
encouraged to take bolder steps, gradually diminishing Israel's power and 
undermining the country's existence. As Abba Eban subsequently noted: 
•.. any submission by Israel to a blockade of the Straits of Tiran .•. 
would mean the collapse of Israel's deterrent power, for there was 
no issue in which Israel had pledged its honour in more irrevocable 
terms ... Unless a stand were made here, nobody in the Arab world, 
and few people beyond it, would ever again believe in Israel's 
power to resist and therefore survive. 1 7 
However, while acceptance of Nasser's fait accompli was impossible 
given its long-term implications for I.srael' s survival, precipitate military 
action by Israel carried with it the certainty of American opposition and 
the condemnation of world opinion. While few of Israel's decision-makers 
placed any faith in diplomatic attempts to get Nasser to back down, a 
period of delay would demonstrate the ineffectiveness of diplomacy and 
win support for unilateral Israeli action from the United States and other 
Western opinion, in the same way as Israel had succeeded in gaining American 
16. (continued) Prelude and Aftermath, London, 1968; William B. Quandt, 
United States Policy in the Middle East: Constraints and Choices, Rand 
Corporation, RM-5980- FF, February, 1970; Nadav Safran, From War to War, 
1'he Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967, New York, 1969; Robert St. John, 
Eban, New York, 1972. 
17. Eban, p. 204. 
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support for its use of force in the period from 1965 to 1967. 18 The problem 
in deferring action to ensure American support was that with every day of 
(I 
wait fog the risk of a c:oordinated two-front Arab attack increased markedly. 
Were Israel confident that it could successfully resist such an attack with 
acceptable costs in terms of casualties, the argument for diplomatic action 
might have persuaded all. However, it was clear that to await the Arab 
attack was believed to be fraught with danger and unacceptable costs 
for a number of important reasons: the :rA_F was concentrated on a small 
number of virtually unprotected airfields vulnerable to an Egyptian air 
strike; Arab armies, attacking from the West Bank, could cut-off Jerusalem 
and sever the country in two by advancing the meagre ten miles between 
the Jordanian border and the sea; the vulnerability of Israel's population 
centres and strategic targets, which were small in number and concentrated 
in nature; while the Arab armies consisted of regulars who could be 
permanently deployed on Israel's borders, Israel's citizen army could not 
remain mobilised for long periods without serious disruption to the economy; 
and, an Arab first strike would inevitably take a higher toll in Israeli 
casualties. 
Thus, even though the proponents of diplomatic action could invoke 
the experience of prior years, when, as we have seen, diplomacy had reduced 
American opposition to Israel's use of force, in this new crisis, with 
the stakes of far greater consequence, the diplomatic option was handicapped 
because of the premium on time were Israel 1 s military response to be 
pre-emptive. Nevertheless, the advocates of diplomatic action also 
possessed some persuasive arguments and in the Ministerial Defence Committee 
meeting of 23 May they carried the day, primarily because the discussion 
focussed on an appropriate response to Nasser's closure of the Straits 
rather than on the military threat posed by the deployment of Egyptian 
. s. . 19 troops in inai. 
18. For the perceptions of Israel's decision-makers see Brecher, pp. 331-355. 
His content analysis of the speeches of key decision-makers reveals that 
the most intense perception was that the survival of the state was in jeopardy 
and that immediate action was called for. However, the second-most intense 
perception, and it was almost equally intense as the first, was that the 
Western powers would do nothing and Israel must rely on its own strength. 
The third most intense perception was that Israel would lose the sympathy 
of world opinion if it acted before all efforts at a peaceful settlement had 
been exhausted. Although one should not overemphasise the importance of such 
analysis, it nevertheless supports the argument that while a military response 
was considered necessary, it was also felt that time would have to be 
allowed for diplomatic efforts to be exhausted and for the Western powers to 
realise that their action would not redress the situation, before Israel's 
decision-makers felt they could pre-empt. 
19. See Safran, pp. 308-9. 
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In arguing that Israel had to concentrate on the politics of patronage 
before resorting to the politics of force, the advocates of diplomacy were 
able to invoke the bitter memory of 1956-7, when the United States had 
forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai in exchange for guarantees that the 
Straits would remain open. 20 If Israel took precipitate action now, the 
United States might adopt the same attitude again - only this time the 
consequences were potentially far more serious. For, while the Soviet Union, 
as in the Suez Crisis, had again made it clear that it supported the Arabs, 
unlike in 1956, Britain and France could no longer be expected to come to 
the aid of Israel. This made American patronage crucial to balance 
Soviet support of the Arabs, as well as to ensure that in the event of an 
Israeli pre-emption it would be able to ratify its military victory with 
political success. This argument was reinforced by a letter which President 
Johnson had sent to Eshkol on May 17, urging restraint and consultation: 
I know that you and your people are having your patience tried 
to the limit by continuing incidents along your border. In this 
situation I would like to emphasise in the strongest terms the 
need to avoid any action on your side, which would add further 
to the violence and tension in your area. I urge the closest 
consultation between you and your principal friends. I am sure 
that you will understand that I cannot accept any responsibilities 
on behalf of the United States for situations which arise as the 
result of actions on which we are not consulted.21 
The pre-eminent advocate of diplomacy, Foreign Minister Eban, was able 
to cite both this letter, and a cable received from Washington while the 
Committee was deliberating, to bolster his case. The cable contained a 
formal request from the President to delay any action for 48 hours, and 
a repetition of his earlier warning that he would take no responsibility 
22 for action on which he was not consulted. On the other hand, Eban 
argued that Israel had strong cards to play in Washington by pointing to 
Dulles' written commitment of February 1957 to guarantee "free and innocent 
passage in the Gulf", as well as other solemn American commitments to 
Israel's integrity. 23 Eban concluded: were Israel to ensure military 
20. Eban, p. 208; Brecher, Zoe.cit. 
21. Cited in Bar-Zahar, p. 41. 
22. Brecher, pp. 378-9. 
23. Eban also cited Mrs Meir's speech to the U.N. General Assembly which 
declared Israel's right to freedom of navigation and which was drawn up 
after assurances of free passage had been received from the U.S., France, 
Britain and Canada, and every word of which had been checked in advance 
by Dulles. For the text of Dulles' aide memoire see Draper, Appendix 1. 
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assistance in the event of a war, were it to redeem American pledges, were 
it to mobilise international opinion in support of its cause, and were it 
to ensure that the United States would not seek "to annul whatever Israel 
could achieve by itself", then it would have to pursue diplomacy before 
resorting to force, it would have to saddle the United States with the 
responsibility for making a choice between, either opening the Straits and 
forcing Nasser to back down, ·or acquiescing in Israel's pre-emptive 
24 
redemption of its deterrent strength. 
Perhaps surprisingly, only Moshe Carmel, the Transport Minister, argued 
for immediate military action and opposed Eban's desire to consult with 
the United States. He seems to have been acutely aware of the danger of 
an Arab first strike and therefore argued that such consultation would 
tie Israel's hands and prevent it from pre-empting. 25 Had Yigal Allon, 
the Minister for Labour and the public exponent of the strategy of pre-
emption, been present at the Ministerial Defence Committee meeting, Carmel's 
arguments would have been bolstered. Allon seems to have immediately 
grasped the strategic import of Nasser's moves and to have decided that a 
pre-emptive strike (an "anticipatory counter-attack" was what he preferred 
to call it) was now the only means of reaction. He believed that diplomatic 
feelers would only invite the Western powers to exert pressure on Israel to 
exercise restraint and that therefore the time to explain Israel's position 
was "immediately after the war had started11 • 26 But Allon's views were not 
taken into account at this stage because he had not yet returned from a 
f ' l S . U . 27 D d P 1 h h . h con erence in t1e oviet nion. ayan an eres, a t oug not in t e 
Cabinet, were present at this meeting, along with other members of the 
opposition parties. They argued in favour of a 48 hour delay while Eban 
consulted with the Western powers, but they cautioned that it should only 
be 48 hours and that there should be no official commitment to the 
principle of prior consultations. 28 
24. Eban, p. 209; Brecher, p. 379; and Burdett, p. 245. 
25. Kimche and Bawly, pp. 139-140; Middle East Record, 196?_. Commenting in 
1972 on the 1967 crisis, Carmel remembered: "If ... the enemy had succeeded 
in hitting our airfields and putting all, or some of them, out of 
operational use, our military situation would have immediately become very 
serious and very dangerous". Cited in Benjamin Geist, "A Question of 
Survival", International Journal, Volume XXVIII, No. 4, Autumn, 1973, pp. 
634-5. 
26. Yigal Allon, The Making of Israel;s Army, pp. 88-9. 
27. Bar-Zahar reports the following conversation between Eshkol and Allon 
on May 25, after his return from the Soviet Union: Eshkol: "Yigal, what do 
you think?"; Allon: "We should go to war". Eshkol: "When?"; Allon: 
"Yesterday". P. 108. 
28. Brecher, p. 380; Bar-Zahar, p. 77. 
Perhaps the decisive opinion which S\mng the meeting over to Eban' s 
position, was that of the General Staff, who were surprisingly reticent 
with their advice and apparently did not exert pressure for military 
action. Rabin outlined the military strategy for reopening the Straits, 
29 but did not oppose a 48 hour delay. The IDF certainly could have used 
the time to complete its preparations, but it was more likely that the 
General Staff needed more time to assess the significance of Nasser's 
actions before such a weighty decision as war was recommended to the 
Cabinet. As Weizmann, then Head of General Staff Division, has observed: 
If the government was groping in the dark, it was the General 
Staff that strengthened and reinforced its doubts, because it 
too was perplexed and confused, and didn't put things before the 
government clearly.30 
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Thus, with only one strong opponent of diplomatic action, the Committee 
decided to postpone military action until Eban had consulted Johnson, 
Wilson and De Gaulle. The Foreign Minister departed for Washington, via 
Paris and London on May 24, to gain international support for Israel's 
right to freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel had decided 
to respond to Nasser's closure of the Straits by seeking international,but 
particularly American, support for its cause. The Cabinet had acceded to 
Washington's requests for consultation before taking military action. 
As a dependent client state, Israel had bowed to considerations of patronage 
before taking upon itself the responsibility of dealing with Nasser's actions 
By stressing its readiness to fight, on the one hand, but its readiness to 
delay war, on the other, Israel could try to ensure that the United States 
would recognise its responsibilities to its client and would attempt to 
prevent war by redressing the situation. Once the United States realised 
that it could not fulfil its responsibilities, that it could not redress 
the situation, it would not be likely to seek to undo politically what Israel 
achieved on the battlefield. However, were Israel to adhere to these 
precepts of the politics of patronage, it would have to delay military action 
29. Brecher, p. 378. Accounts differ on this point with some observers 
arguing that the General Staff wanted immediate military action, while 
others maintained that the IDF needed the time to complete its preparations. 
Brecher cites his own interviews and later accounts as persuasive evidence 
for his claim that "there was no military pressure for immediate action". 
See Brecher, footnote 2, p. 378, and Laqueur, p. 142, Eban, p. 208, 
Middle East Record~ p. 196, Draper, p. 88, Kirncl1e and Bawley, p. 139 and 
Burdett, p. 245. 
30. Weizmann, On Eagles' Tlings~ 
collapsed with nervous exhaustion; 
mind of the Chief-of-Staff. 
p. 211. After the Xay 23 meeting Rabin 
a sign of the doubts that existed in the 
until the United States recognised its responsibilities and then accepted 
that Israeli force was preferable to American action aimed at the 
fulfilment of these responsibilities. 
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It is inherent in the nature of crises that time will be of the essence. 
This was particularly the case in the last days of May 1967 because, with 
each day of waiting, the perceived danger of an Arab first strike increased, 
strengthening the·arguments of those in the Israeli Cabinet who favoured 
an immediate pre-emption. So Israel's attempt to secure American patronage 
in this crisis was severely handicapped by its urge to resort to force. 
Had the perceived costs of delaying the use of force outweighed the 
perceived benefits of American support for whatever ensued, the political 
outcome of the 1967 war might well have been very different, and much less 
favourable to Israel. 
III - THE REACTION IN WASHINGTON 
While Eban travelled to Washington, American decision-makers were 
considering three possible alternative courses of action: i) the reopening 
of the Straits by diplomatic means if possible or by means of a multilateral 
fleet if necessary; ii) a diplomatic compromise tantamount to Israel's 
acceptance of Nasser's action and Nasser's acceptance of freedom of 
navigation for all ships other than those flying an Israeli flag; 
iii) 'unleashing' Israel - i.e. allowing Israel to deal with the problem 
alone. 31 
Those State Department officers with responsibility for the Near East 
favoured the second option because of their concern that either of the other 
two options would cause further polarisation and portray the United States 
as Israel's protector. They were mindful of the consequences of British 
and French action in 1956 and felt that if the United States attempted to 
open the Straits, the ensuing confrontation with Egypt would lead to the 
demise of America's already diminished influence in the Arab world. Keen 
to reassert American influence, they advised against tile United States taking 
any overt action to support Israel or to open the Straits, and strove 
instead for a diplomatic compromise, suggesting at various stages that UNEF 
be positioned on the Israeli side of the border, that Israel was 
exaggerating the importance of Eilat, and that if Israel gave Nasser a way 
out he might agree to reopen the Straits at least to all ships othei than 
31. Draper, pp. 89-90. 
those flying the Israeli flag. They seemed to believe that if this 
compromise failed, 'unleashing' Israel would be preferable to any American 
action on Israel's behalf, since Israel was expected to win the war and 
the United States could then reassert its position of influence in the 
Arab world by forcing Israel to withdraw. 32 
However, the locus of decision-making had shifted from the desks of 
the State Department to the Oval Office of the White House where 
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Secretary of State Rusk, Under Secretary of State Eugene Rostow, Secretary 
of Defense McNamara arid National Security Advisor Walt Rostow were advising 
the President. Rusk and Eugene Rostow opposed the State Department idea 
of compromise, because it might provide Nasser with a diplomatic victory. 
They viewed the decline of American relations with Nasser and the consolidatic 
of Soviet influence in the Arab radical camp with considerable trepidation; 
a victory for Nasser could only strengthen the anti-American forces in the 
region. At the same time they wanted to avoid a war, partly because of the 
risk of superpower conflict and partly because they too were concerned with 
the polarisation of the Arab world su~h that the hitherto friendly 
3-: 
'conservative' Arab states would be forced to turn against the United States.-
McNamara voiced the Pentagon's fear of military involvement in another 
region of the world while the United States was preoccupied with Vietnam. 
He opposed the use of American force to open the Straits of Tiran and 
favoured, instead, multilateral action to force Nasser to back down. He 
apparently told Johnson that if war broke out the Pentagon was sufficiently 
confident that Israel would win and therefore intervention would not be 
34 
necessary. Thus it is reasonable to speculate that McNamara, espousing 
the military perspective, was not so opposed to unilateral action on the 
part of Israel. On the other hand, Walt Rostow was apparently persuaded 
by his brother that the idea of a multilateral fleet designed to test 
the blockade - a suggestion the British had made a day earlier - was a 
viable option and so he backed this action. 35 
32. Bar-Zahar claims that some State Department officials "thought any 
concession justified as long as it did not call for an abandonment of basic 
policies". Others apparently argued that the U.S. should take "an 
objective attitude towards the conflict" which would take into account 
America's oil interests. See Bar-Zohar, pp. 56, 84, 161. Cf. Quandt, pp. 41-2 
33. Quandt, p. 41; Rostow expounds on his anti-Soviet perspective in his 
"The Middle Eastern Crisis in the Perspective of iJorld Politics", 
International Affairs, Volume 47, No. 2, 2 April, 1971. 
34. Quandt, p. 42. 
35. Interview with Townsend Hoopes, June, 1976. 
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Thus on May 23, in preparation for Eban's visit, these advisors drafted 
a joint memorandum for the President which advised that the United States 
was faced with two basic policy options given its commitment to Israel: 
i) permit Israel to deal with the problem on its own; ii) assume responsibili 
for opening the Straits. The advisors, at this stage, rejected the first 
option but it should be borne in mind that they were well aware of the 
danger that if they failed in their pursuit of the second option, the 
only alternative to a diplomatic victory for Nasser was the 'unleashing' of 
Israel. In support of the second option, they reconunended that the United 
States pursue three steps: i) exhaust all possibilities of resolving the 
conflict in the United Nations; ii) sponsor a declaration to be signed 
by as many maritime powers as possible in support of freedom of 
navigation in the Straits; iii) if all else failed, use a multilateral 
36 fleet to test the blockade. 
The President was predisposed to pursuing the second option. He 
recognised that the United States had a commitment to Israel, not only to 
preserve its integrity, but also to support its right to free passage 
through the Gulf of Aqaba. The deterioration in relations with Nasser's 
Egypt gave him little incentive to back a compromise solution, for he 
had little interest, eith~r in preserving Nasser's diplomatic victory, 
or in helping him to save face. However, he did want to preserve stability 
and avoid a superpower confrontation and had therefore already taken 
steps to forestall war by urging Kosygin, Nasser and Eshkol to act with 
restraint. 37 Recognising the need to take effective action were he to 
prevent Israel from going to war over the blockade of the Straits, he 
was nevertheless preoccupied with the need for Congressional approval for 
any American or multilateral action to reopen the Straits because of the 
opposition he was encountering from Congress over his actions in Vietnam. 38 
The House of Representatives seemed to favour action in support of 
Israel for 110 Congressmen had signed a statement drafted by Representative 
Cellar which declared: 
36. Draper, pp. 89-90; Quandt, p. 42. 
37. The cable to Kosygin is cited in Johnson, p. 291. The message to Nasser 
and an accompanying memorandum is cited inTnter>nai;1:onal Docwnents on 
Palest1:ne_, 1967_, The Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1970, 
Documents 20 and 21, pp. 7-9. 
38. See Johnson, pp. 291-2. 
We pledge the fullest support to measures which must 
be taken by the Administration to make our position 
unmistakably clear to those who are now bent on the 
destruction of Israel, that we are now prepared to 
take whatever action may be necessary to resist 39 
aggression against Israel and to preserve the peace. 
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However, the Senate was more cautious and divided in its expressions of 
support. The Majority and Mtnority Leaders both declared their support 
for multilateral action, with Senator Mansfield (Majority Leader) 
emphasising that "there should be no question of unilateral military 
involvement in the Near East''. Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, declared that the only binding commitment of 
1 U . d S . . 1 U . l N . 40 'l 1 1 tle nite tates was to support action in tle nitec ations. ,, tloug1 
other Senators were more forthright in their support for Israel's rights, 
after Rusk corrf erred with the Foreign Relations Committee on 2!f May, 
he reported to the President that, while there was general support for 
Israel's survival, there was opposition to unilateral action and a 
preference for multilateral action, hopefully through the United Nations. 41 
Thus Johnson felt constrained by the need to secure Congressional 
support for any American action. Nevertheless, he recognised his 
responsibility to Israel and believed it necessary to publicly emphasise 
America's commitment to Israel's right of freedom of navigation by 
stating on 23May: 
The United States considers the Gulf to be an international 
waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is 
illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace ... 
To the leaders of all nations of the Near East, I wish to say 
what three American Presidents have said before me - that 
the United States is firmly committed to the support of the 
political independence and territorial integrity of all the 
nations of the area. 4 L (emphasis supplied). 
39. Cited in Near East Repm·t~ Volume XI, 1967, p. 42. 
40. Ib1:d. 
41. Johnson, pp. 291-2. Bar-Zahar reports that the majority of Senators 
on the Foreign Relations Committee had "definitely pronounced against 
unilateral action on the part of the United States'' (p.99). According to 
the NeOX' East Report~ the State Department had advised Senators "to speak 
softly and in terms of UN action", which, if true, would explain the 
caution of some Senators, normally forthright in their support for Israel. 
Newspaper editors were also apparently briefed by the State Department 
and told that in the event of war, the U.S. would probably suspend aid to 
both sides to maintain its evenhandedness (p. 43). This illustrates 
the point made in Part One about the ineffectiveness of the Jewish lobby 
during periods of crisis .. The Senators preferred to listen to the State 
Department. 
42. See "Statement by U.S. President Johnson Calling for Restraint in the 
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nut he had accepted the cidvice of his counsellors, thnt the United Stcites 
shoeld pursue diplomatic and multilateral action to reopen the Straits. 
Were this action to have any chance of success Israel and Egypt would have 
to be restrained from taking precipitate action. His intelligence reports 
indicated that he "could be reasonably sure the Middle East would not 
explode", 43 but once Eban had consulted with him, the Israeli Cabinet 
might well decide to go to war if it felt that the situation would not 
be redressed by American intervention. Clearly what he said to Eban 
would be decisive in preventing war ir.miediately, but what the United States 
did about its now public commitment to Israel would be even more important 
in preserving stability over a longer period by removing the incentive for 
Israel to take pre-emptive action. 
Given the President's disposition, Israel would obviously have to 
allow time for the United States to pursue its diplomacy, were it to gain 
American acquiescence in its pre-emption. Just as Washington had acquiesced 
in Israel's use of force over the Jordan waters dispute and Syrian border 
strife, after it proved unable to do anything to relieve these sources 
of tension, so too would the United States only support an Israeli 
pre-emption if its own efforts to redress the situation in Sinai proved 
worthless. Thus what was required of Israel now was patience and a 
demonstration of its willingness to resist Nasser's fait accompli. If 
Israel took precipitate action, it might find itself condemned by America, 
and if the White House perceived weakness in Israel's will to resist, 
it might take more seriously the State Department's proposal for a 
diplomatic compromise over Israel's right to free passage in the Gulf . 44 
Given that the United States' prim<Jry interest lay in stability rather than 
the preservation of Israel's rights, it would only be convinced to forgo 
its interest in stability if it proved unable to preserve stability by 
its own actions and if Israel was prepared, in any case, to disrupt 
stability in order to preserve its rights. Thus, Eban's mission to 
Washington would only be successful if he convinced American decision-makers 
of the urgency of testing diplomatic action (thereby reducing the time 
during which Isrdel would have to exercisP restraint), and of Israel's 
resolve to take matters into its own hands if this action f<Jiled. 
42. (continued) Niddle East, Hay 23, 1967", in Inter'nat1:onal Doewnents on 
Palestine_, 1967_, Document 23, pp. 10-11. Bar-Zohar claims that domestic 
pressures played an important role in persuading the President to declare 
the blockade illegal. He cites pressures from congressmen, from the AFL-CIO, 
and from "one of Israel's most influential partis<Jns" (pp. 8!1-86). 
43. Johnson, p. 292. 
44. Cf. Safran, p. 311. 
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Eban's task was made all the more difficult by the fact that, 
while en route to Washington, Israel's willingness to exercise restraint 
had been seriously undermined. For, in his absence, the advocates of 
immediate military action had been strengthened by the deployment of the 
Egyptian Fourth Armored Division in Sinai. It was now clear to the General 
Staff, and a growing number of Ministers, that the real problem for Israel 
was no longer the closure of the Straits but rather the challenge to 
Israel 1 s deterrent strength, inherent in the remilitarisation of Sinai. 
The gravity of two problems was now impressed upon the minds of Israel's 
decision-makers: i) the longer Israel waited the greater the danger that 
Egypt might decide to strike first and the less the advantage of an Israeli 
first-strike as a result of the increased preparedness of the Arab 
military forces on its borders; ii) international action to force Nasser 
to back-down had become inappropriate because, if this pressure succeeded, 
Israel would appear to be the weak ward of the Western powers and the 
challenge to its deterrent strength would go unanswered. What the Israeli 
decision-makers failed to appreciate at this juncture was that, were they 
to secure American support for an Israeli pre-emption, they would have to 
risk an Egyptian first strike, they would have to accept the reduced 
effectiveness of an Israeli first strike, and they would have to wait and 
hope that international action would not succeed. Perhaps because they did 
not appreciate the complexities involved in securing American patronage, 
or rather, because they were preoccupied with the military treat, they 
made Eban's mission immensely more difficult and, to some extent, 
undermined the belief in Washington that Israel was prepared to take 
matters into its own hands, thereby undermining Israel's leverage with 
the United States. 
Eshkol's concern with the remilitarisation of Sinai rather than the 
closure of the Straits had been caused by a tour which he had made, 
together with Allon, to the Southern front on 25 May. There he had met with 
the commanders of the Israeli forces who had argued that there was great 
danger, especially the danger of a sharp increase in casualties, in any 
further delay, because the Egyptians were consolidating their forces on 
L1 S 
the other side of the border. - Allon ogreed with their analysis, arguing 
45. Brecher notes that "from that day on there wos almost unanimous 
pressure ... from the army commanders on the Prime Minister to go to war" 
(p. 385). 
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that the time for waiting was over, and Eshkol was apparently convinced by 
1 h · ' b 1 4 6 II h f f 1 . t ese arguments tat war was now inevita e. e t ere-ore et it 
important that Eban find out from Johnson, not what the United States 
would do about the closure of the Straits, but rather, whether it was 
prepared to do anything about the threat created by the military build-up 
in Sinai, and whether it would support Israel if it now took action on 
its own. 
Given the fact that the United States was not so concerned with Israeli 
deterrence as it was with the stability which Israeli deterrence had failed 
to maintain, Eshkol could not expect Eban blunty to request American 
support for an Israeli disruption of this stability, especially if the 
United States was pursuing action through diplomatic channels. Nevertheless, 
it was now necessary to make it clear to Washington that; while in other 
circumstances Israel might be able to await diplomatic action to open the 
Straits, the concentration of Egyptian troops iR Sinai made waiting 
dangerous and less and less possible with each new day. In consultation 
with Chief-of-Staff Rabin and Herzog, the Director-General of the Prime 
Minister's Department, Eshkol apparently decided to put the blame for 
disruption of the precarious stability on Egypt by claiming that Nasser 
was planning an imminent attack. In this way Israel could be portrayed as 
being concerned to prevent an Egyptian attack and American willingness to 
support an Israeli pre-emption could be tested. So, on 25 May, Eshkol 
sent a cable to the Israeli embassy in Washington to await Eban's arrival, 
which advised him that they were now concerned about an imminent Egyptian 
offensive, and which asked him to clarify "to what extent the U.S. is 
prepared to make good on obligations given in the past to Israeli leaders'' 
in the event of such an attack. A second cable, dispatched by Herzog, w~ 
more alarmist, stating that Israeliintelligence believed that Egypt would 
attack on 27 May, and advising Eban to seek an American declaration that 
1 ld b d d k . . u . d s 47 an attack on Israe wou e regar e as an attac on tne nite tates. 
46. Ibid., p. 389; Bar-Zahar, p. 108. 
47. The cables are cited in Brecher, p. 386; cf. Bar-Zohar, p. 109. The 
evidence of such an attack was apparently rather flimsy. Safran reports that 
Israeli Intelligence had intercepted an Egyptian Command order to one of its 
air force units to bring its preparations to the point of readiness for 
offensive operations on May 27 (p. 300). As we shall see, there were many mo1 
indications that the Egyptians were not preparing for an offensive at this 
stage. Rabin has since explained that the idea of sending the cables came not 
from the General Staff but rather from Herzog who had suggested that "we send 
a telegram to ... Eban ... and in it we would say that, according to the 
information in our hands, there may be the development of an Egyptian 
offensive initiative against Israel as the events evolve''. (Cited in Brecher, 
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Eban arrived in Washington on the afternoon of 25 May, read the cables, 
and sought an immediate meeting with Rusk. At this meeting he reported 
Israeli fears of an imminent Egyptian attack and Rusk immediately suspended 
the discussions to consult with the President and McNamara. Despite the 
fact that Eban's information did not concur with American intelligence 
estimates, the Egyptian ambassador was called to the State Department and 
told to warn Nasser not to attack. Then, when the meeting with Eban resumed, 
Rusk told him that the United States did not share the Israeli appraisal:. 
Washington ''did not regard the Egyptian order of battle in Sinai as offensive 
h h . . h h . h " 48 Th S f S t oug it mig t c ange its c aracter . e .ecretary o tate went on 
to rule out any American declaration that an attack on Israel would be 
regarded as an attack on the United States, explained that the President 
could not act without prior Congressional consent, and warned that if 
Israel pre-empted it would tie the President's hands and create great 
difficulties for him. 
Far from gaining American support for pre-emption, the cables had 
helped persuade the Americans to pressure Israel not to pre-empt. Since 
they did not agree with the Israeli assessment, that the Egyptians were 
about to attack, they could only interpret the Israeli alarm in one of 
two ways: either the Israelis were preparing to pre-empt and were 
fabricating an Egyptian plan for an offensive as justification; or they 
had lost confidence in their ability to resist the Egyptians. Whatever the 
case, American pressure on both Egypt and Israel to prevent either from 
striking first must have appeared efficacious. Eban had lost the first 
round and had little choice but to pursue the question which he had 
originally intended to raise - the blockade of the Straits. He produced 
Dulles' aide-memoire (rather surprisingly the State Department did not 
have a copy of this document) and asked what the Johnson administration was 
prepared to do about this solemn commitment. The Americans outlined their 
proposal for a declaration of maritime powers which would support the 
principle of freedom of·navigation in the Straits; were this declaration 
not endorsed by the United Nations and appropriate action taken, it would 
be followed by assembling a multilateral "regatta" which would test the 
blockade. Israel, they warned would have to exercise restraint while all 
47. (continued) p. 385. Herzog's cable was apparently much more alarmist 
than Rabin's explanation implies. 
48. Cited in Brecher, pp. 386-7. 
164 
possibilities of action in the United Nations were exhausted. 49 
The next morning, Friday 26 May, Eban met with McNamara, w11eeler 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and their aides at the Pentagon. 
Again, following his instructions which had been confirmed by another 
cable received as the talks began reiterating "in drastic terms" the 
Israeli appraisal of imminent attack, Eban raised the issue of an 
impending Egyptian offensive~ This time the Pentagon chiefs outlined in 
greater detail the American intelligence estimates: Egypt's armed forces 
were deployed in defensive formations; Nasser was waiting for Israel to 
incur the onus of striking first; Israel would retain air superiority even 
if Egypt did strike first; Israel would win no matter who started the war; 
and the passage of time would only increase Egypt's logistical problems 
h 'l 1 . I l' · · · d 5o w i e eaving srae s security un1mpa1re • 
Eban was now in a quandary. Clearly the United States believed Israel 
to be militarily strong and in no great danger of imminent attack. He 
sensed that the Israeli General Staff were exaggerating the danger and that 
continued repetition of their appraisal ''would be exchanging an attitude 
51 
of military self-confidence for one of apparent weakness". Already he 
felt that his recitation of the cables had created the impression that the 
Israeli government was the "trembling victim of an imminent coup de grace". 52 
Moreover, sounding the alarm had not only generated pressure from the United 
States not to pre-empt, it had also resulted in American pressure on Egypt 
not to attack. Both these factors would make it extremely costly, in terms 
of American patronage, for Israel to take immediate military action; partly 
because the United States had warned it not to do so, and partly because if 
Israel attacked after the United States had warned Egypt against such action, 
Israel could be charged with perfidy while America would be accused of 
collusion. 
His mission was beginning to take on the awesome appearance of failure. 
As a diplomat rather than a general he understood the politics of patronage 
better th;;in the politics of force. He had come to Washington on a diplomatic 
mission to secure American political support, but so far had only 
succeeded in creating the impression that Israel feared Egyptian strength. 
It could only do more harm to push the charge of an imminent Egyptian 
L;9. Ibid.~ p. 387; Bar-Zohar, pp. 110-113; Draper, p. 89; Laqucur, p. 154. 
50. St. John, p. 428; Brecher, p. 390; Bar-Zahar, p. 117. 
51. St John, pp. 426-7; Laqueur, p. 154. 
52. St John, p. 429. 
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attack because American intelligence reports contradicted this assessment; 
and if Egypt did not intend to attack, for the present, Israel could hardly 
persuade Washington that it had to pre-empt and could not allow time for 
the diplomatic process to be tested. As far as Eban was concerned there 
was only one strategy for gaining American acquiescence in an Israeli 
pre-emption: allow time to demonstrate that diplomacy could not redress the 
situation; emphasise Israeli·resolve to resist any compromise solution; and 
thereby encourage the realisation in Washington, that it was less costly 
to allow Israel to deal with the situation on its own rather than intervene 
with force. Therefore his first task was to ensure that the President 
recognised his responsibility to reopen the Straits and that he took 
urgent action to fulfil this responsibility. If this action secured the 
reopening of the Straits, well and good, but if it failed, as was more 
likely, then the United States "could hardly censure Israel for defining 
its own policy in similar terms - and with more effect". 53 Eban's second 
task was to emphasise to the President that Israel was prepared to take 
unilateral action if the United States proved incapable or unwilling to 
redress the situation; that there could be no diplomatic compromise because 
Israel possessed the will-p:nver to protect its vital interests. Thus the 
meeting with Johnson would be crucial for testing American resolve, 
demonstrating Israeli resolve and undoing the damage caused by emphasising 
I 1 ' f f E . 1 54 srae. s ear o· an gyptian attac~. 
The meeting with Johnson did not take place until the evening of 
Friday 26 May. That morning, Eban had spoken with Rusk and emphasised that 
Israel would resist the blockade and that unless the President stated that 
he would act "unreservedly" to reopen the Straits, and provided Israel 
with the logistical details, hostilities would occur in the next week. 
He noted that the Israeli Cabinet would meet on Sunday morning and that it 
would probably be "the most crucial in the history of the nation"; 
53. Eban, p. 211. 
54. Most accounts of Eban's mission, other than his own and St John's, 
emphasise his failure to gain American support or to understand what the 
American's were trying surreptitiously to tell him. They also accuse him 
of reporting inaccurately to the Israeli Cabinet. Safran, in particular, 
makes much of the argument that 13ban failed to demonstrate Israeli resolve. 
The accounts of Johnson and Brech er, which seem to be the most reliable and 
accurate, although neither of them are free of bias, support my contention 
that while Eban n~y have created doubts in the minds of officials in the 
State Department and the Pentagon as to Israel's will to resist, he did not 
fail to impress on the While House Israel's determination to take act.ion if 
American efforts failed. They also support the contentions that Eban did 
report the proceedings accurately and that he well understood the complexitie~ 
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he had to know before then where the United States stood.SS 
Eban used this same lever - Israel's readiness for war if the United 
States did not take firm action - in his talks with Johnson that evening. 
He did not dwell long on the claim of an imminent Egyptian attack, providing 
the President with the essence of the cables, and using them to emphasise 
not so much an impending attack but rather the threat which Nasser's actions 
posed to Israel's survival .. As far as Israel was concerned, he stressed, 
it was faced with a choice between surrender and resistance - it would not 
surrender. He then turned to the American commitment given to Israel in 
19S7 on freedom of navigation in the Straits, and asked whether the 
United States was now determined to carry out this commitment by reopening 
the Straits. He argued that action through the United Nations would be 
worthless because of the Soviet veto, but if the United States backed 
Israel and the President pledged that the blockade would be opposed, then 
Nasser might be forced to back-down and war might be avoided.s 6 
Johnson first asked McNamara to summarise American intelligence reports 
which showed that in the judgment of the three intelligence agencies an 
Egyptian attack was not imminent. Johnson added: "All of our intelligence 
people are unanimous, that if the UAR attacks you will whip hell out of 
them". S? He emphasised that the United States would carry out its 
responsibility for freedom of passage in the Straits, but that any action 
involving the possibility of force would have to have Congressional backing 
for it to be effective: "I am fully aware of what three past Presidents 
have said, but that is not worth five cents if the people and the Congress 
do not support the President 11 .s8 In this regard, action through the 
United Nations had to be the first resort, in order to secure public support 
even if it achieved nothing else. He was hopeful that the United States 
and Britain would be able to raise an international fleet to test the 
blockade, but time was needed for the arrangements to be made. In the 
meantime, Eban could tell the Israeli Cabinet that "we will pursue 
vigorously any and all. possible measures to keep the strait open". He had 
S4. (continued) of this diplomatic bargaining. What Eban failed to do, 
was to convey the sense of alarm in Israel about Egyptian military 
preparations without giving the impression that Israel was weak-willed. 
SS. St. John, p. 428; Bar-Zohar, pp. llS-6; Brecher, pp. 389-390. 
S6. Brecher, p. 392; Bar-Zahar, p. 124; St. John, p. 431. 
S7. Johnson, p. 293. 
S8. Ibid. 
not forgotten the commitments he had made to Eshkol and he was not about 
to retreat or back-track, but these matters had to take their course and 
Israel should devote its attention to winning diplomatic support. 
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If Israel decided that it had to take action, then the United States 
would have no obligation for any consequences which might ensue. Then 
Johnson stated with heavy emphasis: "Israel will not be alone unless ii: 
decides to go alone". He repeated the statement and Eban then asked: "Can 
I tell my Cabinet that you are going to use any and all measures in 
your power to get the Gulf of Aqaba opened to all shipping, including 
that of Israel?" Johnson assured him that this was his position. 
At the end of the meeting Johnson handed Eben an m:de-memoire which 
summarised the American attitude. It contained three essential points: 
i) the United States could only act according to its Constitutional 
dictates and would also have to pursue action in the United Nations; 
ii) the blockade was illegal and the United States would "pursue vigorously 
the measures which can be taken by maritime nations" to reopen the Straits; 
and iii) Israel must not make itself responsible for the institution of 
hostilities - "Israel will not be.alone unless it decides to go alone. 
We cannot imagine that Israel will make this decision. 1159 
Neither Eban nor Johnson had failed to impress their point of view on 
each other. Johnson is reported to have turned to his advisers after the 
meeting.and said: "I've failed. They'll go 11 • 60 Eban had made it clear 
that if the United States did not succeed in its plans to reopen the Straits, 
61 Israel would be left with only one option - war. Equally, Johnson had 
made it clear that were his plans to have any chance of success he would 
have to have time to rimster domestic and international support. If Israel 
59. This account of the talks is taken from Johnson, pp. 293-4; Brecher, 
pp. 391-3; St. John, pp. 431-3; Bar-Zohar, pp. 124-7; Draper, pp. 90-91. 
Brecher' s account, including the text of the a-ide-memoire and the text of 
-:Johnson's earlier conversation with Ephraim Evron (The Counsellor at the 
Israeli Embassy in Washington), are based on the actual Israeli records of 
the meetings. They are consistent with Johnson's account, which is 
presumably based on the American minutes of the meeting. 
60. Bar-Zahar reports that Johnson's reaction was rather different: 
"I was ready for heavy bargaining, but I found myself up against a light-
weight, and I could get away with niceties". There is more reason to doubt 
this than to doubt Quandt' s version because Bar-Zahar' s purpose is to paint 
Eban as a weak and ineffectual negotiator. As we shall see, Johnson took 
Eban very seriously. Quandt, p. 44. 
61. At one point in the discussions Johnson had suggested that perhaps 
Israel could do without Eilat, just as it had made do without passage through 
the Suez Canal since 1956. Eban quickly scotched any idea of such compromise 
H~ apparently replied: "This is like asking a man who is forced to live on 
one lung whether he can 1 t also live without any lungs at all". St. John, p. 4~ 
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pre-empted before he had been given an opportunity to fulfil his commitment, 
then it would have to bear the consequences on its own. Eban is said to 
have· left the meeting with a feeling that if th8 American initiative 
were given "a minimal area in which to breathe" and it failed, then 
. 1 1 . I ] I ld . . h Am . 6 2 uni atera action on srae. s part wou meet wit erican support. 
The President had recognised that Israel had been wronged and that the 
situation created by Nasser would have to be redressed. Were Israel to 
gain American support it was now crucial that it delay action until the 
United States had sufficient opportunity to act. 
IV - ISRAEL'S DECISION TO WAIT 
At 8.00p.m. on Saturday, 27 May, the Israeli Cabinet began its 
deliberations on appropriate action now that the 48 hour delay had expired. 
By this time, the IDF had completed its mobilisation and was ready for war, 
while the IAF had prepared its plans for a pre-emptive strike on 
Egyptian airfields. Weizmann reports that "there were no further doubts 
l~ft in the General Staff about the necessity of Israel breaking out of 
the noose Nasser had placed around its neck". 63 However, there was still 
no unanimity within the General Staff as to how long the Government could 
64 
safely allow for the diplomatic process. Meanwhile, the ministerial 
advocates of pre-emption had grown in numbers as the strength of the 
Egyptian forces deployed in Sinai had increased, and as the Arab leaders 
had stepped-up their rhetoric in calling for the destruction of the Jewish 
state. 65 By the time Eban arrived at the meeting (at 10.00p.m.), the Cabinet 
62. Ibid., ?· 434. 
63. Weizmann, op.cit., p. 213. 
64. Weizmann notes that while he argued that every additional day of 
waiting gave the Egyptians a better chance of organising their defences 
and making it more costly for the IDF to break through, the Commander of 
the IAF, Matty Hod, argued that the more Egyptian troops that were concent-
rated in Sinai the better, because they would be easy prey for the IAF. He 
states that there was no unanimity in the General Staff on immediate action 
until Dayan' s appointment as Defence Minister on 2 June (p. 214). Peres 
argues that Israel could have bornethe cost of mobilisation but could not 
accept a long delay because such a delay might have convinced Nasser that 
he had nothing to fear and he might then have decided to strike first. See 
Shimon Peres, David's Sling, p. 229. 
65. On 26 May, Nasser had announced that war with Israel would be total 
"with the basic objective of destroying Israel". See below, page 254. 
was almost evenly divided with some nine ministers, including Eshkol, 
calling for immediate action, and the other eight recommending further 
political consolidation. 
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The Foreign Minister gave a brief resume of his talks with De Gaulle 
and Wilson and a more detailed exposition of the American reaction. 66 He 
reported that Johnson had given his assurance that the United States 
would pursue "any and all measures" to reopen the Straits. He pointed out 
that, if Israel wanted to attack inwediately, it should nbt have raised 
the alarm in Washington about an inwinent Egyptian attack, since Washington 
had warned the Egyptians not to attack and would be seriously embarrassed 
by Israeli action which would appear disengenuous. He argued that the 
President's assumption of responsibility had to be allowed to mature, 
"if it failed, after more patience on Israel's part, new political 
possibilities would open out in the American-Israeli relationship 11 • 67 
Eban proposed that the Cabinet should wait another 48 hours before deciding 
·1 · . 68 on mi_ itary actions. 
Allon and Carmel led the opposition in arguing that an international 
fleet would not succeed in keeping the Straits open while Egyptian troops 
remained at Sharm el-Sheikh, that such a fleet would not solve the 
problem of Egyptian troop concentrations in Sinai, that its passage would 
only signal to Nasser the opening of the hostilities, and that, even if the 
fleet succeeded, it would increase Israeli dependence on the United States. 
Fearful that, with the passage of time, the chances of a successful 
pre-emption would be severely reduced, they recommended immediate action. 69 
An informal poll showed that the Cabinet remained evenly divided: nine for 
immediate action, nine for a further waiting period. Although Eshkol 
favoured military action he was not prepared to force such a crucial decisio~ 
on his Cabinet. Instead he adjourned the meeting at 5.00a.m. and 
recommended that they reconvene on Sunday afternoon, 28 May. 
On Sunday evening the Cabinet decided by a vote of 16 to 1 to accept 
Eshkol's proposal that Israel delay action for "a week or two" while the 
idea of an international flotilla was tested. By all accounts, the cables 
received that day from Washington were decisive in winning most of the 
66. De Gaulle hacl counselled Eb;-in that Israel must not strike first and 
should rather acqu.i_esce in Nasser's j'crit; aceomplf for the time being. Wilson 
was more forthcoming: the British Cabinet had agreed that Britain would join 
others in an effort to secure freedom of navigation in the Straits. He 
apparently did not counsel Eban on the question of pre-emption. See Brecher, 
pp. 382 and 384. 
67. Eban, p. 211. 
68. St. John, p. 438; Brecher, pp. 396-7. 
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advocates of military action over to the idea of delay. The first cable 
was from Johnson to Eshkol. This letter outlined the response Johnson had 
received from Kosygin on 26 May, which claimed that Israel was about to 
attack and that if it did so the Soviet Union would come to the aid of 
70 the attacked states. Johnson underlined his support for Israel's 
interests and repeated "even more strongly what I said yesterday to Mr Eban: 
Israel just must not take pre~emptive military action and thereby make 
itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities". 71 The letter was 
backed by a cable from Rusk which outlined the substance of Johnson's 
discussions with Eban and added that the United States and Britain were 
proceeding "urgently" to prepare the fleet; the Dutch and Canadians had 
already joined. Rusk added: "With the assurance of international 
determination to make every effort to keep the Straits open •.. unilateral 
action on the part of Israel would be irresponsible and catastrophic". 72 
The third cable came from Ambassador Harman, reporting his talks with Eugene 
Rostow on 27 May, in which Rostow had outlined the details of American and 
British efforts and had asked that Israel wait some two weeks, for the 
President to gain Congressional approval, and for the fleet to be assembled 
and sent through the Straits. 73 
This pressure from the United States proved sufficient to convert 
Eshkol from "hawk" to "dove". Just as six years later Golda Meir would 
decide against pre-emption because of fear that Israel would be isolated 
from its only reliable source of support, so too did Eshkol change his mind 
for fear that if Israel pre-empted Johnson might say: "I warned you in 
advance and now you cannot make any claims whatever on the United States 
II 7 4 
and its allies. Presumably some of the others who had favoured military 
action the night before were swayed by Eshkol's voUe-face; they may also 
70. Brecher, p. 398; Middle East Record~ p. 197; Bar-Zohar cites the text 
of Kosygin's warning: " ... according to our sources, Israel is planning an 
armed action against its Arab neighbours. We know the Arabs do not want 
war ..• If Israel begins hostilities the Soviet Union will come to the aid 
of the attacked countries" (p. 130). 
71. Brecher, p. 398; Bar-Zohar, p. 139. 
72. Brecher, p. 400. 
73. Bar-Zohar, p. 139. 
74. Israeli Foreign Ministry sources, cited in Brecher, p. 401. 
have been influenced by the fact that Ben-Guri'on did not believe that a 
military response was appropriate until and unless Israel was assured of 
75 the support of a reliable ally. Some may have also been swayed by 
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their own doubts about the outcome of military action and the costs involved 
. f 1 . 76 in terms o casua ties. For the leaders of this weak state a decision 
to go to war was difficult given the grave implications; to go to war without 
the support of the United States, and in the face of its express opposition, 
and with the Soviet Union threatening to support the Arabs if Israel attacked 
was a decision which only Carmel, unswerving in his advocacy, was prepared 
to take. Even Allon did not vote for war, preferring to abstain and 
77 
reserving the right to call for a reconsideration if circumstances changed. 
Eban argued that to ignore Johnson's appeal would by flying in the face of 
international opinion; he pointed out that international support was now 
greater than it had ever been in previous crises and that, while waiting 
would not injure Israel's military prospects, it would certainly enhance 
78 its political strength. So Israel had decided to wait. In itself the 
decision was a tactical one aimed at ensuring American support for pre-
emption when its own efforts had failed. It was taken, not out of a lack of 
will to resist Nasser's actions, or American pressure, but rather out of 
a desire to apply Israel's will with careful judgement to enhance its 
prospects and to prevent the alienation of its American patron. However, 
to the Israeli public and to some decision-makers in Cairo, Washington, and 
Moscow, it appeared that the Israeli Government indeed lacked the will to 
take events into its own hands and the public outcry in Israel, which 
followed Eshkol's halting announcement of the Cabinet's decision to do 
nothing, only reinforced this perception. A crisis of confidence in Eshkol's 
leadership, caused by his wavering and indecisiveness, had been building 
since the Government's first decision on 23 May, to delay military action. 
Until 28 May the crisis had been restricted to the corridors of power, where 
the opposition parties had begun negotiating for the replacement of Eshkol 
as Defence Minister, and for a national unity government. Now with the 
country mobilised and waiting for decisive leadership, Eshkol's inability 
75. When asked his advice, Ben-Gurion had argued that the time was not 
right for war because Israel lacked external support. He suggested that 
Israel should wait until such support had been secured. See Geist, op.cit . ., 
p. 643. 
76. Safran, p. 312; Bar-Zahar, p. 143. 
77. Brecher, p. 400. Most accounts state that Allon voted for the decision; 
but Brecher's account is based on an interview with Allon conducted in 1968. 
78. Eban, p. 212. 
to instil confidence into his very attentive public caused an outcry in 
the press which spread to the inner sanctum of the ruling alignment. 79 
V - WASHINGTON ACQUIESCES 
Israel's apparent lack of will to take independent action was not 
perceived uniformly in Cairo, Moscow and Washington. Nasser at this 
stage appears to have felt that his gamble had paid off and that Israel 
80 
would not go to war. The Soviet Union also seems to have based its 
actions in the Security Council on a belief that the worst of the crisis 
81 
was over. But in Washington, where the responsibility now lay for 
action, the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon had 
rather divergent perceptions of Israel's will. 
The President and his advisors did not doubt that they had gained 
only a short respite; a feeling confirmed by the receipt of a letter 
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from Eshkol, on 30 May, which emphasised American responsibility for Israel's 
decision to delay action. The letter stated: "it is crucial that the 
international naval escort should move through the Strait within a week 
or two". Johnson recalls in his memoirs: 
As my advisers and I interpreted it, the phrase 
"within a week or two" meant that we had about two 
weeks to make diplomacy succeed before Israel took 
independent military action.82 (emphasis supplied). 
Rusk had apparently been concerned that Israel would take action while the 
United States was organising its international fleet and thereby give the 
impression that Israel and the United States were working in collusion. Now 
that they had gained a short respite, and the deck was cleared for American 
l . d . . I fl · 11 83 action, lis attention turne to organising t1e - otL a. 
On the other hand, in the State Department, those who had already 
interpreted Eban's alarm over an imminent Egyptian attack as evidence of 
79. For detailed accounts of the crisis of confidence, see Middle East 
Record_, 1967_, pp. 367-372; Brecher, Chapter 7. 
80. See below, Chapter Four. 
81. The Soviet Union refused to have the matter debated in the Security 
Council, arguing that there was no danger of war. See Arthur Lall, The U.N. 
and the Middle East Crisis_, 1.967_, New York, 1968, Chapter III. 
82. Johnson, p. 294. 
83. Kimche and Bawley, p. 127. 
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Israel's fear of war, now perceived the decision to wait as evidence of 
a lack of resolve. ·They saw an opportunity to revive the third American 
option of a diplomatic compromise. Consequently, the State Department 
began downgrading the importance of Eilat for Israeli shipping and 
proposed that Israel should be compensated for any financial disability 
while the United States should undertake responsibility for finding altern-
ative sources of oil for Israel. 84 At the same time two American officials, 
Charles Yost (a State Department advisor on Near Eastern affairs), and 
Robert Anderson (former Secretary of the Treasury), were sent to Cairo 
to test Nasser's willingness for compromise. Anderson met with Nasser 
on 31 May and found him ready to agree on only two points - that·Vice-
President Mohieddin should go to Washington for further talks on 7 June, 
and that this should be followed by a visit from Vice-President Humphrey. 
Yost met with Foreign Minister Riad on 1 June and found him eager for a 
diplomatic solution, yet unwilling to back down on the question of 
Egyptian sovereignty over the Straits. As Yost subsequently observed:· 
Unavailing efforts were made to persuade Nasser to revoke, 
suspend or moderate the blockade but, the action once 
taken, he did not feel 3olitically free to reverse it, 
even had he so desired. 5 
Had Nasser shown some flexibility at this stage, the option of diplomatic 
compromise might have gained greater currency in Washington, but as things 
now st_ood the State Department could no longer advocate this as a viable 
option. Not only had Nasser rejected compromise, so too had Israel, as 
Eban made clear on 30 May when he stated: "We will have no part of any 
suggestion or arrangement which implies that all other ships can go through, 
. 1186 but not Israeli ships. 
Meanwhile the Pentagon was preoccupied with the military implications 
of any American attempt to break the blockade. Those responsible for 
organising the fleet were firmly opposed to such action for, if the 
84. Kirnche and Bawly, p. 127; Brecher, p. 413; Bar-Zohar, pp. 149 and 161; 
M. Howard and R. Hunter, Israel and the Arab florld: The Crisis of 196?,, 
Adelphi Papers, No. 41, October, 1967, p. 24. 
85. Charles Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War, How it Began", Foreign Affairs,, 
Volume 46, No. 2, January, 1968, p. 316. 
86. See "News Conference Statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, 
Jerusalem, May 30, 1967", in International Documents on Palestine,, Document 
41, p. 28. 
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Egyptians fired on an American ship, the risk was high that the United 
States would become involved in war with Egypt. This prospect raised the 
spectre of a "second Vietnam", something which the Pentagon sought to 
avoid at all costs. The Administration had already faced the first major 
American demonstration against the war in Vietnam and the Pentagon had 
no desire to weaken its efforts there by becoming involved in a land war 
in the Middle East - a war f'or which they were as logistically unprepared 
as was American public opinion politically unprepared. Thus the Pentagon 
had already come around to the opinion that "if war is unavoidable, let 
the Israelis do it; let's not get the United States involved 11 • 87 As for 
its assessment of Israeli will-power, a visit to Washington by Meir Amit, 
head of Israeli Intelligence, on 31 Hay, was apparently sufficient 
to convince the Pentagon that Israel was prepared to take appropriate 
. 88 
action. 
With compromise effectively ruled out, although the State 
Department and even the President had not yet given up the idea that 
Mohieddin's visit might yield results, and with the Pentagon opposed to 
American action to reopen the Straits, Washington was itself beginning 
to show signs of a lack of will-power, and was quickly exhausting all 
options other than that of'unleashing'Israel. The essential question was 
whether the international fleet had any chance of redressing the situation. 
Eugene Rostow was responsible for organising the fleet and retained 
a belief in its efficacy even at the last moment when it was clear to 
most in Washington that it would not work. However his task was growing 
more difficult with each new day. As already noted, the Pentagon was 
opposed to the concept, but on top of these bureaucratic problems, Rostow 
was having great difficulty persuading more than a handful of maritime 
nations to sign the declaration and join the fleet. At first Rostow had 
spoken of 40 to 50 signatories on a joint declaration which would state 
that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway, that this right of 
free and innocent passage should apply to all nations, and that the 
87. Interview with Townsend Hoopes, June, 1975; Cf. Draper, p. 107. 
88. As we shall see, Amit was sent to the United States for a different 
purpose, but in his talks at the Pentagon he imparted a feeling of quiet 
confidence that Israel would settle the crisis quickly and efficiently. 
Bar-Zahar, p. 159; Kimche and Bawley, p. 132. 
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signatories were prepared to exercise this right. Yet by 31 May the number 
of maritime nations prepared to sign this declaration had shrunk to five: 
the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand; 
neither France nor Canada were now willing to participate. 89 
Moreover, events in the Middle East created a new and serious problem 
for Rostow. On 30 May Hussein had journeyed to Cairo, healed the deep 
rift between Egypt and Jordan, and, together with Nasser, had announced 
the signing of a Joint Defence Pact which placed the Jordanian army under 
E ' d . h f h ·1· . 90 w·. h h A b ld 'gyptian comman in t e event o osti ities. it t e ra wor 
apparently unified, if the United States attempted to reopen the Straits 
to Israeli shipping, Washington risked alienating its remaining bases of 
influence in the Arab world. Further, Congress was registering its strong 
opposition to the use of American force to reopen the Straits and Rusk found 
it necessary to assure them that the Untied States would not undertake 
unilateral action. 91 For all the emphasis Johnson had placed on Congressiona 
approval, the Administration was not yet prepared to test its support 
because the President's aides had told him that any meaningful resolution 
would become "bogged down in acrimonious dispute". Johnson himself began 
to talk of diplomatic remedies and ruled out any use of force until these 
had been exhausted. 92 
Taking all these factors into account, Rostow began to water down the 
concept of the international fleet, removing any sanction of force which 
it might have used. The declaration of maritime powers which he drafted 
did not contain any threat of the use of force, only an assertion of the 
right of free passage, and an expression of the desirability of a 
coordinated effort to seek "general recognition" of this right. 93 On 30 May, 
Walt Rostow called in Evron (the Counsellor at the Israeli Embassy), 
and told him that Israel had misunderstood Johnson's statements; the 
United States was not prepared to use "any and all measures" to reopen 
the Straits, only multilateral action. 94 And on 31 May State 
89-.-Middle East Recor'd, 196?~ p. 202; Johnson, p. 295; Burdett, p. 230. 
90. Middle Ea.st Record, 196? ~ p. 203. 
91. Burdett, p. 299; Bar-Zohar, p. 161. 
92. Johnson, p. 295. 
93. Cited in Bar-Zohar, p. 160; Cf. Brecher, p. 412-3. 
94. Middle Ea.st Record~ 196?~ p. 200. 
Department spokesman Robert McCloskey announced: 
The focus of our effort to solve the Middle East crisis without 
hostilities is the United Nations. We regard its responsibilities 
as essential and fundamental, and we are doing everything in our 
power to seek a fair and just outcome of the crisis in that forum. 
As part of that effort and in support of that policy ... we are 
consulting other maritime powers as to their views on the 
international character of the Straits of Tiran ... 95 
With the United St~tes apparently pinning its hopes on the outcome 
17 6 
of the debate in the Security Council, it soon becrnne painfully clear that 
these hopes too would come to nothing. On 31 May Ambassador Goldberg 
had submitted a draft resolution which called on all parties to comply 
with U Thant's call to "forgo belligerence", and in his supporting speech 
had made it clear that non-belligerence on the part of Egypt would require 
it to lift its blockade of the Straits. The Council adjourned without 
taking a vote and only reconvened on 3 June, when the French Ambassador 
announced that his country was neutral, Soviet Ambassador Federenko made 
no reference to the draft resolutions, and Britain's Lord Caradon remained 
silent. At 2.20p.m. the Security Council adjourned without reaching a 
d . . 96 ecision. 
Thus by the weekend of 3-4 June, the United States had been forced to 
recognise that pursuing the option of intern~tional action had been to no 
avail. Wbile Johnson later claimed that the next week would have seen 
"intensive diplomacy", on that weekend Rusk sent cables to his ambassadors 
in Arab capitals seeking new ideas for a solution which would prevent war. 
In these cables he stressed that the United States was committed to "the 
right of Israeli flagships to transit the Strait", and that it would do 
no good to suggest that Israel compromise on this right, "because Israel 
will fight and we could not restrain her 11 • 97 In other words, now that the 
idea of an international fleet had collapsed, and the option of compromise 
was unacceptable because of the American commitment to Israel, and because 
Israel would go to war to protect its rights, unless there was some other 
form of action, only one option remained -'unleash' Israel. On Sunday 
afternoon, 4 June, the "Watch" committee, consisting of Eugene Rostow as 
chairman, Lucius Battle, Townsend Hoopes and Cyrus Vance, studied 
95. Cited in Kimche and Bo.wly, pp. 128-9. 
96. See Lall, op.cit._, pp. 32-45; Middle East Recor1d_, 196?_, p. 203. 
97. Johnson, pp. 295-6. 
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a paper submitted by Hoopes and others which outlined the alternatives for 
the United States and argued that it should take no action, that it was 
preferable "to have the Israelis out front". There was a broad consensus 
in support of this conclusion, only Rostow dissented. 98 With the United 
States lacking the will to fulfil its commitments to Israel, because of 
Congressional and bureaucratic opposition, because of the lack of 
international support, and because of the prohibitive costs of doing so, 
in terms of America's other interests, its decision-makers were now 
prepared to acquiesce in an Israeli pre-emption. 
VI - ISRAEL DECIDES TO PRE-EMPT 
It was up to Israel to interpret this change of mood in Washington; 
it did not fail to read these signs of an American lack of will to do 
anything about the situation. The first indication came on 31 May with 
the reports of Evron's conversation with Walt Rostow and Rusk's briefing 
to the Senate - the United States would not take unilateral action. The 
question then became: was there any chance of multilateral action? On 
30 May Eshkol had sent Meir Amit, Head of Israeli Counter-Intelligence, 
to Washington to evaluate American resolve. On 31 May he reported that 
while it was necessary to wait a few days to give the international fleet 
a chance, "I get the impression that the maritime force project is running 
99 into heavier water every hour". On the same day came the report of the 
State Department's announcement that the focus of American efforts would 
be the United Nations. As Eban interpreted it, that "was very like saying 
there were no efforts and would be no focus".lOO Then there was a message 
from an American close to the Administration which noted that Israel's 
exercise of restraint "would have a decisive influence when the United 
States came to consider the measure of its involvement" once hostilities 
broke out; together with a report of Rusk's answer to a question about 
"101 
restraining Israel: "I don't think it is our business to restrain anyone. 
98. Intervieu.J with Townsend Hoopes, June, 1976. 
99. Cited in Brecher, p. 417. According to Jon Kimche, CIA Director 
Richard Helms, had told Amit that while the Americans might find it 
necessary to pressure Israel to protect themselves against the suspicion of 
collusion, Israel would have to resist this pressure if it wanted to get 
tangible results. See Jon Kimche, Palestine or Israel, The Untold Story of 
Why We Failed, London, 1973, p. 258. 
100. Eban, p. 215. 
101. Cited in St. John, p. 444. 
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These signs were sufficient to convince Eban that the period of 
restraint had achieved its objectives of neutralising American opposition 
to independent Israeli action, of ensuring that the Administration 
recognised Nasser's actions as an aggressive act, and of protecting 
Israel from a repetition of the events of 1956. 102 So on 31 May, the 
Foreign Minister, the man who had been the strongest opponent of 
immediate military action, told the Chief-of-Staff and the Chief of 
Intelligence that he was withdrawing his opposition to whatever military 
. 1 'd d 1 1 d . 103 action tley consi ere necessary; tJere was no onger any nee to wait. 
The Cabinet took a little longer to reach the same decision since, until 
1 June, most ministers, and especially Prime Minister Eshkol, were 
preoccupied with the negotiations which finally brought Moshe Dayan into 
the Cabinet as Defence Minister and Menachem Begin, the leader of Cahal 
(the major opposition party), as Minister without Portfolio. 
On Saturday 3 June, Eshkol convened a meeting at his home of his 
key ministers and advis·ors to consider the military and political situation. 1 
New elements had become salient in the military calculus: Hussein had 
healed his rift with Nasser and on that very morning Egyptian troops had 
begun to arrive in Jordan; Iraq had joined the confrontation states and had 
also begun to move its troops into Jordan. The threat of attack on Israel's 
vulnerable centre from the West Bank was now serious and dangerous. The 
Army commanders had grown more forthright in their insistence on iI!ll!lediate 
military action since the evening of 28 May, when they had told Eshkol that 
his indecisiveness would cost Israel "thousands of lives"; if Egypt 
attacked while Israel was attempting to gain support in Washington, they 
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argued, then t11e country was heading for a catastrophe. As the pressure 
mounted the advocates of pre-emption were strengthened by Dayan's 
appointment to the Defence portfolio and the fact that Eshkol had given 
way to overwhelming pressure on this issue suggested that it would not be 
102. As Eban subsequently noted: " ... Israel had involved the Americans 
very deeply. Their political and moral responsibility was much greater in 
their own conscience than it had been a week before. Israel would not be 
repeating the experience of 1956, when the United States, shocked by the 
sheer surprise of Israel's eruption, had joined with the Soviet Union to 
cancel its results ..• The United States could not again question Israel's 
plight or claim that Israel had not involved it frankly in the dilemma". 
Eban, pp. 217 and 220. 
103. St John, pp. 444-5; Brecher, p. 417. 
104. Present at this meeting were: Eban, Dayan, Allon, Rabin, Yadin (former 
Chief-of-Staff) , Herzog (Director-General of the Prime Minister's Department) 
Amit and Harman. 
105. Bar-Zahar, p. 145. 
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.ong · e ore 1e acce.e tot eir pressure or mi. itary action. 
On the political plane, Eban' s recognition that the time for waiting 
had ended was confirmed by new developments. Harman and Amit had 
reported that the United States would not take any unilateral action and 
that there was little chance of any international action. 107 The first 
point was confirmed by a letter from Johnson received on 3 June which, 
while repeating the warning ·against pre-emption, emphasised that "our 
leadership is unanimous that the United States should not move in 
isolation" . 108 The second point was confirmed by the small number of 
states prepared just to sign the declaration, let alone send their ships 
through the Straits. Moreover, Britain's Foreign Minister had made it clear 
that his country also saw the United Nations as the first forum for action, 
followed by consultations on "appropriate action". Meanwhile, the 
Security Council had adjourned on 3 June without reaching a decision, and 
there was now the new danger that, if Israel delayed action until Egypt's 
Vice-President arrived in Washington, pressure would be exerted on the 
White House to promote a compromise settlement which would not meet Israel's 
requirements. Accordingly, pressure would then be exerted on Israel to 
1 . . 109 l l b d d accept t 11s compronnse. So t 1e"Le was not 1ing to e gaine , an much 
that could be lost, in terms of American patronage, from a further delay. 
Israel's decision-makers were in agreement that if Israel now acted on 
its own responsibility the United States would not permit "a policy of 
, , 1 . . , d , If 110 internationa intimi ation . 
106. Weizmann recounts that he went to Eshkol, on his own initiative at the 
end of May to counsel that "the armed forces are ready for war. If you give 
the order, Jewish history will remember you as a great leader. If you don't 
it will never forgive you". On Eagles' Tvings~ p. 219. 
107. Brecher, pp. 417 and 420. 
108. Ibid.; according to Burdett, the letter did not contain any warning 
about pre-emption (p. 315). 
109. The State Department proposals and the Yost mission had confirmed 
these fears. See Burdett, pp. 304 and 308. 
110. Eban has suggested: " ... when President Johnson and Prime Minister 
Wilson met in Washington on June 2, they would have been less than human 
if they had not asked themselves, whether explicitly or in glances of 
private understanding, if it would be all that disastrous for Israel to 
solve her own problems on her own responsibility". Eban, p. 236; 
Cf. Brecher, pp. 420-1. 
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Moreover, French policy at this stage added impetus to the decision 
to pre-empt. De Gaulle had made it clear to Eban that France would oppose 
whichever side fired the first shot and this had been confirmed in 
public statements. Up to 3 June Israel had been able to acquire military 
supplies from the French defence industry through the contacts which it 
had established as a result of ten years of military cooperation. But 
now the French government had announced an embargo on arms sales to the 
Middle East, effective from 5 June - i.e. before either side had fired any 
shots. As Eben subsequently noted: 
.•. General De Gaulle's embargo helped to secure unanimity 
in the Israeli cabinet in favour of armed resistance. 
From 3 June onward France had ensured that time would 
henceforth be working against Israel. This completely 
cut the ground under any possible argument in favour 
of further patience. In short, President De Gaulle 
had faced Israel with a 'now or never' deilemma; if that 
were the case, the answer had to be 'now•.111 
If Israel was sure that whatever it did France would not support it and that 
the 'tacit alliance' had finally come to an end, then clearly the only 
patronage that now counted was American, and it was already fairly 
evident that this had been ensured. 
Finally, the attitude of the Soviet Union had to be taken into account. 
The Russians had made several demarches to Eshkol about their opposition to 
hostilities, but both the Foreign and Defence Ministries were in 
agreement that, if Israel could achieve a quick victory, the Soviet Union 
would not intervene for lack of a capability to do so and for fear of 
Am • • d f . 112 h. dd d er1can reaction an superpower con rontat1on. T is assessment a e· 
weight to the argument for immediate pre-emption to ensure that a quick 
victory would be achieved. 
Thus the political-military calculus pointed to only one conclusion. 
The time for waiting was over; the time for action had come. Dayan 
outlined the IDF's plan for a pre-emptive strike against the Egyptian forces 
with the aim of destroying them and capturing Sharm-el-Sheikh. A holding 
operation would be fought in the North against Syria, and Jordan would not 
be attacked unless it decided to enter the war. The ministers and 
advisors approved this plan and it was decided that Eshkol would propose 
to the full Cabinet on Sunday, 4 June that Israel go to war. 
111. Eban, p. 239. 
112. Brecher, p. 341; Burdett, p. 312. 
The question now was whether the Israeli Cabinet had the collective 
will-power to make this decision. The events of 28 May to 3 June had 
been sufficient to convince Eban and Eshkol that no further purpose 
could be served by waiting. Allon, Dayan and Carmel had already been 
persuaded of the need to go to war and the General Staff was unanimous 
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in its support for this action. The remaining task was to convince the 
rest of the Cabinet that it was necessary to take military action, and 
that this action would succeed in removing the threat posed by the Arab 
armies. The task did not prove difficult given the unanimity amongst the 
key ministers, although the Minister of Interior, Moshe Shapiro, felt 
it necessary to restate Ben-Gurion's opposition to war on the grounds that 
Israel was isolated, would have to fight a war on three fronts, was 
deprived of the element of surprise, lacked decisive leadership, and its 
army was not sufficiently prepared. Ben-Gurion had argued that Israel 
must wait until it found a reliable ally but Dayan, his disciple, 
countered with the charge that if the country waited for an ally it was 
doubtful whether it would still exist. 113 The waverers who had feared 
the costs of war were fortified by the united resolve of the Prime 
Minister, Defence Minister and Forl'.ign Minister, and the confidence of 
the General Staff. On Sunday, 4 June the Cabinet decided by unanimous 
vote "to take military action in order to liberate Israel from the 
stranglehold of aggression which is progressively being tightened around 
11 114 Israel. 
At 7 .45a.m. on 5 June, 1967 the IAF simultaneously attacked ten 
Egyptian airfields. By 10.35 that morning, after three waves of air 
strikes, the Egyptian Air Force had been rendered ineffective, and by the 
end of the day 286 aircraft had been destroyed, 70% of them hit on the 
ground during Israel's pre-emptive strike. The war was effectively over, 
bar the fighting on the ground which, after six days, routed the armies 
of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and left Israel in possession of the Sinai 
peninsula, the Golan Heights, Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan. 115 
113. Geist, op.cit.~ p. 643. 
114. Frbm the text of the decision in Brecher, op.cit., pp. 422-3. At 
the meeting Dayan had outlined the strategy of pre-emption, Eban gave his 
reasons for believing that the United States was committed and tho.t Israel 
would not be isolated after an armed clash, and Eshkol reaffirmed his 
faith in the Army and his unequivocal support for the proposed action. 
Laqueur, p. 178; St. John, pp. 447-8. 
115. See Middle East Record~ 1967, p. 208. 
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Israel's lightning victory, the small number of casualties it suffered, 
and the overwhelming position of strength it had now achieved, vindicated 
the decision to pre-empt on the military level, but on the politic al level 
Israel's decision to delay military action was the decision which had 
been vindicated. 
VII - THE AMERICAN REACT ION . 
The crucial test of Israel's success in playing the politics of 
patronage, and thereby ensuring that its military victory would not be 
undone by political manouevering, came not on the battlefield, but rather 
in the actions of Israel's American patron, both in regard to the fighting, 
and in regard to the deliberations in the Security Council. 
The period of waiting had not been in vain. By involving the United 
States in Israel's dilemma, by ensuring that the United States was committed 
to Israel's right to freedom of navigation, by allowing Washington time 
to realise that unilateral Israeli action was pref errable to American 
intervention, Israel had guaranteed, not only the support of American public 
opinion for its reaction to Nasser's "aggression", but also American 
diplomatic support in international forums and American military support 
. . . s . . . 116 in opposition to oviet intervention. 
The American attitude became clear in the first days of war. 
Washington did not voice any criticism of Israel's pre-emption and in the 
Security Council it steadfastly refused to agree to a Soviet-Egyptian 
proposal for a cease-fire resolution which would brand Israel the aggressor 
and require it to withdraw from territories occupied during the fighting. 
In the face of this American refusal, the Soviet Union was forced to reverse 
its stand, abandon Egyptian demands for a cease-fire tied to Israeli 
withdrawal, and agree to an unconditional cease-fire resolution. This 
resofa1tion was adopted by the Security Council on 6 June, accepted by 
Israel, but rejected by Egypt. On 7 June, the cease-fire appeal was 
repeated and with Egyptian acceptance on 8 June, it went into effect in 
S . . 117 inai. 
On the Syrian front, General Dayan gave the order to attack on 9 June, 
after sensing that a swift occupation of the Golan Heights ~ould not 
116. According to a Gallup Poll taken during the crisis, 56% of Americans 
sympathised with Israel while only 4% sympathised with the Arabs. According 
to Quandt, Louis Harris informed the White House during the crisis that 
U.S. public opinion had rarely been so unanimous as it was in its support 
for Israel. See Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Western Partisanship in the 
Middle East", The Public Opinion Quarterly_, Volume XXXLLI, No. 4, Winter, 
1969, pp. 627-640; Quandt, p. 46. 
117. See Middle East Record_, 1967_, pp. 237-8. 
. . s . . . . s . l' ll8 precipitate oviet intervention to protect its yrian c ient. 
However, as the IDF advanced and the Syrians raised the spectre of an 
attack on Damascus, the Soviet Union found it necessary to threaten 
military intervention unless the Israeli advance was halted. When this 
threat was conveyed to Washington, via the 'hot line' , President 
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Johnson decided to respond in a forthright manner in order to prevent any 
such intervention. He ordered the Sixth Fleet to steam towards Syria, 
cutting its cruising pattern from 100 miles to 50 miles from the coast. 
As Johnson himself has stated, his intention was clear: "the United 
States was prepared to resist Soviet intrusion in the Middle East 11 • 119 
American diplomatic pressure had already been exerted on Israel to cease-
firing once the Golan Heights had been cleared, and Washington had 
received Israeli assurances in this re.gard before the Soviet ultimatum 
was delivered. Further pressure was applied, but it was unnecessary, for 
Israel had already achieved its objectives and had agreed to cease-firing 
at 6.00p.m. on 10 June. 120 With the cease-fire taking hold and the 
American attitude clearly expressed, the Soviet Union had little choice but 
to back-down. In other words, American action to deter Soviet intervention 
had the effect, probably intended, of preserving Israel's occupation 
. 121 
of the Golan Heights. 
Of far greater consequence to Israel's long-term prospects and to 
the future of the Arab-Israeli conflict was the American attitude towards 
a political settlement now that the war had ended. The first sign that 
118. Bar-Zohar reports that a Soviet threat to sever diplomatic relations 
with Israel unless it stopped fighting was received on 7 June. In Israel 
this threat was interpreted as meaning that the Soviet action would be 
limited to breaking diplomatic relations and would not extend to military 
intervention (p. 239). Teveth, Dayan's biographer, states that he was 
preoccupied by the threat of Soviet intervention and therefore issued orders 
to restrict the attack to the central sector of the Golan, at first 
setting the end of the demilitarised zone as the objective and then drawing 
the line at Kuneitra once the SyrL:m army collapsed. See Shabtai Teveth, 
Moshe Dayan~ London, 1972, pp. 338-340. 
119. Johnson, p. 302. 
120. Ibid.~ pp. 301-303. Johnson states that the U.S. was aware of Israel's 
military intentions towards Syria. Bar-Zohar claims that the U.S. had been 
encouraging Israel to attack Syria (p. 260). 
121. This begs the question of whether the Soviet Union would have inter-
vened had Israel not halted its advance. Glnssrn,111 argues th<Jt it was "a 
gratuitous gesture to regain Arab political support" since the Soviet Union 
did not have the capability to intervene with conventional forces. 
Nevertheless, had the United States wanted to pressure Israel into halting 
short of its objectives or force it to withdraw, it could have used the 
Soviet threat as a means of leverage. It did not do so in 1967 because it 
supported Israel's objectives, but it was a very different story in 1973. 
See Jon Glassman, Arms for the Arubs~ p. 58. 
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the United States would not repeat the action it took in 1956 in forcing 
Israel to withdraw in exchange for American guarantees, instead of a 
political settlement with the Arabs, came in a speech made by U.N. 
Ambassador Goldberg on 8 June. He explicitly linked Israeli withdrawal 
to "longer-range discussions" on the establishment of "a stable and 
durable peace in the Middle East". 122 The President and his advisors 
were reported to believe tha·t there should be no return to the status quo 
ante., that Israel should only be asked to withdraw from newly acquired 
territory in return for a peace settlement, and that in the meantime 
123 Israel should use the territories to bargain for peace. This policy 
found its formulation in President Johnson's enunciation of his "Five 
Great Principles of Peace in the Middle East", delivered on 19 June, 1967: 
First, the recognised right of national life; second, 
justice for the refugees; third, innocent maritime 
passage; fourth, liinits on the wasteful and destructive 
arms race; and fifth, political independence and 
territorial integrity for all. 
In regard to the fifth point, Johnson elaborated on America's 
position by calling for "recognised boundaries and other arrangements that 
will give [the nations of the Middle East] security against terror, 
destruction and war". Moreover, he made it clear that the United States 
supported the principle that "the parties to trye conflict must be the 
parties to the peace", but he added the important proviso that "they 
b h 1 d b 1 d . . II 124 I f . . 1 h must e e pe y externa me 1at1on . n terms o pr1nc1p es, t e 
122. Middle Eas·t Record_, .196?., p. 237. On 8 June and again on 13 June, 
the U.S. submitted a draft resolution encompassing this linkage between 
withdrawal and peace. The second paragraph read: "Calls for discussions 
promptly thereafter among the parties concerned, using such third party 
or U.N. assistance as they may wish, looking toward the establishment of 
viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed 
personnel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the 
maintenance of vital international rights and the establishment of a stable 
and durable peace in the Middle East". This resolution was not submitted 
to a vote because the Soviet ambassador made it clear that the Soviet 
Union would veto it. A Soviet resolution which branded Israel as the 
aggressor and called for its unconditional withdrawal was submitted to a 
vote but it was opposed by the U.S., U.K. and France, and failed to gain 
the necessary majority. See Middle East Record., 196?., p. 75. 
123. Quandt, op.cit . ., p. 46. 
124. See Department of State BuUetin_, 10 July, 196 7. 
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United States and Israel were in agreement that withdrawal should only be 
in the context of a peace settlement, arranged through direct negotiations 
which would provide for "secure and recognised boundaries". Throughout 
the debate in the special er:lergency session of the General Assembly, 
called on Soviet instigation in July, and the deliberations of the 
Security Council in October and November, the United States refused to 
depart from these principles.which were within the bounds of Israeli 
policy. 125 And this steadfast approach contributed in large measure to 
the formulation of Security Council Resolution 242 which encompassed, in 
vague terms, these principles and constituted the basis for all subsequent 
negotiations on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 126 
Further, while the United States opposed and refused to recognise 
Israel's unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem and its establishment 
of settlements in occupied territories, it did little else to prevent 
these actions and, even in 1977 its opposition is still confined to 
ineffectual votes in the United Nations. Finally, although Israel was in 
little need of military equipment immediately after the war, when the Soviet 
Union began to resupply Egypt and Syria with military equipment to 
compensate their losses, the United States announced that it would fulfil 
its commitment to Israel to supply the 36 Skyhawk aircraft which had been 
negotiated before the war. It was the first sign that the military supply 
relationship which had been established in the pre-war period would 
continue and grow ever larger in quantity and sophistication. 
125. The United States did move away slightly from the principle of direct 
negotiations in suggesting that a U.N. mediator should be sent to the Middle 
East to facilitate negotiations, but this was acceptable to Israel. See 
Lall, op.cit . ., pp. 198, 206-7, 210-212, 238-9. 
126. The complex negotiations are outlined and analysed in Lall, ibid . ., 
Chapter 24. He shows that Caradon's compromise resolution was based on the 
American draft resolution while including some of the points raised by 
the draft resolution introduced by India, Mali and Nigeria. In 
particular, the American attitude on withdrawal was carefully enunciated 
in Resolution 242: 
'~i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 
recent conflict; 
(ii) Termination of all claims.or states of belligerency and respect for 
and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every state in the area and their right to 
live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats 
or acts of force." 
The resolution deliberately did not call for withdrawal from "all the 
territories" because it was felt not only that Israel would find this 
unacceptable but also that the United States would veto such a resolution. 
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VIII - co:ICLUSI0:1 
Israel }lad come .a long way since its emergence fron tiie 1950s wit~1 
all the disadvantages and none of the benefits of non-alignment. T:1e 
outcomes of the war were not alto(:ptheradvantageous since the Soviet Union 
:1ad broken-off relations \lith the Jewish state, and its Arab neighbours 
were in no mood to negotiate. peace from a position of weakness. 
Nevertheless, in terms of the politics of patronage, Israel had 
succeeded in enhancing its prospects and its value to its superpower 
patron. In six years it had managed to forge a solid relationship with the 
United States, based on an underlying commitment to Israel's survival, 
but going far beyond that commitment to a level of economic, military and 
political patronage which Israel had not hitherto experienced. In six 
years, Israel i1ad managed to transfer its dependence from a waning and 
ultimately unreliable great power to the pre-eminent superpower. Moreover, 
in six days, Israel had become the dominant military power in the Hiddle 
East, defeating wit;1 devastating speed the combined might of Egypt, Jordan, 
Syria and Iraq, while its American patron squared-off Israel's Soviet 
adversary, and then backed ~ts political stance after the victory. The 
contrast between 1956, when the United States had combined with the Soviet 
Union to force Israel to withdraw from Sinai, and 1967, when the United 
States backed Israel's demands for a negotiated peace settlement in 
return for withdraw~l, could not be stronger. As such, it was one further 
indication of the turn-around in Israel's fortunes. 
How had this turn-around been achieved? These two chapters have 
demonstrated that adept utilisation of the various bargaining levers, some 
intrinsic to Israel (its capability to go nuclear, its military strength, 
its unique nature as a Jewish state), others conferred on Israel by the 
regional and international environment (its role as a status quo power, its 
role as the balancer of Soviet-supplied Egyptian power, its role as a 
regional stabiliser, etc.) enabled this we.:ik and dependent state to 
secure American patronage and resist American policy. Houever, Israel's 
experience during this period also underlines the importance of the 
rational application of will-power in bringing these available forms of 
leverage to bear upon its newfound patron. Without a strong will on the 
part of the leadership, the wooing of the United States might have become 
a low priority because of powerful internal opposition. Without a strong 
will to defend its rights and protect its interests, Israel might have 
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failed to convince the United States that its combined strategy of 
deterrence and conipulsion had to be supported for lack of a viable 
alternative. And without the will-power to go to war in defence of its 
vital interests, Israel would not have gained American acquiescence in its 
pre-emption and would rather have been forced to submit to the compromising 
of its rights and perhaps its survival. 
It is necessary to place two qualifications on the general thrust 
of these conclusions. First, had Israel not applied its will-power with 
judgement and care as to the consequences for its relationship with its 
patron, the outcome might have been very different. Had Israel decided 
to ignore the American requests for consultation and then delay, during 
the May-June crisis, had it decided to take immediate military action 
':is it almost did on 28 May), instead of allowing time for the United 
States to realise that diplomacy held no prospect, the political 
aftermath might well have included American support for an unconditional 
Israeli withdrawal, an American arms embargo, and a concerted superpower 
attempt to undo Israel's victory. 
Second, factors beyond Israel's control contributed in large measure 
to the turn-around in Israel's fortunes. Rad relations between the 
United States and Egypt not deteriorated into a 'tail-spin' , Israel would 
have had great difficulty in convincing the United States of the wisdom 
of supporting its deterrent strength. Had the United States retained a 
position of influence in Cairo during the May-June crisis it would have 
been unwilling to consider the option of unleashing Israel, far more 
willing to impose a diplomatic compromise, and far less eager to recognise 
its commitment to Israel's rights. Had Nasser applied his will-power less 
impulsively in his relations with the United States, had he not taken the 
ill-advised decision to close the Straits, had he shown grea~r flexibility 
at the eleventh hour when the United States sought a compromise, Israel's 
fate would have been considerably less glorious. The triumph of Israel's 
weak power politics was closely related to the failure of Nasser's 
non-aligned politics and could not have been achieved without it. 
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PART THO 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE POLITICS OF NASSER'S NON-ALIGNMENT 
I - INTRODUCTION 
In stark contrast to Israel's predicament as the decade of the sixties 
dawned, Egypt emerged ·with Nasser's revolution intact and riding high 
on the prestige which it had gained from the defiance of the West at Suez 
and Aswan, from its friendship with the Soviet Union and from the apparent 
success of its union with Syria. Nasser had established himself as the 
popular hero of the Arab masses in their struggle against colonialism, the 
champion of Arab unity and a leader of the non-aligned world. He had made 
Egypt a force to be reckoned with in the world arena and his demonstrated 
ability to promote Soviet interests and denigrate Western ones had ensured 
that both superpowers, in their competition for influence in the Middle 
East, would seek an accommodation \vith Egypt. As one Egyptian official 
told the American Ambassador at the time, and it was equally applicable 
to the Soviet Union: 
The West no longer has us in a corner. We are now in a 
corridor and if you press us too hard we can always 
come out at the other end.l 
The common superpower perception, that Cairo represented the most 
influential capital in the Middle East and that the protection and 
promotion of their interests therefore dictated common policies of coming 
to terms with Nasser, provided Egypt with considerable leverage by which 
it could gain the aid and support of both the United States and the 
Soviet Union. By 1960 Nasser had become renowned for his successful 
utilisation of this leverage in playing one superpower off against the 
other. 2 Yet by 1967 this leverage had disappeared, Egypt had become solely 
dependent on the Soviet Union and Nasser was so much out of the corridor 
and boxed into the corner that he threw caution to the wind and precipitated 
a war which he was not prepared for and which he had previously sought to 
avoid. These developments appear stranger still ~1en it is remembered that 
1. Cited in J. S. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab f-!orld, p. 11. 
2. See Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism", in Lm.;rence 
W. Hartin (ed.), Neutralism and NonaUgnment, New York, 1962; Alvin Z. 
Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned Yorld, Princeton, New Jersey, 
1970, pp. 265-270. 
at the outset of the 1960s the United States had hammered the last nail 
in the coffin of its inappropriate 'containment' policy and had adopted 
a new approach to Egypt aimed at promoting relations through large-scale 
economic assistance. At the same time the Soviet Union had begun to 
recognise the shortcomings of its doctrinal rigidity and, despite 
Nasser's anti-communist actions, had decided that the provision of arms 
and aid to Egypt represented· the most promising and stable investment in 
Middle Eastern influence. How does one then explain why Nasser, having 
succeeded in gaining grain from one superpower, guns from the other, and 
economic aid from both, unnecessarily alienated his American patron and 
thereby forfeited the foreign aid so crucial to the stable development 
of his country? 
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The explanation lies in the very failure of the exercise of leverage 
by a weak state which perhaps possessed greater means to resist the 
influence of its patrons than any other country of similar status. Nasser 
can be held responsible for much of this failure because his impulsive 
behaviour caused the dissipation of goodwill between patron and client, 
and thereby reduced the effectiveness of his leverage. However, his 
impulsiveness would not have been sufficient to cause the United States 
to abandon Egypt had it nbt been accompanied by an underlying conflict 
between the imperatives of Nasser's foreign policy and American interests 
in the Middle East. In accentuating rather than sublimating this conflict, 
Nasser's conduct doomed Washington's new approach as effectively as it 
doomed Egypt to the fate of Soviet dependence. 
Theoretically, it is possible that the existence of a basic conflict 
of interest between patron and client can be sublimated by careful efforts 
on both sides to emphasise that which unites rather than that which divides, 
by the construction of a reservoir of goodwill, by the accumulation of 
positive nuances through the exercise of leverage only on those issues where 
both possess flexibility. Such cautious conduct is especially important 
for the client if its patron has no underlying commitment tying it to the 
client and can as readily abandon it and support its adversaries as accept 
the cost of continuing the investment when the prospects of return appear 
small. In periods of relative stability, such as existed in the Middle 
East before 1967, t.he demands of this p;irticular type of rcL:it.ionship are 
more easily met because issues vital to patron or prot.~g& tend to be 
submerged beneath the surface calm of the detente. But. the client must 
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take care to appear to have regard for the interests of the patron on the 
minor issues of dispute, if the major issues produced by the basic conflict 
of interest are to be prevented from disturbing the halcyon atmosphere. 
In this way the client is likely to get its way on issues vital to its 
well-being, but of minor import to the superpower, while storing goodwill 
for the clash over vital interests should it arise. Moreover, the task 
of accoCTmodation is made easier where the patron perceives an interest 
in maintaining the detente and promoting the relationship by purposely 
deemphasising the basic conflict. In short, whether the client will be 
able to secure patronage from, and resist the influence of, a patron whose 
basic interests are in opposition to its own, will depend on the tolerance 
of the superpower and its expectations of pay-offs for its patronage, as 
well as on the skilful promotion of this tolerance and encouragement of 
these expectations by the client. 
If the theory appears simple, the practice proved to be far 
more complex in the case of Egyptian-American relations. Sublimating the 
basic conflict of interests was particularly difficult for Nasser because 
of the dictates of his foreign policy. His priorities were set by the 
nature of his regime. Revolutionary and nationalist, imposed on Egypt by 
a small group of officers, surrounded by conservative and feudal monarchies, 
the regime had to be protected from internal subversion and external attack 
by establishing its legitimacy at home and its importance abroad through 
domestic economic development and foreign policy achievements. Domestic 
economic development had become a priority because of the poverty of the 
masses and because the regime's pursuit of modernisation had widened the 
expectations of the burgeoning 'modern' sector of the population. Thus 
political stability could only be assured by the fulfilment of the economic 
expectations of the masses and the bourgeoisie, which required the 
3 
maintenance of a high consumption, welfare economy. This in turn required 
extensive foreign aid to finance the balance of payments deficits generated 
by imports of food, raw materials and finished goods. Thus the survival 
of Nasser's regime depended, in part, on foreign assistance, and in this 
3. Accordingly in the first five year plan Egypt allocated a greater 
proportion of investment to services, housing and public utilities than 
to agriculture or industry. The planned share in total investments 
for 1960-1965 of dwellings, public utilities, transport and other services 
was 43%. Moreaver, in this plan, a good part of industrial investment was 
directed to industries producing such things as air-conditioners, refriger-
ators and motor cars. See Galil A. Amin, The Modernisal1:on of Poverty_, 
Lieden, 1974, p. 61. 
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context Egypt sorely needed American aid, because it provided large amounts 
of food which could be paid for in Egyptian currency, thereby freeing hard 
currency for other purposes, while these payments were mostly relent to 
Egypt for its investment projects. 4 However, this means of promoting 
internal political legitimacy had to be complemented by continuous foreign 
policy triumphs to provide Nasser's supporters with a constant replenishment 
of his charismatic authority; As one analyst and observer of Nasser's 
style has noted: 
... the Egyptian masses pictured him as the Nile Valley-dweller 
rising against the invader, courageous enough to say "No" and 
shrewd enough not to return empty-handed ... Nasser became Gamal, 
he who does not retreat.5 
His failure to develop a political structure that would legitimise his 
power made him reliant on this "personification" of authority through 
6 diplomatic triumphs which reinforced his popular mandate. Moreover, 
Nasser's desire to build his prestige, to fulfil the role of leader and 
unifier of the Arab world, compounded this propensity for foreign exploits 
already enhanced by his dramatic successes in the fifties. 
Herein lay the dile1mna which made Nasser's task so difficult, for while 
he needed American aid for economic development, he need.ed to debase 
American interests to achieve diplomatic success. Were he to enhance his 
authority by championing the causes of anti-imperialism, Arab unity and 
Palestine, and by achieving victories at the expense of his conservative 
Arab rivals, it was inevitable that he would threaten the interests of 
the United States, which had become identified as the new imperialist, which 
possessed important oil interests in the conservative Arab states, and 
which was committed to preserving the integrity of Israel, Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia. Thus Nasser's natural proclivities produced a peculiar form 
of non-aligned politics which relied, not on playing one superpower off 
against the other, but rather on the debasement of American interests and 
the promotio1i of Soviet ones. Given this natural proclivity for conflict 
with the United States, how could Nasser encourage the American tolerance 
and expectations of benefit so necessary to maintain its patronage? 
4. See R.H. Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasser_, A Study in Political Dynamics_, 
p. 225. 
5. Jean Lacouture, The Demigods_, p. 109. 
6. See Dekmejian, op.cit.; John P. Entelis, "Nasser's Egypt: The Failure 
of Charismatic Leadership", Orbis_, Volume XVIII, No. 2, Summer, 1974, 
pp. 455-9. 
The State Department in Washington thought it had the answers to 
this problem, for its officers were as keen to promote the relationship 
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as the Egyptians. Seizing on Kennedy's desire to build fruitful relations 
with the newly emergent nations of the Third World, and the particular 
White House priority of coming to terms with the most powerful leader of 
the Arab world, the State Department articulated a new approach designed 
to extend the limits of American tolerance. 7 First it was argued that 
American strategic interests no longer required a pro-Western defence 
coalition in the Middle East heartland, a policy which had caused conflict 
with Nasser in the 1950s. The development of ICBMs had made the Middle East 
less important as a strategic base for the containment of the Soviet 
Union, while the Arab opposition generated by this policy had demonstrated 
that "emphasis on a maximum military security programme is not necessarily 
the best way to protect our national interests". 8 Secondly, non-alignment 
was looked on with greater favour than in Dulles' era, especially in 
the Middle East where the suppression of the communist parties in Egypt, 
Syria and later Iraq, was hailed, in Washington, as the coming of age of 
Arab neutralism; while not pro-Western it had ceased to be unthinkingly 
pro-Soviet. 9 In particular, Nasser's dispute with the Soviet Union was 
interpreted as a "growing understanding that CO!lli'Tiunism is antithetical to 
Arab nationalist aspirations"; 10 Egypt exemplified "how diametrically 
opposed these two. forces really are and what a powerful obstacle to foreign 
11 infiltration the dynamic effort of a developing new country can be". 
7. Arthur M. Schlesinger, A 'l'housand Days, p. 451. 
8. "The Basic Ingredients for a Realistic American Middle East Policy", 
Address by Chester Bowles, the President's Special Advisor on African, Asian 
and Latin American Affairs, in United States Foreign Policy, Current 
Documents, 1962, Washington, 1965, p. 748; Cf. William B. Quandt, United 
States Policy in the Middle East: Constraints and Choices, pp. 30-32. 
9. See John C. Campbell, The Middle East in the Muted Cold War, Monograph 
Series in World Affairs, University of Denver, Colorado, No. 1, 1964/65, 
pp. 15ff. 
10. Address by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Averell 
Harriman, at the Twenty-Fourth American Assembly, 26 October, 1963, in 
U.S. Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1963, Washington, 1966, p. 569. 
11. Bowles, op.cit., p. 747. From 1959 to 1961 relations between Egypt 
and the Soviet Union went through a stormy period because Nasser had embarked 
on a campaign to suppress the Arab communists of Egypt and Syria, while 
vehemently attacking their influence in Iraq, in an attempt to eliminate 
communist influence from the Arab national movement. Moscow had treated the 
suppression of the relatively insignificant Egyptian communists as an 
internal affair, but it was unable to ignore the suppression of the more 
numerous and influential Syrian party, and Nasser's opposition to the rising 
The success of Arab socialism, so the argument went, better suited 
A . . h . 1 1 1 . . 12 ~1 • merican interests t an its on y rea a. ternative, communism. 11ns new 
attitude was reinforced by a reassessment of the threat to American oil 
interests posed by Arab nationalism. The development of a glut in the 
world oil marked and the discovery of new fields in Libya and Venezuela 
seemed to assure the security of oil supplies for the industries of the 
West, because even if radical regimes replaced conservative ones in some 
Arab oil producing states, they would still need to sell their oil to 
13 
the West. 
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Finally a critical appraisal of past American policy failures 
encouraged the belief that the best interests of the United States lay in 
remaining detached and impartial in the face of the inter-Arab and 
Arab-Israeli conflicts - a wise arbiter, rather than a partisan promoter 
of parochial interests. Since stability best served American interests, 
it would be promoted by assisting economic development and by discouraging 
external involvement in local rivalries. Progressive regimes would be 
encouraged to develop in an orderly and productive way in order to reduce 
the opportunities for Soviet exploitation of the tensions that were bound 
14 
to accompany the modernisation of the Arab world. 
11. (continued) importance of the Iraqi party. The verbal battle which 
ensued was vocal and bitter, waged in the Cairo press, and less frequently, 
though with equal vehemance, in speeches made by Nasser and Khrushchev. 
See A. Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet Mir'ror~ Jerusalem, 1973, pp. 62-
75; Jaan Pennar, The U.S.S.R. and the Arabs~ The Ideological Dimension 1917-
1972~ London, 1973, pp. 66-67; and Oded Eran and Jerome E. Singer, "Soviet 
Policy Towards the Arab World, 1955-71", Survey~ 17, No. 4, Autumn, 1971, 
pp. 20-21. 
12. Campbell, op. cit.~ p. 20; Cf. William Polk, "Social Modernisation: 
The New Men", in Georgiana G. Stevens (ed.), The Urdted States and the 
Middle East~ Englewood Cliffs, N.J., pp. 30-52. 
13. The fears of an interruption in oil supplies as a result of radical 
coups in the Arab oil-producing states had been allayed by the experience 
with Iraq after Kassem's coup. See Richard Nolte, "United States policy 
and the Middle East", in 1:b1:d.~ pp. 79-80. 
14. Under Secretary of State Harriman stated this explicitly in a speech 
in 1963: "The U.S. is not taking sides in disputes and is encouraging other 
states where possible not to take sides in disputes in the area, but rather 
to allow states to decide their own destinies. We are assisting those 
nations in the achievement of their basic goal - an adequate rate of economic 
development. Such development, I firmly believe, affords the soundest and 
in a sense the only basis for.long term stability". Op.cit.~ p. 567; Cf. 
Badeau, The American AppPoaeh to the Anw T/orld., pp .. 16-18; Charles D. 
Cremeans, The Arabs and Uie World., Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy~ New 
York, 1963, Chapter XIII. 
Thus Washington's new approach to Egypt was to be explicitly based 
on tolerance of Nasser's non-alignment and his desire to lead the Arab 
world. As one of the State Department's policy planners put it: 
The theory behind American policy in this period rested on 
two assumptions: that it might be possible to use American aid 
to encourage tendencies and people, even where regimes 
appeared hostile, to create a situation more favourable to 
American interest; and that the United States could tolerate, 
with safety to its fundamental objectives, a high level of 
"static" in Arab political activity. 15 
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Relations with Egypt were to be cultivated through the provision of 
extensive economic assistance under the PL 480 'food for peace' programme. 
Egypt had already been receiving some $45 million to $100 million per year 
since 1959 under this programme, but in 1962 the United States concluded a 
medium-term agreement providing Egypt with $431.8 million worth of American 
whe::itand other surplus commodities over a period of three years. The food 
would be paid for in Egyptian currency, 85% of which would be relent to the 
E . 1 . f d 1 . l6 
· gyptian government at a ow interest rate ··or eve opment proJ ects. 
This assistance would be supplemented by hard currency loans amounting to 
between $20 million and $40 million per year, bringing annual assistance to 
a proposed total of some $200 million per year, a doubling of existing 
17 levels. As an indication of the importance Washington attached to 
cultivating relations with Cairo, Egypt would receive over the next three 
H years between 30% and 43% of total American economic aid to the Middle East. 
15. William R. Polk, The United States and the Arab World, p. 287. 
16. According to Nasser the terms were 4% over thirty years. See President 
Nasser's 23 July Speech, Foreign Broadcas·t Information Service, Daily Report, 
(FBIS), 23 July, 1965. 
17. New York Times, 27 January 1965. 
18. U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO THE MIDDLE EAST 1946 - 1966 ($millions) 
YEAR EGYPT TOTAL EGYPT AS % OF TOTAL 
1946-1961 384.4 2325.6 
1962 224.l 524.0 
1963 199.7 661.8 
1964 140.5 441.8 
1965 147.8 402.4 
1966 60.5 262.3 
16.5 
42.8 
30.2 
31.8 
36.7 
23.0 
SOU_R_C_E_:~il-~-,a-.r~E-a_c_t_·~R-e_p_o_r_t_·,~l-9~6~J---1-.9-6~7~~~~~-~~~~~~~~ 
The Kennedy Administration was also responsible for encouraging the West 
German government to iJrovide extensive aid to Egypt. A protocol signed in 
April 1963 provided Egypt with a loan of $57.5 million, repayable over 12-16 
years at an interest rate of 2 1/2 - 4%, as t.;rell ~s technical aid of $12. 5 
million, and export credits of $127.5 million over seven to ten years. A 
further agreement was signed in August 1964 for a hyclro-electric and irrigati 
project at Quattara for which West Germany would have provided $118 million i 
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Clearly, there were important pay-offs for Egypt if Nasser could keep his 
foreign exploits within the bounds of increased American tolerance. 
What did Washington expect in return? The most important expectation 
of American policy-makers was that the Arab-Israeli conflict would be 
frozen and placed in the 'ice-box' • If Nasser could resist heating up this 
issue, the basic conflict of interest between patron and client would 
remain submerged and Washington could then adopt an 'even-handed' policy, 
without affecting its commitment to the integrity of the Jewish state. 
According to Ambassador Badeau, the former president of the American 
University of Cairo who was dispatched to Cairo by Kennedy to supervise 
the implementation of the new policy, the Arab-Israeli conflict would be 
frozen by a "frank and mutual recognition of basic differences regarding 
the matter and an agreement not to let these intrude on mutually 
profitable relations". 19 
A further expectation of American policy was that the United States, 
in assisting Egypt in its economic development,would encourage those 
tendencies which were constructive and peaceful, while removing the 
incentives for policies aimed at defying the West or damaging its interests 
in the Middle East. Returning from a trip to Cairo in 1962 Chester Bowles, 
a special advisor to Kennedy, best expressed this expectation: 
If the leaders of the Egyptian government come to see 
that their role in history will be determined ... by 
what they actually do about the aching poverty and 
misery that oppress the people of Egypt, there will 
be opportunities for constructive, peaceful 
cooperation between the American and Egyptian govern-
ments. In this event tensions may gradually be eased 
throughout the Middle East and energies may increas-
ingly be diverted from angry conflict to constructive 
development. 20 
Thus Washington's new approach to Egypt appeared to allow Nasser 
considerable leeway in pursuing the enhancement of his charismatic authority 
and prestige, as long as he also paid some attention to the boundaries 
of American tolerance and made some attempt to fulfil American expectations 
-18. (continued) aid. This project was scrapped in 1965 along with the 
cancellation of the other aid agreements because of Nasser's invitation to 
Ulbricht of East Germany (see below). Keesing 's Contempora.ry Ar•chives, 
15-22 May, 1965, p. 20740. 
19. Badeau, p. 175-6. For the exchange of letters between Nasser and 
Kennedy on this issue see Heikal, The Cairo Documents, pp. 203-4. 
20. "A Balance Sheet on Asia", Address by Chester Bowles, the President's 
Special Advisor on African, Asian and Latin American Affairs, in U.S. Foreign 
Policy, Current Documents, 1962, p. 986. 
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by leaving ronflict with Israel in the "ice box" and by concentrating on 
economic development. Yet by 1966 he had lost all American support and 
had become heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. Why did he fail? 
Some analysts of this period have tended to emphasise the basic 
conflict of interest between Egypt and the United States when explaining 
the failure. 21 Others have argued that the United States forced Nasser 
. d l . 22 y f 1 1 . into a corner, was even out to estroy 11m. et a care.u ana ysis 
of the conduct of the relationship will show that while elements of 
these arguments are apposite, Nasser's conduct of the politics of 
patronage bears the major responsibility for his failure. Far from 
sublimating the basic conflict of interest, far from demonstrating that 
aid moderated his tendency to denigrate American interest, he preferred 
to use the United States as his hete noir to enhance his position in the 
Arab world and his importance to the Soviet Union. In doing so, he tended 
to ignore the limits beyond which damage to American relations would 
prove counterproductive; he tended to ignore the fact that while his 
admirers in the State Department could make policy, Congress and the 
President could do much to break it, if they decided that there was little 
to gain from cultivating a leader whose imperatives were anti-American; 
and perhaps most significantly, he tended to ignore the fact that, once 
America tired of the game, it had the ability to redefine the conditions, 
abandon him to the Soviet Union, and turn its attention to other clients 
in the region. The new approach in Washington allowed for "static" in 
relations with Cairo, but it did not allow for the noise to become so loud 
that it would exceed American tolerance and obscure any of the supposed 
benefits of the relationship. Nasser failed to keep the noise down to a 
tolerable level. 
II - YEMEN: THE FIRST TEST 
It did not take long for the noise to generate. In September 1962 a 
coup in the Yemen replaced the feudal Imam with a revolutionary, professedly 
Nasserite regime under the leadership of Abdullah Al-Sallal. Lacking 
21. See Malcolm H. Kerr, "Coming to Terms with Nasser: Attempts and 
Failures", Ini;er'nat'l:ort12l llffaiY'.'' (London), Volume 43, No. l, January, 1967, 
pp. 65-84; Badeau, "U.S.A. and U.A.R., A Crisis in Confidence", Forei9n 
Affairs_, Volume 43, 1965, pp. 281-296; William Polk, The United States and 
the !tralJ ~lorld_, Chapter XVIII. 
22. See Heikal, The Ca?:ro Documents" Chapter VII; His ham Sharabi, "Prelude 
to War: The Crisis of Hay-June 1967", in I. Abu-Lughod (ed.), The Ar•ab-
Is1,aeli Confronf;ation of June 1.967_, An AralJ Perspect--Z:ve~ Evans ton, 1970, 
pp. 49-65; Anthony Nutting, Nasser_, London, 1972, Chapters 18-19. 
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popular support, and opposed by the deposed Imam, who was busy rallying 
the support of the mountain tribesmen as well as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, 
Sallal's regime appealed to Nasser for assistan:::e. Within a few days, 
Egyptian paratroopers and materiel had arrived in Yemen, and by November, 
a mutual defence treaty had been signed; within two months of the coup 
there were already 10, 000 Egyptian troops in Yemen. 23 Heanwhile, the Imam 
had gained the financial and.material backing of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, 
since they perceived the Yemeni revolution as a direct threat to the 
integrity of their regimes and to stability in the Arabian Peninsula. By 
the end of Nove1;1ber, with Egyptian planes bombing Saudi cities and Sallal 
publicly threatening to march his forces into Saudi Arabia, a new theatre 
of conflict between the 'progressives' and 'reactionaries' of the Arab 
world had opened. As a consequence, Nasser's intervention generated 
noise in the relationship with Washington, for it raised the spectre of 
instability in the Arabian Peninsula spreading to the feudal oil states of 
the Persian Gulf and to the British protectorate of Aden. 
The civil war in Yemen thus presented Cairo and Wasl1ington with their 
first test of whether l:he patron and its uncertain client, while remaining 
true to their interests, could conduct relations to their mutual benefit. 
It was not a major test for the new relationship since the vital interests 
of neither were involved, but it would prove to be a classic case of how 
a minor issue, involving divergent interests, could do much to affect the 
tenor of relations and lead the patron to question its policy. 
At the outset of the civil war Washington's concerns were twofold: 
to prevent the subversion of the monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan; 
and to deprive the Soviet Union of an opportunity to exploit the conflict 
and precipitate a polarisation of the Arab world, making Hoscow the champion 
of progress and Washington the protector of reaction. Accordingly, 
the United States, adhering to the precepts of its new tolerant approach, 
decided to regard the revolution in Yemen as a legitimate expression of 
nationalist and progressive aspirations, while bolstering Saudi Arabia and 
24 Jordan with declarations of support. Washington was determined to remain 
23. Manfred W. Wenner, Modern Yemen~ 1918-1966~ Baltimore, 1967, pp. 193-8. 
24. The State Department was concerned that if it did not recognise and 
encourage such movements the United States would become increasingly 
identified as the protector of reaction while the Soviet Union became the 
champion of progress in the Arab world. To avoid this polarisation and 
enhance America's moderating influence, recognition of the new regime in 
Sana'a was considered essential. See Badeau, p. 137 and a letter from 
Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot to Senator Hickenlooper, printed 
in Congressiona,l Record~ 30 July, 1963, p. 12902. 
detached from this local dispute and to continue its policy of impartial 
assistance to Egypt. The new three-year aid agreement, concluded in 
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October 1962, at the very time that Egyptian troops were landing in Yemen, 
would not be used as a lever to pressure Nasser into withdrawal because 
policy-makers argued that food aid was too sensitive to be used as a 
bargaining lever, and too important in the development of American relations 
with Egypt to be abandoned b~cause of limited tension in the Arabian 
Peninsula. 25 Instead Washington would rely on quiet diplomacy, dialogue 
and mediation to persuade Nasser that it was in his interests, both for 
the welfare of his country, and for the continuity of good relations with 
the United St~tes, to cooperate in finding a way out of the impasse 
created by Egyptian intervention on behalf of the republicans and Saudi 
support for the royalists. The aim of American policy would be to provide 
a face-saving way for Nasser to withdraw his troops while providing 
Saud and Hussein with sufficient security to enable them to accept the 
neH regime in Sana'a. 
American policy therefore, in theory, provided Nasser with the leeway 
to preserve the republican regime as well as his American connection. 
Moreover, the absence of pressure for continued involvement from his 
Soviet patron should have enhanced this manoeuvrability. While Moscow 
had recognised the republican regime and expressed its support for the 
"just national aspirations of the Yemeni people" it had also adopted a 
cautious approach, channeling minor assistance through the agency of Egypt, 
but demonstrating little desire to exploit the situation or to encourage 
greater Egyptian involvement. 26 The Soviet Union certainly supported this 
' anti-imperialist' revolution, but it was not averse to Egyptian 
withdrawal. 27 It has been suggested that Nasser feared that Egyptian 
withdrawal would enable the Soviet Union to replace his support for the 
republicans. But this fear of Soviet penetration was shared by the 
25. According to Badeau, the aid was designed to promote long-term 
dependence: " ... the real choice here ... (was) between surrending an area that 
is vital to American interests to further Soviet penetration and control, or 
remaining to wield such influence as is possible while pursuing the long-term 
objective of gradually making Western and American aid so needed to the 
local economy, that the need will temper activities harmful to American 
interests". J.S. Badeau, "The Sovereign Middle.East: New Horizon in American 
Foreign Policy", in S.N. Fisher (ed.), New Horizons in American Foreign 
Policy~ Ohio, 1966, p. 94. 
26. Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror~ p. 258; Y. Ro'i, From 
Encroachment to Involvement~ A Docwnentary Study of Soviet Policy in the 
Middle East~ 1945-19?3~ Jerusalem, 1974, pp. 410-11. 
27. In fact the Soviet Union endorsed the peace talks between Faisal and 
Nasser in August, 1964. 
United States and might therefore have been used in bargaining for 
American guarantees of the Sallal regime, in exchange for Egyptian 
disengagement. 
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However, if the policies of his patrons were conducive to withdrawal, 
Nasser's Arab aspirations exerted pressure in the opposite direction. The 
collapse of the United Arab Republic in 1961, following the secession of 
Syria, together with antagonism towards Kassem in Iraq, had served to 
isolate Egypt in the Arab world. Nasser had been concentrating on 
socialist reconstruction at home and a polemical war against the 
'reactionaries' abroad through the carrying of the message of the Egyptian 
28 
revolution across the borders and over the heads of his Arab opponents. 
Under attack from Iraq and Syria on the left, and Jordan and Saudi Arabia 
on the right, he responded in kind, labelling them "reactionary" and 
"imperialist" and declaring that "un;:mimity about the goal is more 
k " 29 important than unity of the ran s . When the coup in Yemen brought to 
power a regime which espoused this very unanimity with the Egyptian revolution 
and called for its support, Nasser was presented with an opportunity to 
reject his isolation,to prove that his ideas on Arab unity through 
revolution were not moribund,and to demonstrate to their own people the 
30 
reactionary nature of the Saudi and Jordanian monarchs. It was an 
opportunity he could hardly refuse, given his predilection and need for 
foreign exploits, his desire to enhance his prestige and the blow that 
non-intervention would have dealt it, his interest in regaining the 
initiative in inter-Arab rivalry, and the pressure of his powerful deputy 
31 
supreme commander, General Amer. Any consideration of damaging Egypt's 
relationship with the United States would have been dwarfed by these stakes, 
had it not already been dwarfed by Washington's own purposeful tolerance. 
So Nasser intervened with precipitate haste, knowing next to nothing about 
28. See Malcolm H. Kerr, The Ar>ab Cold fv'ar> _, Gama l 'Abdal-Nasir> and His 
Rivals_, 1958-?0_, (third edition), London, 1971, Chapter 2. 
29. Thus Nasser declared: 11 ••• we must always differentiate between the 
struggling Arab peoples ... and certain Arab rulers for whom circumstances 
and imperialism paved the way to dominate these peoples. Such rulers 
do not belong to the Arab nation". Speech on the Occasion of Unity Day, 
22 February, 1962, in Speeches by President Gamal Abdul llasser>_, _1.962_, U.A.R. 
Ministry of Information, State Information Service, p. 24. 
30. See Kerr, The Ar>ab Cold fv'ar>_, p. 39; Nutting, pp. 321-2. 
31. Amer and Sadat visited Yemen in October 1962 to report on the situation. 
Amer called for troop reinforcements, arguing that with more men the country 
could be brought under control. See Robert Stephens, Nasser'_, A Political 
Biogr>aphy_, London, 1973, pp. 393-4. 
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the country and the conflict yet impulsively committing his troops and his 
prestige in support of a regime which had little prospect of exercising 
authority over its countrymen without this support. 32 In these 
circumstances he could not withdraw his troops unless the royalist 
opposition had been eliminated. This commitment, together with his belief 
that victory could be achieved(which was bolstered by Amer's unfounded 
optimism) led him to reject :American mediation efforts, thereby 
dissipating the goodwill that Washington had brought to this dispute. 
The first American attempt to mediate a disengagement came in November 
1962 when Kennedy wrote to Nasser, Faisal, Hussein and Sall.al proposing 
a compromise settlement whereby Egypt would withdraw its troops, while 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan would cease all assistance to the royalist forces. 33 
Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt rejected the proposal because at this stage 
neither had abandoned its hopes for victory. Cairo 1 s rejection had not 
yet strained relations with its American patron because Washington 
recognised that it could not expect a unilateral Egyptian withdrawal. So 
Washington persisted and managed to secure what it thought was an Egyptian 
commitment to withdrawal as a quid pro quo for American recognition of 
the Yemen Arab Republic. 34 This agreement was made explicit in the official 
American statement of recognition, which welcomed Egypt's declaration of 
its willingness "to undertake a reciprocal disengagement and expeditious 
phased removal of troops from Yemen as external forces engaged in support 
of the Yemen royalists are removed from the frontier and external support 
"35 
of the royalists is stopped. 
However, Washington did not receive its quid pro quo because the 
Egyptian forces sought and failed first to deal a decisive blow to the 
royalists before withdrawing. Within two weeks of American recognition, 
Egyptian planes had resumed their bombing raids on Saudi villages and within 
two months Egyptian forces had launched a major offensive against the 
royalist strongholds. Washington responded with patience, "strenuous" 
representations in Cairo, a reiteration of its support for the integrity 
of Saudi Arabia - underlined by the dispatch of a squadron of jet fighters, 
32. See Nutting, Zoe.cit. 
33. Wenner, pp. 199-200. 
34. See Patrick Seale, "The War in Yemen", New Republic_, Volume 198, 26 
January, 1963, p. 11. 
35. See "United States Recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic", in 
U.S. Foreign Policy_, Current Docwnents_, 1962_, p. 784. 
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a destroyer and paratroopers - and yet another attempt at mediation. In 
.March 1963, Kennedy sent .a special envoy, Ellsworth Bunker, to negotiate 
with Nasser and Faisal in conjunction with an American sponsored U.N. 
mediation effort by Ralph Bunche. Ostensibly successful, Bunker and 
Bunche arranged a disengagement based on the same terms as had originally 
been proposed by Kennedy, but by the time the U.N. Yemen Observer Mission 
(UNYOM) had been dispatched .to oversee its implementation, the royalists 
had launched a counter-attack and had regained much of the ground lost in 
the Egyptian offensive. In these circumstances Nasser was less inclined 
than ever to withdraw. By September 1963, the number of Egyptian troops 
deployed in Yemen had risen to 28,000 with their maintenance estimated to 
be costing Egypt some $150 million per year. 37 
Although Nasser had demonstrated a willingness to negotiate and to 
entertain the idea of withdrawal he seemed trapped by his committed 
prestige and therefore proved unable to prevent a deterioration in relations 
with the United States. Even after Saudi Arabia, on American urging, 
suspended its assistance to the royalists in June 1963, it was clear 
that the republican regime could not survive without Egyptian protection. 
In such circumstances withdrawal would lead to the downfall of the regime, 
striking a blow to Nasser's prestige and the cause of Egyptian-led Arab 
unity. 38 Unable and unwilling to cut his losses,he found it necessary 
to increase the Egyptian commitment, thereby precipitating the suspicion 
in Washington that he sought to spread his influence in the Arabian 
Peninsula and threaten Saudi Arabia. If Egyptian bombing of Saudi territory 
did nothing to allay these fears, Nasser's rhetoric did much to reinforce 
them, declaring as he did that "the revolution in Yemen is an expression of, 
not only the Yemeni people's hopes, but the hopes of the Saudi people" and 
that Egypt supported these people "against the despotism and exploitation of 
h S d • 1 11 39 t e au i ru e.rs . 
Instead of emphasising Egyptian desires for withdrawal, Nasser 
demonstrated his disregard for American interests, the.re.by exacerbating 
the divergence. in Egyptian-American relations. By October 1963, Kennedy's 
patience seems to have run out, for in his last letter to Nasser he charged 
36. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World~ p. 146; Wenner, p. 205. 
37. N0J York Times~ 18 October, 1963; Cf. Wenner, p. 198. 
38. ·see Kerr, The Arab Cold War~ pp. 106-8, 
39. FBIS~ 9 January, 1963. 
202 
that, while Faisal was carrying out his end of the bargain, Nasser was not 
and this fact was causing him "personal concern": 
I therefore have no leverage with Faisal when ... he 
continues to see Egyptian troops in Yemen and hear 
expressions of hostility from Cairo ... While we think 
we understand some of the reasons we cannot blink at 
the fact, which is becoming public knowledge, that the 
United Arab.Republic is not carrying out a compact made 
with the United Nations· and, in effect, underwritten 
by the United States as a friend of both parties.40 
But if Nasser had only strained Kennedy's patience, his involvement 
in Yemen had antagonised Congress, which now felt that American aid had 
enabled Egypt to divert resources to the war. While the Administration 
continued to defend aid to Egypt on the basis of Nasser's importance in 
the Arab world, his non-alignment, and the necessity to keep aid 
"impartial", Congress began seriously to question the rationale behind 
this policy. 41 In October, Senator Gruening presented a report on American 
aid to the Middle East in which lie charged that: 
U.S. dollars are enabling Egypt to wage war in Yemen, 
to foment trouble in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and to 
arm to attack Israel just as surely a~ 2 though they 
were spent directly for that purpose. 
In November, the Senate and House approved an amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act to ban aid and sales of surplus food to nations prepar.ing for 
aggression against other recipients of aid. 43 Although Egypt was not 
referred to by name, the deployment of troops in Yemen, and Nasser 1 s threats 
against Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel came under attack from both sides 
!+O. Cited in Heikal, The Cairo Documents_, pp. 222-3. 
!+l. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, defended aid to Egypt on the grounds that it had helped 
to reverse the adverse situation of the 1950s and encouraged Egypt to 
maintain a non-aligned policy which was "increasingly more compatible with 
free world interests". He argued that the use of aid "as a bludgeon to force 
solutions will not work where deep-seated beliefs and long-standing grievances 
are held". Cited in Near East Report_, Volume VII, 1963, p. 56; Cf. Testimony 
of Assistant Secretary Talbot to the House Sub-Committee on Foreign Operat-
ions, cited in Nea:r East Report_, p. 90. 
42. A Study on U.S. Foreign Aid in Ten Middle Eastern and North African 
Countries~ Report of Senator Ernest Gruening to the Committee on Government 
Operations, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963. 
43. The amendment stated that no aid should be supplied to "any country 
which the President determines is engaging in or preparing for aggressive 
military efforts directed agains~ 1) the United States; 2) any country 
receiving assistance under this act; 3) any country to which sales are made 
under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, until 
in the Congressional debate. 44 In proposing the amendment, Senator 
Gruening charged that the State Department had many pro-Arab people in 
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it who would never get tough with Nasser except under a stiff Congressional 
45 
mandate. 
In public, Kennedy's reaction reflected the continued tolerance of 
his Administration. He criticised the Congressional amendment for reducing 
his flexibility in negotiating an Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen and warned 
that "these threats that the United States is going to cut off aid is [sic] 
a great temptation to Arabic countries to say: 'Cut if off' " He went on 
to argue that, while quiet diplomacy might not bring about the withdrawal, 
Congressional threats were likely to have the opposite result of 
. N k h. . y 46 LI • • encouraging asser to eep is troops in emen. towever, in private 
representations it became clear that Congressional action, together with 
growing dissatisfaction within the Administration, had led the United 
States to increase its pressure on Nasser: the Egyptian government was 
informed that future aid would depend on the progress of troop withdrawals 
47 from Yemen. Apparently, Nasser responded with some assurances that there 
would be withdrawals in January 1964, but these did not eventuate. By 
September 1964, when UNYOM was disbanded, having failed to complete its 
task, Egyptian troop deployments had in fact risen to 40,000 with still 
no prospect of resolving the conflict. 48 
Accordingly, with the accession of Johnson to the. presidency the 
United States abandoned its attempts at mediation and instead adopted what 
became known as a 'stew-in-your-own-juice' policy. No further efforts would 
be made to salvage Nasser from his difficulties in Yemen. Instead, Washington 
hoped that discontent within Egypt at the high cost and absence of benefits 
from the Yemeni involvement would eventually force the disengagement which 
43 (continued) the President determines that such military efforts or 
preparations have ceased and ... will not be renewed ... ". Cited in U.S. F01'eign 
Policy_, Current Docwnents_, 1963_, p. 612. The amendment was passed in the 
Senate by a majority of 65 to 13 with 22 absent; 17 of those absent 
announced that they would have voted in favour, bringing opposition to 
Nasser up to at least 82 Senators. See Near East Report_, Volume VII, 1963, 
p. 99. 
44. See Near East Report, Volume VII, pp. 97-99. 
45. Nez,J York Times_, 8 November, 1963. 
46. See President Kennedy's News Conference on llf Novemb0~r, 1963, in 
U.S. Fore1:gn Policy, Current Docwnents_, 1963_, p. 612. Rusk also publicly 
opposed the legislation: "I am very concerned with the loss of flexibility, 
the loss of any ability to move to protect and forward the interests of the 
United States wherever they might be engaged". New York Ti:mes_, 9 November, 1963. 
47. Hedrick Smith, "U.S. Aid to Cairo Linked to Yemen", New York Times" 
18 October, 1963. 
48. Wenner, av.cit .• pp. 209-210. 
49 American diplomacy had failed to secure. 
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In the final analysis, the civil war in Yemen had only a marginal 
impact on American interests in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia had been 
stabilised through the accession of King Faisal and minor demonstrations 
of American support; revolutionary nationalism had been contained within 
the borders of Yemen. However, the failure of America's mediation effort 
had caused disillusionment with the new approach developed under Kennedy 
and had led to a deterioration in American-Egyptian relations. Although 
the damage to American interests had been limited, and Nasser's involvement 
in the civil war had not yet become a major source of tension in relations 
between patron and client, the limits of compatibility between the Egyptian 
revolution and American interests in the Arab world had been delineated. 
Nasser had not only succeeded in raising the level of noise in his relations 
with Washington, by making it difficult for American policy-makers to 
justify continued assistance in the face of Congressional opposition, he 
had also done much to destroy the expectation that American aid would 
encourage him to concentrate on internal development. An atmosphere of 
mutual suspicion had developed, with Washington attaching greater 
significance to the 'anti-imperialist' component of Nasser's foreign policy, 
while he suspected that Washington was behind the royalist successes 
d h k h . . d d . Y 5o Th Y . · 1 h d an soug t to eep im tie own in emen. e emen civi .war a 
demonstrated that, for Nasser, the politics of American patronage conflicted 
with the politics of Arab unity; he seemed unable to strike a balance between 
the two. In 1962, Kennedy had written to Nasser that "many people in both 
of our countries question whether good relations between us are really 
11 51 possible. I think they are wrong, but it is up to us to prove them wrong. 
By 1964 Nasser had done much to prove them right. 
III - UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS 
If Egyptian involvement in the Yemen had demonstrated that American 
aid would do little to encourage Nasser to concentrate on the economic 
49. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World, p. 147. 
50. Heikal, The Cairo Docwnents_, p. 261. 
51. Cited in ibid., p. 220. 
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development of his country, Nasser's reaction to subsequent events 
underlined his slight regard for other American expectations. Time and 
again, when the underlying conflict of interest between patron and client 
emerged, he disregarded the limits of American tolerance and, instead of 
sublimating the conflict, used it to bolster his position in the Arab world 
and his importance in Soviet eyes. He wasted his leverage through impulsive 
attacks on the United States· and thus ensured that, at the same time as 
his position in the Arab world became more untenable, Washington's 
attitude exacerbated his problems. Nasser's task was not easy given the 
incompatibility of his objectives and American interests, but by 
continually drawing attention to this incompatibility he made that task 
far more difficult. Consequently, by the end of 1964 America's new 
approach had all but collapsed under the strain of unfulfilled expectations, 
taking Nass er 1 s pol icy of non-alignment with it. 
The most important expectation of the new approach had been that the 
Arab-Israeli conflict would remain in the 'ice-box' . America's commitment 
to the integrity of Israel was bound to create difficulties for its 
relations with the Arab world given the deep-seated nature of Arab hostility 
towards the Jewish state. Precisely for this reason the United States had 
sought to neutralise the conflict by promoting a settlement of the Palestine 
refugee problem, by arbitrating the dispute over the utilisation of the 
Jordan river, by avoiding the role of major arms supplier to the region 
while seeking to maintain a military balance between Israel and the Arabs, 
and by encouraging Egypt, which possessed the most powerful Arab army, to 
concentrate on other issues. The policy had functioned well enough in 
preventing any major outbreak of fighting, although no progress had been 
made on the basic issues of recognition of Israel by the Arab states or the 
redressing of Arab grievances. However, its efficacy was tested anew 
at the beginning of 1964, after Israel announced the completion of 
preparations for its diversion of the Jordan river. 
Under a plan negotiated by Eric Johnston, an envoy dispatched by 
Eisenhower, Arab and Israeli engineers had agreed, in 1955, to diversion 
of the Jordan waters for the development of the riparian states. Although 
the Arab League had rejected this plan because it implied recognition of, 
and cooperation with, the Jewish state, the plan acquired de fac:to status 
as a result of the implementation of American supported projects in Israel 
and Jordan, which conformed to the limits laid down by 
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52 Johnston. To allay Israel's doubts about the Jordanian project, Kennedy 
had written to Ben-Gurion in November 1962 reiterating American support 
for Israel's project, thereby committing Washington to the diversion 
53 
which was about to take place. 
Perhaps Washington believed that the tacit Arab agreement to the 
diversion plan in 1955, together with the implementation of Jordan's East 
Ghor Canal project, had defu·sed Arab objections to the Israeli plan and 
thus no conflict between the Arabs and Israel would arise. If that was the 
case, the belief quickly proved mistaken, as Israel's announcement of the 
completion of its National Water Carrier aroused anew the Arab fear that 
the diversion would assist the expansion of Israel's presence in the 
region. Its stated purpose had been to make the Negev desert 'bloom', 
enabling the creation of new settlements for Jewish immigrants. Although, 
by the time the project was completed, this aim had become impracticable 
because of the high salinity of the water, the prior demands of the coastal 
water tables which had been depleted by drought, and the shift of emphasis 
from agricultural to industrial expansion, the diversion retained its 
symbolic significance to the Arabs. Settlement in the Negev would scotch 
the dream of a land bridge between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world and 
emphasise Arab inability to promote the return of the Palestinian refugees. 
As one analyst has noted: 
The feeling that the Israeli water withdrawals in 1964 
were as serious a matter as was the establishment of 
Israel in 1948, is so innate and pervasive that it 
demands attention from any would~be Arab leader.54 
Nasser, very inuch a 'would-be Arab leader', seized the opportunity to 
promote his cause by championing Arab opposition to the Israeli project. 
In doing so, he was again forced by inter-Arab rivalry to adopt a position 
which brought him into conflict with the United States. Since 1959, when 
52. Under the Johnston Plan, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon were apportioned 
60% of the water, and Israel the rest. See Georgiana G. Stevens, Jordan 
River Partition_, Hoover Institution Studies, No. 6, Stanford University, 
Stanford, California, 1965, p. 15; Cf. Nutting, who claims that Israel 
intended to divert 75% of the water! p. 345. 
53. Dulles had given oral assurances of support for the Israeli diversion 
in 1955 and again in 1958. The letter from Kennedy was accompanied by State 
Department assurances that Washington would strongly oppose submission of 
the issue to the World Court and any action by the Security Council. See 
Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy_, p. 210. 
54. Stevens, op.cit._, p. 74; Cf. N. Bar Yaacov, The Israeli-Syrian 
Armistice: Problems of Implementation_, 1949~1966,, Jerusalem, ] 967. 
Israel first announced its decision to proceed with the diversion, Syria 
had been urging a military confrontation to prevent its implementation. 
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In that year Nasser had successfully quashed Syrian proposals for military 
action and the reinstatement of the blockade in the Straits of Tiran. 55 
Instead, he had encouraged the Arab League to investigate a plan for the 
diversion of the Jordan headwaters in Lebanon and Syria, in order to 
reduce the flow of water to Israel. A plan was drawn up and adopted by 
the League in 1961, but no further action had been taken. Now the 
Syrians were again urging a military response and Nasser faced the prospect 
of being outbid on an issue which "wuld test ]1is pan-Arab credentials. 
Nasser had to act to promote his leadership while avoiding a war Hitl1 
Israel which he knew the Arabs were not prepared for. 
In a now rare demonstration of the skill which had brought him 
success in the fifties, he moved to undermine Syrian blustering by 
declaring publicly his opposition to war: 
... we cannot use force today because our circumstances 
do not enable us to do so ... 1 will not be outbid. I 
am not ashamed to say that I cannot fight if I feel 
that 1 cannot really. If I cannot fight and then go 
out and fight 1 will lead you to a disaster. Shall I 
gamble with my country? Impossible.56 
Instead, he proposed a sumr.iit of Arab heads of state to decide on 
unified action, and declared his willingness to bury the hatchet and 
"sit together with those with whom we have disputes, because of Palestine". 
Within a month, his sworn enemies, Hussein and Saud, his Syrian antagonists, 
and the other leaders of the Arab world, had convened in Cairo for the 
first Arab summit. Nasser demonstrated his consummate skill by isolating 
the Syrians, by forcing the other Arab states to share responsibility for 
the decision not to fight, and by suggesting an alternative course of 
action - the implementation of the plan for an Arab diversion of the 
headwaters of the Jordan together with the establishment of a Unified 
:Military Command to coordinate the strengthening of Arab armies. I-Ie also 
55. According to Heikal, Nasser told the Syrians at the time: "I shall not 
permit U1e initiation of war unless I am capable of developing it into all-
out war against the enemy and against all the support which may be sent to 
him, and achieve victory". Cited in Robert Stephens, Nasser~ A Political 
Biography~ London, 1973, p. 443. 
56. Address on Anniversary of Victory Day, Port Said, 23 December, 1963, 
FBIS~ 24 December, 1963. 
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managed to patch up his differences with Jordan and Saudi Arabia, reestab--
lishing diplomatic relations with Amman and acquiring a commitment from 
Saud to normalise relations through a reconciliation of their differences 
57 
over Yemen. 
By championing the cause of Palestine, Nasser appears to llave taken 
one step foruard and two steps back, placing himself in a more difficult 
position because the short-term benefits were outweighed by the long-term 
costs. In the inter-Arab sphere, he had certainly enhanced his prestige 
by constructing a.facade of Arab unity which concealed the deeper divisions 
between the aspirants for leadership in the Arab world. This mustering 
of third party support, however uncertain, served to increase his 
importance to the Soviet Union, where the summit was hailed as confirmation 
of Khrushchev's contention that Soviet influence could best be promoted 
by supporting Nasser. 58 However, these benefits had to be weighed against 
the costs involved in the consequent thawing of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The decision to proceed with the diversion of the headwaters had been met 
by an unequivocal declaration from Eshkol that any attempt to deprive 
Israel of water would meet with action to protect Israel's "vital rights 11 • 59 
Thus by choosing diversion rather than confrontation Nasser had not avoided 
war, he had only postponed it. In supporting the Arab diversion he had 
committed himself to protect Syria, Lebanon and Jordan against Israeli 
retaliation; he could not abandon them, or the project, without revealing 
himself as too weak to deal with Israel. 
Hore importantly for this analysis, the thawing of .the conflict with 
Israel caused the disappointment of a very significant American expectation. 
By ma.king an issue of Israel's diversion, Nasser had removed the conflict 
from the 'ice-box' and had highlighted the divergent interests of Cairo 
57. Al Ahram, 16 January, 1964; Kerr, The Arab Cold War, pp. 96-100. The 
summit allocated $17.5 million for the diversion plan and $42 million for 
the annual budget of t!-ie United Military Command. See M. Mehdi, "The Arab 
Summit", Middle East Forum, Hay, 1964, pp. 25-8. 
58. See Y. Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement, p. 379. 
59. Eshkol in a Speech to the Knesset, FBIS, 17 April, 1964. The debate 
in Israel focussed not on the question of military action but whether such 
action should be taken to prevent the implementation of the project, or 
whether it should be taken after the project had been completed. 
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d \. 1 • 60 an vas.1ington. If Nasser had hoped that the demonstration of unified 
Arab opposition to Israel's project would force the United States to alter 
its position, he was sorely mistaken. Washington was already committed 
to the diversion and, in the wake of the summit, reiterated its support 
for Israel. The State Department declared that it endorsed utilisation 
of the Jordan waters "as long as this is in accordance with the Johnston 
pla~' and noted that the Israeli diversion conformed to the provisions of 
61 
that plan. Deputy Under Secretary of State Johnson also reiterated the 
Administration's commitment to support "any intended victim of any would-be 
aggressor" in the Middle East. 62 
These statements confirmed Nasser's suspicion that Washington was in 
fact encouraging Israel's diversion and using Israel's military strength to 
deter the Arabs from proceeding with their project. 63 Accordingly, the 
Cairo press vilified the United States while Nasser accused Washington of 
partiality, declaring that ''whoever supports Israel, his interests in the 
Arab homeland, from the Gulf to the Atlantic will be affected''. He warned 
that "war will occur to repulse and deter aggression, which I expect will 
1 1 , II 64 taze p ace at any time . 
60. Until the Arab Summit, the State Department had been able to claim that 
at least Nasser had been cooperative in this regard. Thus James P. Grant, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 30 April 1963: "in a very 
real sense, in terms of real actions, the UAR, I think, can be said to have 
put its relations with Israel in the 'ice-box'. Cited in Near East Report_, 
Volume VII, 1963, p. 50. 
61. Israel Home Service_,in Hebrew, 13 January, 1964; FBIS, 16 January, 1964. 
This statement was repeated on 9 May, 1964 by a senior State Department 
official 1-iho affirmed Washington's policy "to support and endorse any 
project of any of the riparian states which remains within the limits of 
the Unified Water Plan". Cited in American Jewish ComCTittee, Tvater and 
Politics in the Middle East" New York, December, 1964. 
62. Address by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U. Alexis 
Johnson, before the Citizens Committee on American Policy in the Near East, 
20 January, 1964, in U.S. For•eign Policy" Current Docwnents_, 1964_, 
Washington, 1967, p. 679. 
63. See Heikal's report of his discussions with an American diploBat in 
which he charges that the United States had warned that it would not stond 
by idly if Israel faced an Arab attack, and if the Arabs implemented their 
diversion plan, then Israel might he forced to occupy t11e i\1-lfasboni and 
Banias springs. Heikal charged that the United States was protecting Israel, 
trying to impose its trusteeship on the area and inciting Israel to 
aggression. Al Ahram~ 31 January, 1964, in FBIS, 4 February, 1964. 
64. Interview with Indian milgazine "Blitz", in Al Ahr>am_, 7 February, 196L1; 
F!JIS, 7 February, 1964. Cf. Nasser's Unity Day speech, 22 February, 1964, FBIS~ 
24 February, 1964. In this speech he repeated the threat of war declaring 
that "the possibilities of the future will be war with Israel". 
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Of course, Nasser was under pressure to prove his anti-Israel 
credentials in the Arab world and American support for Israel's diversion 
had not made his task any easier. Nevertheless, if Nasser, in his contacts 
with the United States, had sought to downplay the Jordan waters dispute 
and emphasise instead the Arab decision not to take military action, he 
might have allayed American fears about the spectre of war. Instead, he 
used the issue as an occasion to attack the United States and emphasise 
the conflict of interest over Israel. In doing so, he again demonstrated 
the incompatibility of his objectives and American interests and, with his 
rhetoric, succeeded in raising serious doubts in Washington about the 
validity of the expectation that the Arab-Israeli conflict would remain 
frozen. 
The thawing of the Arab-Israeli conflict coincided with Khrushchev's 
visit to Cairo in May 1964; again Nasser's reaction challenged American 
expectations and confirmed the direction in which he was drifting. The 
State Department had previously argued convincingly that Nasser's 'positive 
neutralism' was anti-communist as much as it was anti-imperialist, but now 
Nasser had decided to patch up his ideological differences with Khrushchev. 
As a prelude to the visit, he released ti1e Egyptian communists whom he had 
earlier gaoled and backed this move with an orchestrated bout of anti-
imperialist rhetoric. He attacked the American presence in neighbouring 
Libya, calling on that country to demand the closure of the Wheelus Air 
65 Base, which it dutifully sought to do, the next day. He launched a new 
offensive in Yemen, and declared that the primary mission of the Arabs was 
"to expel the British from every part of the Arab homeland". 66 In return, 
he was rewarded by Khrushchev with a new $277 million long-term loan 
(252 million rubles) and the title Hero of the Soviet Union and the Order 
of Lenin. While Khrushchev criticised the ideology of Arab unity during 
his visit, on his return to the Soviet Union he declared: 
... different interpretations of certain phenomena does not 
prevent us from strengthening friendship between the two 
states, friendship which is based on identical aims in 
the struggle against imperialism and colonialism ... 6 7 
In the joint communique issued at the conclusion of the visit, Egypt and 
65. Unity Day Speech, ibid. 
66. Nasser's Speech at May Day Rally, 1 Hay, 1964, FiJI8_, 4 .May, 1964. 
Cf. J.S. Badeau, "U.S.A. and U.A.R., A Crisis in Confidence", Foreign 
Affairs_, Vol.ume Lr3, 1965, pp. 281-296. 
6 7. Cited in Ro' i, From Encroachment to Involvement_, p. 398. 
the Soviet Union expressed mutual support for the people's struggle 
in the Arabian Peninsula, called for the elimination of Western bases 
in Libya, Oman and Aden, and noted Soviet support for the Arab stand on 
the Jordan Waters dispute. 68 For his part, Nasser declared Egyptian 
support for Soviet policies across the globe from Laos to Africa. 
The visit received a quiet response in Washington, reflecting the 
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fear that a hasty reaction might drive Nasser even further into Khrushchev's 
embrace. The opening of the Aswan dam during Khrushchev's visit had 
served as a reminder of the consequences of previous American policies. 
Since Congressional opposition, now supported by a British call for cuts 
in American aid to Egypt, made an overt gesture to Nasser difficult, the 
Administration responded with indirect support by ·virtually forcing the 
International Monetary Fund to lend Egypt $40 million, on terms 
69 
unprecedented for their leniency, to cover Egypt's foreign currency debts. 
Moreover, the Administration continued negotiations on direct assistance 
of $20 million, in the hope that the atmosphere would become more 
70 
conducive to American support for Egypt. 
Although the Soviet-Egyptian rapprochement had raised doubts about how 
neutral Nasser now was, the American reaction demonstrated the leverage which 
he retained in playing the Soviet Union off against the United States. Even 
though his actions in Yemen and over the Jordan waters dispute, and his 
periodic attacks on American interests in the Arab world, had strained 
American tolerance and raised doubts about the validity of its expectations, 
the spectre of Egypt becoming a Soviet satellite was still sufficiently 
worrying to ensure continued economic assistance. However, the fact that 
the Administration did not believe it could gain Congressional support for 
further aid suggested that America's role as patron had become severely 
circumscribed, and that Nasser would have to make a serious effort to 
appear friendly to the United States, were he to maintain its patronage when 
the aid agreement expired in mid-196S. Towards the end of 1964 there 
appeared to be good reasons for believing that an improvement in relations 
might be possible. The second Arab summit conference in September had 
68. Ibid., pp. 38S-394. 
69. Edwin L. Dale, "U.S. Allies Irked on Loan to U.A.R.", New York Times, 
2 May, 1964. 
70. The negotiations were never concluded. Near E.,ast Report, Volume VIII, 
1964, p. SS. 
confirmed his policy of delaying any military action against Israel, 
while a truce went into force in Yemen as a result of Nasser's 
agreement with Faisal to bring the rival factions together for a peace 
conference in Erkwit (Sudan). 
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It is therefore ironical, surprising, and yet typical of the ineptness 
·generated by Nasser's sensitivity, that at the very time he had begun to fulfil 
some of the·American expectations, a serious crisis was generated by minor 
issues of marginal interest to both patron and client, rather than by the 
underlying conflict of interest. 
The spark was provided by events in the Congo, where Belgian 
paratroopers in American planes had recaptured Stanleyville from the rebels 
in November, 1964. Since Egypt had been supporting the rebels, this 
setback touched off riots in Cairo which resulted in the burning of the 
American Embassy's library. While the Cairo press accused the United 
States of "imperialist aggression" the Egyptian government made its belated 
apologies for the burning, doing little to allay the ambassador's suspicions 
that the incident had been officially condoned. 71 This event was quickly 
followed by the shooting down over Egypt of an American oil company plane, 
which injected a personal element into relations since the president of the_ 
company was a friend of President Johnson. Again the Egyptian government 
showed little concern in providing an explanation to the United States. It 
was in this context that Deputy Prime Minister, Ramzi Stinu, sought a 
meeting with the new ambassador, Lucius Battle, to request early agreement 
to an additional $35 million in food assistance, so that when the 1962 
agreement expired Egypt would not have to pay in foreign currency for new 
shipments. 72 Battle was "livid" over the plane-downing incident and 
suggested to Stinu that it was not an appropriate time to discuss an increase 
. A . .d 73 in merican ai • Ali Sabry reported this conversation to Nasser, claiming 
that the.American ambassador had threatened to cut-off aid because of Egypt's 
behaviour, and in his impulsive way Nasser responded with a scathing public 
71. New York Times, 2 December, 1964; Interview with Lucius D. Battle, 
Ambassador to Egypt, (1964-1967), Washington, 13 June, 1975. 
72. The urgency had been caused by a change in the PL 480 legislation which 
required the recipient country to pay the shipping expenses for aid agreements 
concluded after 13 December, 1964. Egypt's foreign currency reserves were 
very low and the present aid agreement was due to expire in 1965. 
73. Battle had just returned from identifying the bodies of the plane crash 
victims, Interview with Lucius D. Battle. 
attack on the United States: 
I hereby tell anybody not liking our behaviour to go 
and drink out of the Mediterranean. If the water of 
the Mediterranean is not enough then let him drink 
-from the Red Sea. What I want to say is that we 
cannot sell our independence for thirty million pounds. 
We will never accept any reproach from anybody. 
Whoever addresses the slightest reproach to us, we will 
cut out his tongue. Th~s is clear and this is frank ... 
If anything this smacks of an attempt to exert pressure 
on us. We are sorry. He cannot tolerate any pressure 
or accept insolent words or vileness.74 
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And, as if that was not enough to offend Washington, he declared in the 
same speech that Egypt had sent arms to the Congo rebels and would continue 
to do so. 
Nasser had overstepped the limits of American tolerance, not on the 
burning issues of Yemen or Israel, but on the very issue which the United 
States had been determined to keep divorced from relations with its client. 
Despite growing doubts about the assumptions of the new approach, and strong 
Congressional opposition, the Administration had adhered to the principle 
of 'impartial' assistance as a means of keeping the lines of communication 
open between Washington and the most influential capital in the Arab world. 
Even in the wake of the library burning incident, the State Department had 
announced that it was giving "favourable consideration" to the Egyptian 
request for the additional $35 million in food aid. 75 Ambassador Battle had 
not threatened to cut off aid after the plane-downing incident, he had only 
d h . . . . d. . 76 suggeste t at it was an inappropriate time to iscuss it. 
Even if we accept that Nasser had been misinformed by Sabry about the 
aid discussion, there remains the question of what he was trying to achieve 
by attacking the United States and insulting its. ambassador and President. 
It has been suggested that Nasser was particularly concerned to ingratiate 
himself with the Soviet Union because the removal of Khrushchev from 
office in October, 1964, following trenchant criticism among the Soviet 
"77 leadership of his additional aid commitments to Egypt- had raised doubts 
74. Nasser's Speech at a Rally to commemorate Victory Day, Port Said, 23 
December, 1964, in Egyptian Gazette, 24 December, 1964. Ambassador Battle 
was sitting in the audience. 
75. John W. Finney, "U.S. May Aid Cairo with More Food", New York Times, 
13 December, 1964. 
76. InterviezJ with Lucius Battle;' the Ambassador's account is confirmed 
by Heikal in The Cairo Documents, p. 229. 
77. See Ro' i, From Encroachment to Involvement_, p .. 394. 
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about the continuity of Soviet patronage. Since the speech was delivered 
in the presence of Politburo member Shelepin, some credence might be 
attached to this explanation. 78 However, the new Soviet leaders had 
previously promised to honour Khrushchev's pledge, Amer had signed a new 
military agreement in Moscow in Novel'lber, and Shelepin had already received 
a quid pro quo for his reiteration of Soviet economic commitments, in the 
form of an invitation to Secretary General Ulbricht of East Germany to 
. c d . . f l v. 79 h visit airo an Egyptian recognition o Nort1 ietnam. In t ese 
circumstances it would hardly have been necessary to upbraid the United 
States to gain further Soviet support. On the contrary, having just 
negotiated some $500 million in aid from Communist countries, Nasser should 
have been preparing to seek further aid from the West. Given the doubts 
which had already been raised in Washington, and the fact that the aid 
agreement was about to expire and would require renegotiation, wisdom should 
have dictated a conciliatory attitude. Such an attitude might have 
convinced the U.S. Administration that Nasser's moderation was still worth 
encouraging through adherence to the "impartial" aid guideline. After all, 
the State Department had announced before his speech that it would give 
favourable consideration to the request for additional aid, 80 and even in 
the wake of Nasser's attack, the Administration still fought hard to prevent 
Congress from cutting aid altogether, arguing that the programr1e had 
d N . . 81 h f f encourage asser to exercise restraint. It is t ere ore air to assume 
that the Administration was predisposed to renegotiation of the aid programme 
before Nasser delivered his speech. 
78. Thus Kerr argues that Nasser "may have felt at least subconsciously 
impelled to plRase his successors by raising the level of tension with the 
United State~! Heikal notes that Nasser feared that the understanding he had 
finally reached with Khrushchev, after much argument, would disappear with his 
removal from office. On hearing of Khrushchev's fate Nasser is said to have 
remarked to Heikal: "Now we have got to start all over again". :Malcolm Kerr, 
"Coming to Terms with Nasser, Attempts and Failures", International Affairs_, 
(London) Volume 43, No. 1, January, 1967, p. 79; Heikal, The Cairo Docwnents_, 
p. 158. Cf. Hedrick Smith, "Ulbricht Visit to Cairo Today Said to Have Been 
Urged by Soviets", Ne1v York Times_, 24 February, 1965. 
79. Hedrick Smith, ibid.; Ro'i, op.c1:t._, p. 413. 
80. New York Times_, 13 December, 1964. 
81. In January 1965, the House had voted to ban aid to Egypt, a decision 
which would have immediately prevented the shipment of the final $37 million 
instalment on the original 1962 programme. The Administration lobbied hard 
to reverse the vote in the Senate and Secretary of State Rusk, in special 
testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued that food aid 
provided one of the few remaining levers in U.S. relations with Egypt. The 
language in the final bill was amended to allow the President discretionary 
authority to complete the shipments. See Ne1J York Times_, 27 January, 1965, 
28 January, 1965, 4 February, 1965; and Congressional Quarterly Almanac_, 
Volume XXI, 1965, pp. 190-3. 
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Thus, Nasser's decision to bite the hand that fed Egypt appears to have 
been dictated by impulse rather than wise application of his will. Generated 
by the conviction that Egyptian independence could not be bartered for aid, 
his impulse drove him to a flamboyant and provocative demonstration of this 
independence. 82 In doing so, he ignored the realities of American-Egyptian 
interdependence. Far from being solely dependent on Egypt, the United 
States possessed a number of alternative clients in the 'conservative' 
Arab states and Israel, and could well decide to promote its influence in 
the Middle East by increasing its support for Nasser's adversaries, rather 
than by continuing to appease him. On the other hand, Egypt did not possess 
a viable alternative to American food assistance. The Soviet Union, a 
grain importer, could supply neither the food nor the hard currency to pay 
for it. Nasser may have found it easy to make quixotic speeches about 
Egypt's ability to survive with less bread, meat or tea, but he would find 
it more difficult to satisfy the demands of the burgeoning 'modern' sector 
of Egyptian society, on whom he depended for legitimacy, without American 
assistance. 83 In this context, his speech was a classic example of the 
misapplication of will by a weak state in defiance of its patron, for it 
ignored the fact that the patron could afford to abandon its client should 
it decide that the benefits of continued assistance were outweighed by the 
costs, in terms of domestic opposition and international humiliation. 
IV - THE BREAK WITH THE UNITED STATES 
The United States did not decide to abandon Egypt, but Nasser's speech 
provided sufficient additional strain to cause the collapse of the new 
approach developed under Kennedy. While widespread domestic condemnation 
of American policy increased the pressure on the Administration to respond 
in kind, Cairo's rejection of an official American protest over the shooting 
down of the plane confirmed the view in Washington that Nasser 
82. Nasser was extremely sensitive about Egypt's independence because of 
the colonial experience. See Kerr, "Coming to Terms with Nasser", p. 82; 
Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World, p. In a letter to 
Johnson written later, Nasser had attempted to explain to the President 
his sensitivity: "We have big hopes, but we have big problems, and that is 
what makes us sensitive to any pressure because if we submitted to any 
pressure then we would be losing whatever we had gained. We cannot adhere 
to anything except our principles". Cited in Heikal, The Cairo Docwnents, 
p. 238. 
83. In his 23 December speech Nasser had gone on to say: "If we are drinking 
tea seven days a week now, we can drink it five days only to build our 
country. If we have coffee seven days a week now, we can drink it four days 
only. If we are eating meat four days a week, we can do with only three ... 
for we are a proud people, conscious of our dignity, and are not prepared 
to trade our dignity". 
had adopted his toughest anti-American stance since the 1956 Aswan Dam 
incident. 84 On 28 December the Administration announced that Egypt's 
request for additional aid would be deferred because the paperwork could 
85 
not be completed by the end of the year. The aid door had not been 
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slammed shut, but policy-makers now made it clear that whether it remained 
d ff . 86 open would depen on Egyptian e orts to prevent it from being closed. 
The Administration had decided to place Egypt on a 'short-leash': the long-
term agreement which expired in mid-1965 would not be renewed; instead each 
request for short-term assistance would be considered in the light of 
Egypt's attitude at the time. Abandoning the 'impartial' guideline, the 
United States would now use aid as an explicit bargaining lever, with the 
process of continuous negotiations designed to encourage better relations 
by providing or denying aid on the basis of Egyptian behaviour towards its 
87 patron. Washington's attitude would make it difficult for Nasser to play 
his politics of non-alignment because any new attack on American interests 
would be met by a reduction in aid; the very antithesis of the former policy, 
under which aid was granted despite such attacks. It was no longer a 
question of limiting the damage to American interests, while promoting 
Soviet ones, to gain assistance from both, for if Nasser now damaged 
American interests, he might gain Soviet support, but he would lose American 
food aid. 
Nasser soon discovered how seriously this redefinition of American 
policy had limited his manoeuvrability. Washington ignored the Egyptian 
request for an additional $35 million in food aid, refused to discuss a 
long-term request for $500 million and only agreed to the shipment of the 
84. Neu:J York Times, 24 December, 1964. 
85. Neu:J York Times, 29 December, 1964. 
86. Ibid.; in a press conference on 4 February, 1965, President Johnson 
stated that "relations between the United States and the United Arab 
Republic must be improved. It will demand efforts from both countries. 
I cannot predict whether improvement can be achieved". 11Transcript of the 
President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Affairs", Neu:J York Times, 
5 February, 1965. In testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
Under Secretary of State George Ball stated: "If an improved relationship 
is to be achieved, it will take a substantial effort by the United Arab 
Republic and not merely by the United States". Cited in Near East Report, 
Volume IX, 1965, p. 10. 
87. Intervie11J u:Jith Lucius Battle. 
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88 final $37 million instalment of the 1962 programme in June 1965. To prise 
this relatively small and already committed amount out of Washington, in 
the intervening six months, Nasser restrained the Egyptian press, declared 
his independence from communism, provided compensation for the library, 
discontinued arms shipments to the Congo rebels, and toned down his attacks 
on Israel and the United States. 89 Nasser's 1965 May Day. speech stood in 
stark contrast to his earlier sarcasm for the measured tenor of its 
declaration of independence: 
We have asked for renewal of the [wheat] agreement, 
·but so far it appears that there will be no renewal. 
Some say that there is a possibility. What I want to 
say is that we can never accept threats ... He who tells 
us to do something or else - we will tell him: sorry 
we do not accept conditions •.• we are prepared to eat 
half a loaf instead of the whole loaf in order to 
safeguard our honour and dignity.90 
Nasser also discovered during this period that Washington was no 
longer restrained, by its desire for improved relations with Egypt, from 
supplying arms to Israel. Again his ineptness did much to· force Washington's 
hand, but the collapse of the 'new' approach had already reduced American 
reluctance to be identified with the stat-us quo forces in the region. 
Nasser actually created the issue by threatening, on the eve of Ulbricht's 
visit to Cairo in February 1965, to recognise the German Democratic 
Republic unless the Fed~ral Republic ceased shipping arms to Israel. When 
Bonn hastily complied with Nasser's demand, Washington was placed in an 
embarrassing position since it had encouraged the arms deal as a means of 
avoiding direct involvement in the Middle East arms race. The $80 million 
deal involving M-48 tanks, aircraft, helicopters and torpedo 
boats was already 80% complete when Nasser raised the issue but, as 
88. The request for the $500 million aid programme was raised in discussions 
with Assistant Secretary of State Talbot when he visited Cairo in April, 1965. 
The Cairo correspondent for the New York Times reported: "The administration 
is understood to feel that in the wake of the clash with Cairo late last 
year on the aid question and over Congo policy a big, new aid package is out 
of the question for the time being". See Hedrick Smith, "New U.S. Food Aid 
is Asked by Cairo", New York Times, 17 April, 1965. 
89. See Hedrick Smith, "Nasser, In Apparent Bid to West, Restates 
Differences with Reds", New York Ti,mes, 27 February, 1965; Felix Belair Jr., 
"Johnson Ends Suspension of Food Aid for U.A.R.", NeiJ York Times, 18 July, 
1965; Hedrick Smith, "U.S. Relations with Egypt are in Period of Relative 
Calm", New York Times, 18 July, 1965; and President Nasser's Speech on the 
Anniversary of the Revolution, 23 July, 1965, FBIS, 23 July, 1965. 
90. Nasser's May Day Speech, FBIS, 3 May, 1965. 
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we have already seen, Israel exploited Bonn's decision to acquire the rest 
of the arms deal directly from the United States. Prior to this, Washington 
had sought to avoid becoming a major or principal supplier of arms to 
either side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The reason had been quite 
explicit: 
We wanted .to maintain as much suasion as we could 
in the Arab countries. ·We felt that would have 
been decreased if we had become a large single 
source supplier to Israel.91 
But with the collapse of the new approach, this barrier to an open arms 
supply relationship between Israel and the United States had been removed. 
Henceforth, the United States would supply Israel with the arms necessary 
to maintain "a reasonable balance" between the adversaries in the Middle 
92 East. And if this development was not enough to demonstrate Nasser's 
loss of leverage, Washington used its own form of 'blaclanail' politics to 
keep him from making an issue of it. In March 1965 Nasser was informed that 
the United States would supply Israel and Jordan with tanks and was 
explicitly warned that if he exacerbated the issue the United States would 
93 
simply respond by selling more arms to Israel. 
For a time, Washington's 'short-leash' restrained Nasser and he made 
a serious effort to improve the tenor of relations with his now uncertain 
patron. At the end of May 1965, he told the Palestine National Conference 
that the Arabs were not capable of attacking Israel, and in response to 
American requests conveyed by Assistant Secretary of State Talbot on a 
visit to Cairo in April 1965, he stated that since they could not protect the 
diversion project it should be postponed. He attacked Syria for attempting 
to involve Egypt in a war with Israel and emphasised the necessity of 
building Arab strength, a task which would require the postponement of 
confrontation for some four to five yea.rs, at least. 94 Although, following 
the announcement of the $37 million aid package in June, he charged 
91. Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kitchen, in U.S. 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Sub-Committee on Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs), Arms Sales to Near Eastern and South Asian Countries" 
90th Congress, ist Session, 22 June, 1967, p.88. 
92. See John W. Finney, "Rusk Hints Backing For Israel on Issue of Mideast 
Arms Race", Neu.1 Yorl<. Times" 26 February, 1965. 
93. See the State Department memorandum cited in Heikal, The Cairo 
Documents" pp. 235-6. 
94. See President Nasser's Address to the Palestine National Conference, 
31 May, 1965, in Arab Political Documents" 1965" pp. 227-8. 
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the United States with attaching conditions to its aid, he referred only 
to pressures supposedly exerted in 1963, which he could safely reject, 
having already acceded. to the pressures applied by the more recent 'short 
leash'. As a declaration of independence the speech was mild in comparison 
with his earlier flamboyance, and was coupled with an announcement of the 
resumption of peace talks with Saudi Arabia over the war in Yemen, and 
a declaration of his readiness to withdraw Egyptian troops "within six 
months11 • 95 In August, he affirmed this intention by reaching agreement 
with Faisal on the terms for a settlement of the Yemeni conflict. 96 
Meanwhile his moderate approach towards the problem of Israel found 
confirmation at the Cassablanca summit in September, where the Arab leaders 
agreed to a four year programme for strengthening the armed forces. 97 As 
Eshkol was quick to observe, it appeared that war had been postponed 
98 
"until the 1970s or later". 
Even Nasser's visit to Noscow in August reflected this new caution in 
his approach to international affairs. In his speech to the Arab-Soviet 
Friendship Society, he made scant mention of Israel, the United States or 
even imperialism (except in its historical context), concentrating instead 
99 
on "socialist transformation" in Egypt. The joint communique issued at 
the end of his visit was notable in that, while condemning imperialism and 
British policy in Aden, it made no direct attack on either the United States 
or Israel. Instead the communique meekly called for a cessation of the bombing 
95. See President Nasser's Anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution Speech, 
22 July, 1965, in ibid., pp. 262-280. 
96. ·A Saudi-Egyptian commission would supervise a truce under which both 
sides would disengage while Egyptian troops prepared to withdraw; the 
republicans and royalists would convene for peace talks at Harad in 
November, to create a provisional regime which would organise a plebiscite 
on the country's future; the plebiscite would be held within a year, by 
which time the Egyptian troops would have completed their withdrawal. For 
the text of the agreement see ibid., pp. 309-310. 
97. Retaliation raids by Israel in 1965 against the Arab diversion 
projects led to a decision in September 1965 that work should be confined 
to areas beyond the reach of retaliatory measures, until Arab military 
strength was sufficient to cover operations closer to the border. It was 
estimated that it would take four years, and $250 million to reach 
the necessary state of military preparedness. See Middle East Record, 1967, 
Tel Aviv, 1970, p. 107. 
98. FBIS, 22 September, 1965. 
99. See Arab Political Docwnents, 1965, pp. 310-315. 
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of North Vietnam and condemned only West Germany for supplying Israel with 
I . y 100 
arms, while endorsing Nasser s peace moves in emen. 
If Washington had reason to be satisfied with the direction of 
Egyptian foreign policy, it also had reason to be encouraged by Nasser's 
concentration on domestic economic problems. The uncovering of a Moslem 
Brotherhood plot against his regime in July, together with serious food 
shortages, an alarming foreign deficit, and the realisation that the five 
year plan completed in June had been 33% short of its production goals, 
1 . 101 had served to emphasise tie dangers inherent in neglecting these problems. 
On his return from Moscow Nasser replaced Prime Minister Aly Sabry (known 
for his pro-Soviet leanings) with Zacharia Hohieddin, who introduced an 
austerity programme, relaxed planning controls, encouraged Western 
d d 11 d d II 102 investment an promise to let the laws of supply and eman operate . 
Thus in October, despite Congressional reiteration of its opposition 
to aid for Egypt, the Administration reopened discussions with Egyptian 
103 
officials on a new aid agreement. As these negotiations drew to a close, 
Nasser publicly underlined the new tenor of relations by declaring, on the 
anniversary of the burning of the American library, that while basic 
differences existed over attitudes to Israel, "there has been a great 
improvement in the relationship between us recently ... both parties bave made 
100. And for this mild performance, Egypt received $300 million worth of 
arms, and the Soviet Union erased $460 million of Egyptian debts. True, the 
Soviet navy did make its first call at an Egyptian port in September 1965, 
but this only emphasises the resources which Egypt had to bargain with and 
therefore makes the explanation that he spurned the United States in 1964 
to endear himself to the new Soviet leaders even less credible. See Ro 1 i, 
Fnm1 Encroachment to Involvement:J pp. 413-419; George S. Dragnich, "The 
Soviet Union's Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to the 
June War of 1967", in Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth and John McDonnell (eds.), 
Soviet Naval Policy., Objectives and Constr•aints 3 New York, 1975, pp. 237-277. 
101. The balance of payments deficit in 1964/5 amounted to $213 million, 
with the total deficit over the five years of the plan estimated at $1,156 
million. IMF statistics show that by 1965/66, 34% of nationalised industry 
was able to utilise only 30% or less of its capacity because of shortages of 
raw material and spare part imports. See Stephens, Nasser3 p. 370; Inter-
national Monetary Fund, United Arab Republic - Article XIV Consultation_, 
22 December, 1967; New York Times_, 23 October, 1965. 
102. Neu! York Times 3 23 October, 1965. 
103. NevJ York Times, 13 October, 1965. In September, Congress had added 
a general rider to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 which stipulated that 
no sales of surplus agricultural commodities could be made to Egypt unless 
the President determined such sales to be essential to the national 
interests of the U.S., and that no such sale should be based on the 
requirements of the U.A.R. for more than one fiscal year. Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac3 1965, pp. 425 and 437. 
important efforts to stop the deterioration and to ease the sharpness 
of tension in these relations ... our concern is to create a basis for 
1 d d . d . . II 104 I J 1966 h mutua un erstan ing an appreciation n anuary , t e terms 
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of the new agreement were announced: $55 million food aid over six months, 
25% to be paid in hard currency, the rest in Egyptian currency, 75% of 
which would be relent for development projects. 105 
The terms were the toughest yet negotiated since they required part 
payment in hard currency, as well as an Egyptian commi.tment not to expand 
cotton production. Clearly, Washington believed that its 'short leash' 
policy had proved efficacious and that by continu.ing to off er short term 
aid it was encouraging Nasser to fulfil the long-held expectations of 
American policy: avoidance of external confrontations and concentration 
on restoring balanced growth to the economy. Nasser had indeed 
demonstrated that it was possible to sublimate the basic conflict of 
interest between patron and client and to conduct relations to mutual 
advantage. However, it would prove to be too little, too late; a momentary 
calm before the all too familiar storm. For twelve months Nasser had 
successfully parried the pressures of inter-Arab rivalry, undercutting 
Syrian belligerency, seeking a settlement of· the war in Yemen, taking 
care not to provoke Israel, nor to damage American interests, and only 
106 promoting Soviet interests in safe areas. Yet his new moderation 
depended upon the maintenance of the facade he had created to conceal Arab 
disunity. When this facade began to collapse, the goodwill accumulated 
during twelve months of restraint was dissipated in two months of conflict 
in the Arab world. Washington's limited tolerance had reduced Nasser's 
flexibility and made relations between patron and client brittle. Faced with 
a new challenge to his leadership of the Arab world, he again proved unable 
to reconcile the politics of Arab unity with the dictates of American 
patronage. But, whereas before this failure had only strained relations, 
10!.i. President Nasser's Speech to the National Assembly, in Arab Pol1>t?'.cal 
Documents~ 1965J p. 424. 
105. Washington loaned Egypt $14.6 million to cover the hard currency 
payments. See Hedrick Smith, "U.S. Signs Accord for Aid to Egypt", 
f\lezJ York Times~ 4 January, 1966. 
106. For example, playing China off against the Soviet Union by backing 
Moscow's requests to be represented at non-aligned summits. The Soviet 
Navy's call at Port Said in September 1965 was low-keyed - no publicity, 
either Egyptian or Soviet, surrounded the visit. Dragnich suggests that this 
was because of Egyptian sensitivity about the issue of naval facilities. 
However, it may also have been because of .the Egyptian desire not to 
jeopardise the improved relations with Washington. See Dragnich, op.cit . ., 
p. 255. 
under these new conditions, which he had done much to create, it became 
inevitable that relations would be broken. 
Nasser's leadership of the Arab world had suffered several setbacks 
in 1965. The failure to maintain unity in the face of West Germany 1 s 
decision to recognise Israel, Bourguiba's 'heretical' proposals for 
recognition of Israel, and Syrian, Jordanian and Lebanese objections to 
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the stationing of Egyptian forces in their territories and to other United 
Arab Command measures, had cracked the facade of unity which Nasser had 
constructed through Arab summitry. 107 Nevertheless, the spirit of 
reconciliation had appeared to hold sway, and the Yemen agreement seemed to 
represent its consummation. But appearance and reality had diverged in the 
Arab world, for while Nasser and Faisal had reached agreement on a settlement, 
neither was sufficiently committed to the compromise to force his Yemenite 
protege to accept it. Thus, neither seemed particularly perturbed by the 
breakdown of talks at Harad in December: not Nasser, because the announcement 
of British withdrawal from Aden by 1968 had given him a new reason for 
maintaining a presence in the Arabian Peninsula; not Faisal, because he 
believed that Nasser's journey to Jeddah reflected a weakening of his 
domestic position and created the opportunity for Faisal to challenge his 
leadership. The Arab summits had never reconciled the basic differences 
between the conservatives and progressives of the Arab world, but they had 
provided the conservatives with legitimacy. Now Faisal seized on Nasser 1 s 
weakness to promote the cause of the conservatives by floating the idea 
of an Islamic Conference to be convened in Mecca under his auspices. His 
idea received the support of Iran, Jordan, Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco and 
Pakistan - which only confirmed its image as a new conservative coalition 
in the Middle East. 108 
107. When West Germany recognised Israel in Hay 1965, Nasser called on the 
Arab states to break off relations. Morocco, Tunisia and Libya refused to 
do so. In April, President Bourguiba had proposed that the Arabs should 
negotiate a settlement with Israel. His proposals were attacked by Nasser 
and criticised by all Arab states except Morocco, Libya and Saudi Arabia. 
Bourguiba responded by accusing Nasser of trying "to exercise exclusive 
leadership in the Arab world in such a way as to appear the uncontested 
master of its destinies .. As a great nation, Egypt has a right to our 
consideration, but that is no reason for trying to impose its law on 
everyone". Keesing 1 s Contemporary Archives~ 15-22 T"Iay, 1965. On the problems 
of the United Arab Command, see J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Pol1:t·Z:cs~ The 
Military D1:mension~ pp. 482-3. 
108. See Kerr, The Arab Cold War~ pp. 107-114. 
For Nasser, Faisal's challenge took the shape of a horrible phoenix 
rising from the ashes of the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower doctrine. 
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The seriousness of Egypt's domestic economic difficulties, and his failure 
to consolidate the support of radical Syria and Iraq, heightened his 
sensitivity to this challenge and encouraged him to meet the threat head-on. 
This proclivity was compounded by his growing sense of isolation in the 
world arena. The downfall of Ben Bella and Nkrumah, the deaths of Nehru 
and Aref, and the challenge to Sukarno in Indonesia, generated the fear 
that Egypt was "the next objective of the imperialist-reactionary 
11 109 
advance. Nasser perceived the ha11d of Washington behind Faisal's 
Islamic proposal and in these circumstances America's 1 short leash' was 
not strong enough to restrain him. He responded with a harsh 
condemnation: 
The Islamic alliance is an imperialist one, aimed at 
resisting liberation movements and blocking social 
progress. The Islamic· alliance is an alliance of 
conspiracy against the Arab peoples, designed to 
cluster them within the Western spheres of influence 
••. it is designed to gather all the pro-imperialist 
reactionary forces in one last defence line against 
the revolutionary progressive tide in the Arab 
countries.110 
He backed the charge with a declaration that Egyptian forces would 
remain in Yemen for another five years, if necessary, and certainly until 
after the British withdrawal from Aden in 1968. He attacked the United 
States for supplying arms to his adversaries and threatened "preventive 
war" against Israel because of its supposed developr.1ent of nuclear 
111 
weapons. 
In one blow he had dashed the American expectations so carefully 
nurtured in twelve months of restraint, for now Washington's worst fears 
about Nasser's designs in the Arabian Peninsula had been confirmed. Patron 
and client were back on a collision course over the perennial problems of 
Yemen, but this time the reservoir of tolerance and goodwill had evaporated. 
Cairo's requests for a $100 million development loan and $150 million in 
food aid to replace the agreement which would expire in June went unanswered. 
If there was some slight chance that the Administration might accede to a 
new aid agreement Nasser made a negative response certain by stepping·-up 
his attacks on the United States, with all too perfect timing. His 
109. Heikal in Al Ahrcon, 8 April, 1966, in BBC/SWB" HE/2133/A/2; Cf. Jean 
Lacouture, Nasser_, London_, 1973, pp. 294-5; Anthony Nutting, Nasser_, London, 
1972, p. 386. 
110. President Nasser's Unity Day Speech, 22 February, 1966, in BBC/SWB, 
NE/2097/A/8. 
111. Ibid. 
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condemnation of the Islamic alliance came on the eve of Vice President 
Sadat's arrival in Washington. A few months later, as Assistant Secretary 
of State Hare was travelling to Cairo to mediate the Yemen conflict, 
Nasser threatened to invade Saudi Arabia and "occupy the centres of 
aggression"~12 A few days after that, on the occasion of Premier Kosygin's 
first visit to Egypt, he introduced a new area of conflict into relations 
with the United States by condemning its involvement in Vietnam as 
"horrifying aggression that shakes the conscience of the free world 11 • 113 
Heikal accompanied this new attack with the charge that Washington's 
use of "a policy of force and blind pressures" ruled out political and 
. . 114 
economic cooperation. 
In these circumstances it should have come as little surprise that 
Heikal's charge proved to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. With Secretary 
of State Rusk voicing the Administration's anxiety over the deterioration 
in relations "on matters of great concern to us, such as Vietnam", 
W h . d f d . . E I "d 115 as ington e erre any negotiations on gypt s ai requests. In 
subsequent months, while ignoring Cairo's repeated requests for aid, the 
Administration refused to reschedule Egyptian debts, stalled on the release 
of Egyptian currency for development projects and, unlike in 1964, declined 
to pressure the IMF into loaning Egypt $70 million to cover its now 
d . b 1 f d f" . 116 Ll h 1 d d h isastrous a ance o payments ec1c1t. was ington a so emonstrate t e 
direction of its patronage by supplying Nasser's adversaries with weapons of 
greater sophistication: Saudi Arabia received Hawk missiles, Jordan received 
M-48 tanks and F-104 aircraft, while Israel, in addition to securing a 
112. Ne1il York Times, 2 May, 1965. 
113. N~ York Times, 11 May, 1966. A NLF office was opened in Cairo soon 
after this visit. 
114. N~ York Times, 14 May, 1966. 
115. Secretary of State Rusk's News Conference, 17 May, 1966, in U.S. Foreign 
Policy, Cu:r'rent Docwnents, 1966, Washington, 1969, p. 546. 
116~ David G. Nes, The Sinai Accord, The United States and Egypt (1952-
1975), paper delivered to the International Symposium on the October 1973 War, 
Cairo University, October, 1975, pp. 5-8; N~ York Times, 5 May, 1966. The 
IMF declined the loan request ostensibly because of Egypt's refusal to 
undertake a 43% devaluation, to increase taxes, and to reduce 
government spending. Egypt's balance of payments deficit had risen to $268.2 
million for 1965/66, and in October it was forced to sell $25 million of 
gold to service its foreign debt. Egypt owed the United States $169. 2 million 
in hard currency, which the Administration refused to reschedule until Egypt 
complied with IMF recommendations. IMF, op.cit., p. 22; Ne1i1 York Times, 
28 October, 1966, 27 February, 1967. 
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renewal of economic assistance, acquired an American commitment to supply 
some 48 A-4 Skyhawks, in an unprecedented move which would provide Israel 
with an offensive capability to strike at Arab bases. Nasser responded 
with the charge that there was an inevitable clash with Western interests, 
sacked Mohieddin and the pro-Western members of his cabinet, and finally, 
in January 1967, withdrew the unanswered request for aid which he had 
placed with Washington some 11 months before. In mutual recognition that 
only formal relations remained, Ambassador Battle returned to Washington 
and was not replaced for what proved to be a very crucial three months, 
while Heikal expounded at length on the "violent clash" between Egypt 
117 
and the United States. 
The death knell had sounded for Nasser's policy of non-alignment. The 
United States had finally decided to abandon its Egyptian client to the 
Soviet Union and redefine its interests in the Middle East. Until some 
new opportunity presented itself, Washington was content to maintain the 
status quo and protect its vital interests by bolstering Israel's deterrent 
strength and by supporting the conservative Arab regimes. Nasser had failed 
to sublimate the basic conflict of interest because he had placed a higher 
priority on the pursuit and protection of his prestige and power in the 
Arab world. Had he been sufficiently adept to harbour his resources, 
consolidate his relations, and exercise his leverage with caution when 
necessary, he might have prevented what had become inevitable. But, as one 
analyst has obse,Lved: "Nasser never appeared to be able to cliff erentiate 
between the symbols and implements of modern power and the factors which 
118 
made them employable". Perhaps "never" is too strong, for there were 
indeed times when, sublimating his concern for the symbols of power, he 
proved quite capable of adhering to the precepts of successful weak state 
behaviour. In fact, his behaviour during the short improvement in relations 
during 1965, would appear to be a confirmation of one of the hypotheses 
devised in Part One. For when relations reached the stage where Egypt was 
about to lose its alternative patron, its leader indeed began to act 
cautiously. However, this caution was overwhelmed by events which were 
external to the Egyptian-American relationship, but which nevertheless had 
a direct impact on it. When faced with challenges to his position of 
117. See Heikal's series of articles on Egyptian-American relations in 
AZ Akram., 24 February, 1967, BBC/SWB, ME/2402/A/2; 17 March, 1967, in 
BBC/Sf!B, ME/2420/ A/3; 5 May, 1967, in FE.IS, 9 May, 1967. 
118. William Polk, The United States and the Arab World, p. 291. 
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leadership iti the Arab world, Nasser ignored the wider consequences of his 
reactions, applying his will-power carelessly, so that by enhancing his 
position on the regional level, he depreciated it on the level of patronage. 
Consequently, Egypt was abandoned by its American patron at precisely the 
time when it could least afford it. 
At the end of 1966, Nasser had declared that "our first duty is to 
prove to those who want to put pressure on us that we can rely on ourselves 
and can follow an independent .road and bear its consequences" . 119 
Certainly, by that time Nasser had demonstrated that he possessed the 
ability to resist American pressure and could act independently of 
American policy. But in the process, he had tended to ignore the fact that, 
in the final analysis, the patron could abandon its client, and he had 
therefore neglected to secure the support without which resistance had 
little point. Thus, far from placing Egypt on an independent road, Nasser's 
resistance had placed Egypt a long way down the road which led to Soviet 
dependence, and he would now have to bear its consequences. 
119. Neh1 York Times~ 25 November, 1966. 
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PART TWO 
CHAPTER FOUR 
1967 - NASSER'S DEFEAT IN THE POLITICS OF PATRONAGE 
The Egyptian debacle o~ 1967 and the earlier failure of Nasser's 
policy of non-alignment might appear to be unusual case studies for a 
thesis whose subject is the power of weak states in their relations with 
superpower patrons, for they could be said to der.10nstrate the weakness of 
Egypt in its inability to resist or influence either the policies of its 
superpower patron or the policies of its superpower adversary. Nevertheless 
Egypt's experience during this period is of considerable heuristic value in 
defining the parameters of successful weak power behaviour; a sobering 
antithesis to the surprising success of Israel, which serves to illustrate 
the bounds beyohd which a weak power cannot go if it is to achieve its aims 
in the politics of patronage. For although Nasser failed on the political 
plane as surely as his armed forces were defeated on the field of battle, 
he did in fact succeed in resisting the pressures of both the Soviet Union 
and the United States when he felt they clashed with his own aims,and he 
might well have prevailed in this crisis had he understood his true condition, 
had he not miscalculated the direction of the political forces present in 
the international and regional environment of 1967, had he applied his will 
with judgement, caution and flexibility, and had he devoted more attention 
to influencing rather than defying the superpowers. Thus the reverses which 
Egypt suffered as a result of the May-June crisis should be seen not as a 
demonstration of weakness but rather as an overstepping of the bounds of 
successful weak power politics; as the exception which proves the rule 
rather than as the evidence which refutes the hypothesis. 
Although the origins of the 1967 crisis undoubtedly lie in the long 
history of the Arab-Israeli enmity, its immediate causes can be traced back 
to Egypt's all but formal break with the United States at the end of 1966 
and the signing of the defence pact with Syria in November of that year. 
The first development marked the end of Nasser's policy of non-alignment, 
making Egypt heavi'ly dependent upon Soviet military and economic aid now 
that the United States had halted its wheat shipments and was supplying arms 
to Nasser's adversaries. However, this dependence constituted only one of 
the reasons for Nasser's despair; the collapse of Egyptian-led Arab unity, 
the spectre of the "Islamic alliance", the expense of the war in Yemen, 
and the exacerbation of the border conflict in the north (between Syria, 
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the Palestinian fedayeen and Israel) while Egypt watched from the side-lines, 
all heightened Nasser's sense of isolation, frustration and dependence. 
Clearly he had to take some action to pull Egypt out of this 'tail-spin', 
reassert his leadership of the Arab world and demonstrate his importance 
to, and independence from, both superpowers. 
In searching for a foreign policy issue which would serve these 
purposes Nasser's choice was limited: he could escalate the war in Yemen, 
repeat his demands for the removal of Western bases in Libya, or confront 
Israel. While the last option presented the most dangerous risks it also 
held out the prospect of the greatest gains, but that does not seem to have 
determined the choice, although it did much to determine the outcome. 
Rather, as was so often the case with Nasser, events determined his 
priorities. Thus the events which followed the signing of the defence 
pact with Syria in November 1966 ensured that Nasser's target would be 
Israel. For, in signing the defence pact, Nasser linked Egypt's fate to 
the uncontrollable Syrians and continued border conflict then made it 
impossible for him to remain on the side-lines. So Nasser, forced to choose 
Israel as his target, decided to remilitarise Sinai and then subsequently 
decided to confront Israel at the brink of war, in order to secure a 
political triumph for his troubled regime. 
In all this Egypt's relations with the superpowers played a crucial 
role. On the one hand, the Soviet Union had urged him to sign the defence 
pact with Syria and to take appropriate measures to protect the Syrian 
regime. However, as we shall see, Nasser was not simply doing the bidding 
of his Soviet patron in precipitating the May-June crisis; rather, he was 
acting in what he regarded as his own interests. When Soviet and Egyptian 
interests diverged, after his decision to close the Straits of Tiran to 
Israeli shipping, he proved quite capable of maintaining his course despite 
Soviet opposition. On the other hand, during the crisis, he treated with 
the United States in an attempt to isolate Israel from its American support 
and, although he would have been well advised not to do so, he nevertheless 
was able to resist American demands for a relaxation of the blockade and 
was thus able to render American diplomacy ineffective. Of course, in the 
final analysis he failed and Egypt was defeated, both militarily and 
politically, by an adversary which was more skilful in its utilisation of 
leverage and more cautious in its application of will-power. Nevertheless, 
Nasser failed to secure the superpower support, so crucial to his success 
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during the crisis, because he ineptly orchestrated the leverage at his 
conunand and ignored the realities of both the American and Soviet positions. 
He did not fail because he lacked leverage or will-power, but because he 
applied his resources rashly and wrongly. 
I - THE SIGNING OF THE SYRIAN DEFENCE PACT 
On 4 November 1966, Egypt entered into a mutual defence pact with 
Syria, linking Egypt's fate to Syrian security without conferring Nasser 
with the recompense of control over Syria's belligerency towards Israel. 
This move marked the first substantive connexion between the Syrian and 
Egyptian regimes since the abortive unification of 1958. As such, it 
constituted a significant departure in Egyptian policy because, since the 
break up of the union in 1961, Nasser had been irreconcilably antagonistic 
towards the ruling Syrian Ba'ath party. 1 For very practical reasons 
Nasser had sought to avoid any connexion with Syria because its successive 
regimes had called for immediate military action against Israel and had 
attempted to involve Egypt in a war which Nasser knew his army was not 
prepared for and could not win. 
Since 1959, and throughout the era of Arab summitry, Nasser had 
managed to undercut the Syrians and ridicule their persistent calls-to-arms, 
although this was a difficult task given the importance of hostility towards 
Israel in establishing one's credentials in the Arab world at that time. 
Nevertheless, Nasser constantly declared that Egypt would not go to war 
until its forces were capable of achieving victory, that he would not gamble 
·with Egypt's fate because the Arabs were not strong enough to fight Israel, 
and that the confrontation should be postponed until the forces of the 
2 Arab revolution were adequately prepared. Why then did Nasser decide to 
enter into a defence pact with Syria, linking Egypt's fate to a Syrian 
regime even more radical than its predecessors in its sponsoring of a 'war 
of popular liberation' against Israel? 
1. The Cairo Unity Talks in 1963 demonstrated just how reluctant lfasser had 
been to link Egypt with a regime whose ideology he regarded as suspect and 
whose stability he believed to be non-existent. See Malcolm H. Kerr, 
The Arab Cold War~ pp. 44-95; Jon Kimche, The Second Arab Awakening~ 
London, 1970, Chapter 3; BBC/SfvB (Middle East) June-July, 1965. 
2. See above, Chapter Three; Robert Stephens, Nasser, p. 443; and President 
Nasser's Speech on the Occasion of May Day, 1 Hay, 1965 in Arab Political 
Docwnents, 1965, pp. 227-8. 
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In searching for the answer one might all too easily find the guiding 
hand of the Soviet Union. After all, as Egypt's relations with the United 
States deteriorated, Nasser's dependence on the Soviet Union necessarily 
increased and one might have expected that his ability to resist the 
influence of Moscow would be diminished. }foreover, the Soviet Union was 
clearly interested in bolstering the position of the new regime in Syria, 
not only because it espoused· the ideologically 'pure' motives of uniting 
the 'progressive' forces of the Syrian proletariat, aligning with the 
'progressive' forces of the Arab world, and relying upon the support of 
the Soviet Union and the Socialist Commonwealth, but also because Moscow 
well understood the considerable advantages to its position in the region 
of establishing two radical regimes (i.e. Egypt and Syria) in the 
Arab heartland, dependent upon the Soviet Union. 3 Thus Moscow was keenly 
interested in an alliance between its two Arab proteges as a means for both 
reducing the risk of subversion of the new Syrian regime because of Nasser's 
4 
opposition, and for establishing Syrian legitimacy in the Arab world. 
The task became more urgent with the emergence of the so called 'Islamic 
alliance' in 1966, because it now appeared to Moscow that the West was 
renewing its drive for influence in the region through this alliance of 
conservative Arab states. 
Moscow's public calls for the establishment of a bloc of "progressive 
and patriotic forces" in the Arab world, which was echoed by Syrian 
Premier Zuayyin on his visit to Moscow in April 1966, is testimony to the 
5 Soviet desire for the defence pact. When Kosygin journeyed to Cairo for 
talks with Nasser in May 1966, he was reported to have urged closer ties 
with the Syrian regime; the defence pact was said to have been the main 
3. Moscow's interest in Syria at that time resulted from its strategic 
importance in outflanking Turkey, its key position in relation to Iraq, 
Jordan and Lebanon, and its proximity to the southern borders of the Soviet 
Union. Relations with the Ba' ath had been difficult in the early sixties 
but by the end of 1964 relations improved. Moscow however had remained 
suspicious of the 'petty bourgeois' base of the party, despite the 
nationalisation decrees of 1965, and had only embarked on a policy of 
strengthening its influence and supporting Damascus after the coup of 
February 1966 brought the left-wing of the party to power under President 
Atassi and Premier Zuayyin. See A. Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet 
Mirror~ p. 134; Y. Roi, From Encroachment to Involvement~ pp. 419-420. 
4. See Oded Eran and Jerome E. Singer "Soviet Policy Towards the Arab 
World, 1955-1971", Survey~ Volume 17, No. 4, Autumn, 1971, pp. 10-29. 
5. See the text of the communique in Ro'i, ibid._, pp. 420-4. 
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6 i tern on the agenda. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
Soviet Union was pressuring Nasser into joining a defence pact with Syria. 
Yet it is also clear that Nasser had the means to resist this pressure 
had he so desired. For, although Egypt was now heavily dependent upon the 
Soviet Union, Moscow had few worthwhile alternatives in the Middle East 
and could not risk alienating Nasser. Moreover, Nasser could have argued 
that the deterioration in Egyptian relations with the United States, which 
had cost Egypt irreplaceable economic ~ssistance, and the accelerated pace 
of his anti-imperialist campaign, were sufficient recompense for Soviet 
military and economic support. Nasser might also have responded to Kosygin's 
call for unity amongst the Arab 'progressives' by suggesting that the Soviet 
Uni6n should first heal its rift with China before offering advice to its 
clients in the Middle East. 
Yet despite these forms of leverage over his Soviet patron, Nasser 
appears not to have even attempted to resist the pressure to do something 
which he had previously avoided with every effort. That ~fasser could not have 
demonstrated any reluctance to do Moscow's bidding in his talks with Kosygin 
is evident from the fact that he was offered no quid pro quo for his 
subsequent decision to sign the defence pact. Kosygin gave him nothing 
more than vague assurances about the continuation of economic assistance 
at current levels at a time when the Egyptian economy was in dire straits. 7 
In other words, if Nasser had not attempted to drive a bargain over the 
defence pact it would suggest that he in fact perceived it to be in his 
interests to link Egypt's fate to Syrian belligerency. 
This was a complete turn-around in Nasser's perception of Egyptian 
interests, for we have already noted his continual reluctance to provide 
Syria with an opportunity to force Egypt into a confrontation with Israel. 
Implicitly, he had recognised Israel's deterrent strength a.nd had therefore 
opposed any Arab action which would challenge Israeli deterrence until they 
were strong enough to do so. For the same reason, he had avoided challenging 
Israel's strategy of compulsion by refusing to respond to Israeli 
retaliations against Syria, Jordan and the fedayeen. A defence pact with 
Syria would now force him to respond to any Israeli retaliation and he would 
therefore be forced to challenge Israel's doctr'ine of deterrence. Since lie 
6. New York Times,, 12 May, 1966; Hedrick Smith, "UAR-Syria Rift Ended by 
Kosygin", New York Times,, 18 May, 1966; Ro'i, pp. 436-7. In a speech to 
the National Assembly Kosygin referred to the desirability of coordinating 
the efforts of Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Iraq to strengthen the anti-
imperialist front. See Eran and Singer, op. cit.,, p. 22. 
7. See Hedrick Smith, "Kosygin Snubbed by U.S. in Cairo", New York Times,, 
19 May, 1966. 
could not have believed that the balance of power had changed and that 
Egypt was now capable of confronting Israel, how could he then have 
8 
regarded it as in his interests to sign the Syrian defence pact? 
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The explanation for Nasser's behaviour lies in an understanding of 
his perception of the deterioration in Egypt's economic, political and 
diplomatic position. First, the loss of American assistance placed severe 
internal pressures on Nasser· and he therefore perceived the United 
States as responsible for his predicament. By June, 1966 Egypt's external 
debt had climbed to $2 billion while.its foreign exchange reserves had 
declined to only $53 million and its gold reserves to $114 million. With 
the balan~e of payments deficit at $268 million, Egypt was forced to set 
aside $40 million in hard currency just to meet Egypt's food inports for the 
last half of 1966. Production of cotton, Egypt's chief export, went into 
decline, while industrial production began to exhibit the consequences of 
a lack of capital and raw material. The official growth in Gross Domestic 
Product had dropped from an average increase of 6.5% during the previous 
five year plan to 4.7% in 1965/66 and to 4% in 1966/67. In these 
circumstances, it was only natural for Nasser to blame Egypt's economic 
problems on the United States, especially because Washington refused to 
answer Nasser's requests for renewed economic assistance, rejected an 
Egyptian attempt to renegotiate its American debts, declined to intervene 
(as it had done in 196Lf) when the IMF refused to extend some $70 million in 
special drawing rights, stalled on the release of Egyptian pounds for 
development projects (pounds which had accrued in Cairo from the PL 480 
programme), and refused to participate in other development projects. 9 
Nasser's perception of Washington's responsibility for Egypt's economic 
plight only reinforced his perception of American 'imperialism', hell-bent 
8. That Nasser at this stage still recognised Egypt's inferiority is evident 
from the testimony of Badran, the Minister for War. He has revealed that 
Nasser rejected Amer's proposal to occupy Sharm el-Sheikh in December 1966, 
precisely because he believed that it would lead to war. See Theodore 
Draper, "From 1967 to 1973, The Arab-Israeli Wars", Corronentary" December, 
1973, p. 33; Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis" pp. 65-6. 
9. These projects included construction of grain silos, an agricultural 
project, modernisation of the Suez Canal, and a nuclear desalination project. 
It was at least expected that the U.S. would support Egypt's approaches to 
financi~l institutions to acquire the necessary funds. In fact, Egypt's 
balance of payments problems and the decline in its economic growth were 
responsible for Egypt's inability to raise international capital. But 
American refusal to renew its aid contributed to the problems as well as to 
Egypt's low credit rating, and stood in stark contrast to its earlier 
representations on Egypt's behalf. See David G. Nes, The Sinai Accord: The 
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on his demise. The spectre of the 'Islamic alliance' was one of the 
manifestations of this apparent threat, but the:::-e were others. The demise 
of Sukarno, Ben Bella, and Nkrumah, his companions in Third World non-
alignment, was taken as further evidence of a new imperialist offensive. 
Moreover, Egyptian intelligence reports of American intentions to neutralise 
Arab nationalism by supporting Israeli actions against Syria and Saudi 
actions against Yemen, reinforced these fears. 10 As Heikal warned in an 
article in April 1966: 
The imperialist-reactionary advance is moving from East to 
West Asia and from South to North Africa, in other words 
it is creeping towards the Arab world and in particular 
towards its focal point - the UAR. Indeed the UAR is the 
next objective of the imperialist-reactionary advance. 11 
(emphasis supplied). 
With support for the Yemeni Republicans draining the Egyptian economy, 
with his aspirations for leadership of the Arab world blocked by the 
opposition of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, with the deterioration of Egyptian-
American relations, and with the Soviet Union beginning to demand some 
returns for its heavy military and economic investments, Nasser had to 
break out of this downward spiral of economic and political setbacks. He 
had to take the initiative in some area, gain a political triumph, and 
thereby demonstrate his importance to the Soviet Union and the Arab world 
as well as proving America's inability to defeat him and therefore its 
need to come to terms with him - this time on his terms. With nowhere 
else to go because of his perception of the 'conservative' Arab states and 
Israel as the agents of American 'imperialism', Nasser turned to Syria and 
the other 'progressive' Arab states to consolidate his ii1fluence and 
reassert his importance in regional and international politics. 
By November 1966 a defence pact with Syria appeared to provide the 
9. (continued) United States and Egypt, (1952-1975), International Symposium 
on the October 1973 War Cairo University, October, 1975. 
-10. Nutting recounts that the Egyptian Embassy in Brussels reported that the 
Americans had told a secret meeting of NATO that peaceful-coexistence with 
Egypt was no longer possible and that henceforth defence of American 
interests in the Middle East would be based on the_ twin bastions of Israel 
and Turkey. See Nutting, Nasser, p. 390. Heikal reported CIA support for 
Saudi Arabia and for the Yemeni Royalists aimed at removing the Egyptian 
army from Yemen "crushed if possible or intact if this 1'lroved impossible". 
See"Heikal Continues Study of US-UAR relations", Cairo Home Service, 5 May, 
1967, FBIS, 9 May, 1967. 
11. BBC/SWB, ME/2133/A/l-/2, 10 April, 1966. 
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opportunity which Nasser had been looking for. Following Kosygin's visit 
he had amplified his campaign of rhetoric against the Arab 'conservatives' 
and the United States and had put an end to the facade of Arab unity by 
announcing that he would not attend the forthcoming Arab summit. 
Meanwhile, growing tension on the Israeli-Syrian border, as a result of 
Syrian-sponsored fedayeen raids and Israeli warnings of a forthright military 
response, threatened to cause him embarrassI!l2nt and underline his weakness. 
If Israel attacked Syria, and Egypt stood idly by, he would be vulnerable to 
the humiliating charge, levelled by his conservative and radical critics 
alike, that Nasser was too timid to do his duty in protecting the Arab 
.world from 11Zionist aggression11 • However, if he now agreed to join Syria 
in a mutual defence pact, he might deter Israel from attacking Syria, 
restrain the regime in Damascus from further acts of provocation by shoring 
it up with Egyptian support, counter the conservative Arab alignment by 
consolidating the 'progressive' forces, and placate his Soviet patron by 
doing its bidding. While in theory such a move risked dragging Egypt into 
war with Israel, in Nasser's perception of reality the risk was not 
significant because Syria refused to allow Egyptian forces to be stationed 
on its territory and refused to place its forces under Egyptian control. 
Therefore Nasser assumed no direct responsibility for Syria's defence. 
Just to make sure that Syria understood this, Nasser publicly emphasised 
that Egypt 11 reserves to itself absolute freedom of action" while Heikal 
warned that Egyptian forces w·ould not automatically intervene against an 
I 1 . k s . . 12 srae i attac on yrian territory. 
Thus, acting in what he regarded as his own interests, Nasser had 
decided to do the bidding of his Soviet patron. He had acted out of a desire 
to improve his position in the Arab world and between the superpowers, 
rather than out of an inability to resist the designs of his Soviet patron. 
Had Nasser not been so isolated, had Egypt not been in such economic 
difficulties, and had he not alienated the United States, such a move would 
not have made sense; it certainly made no better sense simply because the 
Soviet Union was advocating this course of action. But in the present 
circumstances it appeared to be the only way of reasserting h±s importance 
12. See President Nasser's Speech to the National Assembly, 24 November, 
1966; Malcolm H. Kerr, Regional Arab Politics and the Conflict with Israel, 
Rand Corporation, RM-5966-FF, October, 1969; Nutting, pp. 390-2; Winston 
Bartlett, Encounter with the Middle East, p. 371. 
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and regaining his prestige as leader of the Arab world. His ineptness 
in harboring and utilising his political leverage over the past years had 
finally taken its toll by forcing him to adopt a position which, despite 
his declarations to the contrary, would bind Egypt to Syrian belligerency. 
Thus the remilitarisation of Sinai followed on 'as the night the day', 
Nasser's decision to sign the Egyptian-Syrian defence pact. It was not, 
however, the consequence of ·soviet pressure on a compliant client. 
II - THE REMILITARISATION OF SINAI 
At first it appeared that Nasser's action would produce the desired 
results. Apparently deterred by its reluctance to test the new alliance, 
on 13 November, 1966 Israel struck at Jordan instead of Syria, in 
re.taliation for fedayeen raids known to have been sponsored by Damascus. 
The raid on the village of Sammu did raise the Jordanian charge that Egypt 
should have come to its defence but was instead hiding behind the UNEF 
13 buffer. However, the Hashemite regime itself faced Palestinian charges 
that it was not doing enough to protect and support the fedayeen~ and these 
charges served to defuse its criticism of Egyptian inaction. 14 
However, it became increasingly evident, as fedayeen raids and 
Syrian bombardments mounted, that far from restraining Syria and deterring 
Israel, the Egyptian-Syrian defence pact could only serve either to 
embarrass Nasser further or to embroil Egypt in the escalating conflict. Syria 
showed no signs of exercising restraint as a result of the defence pact 
and on 7 April, 1967 Israel retaliated, shooting down six Syrian MIGs in the 
process. Still unwilling to respond, Nasser declared that Egypt was unable 
to come to Syria's defence because Damascus refused to allow the 
. 15 
stationing of Egyptian aircraft on Syrian territory. Perhaps surprisingly, 
Syria did not respond to this charge and its bombardments of Israeli border 
settlements subsided in subsequent weeks as the regime became preoccupied 
. l . 1 . . . 1 . . 16 wit1 an interna crisis over its .egitimacy. 
13. Middle East Record, 1967., p. 115. 
14. Ibid.;, and David Kimche and Dan Bawly, The Sandstorm, pp .. 79-84. 
15. See President Nasser's May Day Speech, 1 May, 1967, in International 
Docwnents on Palestine~ 1967, (IDOP), Document 306, pp. 523-4. 
16. The Syrian official press ignored Nasser's charges devoting only a 
ten line summary to the speech. The internal crisis was precipitated by 
the publication, in a Syrian Army journal, of an attack on religion which 
caused an outrage amongst the religious leaders and mass demonstrations. 
See C. Earnest Dawn, "The Egyptian Remili tarisation of Sinai", Journal of 
Contemporary Histor'y., Volume III, No. 3, July 1968, pp. 205-7; Walter 
Laqueur, The Road to War, pp. 92-95. 
However, fedayeen raids increased, with almost daily incidents, and the 
corresponding warnings issued by decision-makers in Jerusalem made it 
apparent that Israel would take action "no less drastic" than the April 
raid if Damascus did nothing to restrain the fedayeen. 17 
In these circumstances, it was natural for those interested in 
bolstering the increasingly unstable regime in Damascus to welcome and 
magnify the external diversion presented by the threats from Israel, and 
this in turn made it difficult for Nasser to remain on the sidelines of 
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the conflict. At some stage he would have to demonstrate that the defence 
pact was not a 'paper tiger' and that Jordanian claims that he had reached 
agreement with Israel, ensuring calm on the Egyptian border "until the 
Palestine question is settled or until reconciliation occurs", were 
18 
unfounded. Moreover, the more severe the Israeli retaliation, the weaker 
would Nasser appear if he failed to respond - and the Israeli warnings 
made the attack sound ominous indeed if the press dispatches could be 
believed . 19 
Further reason for responding to the situation on the Israeli-Syrian 
border came from the actions of Nasser's Soviet patron. On 11 May in 
Moscow, Chairman Podgornyi warned Vice-President Sadat that Israeli troops 
were being concentrated on the Syrian border in preparation for an attack on 
17 May. Such warnings were not new; they had been a standard Soviet 
technique for bolstering the Syrian regime since May 1966 when lfoscow had 
f d 1 f h · · 20 I h . f '1 irst accuse Israe o sue intentions. n t e circumstances o - ~- ay 
1967 however, they provided Nasser with both the opportunity and 
justification for a show of force which would have Soviet backing because 
21 Moscow had raised the alarm in the first place. 
17. For a list of the raids conducted by the fedayeen in this period see 
Middle East Record~ 196?~ p. 178; and for a summary of the warnings issued 
by Israel see~ ibid.~ pp. 179 and 187. 
18. See King Hussein's speech, BBC/SWB~ 27 January, 1966. 
19. Arab sources quoted a UPI dispatch reporting an off-the-record briefing 
given by an Israeli official on 12 May. The dispatch stated that Israel 
would take limited military action designed "to topple the Damascus army 
regime if Syrian terrorists continue sabotage raids against Israel". The 
record of this briefing shows no direct reference to such an aim but it 
would not have been difficult to infer from the words of the official. 
For the official text, see Middle East Rec01~4 1967 ~ p. 187. The text of 
the dispatch is cited in Dawn, "The Egyptian Remilitarisation of Sinai", p. 210. 
20. See Avigdor Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem~ London, 1970, Chapters XVII-XIX. 
21. See President Nasser's Speech on the Fifteenth Anniversary of the 
Revolution, 23. July, 1967, IDOP~ 1967~ Document 393, p. 621. 
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The question again arises as to whether Nasser was doing Soviet bidding 
in remilitarising Sinai or whether he was acting in what he regarded as 
Egyptian interests. Yet again the answer lies in the convergence of Soviet 
and Egyptian interests, for while the Soviet Union appears to have had 
good reason for wanting Nasser to remilitarise Sinai, Nasser had reasons 
of his own which were more decisive in his calculations. The Soviet 
reasons for wanting an Egypt·ian show of force appear to have been twofold. 
First, Moscow wished to bolster the Syrian regime and secure its own 
position of influence in Damascus by deterring Israel from attacking at a 
time when there was domestic strife in Syria. Soviet warnings to Israel, 
combined with an Egyptian mobilisation on Isiael's southern front, 
might effectively achieve this aim while demonstrating that the Egyptian-
Syrian defence pact had teeth and that the union of 'progressi~e' Arabs 
would have to be taken seriously by all its adversaries. Second, it is 
possible that the Soviet Union was interested in replacing Egyptian support 
for the regime in Yemen with its own direct assistance, to secure a 
position of influence in Southern Arabia in preparation for the British 
withdrawal from Aden in 1968. An Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen could only 
be achieved if Nasser could justify the withdrawal in terms of the higher 
demands of the conflict with Israel. So the remilitarisation of Sinai 
would provide Nasser with the justification for withdrawing his troops 
from Yemen an~ thereby enable the Soviet Union to replace Egyptian support 
f h . . S I 22 or t e regime in ana a. 
Nasser's purpose in remilitarising Sinai is more difficult to 
unravel. It seems unlikely that he believed, and was therefore prompted 
b~ Soviet and Syrian warnings of Israeli troop concentrations. Not only had 
22. The evidence for this Soviet interest comes from the press reports of 
a meeting in Cairo between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Nasser from 29 
March to 1 April, 1967. The subject of .these talks was said to be the 
situation in Yemen-, but the well-informed Yugoslavian news agency, Tanyug_, 
reported that the UNEF in Sinai was also discussed. A Lebanese paper 
reported that Nasser had told Gromyko that he could not withdraw from 
Yemen without causing trouble there and in Egypt. Gromyko is said to have 
answered that nothing is impossible in politics and that the Soviet Union 
was no longer prepared to finance the Egyptian campaign in Yemen. From these 
reports one might speculate that one of the purposes of the Soviet warning 
on Israeli troop concentrations was to provide a cover story for the 
withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Yemen. See Middle East Record_, 1967_, 
p. 22; Ro' i, From Encroachment to Involvement_, p. 437. 
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the UN observers and the Americans rejected the claim23 but, more importantly, 
Nasser had sent General Fawzi to Syria on 14 May (i.e. before he decided 
to remilitarise Sinai) and Fawzi had advised, according to the subsequent 
testimony of Badran, that the reports of troop concentrations were 
without'foundation and that the Soviets and Syrians "must have been having 
hallucinations". 24 Nasser's subsequent explanation, that the defence 
pact with Syria made it impossible for him either to remain silent or only 
to issue "cables of support", and that therefore he had to "take concrete 
steps to face the danger threatening Syria", should also be discounted. 25 
The threat of an immediate Israeli invasion was illusory, and Nasser had 
explicitly stated that he would not be drawn into precipitate action as 
a consequence of the mere existence of his signature on a piece of 
26 paper. 
What then were Nasser's motivations in sending two Egyptian divisions 
into Sinai on 15 May? By analysing the pressures on Nasser at this stage 
it is possible to construct an explanation of his motives. First, as 
already enunciated, Nasser's position in the Arab world was at a low point 
and he was under pressure to improve it to reassert his influence in the 
region. For this reason he had signed the defence pact and for this reason 
General Amer had proposed in December 1966~that Egypt send troops into 
Sinai and occupy Sharm el-Sheikh. 27 Nasser had rejected the proposal in 1966, 
but it now appeared more attractive as a means for deflating his Arab 
23. On 17 May, U Thant told El-Khony that UNTSO had reported no troop 
movements "which should give rise to undue concern". This was repeated on 
19 May in U Thant's report to the Security Council: "Reports from UNTSO 
observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations ... ". Nes 
reports that the American Embassy in Cairo had tried to refute the Soviet 
reports based on American intelligence. See Middle East Record_, 1967, p. 186; 
Nes, op .. cit._, p. 8; Safran, From War to War_, p. 274; Dawn, op.cit._, p. 209. 
24. Cited in Middle East Record_, 1967_, p. 191. 
25. Nasser's speech, 23 July, 1967, IDOP_, 1967_, p. 621. 
26. Cf. Nadav Safran, From f1'CIT' to War_, p. 273. 
27. According to the testimony of Badran, Amer had proposed this action 
to relieve the pressure on Egypt from Jordan, whose leaders were 
criticising Nasser for "hiding behind the skirts of UNEF": "So the 
idea occurred to the Field Marshal that we ought to do something about 
it in order to forestall the campaign [of the reactionary Arab states]". 
Cited in Draper, lac.cit. 
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critics, who were accusing him of selling out the Arab nation in its 
conflict with Israel, by demonstrating that Egypt would protect a 
threatened Syria. Whereas in better times he had resisted such pressure 
by arguing that the Arab forces were not strong enough to confront Israel, 
now his political fortunes had declined to such an extent that he found 
it necessary to reconsider his caution and accept higher risks in order 
28 to recoup his lost prestige in the Arab world. 
Accordingly, by concentrating his forces in Sinai Nasser could force 
Israel to divert its attention and its troops from Syria to the southern 
29 border with Egypt. Nasser may not have believed that Israel intended 
to launch an offensive war against Syria but~rre~would have been certain that 
Israel would retaliate against Syria for the escalating activity of the 
fedayeen - Jerusalem was warning of such a niove and it would have been 
consistent with its policy of retaliation. An Egyptian mobilisation might 
deter such an attack and thereby reduce the pressure on Nasser to respond 
to Israel with a more forthright and offensive strategy. Israel could be 
expected to act with caution on all fronts until it had gauged Egyptian 
intentions and Nasser might thereby claim that he had deterred Israel, 
protected Syria, and upheld the Arab cause. And in the longer term, Israel 
might continue to be deterred by the prospect that any retaliation would 
be at the risk of uncontrolled escalation to a large-scale conflict. 30 
Second, Nasser faced the pressures of what he regarded as an imperialist 
offensive against his revolution - an offensive spearheaded by Israel. 
According to two of his biographers, the coup in Greece on 21 April had 
confirmed these fears and increased his desire to pre-empt, politically, 
28. Nasser had rejected Amer's proposal concerning UNEF and Sharm el-Sheikh 
because he believed it would lead to war. According to Badran: "Nasser turned 
it down and told Amer that this would be a dangerous action, for seizure of 
the Gulf would lead to blockade and this would lead to war". Even on 5 
February 1967 Nasser demonstrated his understanding of the need for caution: 
11The battle with Israel is a decisive one. The Arab world cannot afford to 
enter a losing battle. We shall mobilise the Palestinian people first; then 
the Arab people; then we shall face the fifth columns among us. Then we shall 
be free to deal with the Palestinian issue. We must first purge the Arab 
lands of the forces that collaborate with Imperialism". See Draper, Zoe.cit; 
Middle East Record_, 1967_, p. 160. 
29. Heikal subsequently claimed this to be Nasser's intention. See Al Ahram_, 
6 October, 1967, cited in Middle East Record_, 1967_, p. 191. 
30. Safran argues, similarly, that the mobilisation might have been part 
of a new strategy of undermining Israel's strength by guerrilla action. 
Mobilisation would thereby prevent Israel from launching a surprise attack, 
i.e. a repeat of 1956, on the guerrilla bases. See Safran, pp. 283-4. 
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the imperialist design. 31 Since he had received warnings of an impending 
Israeli attack from the Soviet Union, Nasser could safely expect Moscow to 
support such a political pre-emption, for it would serve Soviet interests 
in the region. Thus, by remilitarising Sinai, Nasser might hope to thwart 
the expected offensive if this show of strength succeeded in deterring 
Israel while Soviet backing neutralised the United States. If, by means of 
this action, Nasser could demonstrate that Egypt was still a force to 
contend with and that he had not lost his will to resist the apparent 
design of the United States, then perhaps he would succeed not only in 
reasserting his leadership of the Arab world, but also would succeed in 
reclaiming Egypt's position of importance between the superpowers. If, in 
this way, he could precipitate the realisation in Washington that the 
'progressive' Arab states could not be contained and neutralised by Israel's 
deterrent strength, he might force American policy makers to rethink their 
strategy and attempt anew to come to terms with him - on terms which would 
help to alleviate Egypt's economic plight as they alleviated his own 
political plight. 
Finally, Nasser may have been attempting a trade-off with the Soviet 
Union to reduce Moscow's pressure for a withdrawal from Yemen by doing its 
bidding in Sinai and bolstering the Syrian regime. Clearly Nasser did not 
want to withdraw his troops from Yemen despite the drain of the civil war 
on the Egyptian economy and despite the fact that Egyptian intervention had 
been a major cause. of the rift with the United States. Rather, he saw an 
opportunity to spread his influence to southern Arabia when the British 
withdrew in a year 1 s time. 32 Nasser could not have welcomed the Soviet 
attempt to exercise direct influence in Yemen by replacing. Egypt, for Moscow 
had the same intentions as Nasser; in southern Arabia they were competitors 
rather than allies. Nevertheless, Moscow was apparently exerting pressure 
on Nasser to withdraw by arguing that the Egyptian economy could no longer 
bear the burden and by suggesting that the Soviet Union was no longer 
d f . h E . . . 33 T.Th • 1 h s . u . prepare to ·inance t e gyptian operation. wul e t e oviet nion may 
have created the cover for an Egyptian withdrawal by suggesting the movement 
of Egyptian troops into Sinai, Nasser perhaps intended to use this cove~ not 
to withdraw from Yemen, but rather to bargain with his Soviet patron on the 
31. See Nutting, p. 396; Lacouture, Nasser·~ London, 1973, pp. 294-5. 
32. Nutting, pp. 383-4; Middle East Record~ 1967~ pp. 128 and 598. 
33. See above, footnote 22. 
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basis that the remilitarisation of Sinai would protect Moscow's Syrian 
protege, and that therefore Nasser was a valuable client whose objectives 
in southern Arabia should be supported rather than thwarted if the Soviet 
Union wanted his continued support in the north. In the same way, Nasser 
could defuse his critics in Jordan and Saudi Arabia who were charging 
that Egypt's intervention in Yemen prevented its forces from being deployed 
34 
against Israel. Thus on 22 May, while announcing the closure of the 
Straits of Tiran and Egypt's willingness to confront Israel, Nasser 
addressed himself to the question of Yemen and declared: 
Of course they say we are tied up in the Yemen and have 
problems there ... but ... we are capable of performing our 
duty in the Yemen and at the sah1e time performing our 
national duty here in Egypt, both in defending our 
frontiers and attacking, if Israel attacks any Arab 
country.35 (emphasis supplied). 
Thus, because of mounting pressures, the perceived advantages to 
Egypt's position in the Arab world and between the superpowers made the 
option of remilitarising Sinai attractive to Nasser. It was these pressures, 
rather than the bidding of the Soviet Union, which forced him to take the 
action which would spark a chain of events disastrous to Egypt. At this 
stage, he calculated the risk of war as a result of the troop movements 
at 20%~ 6 so he clearly believed that the possible advantages would outweigh 
the implicit risks involved. Nevertheless, he was now seeking a political 
victory over his adversaries in a game in which he controlled very few of 
the levers. As a result, Nasser forced himself into an ever more dangerous 
and costly disposition, raising the stakes without improving his position 
in this game of brinkmanship. He might just have achieved his aim of a 
political victory, and at stages looked like doing so, had his importance 
to the superpower players been greater, had he correctly perceived Egypt's 
political strengths and weaknesses and the commitments of the other players, 
and had he acted according to the limitations imposed by these factors. 
Unfortunately, he failed to assess his position and the resolve of his 
opponents accurately and these miscalculations led to his denouement in a 
daring playing out of the politics of patronage. 
34. Hussein made an attack on Nasser in these terms in February, 1967 on a 
visit to Saudi Arabia. He charged: "Members of this group [Egypt] have led 
the Arab forces away from their natural positions along the [Israeli] border. 
They instead have sent these forces to kill our brothers in ... Yemen". R. 
Jeclda, 12 February, 1967, BBC/SWB_, 14 February, 1967; cf. Middle East Record_, 
1967_, p. 115. 
35. President Nasser's Speech Announcing the Closure of the Gulf of Aqaba 
22 May, 1967, IDOP_, 1967., Document 318, pp. 538-9. 
36. Nasser's Speech, 23 July, IDOP_, 1967_, p. 622. 
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III - THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF AND THE CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS 
The remilitarisation of Sinai could not achieve its manifold purpose 
if UNEF still held its positions on the border with Israel, for then 
Nasser would be seen to be bluffing and neither his adversaries nor his 
brothers would take him seriously. Clearly, were Egypt to establish the 
credibility of its deterrent threat to Israel it would have to seek the 
withdrawal of UNEF from its observer positions on the border. Again Nasser 
had been considering this action for some time and did not rush into the 
decision without careful thoughb for his objective and the chances of 
achieving it. 
That Nasser was aware of this option and cognisant of its consequences 
was evident in 1965 when he stated, in his retort to Syrian demands for war: 
They say "remove the U.N. Emergency Force. This force prevents 
Egypt getting at Israel". Well, remove the Emergency Force. Then 
what shall we do? What is our plan? We must first of all have 
a plan.37 (emphasis supplied). 
Moreover, when Amer had proposed in December 1966 that Nasser demand the 
evacuation of UNEF and then occupy Sharm el-Sheikh, without blockading 
the Gulf of Aqaba, Nasser had rejected this plan because he believed that 
the removal of UNEF and the occupation of Sharm would make it necessary 
to close the Gulf and this would lead to war. Badran claims that he also 
shared this perception: if Egypt removed UNEF it would have to close the 
G ] f d h . ld 1 d H . d . "l lf 1 . II 38 u_ an tis wou ea to war. e too reJecte it as 1a a so ution . 
However, Nasser and Arner had gained some experience in UNEF withdrawals 
in 1960 when, following an Israeli reprisal raid on the Syrian village 
of Tawarfiq, large military formations had been ordered into Sinai while 
UNEF had been requested to withdraw from the border, 39 but not from Sharm 
el-Sheikh. Secretary-General Hammarskjold had agreed to withdraw the UNEF 
from the border positions to their base camps in the Gaza Strip. Although 
Israel had also mobilised reserve units and sent large tank formations 
to the south, when tension had eased on the northern border, Nasser had 
ordered the Sinai reinforcements to withdraw and, after a month, UNEF 
37. President Nasser's Address to the Palestine National Conference, 31 
May, 1965, in Ar>ab Political Documents:> 1965~ p. 227. 
38. Draper, lac.cit.; Bar-Zahar, Embassies in Crisis~ pp. 65-6. 
39. See Michael I. Handel, Israel's Political-Military Doctrine_, p. 47. 
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40 had returned to its observer posts on the border. Thus, Nasser 
apparently decided to repeat the Tawarfiq manoeuvre by requesting a partial 
withdrawal of UNEF from the border with Israel. If UNEF remained at Sharm 
el-Sheikh then Egyptian forces would not have to occupy that position and 
the problem of Israeli navigation in the Gulf would not present itself. 
And if UNEF only withdrew to its base camps, then it could return to 
its border positions once the Egyptian remilitarisation had succeeded in 
deterring Israel from retaliating against Syria. 41 
Thus the decision to request the withdrawal of UNEF was taken neither 
precipitately nor without due regard for its consequences. The time had 
come to challenge Israel's doctrine of deterrence by demonstrating that 
Egypt had the power to deter Israel from attacking Syria. To be effective, 
such a strategy required the removal of UNEF from the border with Israel 
so that Egyptian resolve would not be questioned by Nasser's adversaries 
in the Arab world and elsewhere. However, while Egyptian spokesmen had 
always claimed that UNEF did not present an obstacle to effective action 
against Israel, the fact remained that UNEF did occupy positions on the 
Egyptian border and acted as a symbolic buffer between Israel and Egypt. 
If Nasser was to demonstrate Egyptian resolve to face Israel he could not 
afford to become engaged in a side-battle with the United Nations which 
might reveal UNEF to be somewhat more of an obstacle than had been portrayed. 
The UNEF troops had to be withdrawn as quickly as possible, without 
diplomatic wrangling, for Nasser's strategy to be effective. 
40. Kimche and Bawly, p. 84; Bar-Zohar, p. 32. This experience remained 
salient in the subsequent defence of Egypt's role in the conflict with 
Israel: When Nasser declared in 1965 that he would not remove UNEF without 
a plan, Damascus radio attacked Egypt for deserting the Syrians. AZ Ahram 
responded: '' ... the presence of UNEF in the Gaza sector cannot constitute an 
obstacle in the face of Egyptian movements in the case of a comprehensive 
war or the possibility of such a war. The Syrian rulers know this very well 
from the experience of the At-Tawarf iq battle when matters along the armistice 
line were about to develop into a possible comprehensive war. At that time 
the Egyptian military command asked the UNEF to move out of the way. Egyptian 
forces were then massing heavily along the armistice line, and the emergency 
force - with its symbolic number - could not possibly show any objection". 
AZ Akram_, 3 June, 1965, FBIS_, 3 June, 1965. 
Ltl.. In an interview in 1970 Nasser claimed: "In 1967, when we asked UN 
forces to withdraw, we cited specifically the area from Rafah to Elath. We 
did not ask UN troops to withdraw from Sharm el-Sheikh, nor from all other 
areas. Because they did withdraw this created a problem". U.S. !Jews and 
vlorld Report_, 18 May, 1970, p. 61; Cf. Heikal, The Cairo Docwnents" p. 241; 
Robert Stephens, Nasser_, p. 474; Middle East Rec01?d., 1967_, pp. 192-3; Kimche 
and Bawly, The Sandstorm_, pp. 92-4; Charles Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War: 
How it Began", Foreign Affairs~ Volume 46, No. 2, January, 1968, pp. 313-4; 
Eric Rouleau, Jean Lacouture, Jean-Francois Held, Israel et Zes Arabes: le 
3e Combat_, Paris, 1967, p. 76. 
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However, Nasser could not be sure that U Thant would do his bidding 
meekly and withdraw UNEF from the border forthwith, so on 16 May he first 
sought to repeat the manouevre of 1960 by requesting the withdrawal of UNEF 
to its base camps. Hoping to avoid any deliberations about this withdrawal 
in New York, the request was issued to General Rikhye, the Commander of 
UNEF in Sinai, and was accompanied by a warning that, if UNEF troops were 
not ordered to evcJcuate their observer positions and to remain in their 
camps, fighting might well break out between Egyptian and UNEF troops. 
Rikhye refused to comply with the request and said that he could only 
take instructions from the Secretary-General. Everything now depended upon 
U Thant's decision. If he followed Hammarskjold's precedent Nasser's plan 
would have succeeded and Egypt's show of force on Israel's borders would 
have been achieved without any complications. However, when U Thant 
received Rikhye's report, on the evening of 16 May, he called in the 
Egyptian ambassador and told him that a request for partial or temporary 
withdrawal of UNEF from the Armistice lines would be regarded by him as 
tantamount to a request for a complete withdrawal of UNEF from Gaza and 
Sinai since UNEF could not be asked to stand aside while Egyptian and 
Israeli forces confronted each other. 42 
Thus U Thant presented Nasser with an 'all or nothing' decision and, 
given Nasser's situation, he had to demand 'all', for he would completely 
lose face if he accepted 'nothing' and UNEF remained in its positions. 
However, now that his initial plan for partial withdrawal had failed, 
Nasser still had to make sure that U Thant complied with his request for 
total withdrawal and did not adopt stalling tactics in the face of pressure 
exerted by Israel's friends in the United Nations. 43 Accordingly, 
Nasser decided to establish a fait accompli which would make it impossible 
for U Thant to do other than order the immediate withdrawal of UNEF. On 
17 May, before Egypt formally requested complete withdrawal, its troops 
surrounded or occupied UNEF positions while others moved up to the Armistice 
line with Israel. 44 Meanwhile General Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief-of-Staff, 
42. Report of Secretary General U Thant on the Withdrawal of UNEF, 26 
June, 1967, IDOP~ 1967~ Document 226, pp. 211-12. 
43. As Golda Meir has noted: '' ... I don't for a minute believe that Nasser 
actually expected the United Nations to do his bidding meekly. It was 
against all rhyme or reason ... and I am sure that Nasser anticipated a long 
round of discussions, arguments and haggling. If nothing else he almost 
certainly reckoned that the United Nations would insist on some kind of 
phasing out operation". Golda Meir, My L1:fe., pp. 295-6. 
44. The UNEF position at El Sabha was occupied, while the positions at 
El Kuntilla, El Amr and El Quseima were surrounded. U Thant, Zoe.cit.~ P· 212. 
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requested Rikhye to order the withdrawal of the Yugoslav detachments (the 
troops which were at that time occupying the border positions) from Sinai 
within twenty-four hours and from Sharm el-Sheikh within forty-eight 
hours. 45 Egypt intended to occupy all UNEF positions regardless of the 
deliberations at UN headquarters in New York. 
At the same time, the governments of Yugoslavia and India were 
consulted to ensure that they would advise U Thant to comply with the 
46 Egyptian request. Thus when U Thant consulted with the contributing 
countries on the afternoon of 17 May, he was duly advised by Yugoslavia and 
India that Egypt was entitled to make the withdrawal request and that he 
47 
should comply without consulting the General Assembly. That evening 
U Thant informed Egyptian ambassador El Khony that, if a formal request 
for withdrawal were lodged by the Egyptian government, he would have to 
comply, because UNEF could not remain on Egyptian territory without the 
48 host government's consent. 
When this message was received in Cairo it signalled.the green light 
for the occupation of the remaining observer posts. On the morning of 18 
May, beforethe formal request for withdrawal was submitted, General Fawzi 
ordered his troops to occupy Sharm el-Sheikh, El Kuntilla and El Amr, 
while Foreign Minister Riad summoned the ambassadors of the contributing 
countries and informed them that UNEF had "terminated its tasks" in 
Egypt and the Gaza Strip and."must depart from the above territory 
forthwith. 49 
Then the final touches were added to the fait accompli by allowing 
U Thant no room to manoU:evre once he had received the request. Thus when 
El Khony submitted the formal request on the afternoon of 18 May, he 
informed U Thant of the bitter resentment felt in Cairo over what was 
considered to be attempts to turn UNEF into "an occupation force". \fuile 
U Thant could not have wanted to be portrayed as the new 'imperialist' in 
the Third World, he nevertheless expressed his intention to appeal 
45. Ibid. The greater time allowed for the evacuation of Sharm el-Sheikh 
can be explained by the need for more time to deploy Egyptian troops in this 
distant and inaccessible position. 
46. Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East~ p. 225. Yugoslavia and India 
were part of the non-aligned "old boy" network and were glad to comply. 
47. U Thant, lac.cit. p. 213. The contributing countries were Brazil, 
Canada, Denmark, India, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Canada advised 
against withdrawal and suggested that the opinion of the General Assembly 
should be sought. 
48. Ibid.; Charles Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War: How it Began", PP• 311-12. 
49. Ibid.; Burdett, p. 225. 
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directly to Nasser to reconsider his decision. The Egyptian response was 
to warn U Thant that any such intervention was ill-advised because it 
would be "sternly rebuffed". SO 
If U Thant had intended to try for a compromise at this late stage, 
this warning was sufficient to convince him that it would be in vain. 
Moreover, when U Thant consulted with the contributing countries on 
the formal request for withdrawal, he was informed by Yugoslavia and 
India that they would withdraw their contigents even if he did not 
immediately comply with the request. 51 Thus, with the UNEF positions 
already occupied by Egyptian troops, with Nasser rejecting any compromise 
and with the most important UNEF contingents withdrawing regardless of 
his decision, U Thant was left with only one option. On the evening of 
18 May, he ordered the complete withdrawal of UNEF from Egypt. 
Within forty-eight hours of the initial request for the withdrawal 
of UNEF, Nasser had achieved his purpose; his troops were now deployed 
along the border with Israel. On the other side, although Israel had 
ordered a partial mobilisation on its southern border; all threats 
against Syria had ceased and the attack which Nasser had claimed would 
occur on 17 May had not transpired. If Nasser had now allowed the tension 
to subside by exercising the same caution as Israel, he would have 
achieved the initial aims he had sought in deciding to remilitarise 
Sinai. He would have demonstrated that the defence pact with Syria had 
teeth and that the alliance of 'progressive' Arab states had to be taken 
seriously; he would have pleased the Soviet Union and would have demonstrated 
his ability to deter Israel; he would have deflated his critics in the 
Arab world by proving that Egypt was in the vanguard of action against 
Israel. 
However, the total withdrawal of UNEF confronted Nasser with the 
problem of the "half a solution" which had led him to reject Amer's 
earlier proposal for the removal of UNEF in December 1966. UNEF had 
now vacated Sharm el-Sheikh and with Egyptian troops moving into positions 
at this strategic location the question arose as to whether Nasser should 
close the Straits and blockade Israel's southern port of Eilat. Israel 
had declared time and again that it would regard any such interference 
with its right to freedom of navigation as a casus beUi. Clearly, if 
Nasser closed the Straits he would be risking war with Israel. Yet on 
50. U Thant, ibid.~ p. 214; Burdett, ibid. 
51. Ibid. 
22 May, after lerigthy deliberation, Nasser declared: "Under no circumstances 
52 
can we allow the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba". 
Was Nasser intending to provoke Israel into war? From the available 
evidence it would seem unlikely. Nasser claimed after the war that 
when the closure of the Gulf was discussed at meetings of the Higher 
Executive Committee ••. 
••• it was clear to all of us that our role would be purely 
defensive; we should not attack unless there was an 
aggression against Syria; we merely had to be in a state 
o;f preparedness. At that meeting no one spoke of 
attacking Israel; there was absolutely no intention of 
taking offensive action against Israel.53 
If one is sceptical of such post hoc explanations, it should be 
borne in mind that had Nasser intended to launch an offensive against 
Israel, such an intention would have required a belief in the ability 
of Egypt's forces to defeat Israel on the battlefield. From Nasser's 
statements it is evident that he did not hold such a belief in 1965 or 1966 
or even in February 1967, and nothing had changed in the structure of 
Egypt's forces since then which might have altered the fact that Egypt 
possessed only a limited offensive capability. Although Amer and Badran 
had informed Nasser that the army was ready for war and although, as 
Heikal has suggested, the remilitarisation of Sinai had created a state 
of euphoria which might have encouraged over-confidence, nevertheless 
Nasser must have been aware of the limitations imposed by the structure 
54 
of his forces. Even if he believed that his air force could match 
Israel's and that Egypt's numerical superiority in tanks would neutralise 
Israel's qualitative manpower advantage, even if he believed Amer's 
exaggerated assessment of the balance of military power, he would still 
have been aware that, while the air force possessed large numbers of 
interceptors (MIG 2ls), its strategic bomber force was much smaller and 
Egypt could therefore only hope to inflict marginal damage on Israel's 
strategic targets. He would also have been aware that the Soviet Union 
had only supplied large quantities of obsolescent ground-attack aircraft 
(MIG 17s and MIG 19s), which were no match for Israel's Mirage Ills, 
while limiting the supply of the far more effective and modern 
52. Nasser's Speech on 22 May, 1967, IDOP, 1967, p. 540. 
53. Nasser's Speech on 23 July, 1967, IDOP, 1967, p. 623. 
54. See the testimony of Shamseddin Badran cited in Burdett, p. 240. 
Heikal observed in October 1967: "Some of us were dazzled by the . 
spectacle of the force we moved into Sinai between Nay 15 and May 20". 
Al Ahram, 6 October 196 7, cited in Stephens, p. 481. 
SU-7s. 55 Moreover, had Nasser intended to launch an offensive against 
Israel he would certainly not have decided to forgo an Egyptian first 
strike with such complacency, since this would have given Egypt the 
56 
only chance of achieving a decisive advantage over Israel. 
Nasser's professed plan for confronting Israel had been to build 
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Arab strength over four to five years, to weld the Arab states into a 
unified force through the alliance of progressive regimes and the 
overthrow of reactionary ones, and to withdraw his troops from Yemen 
before confronting· Israel. 57 None of these conditions had been fulfilled, 
nor were they likely to be fulfilled in the near future. Moreover, 
in scotching calls for an Arab attack on Israel over the. years he had 
constantly warned that it was first necessary to isolate Israel from its 
international support. Yet he had witnessed and registered his alarm 
at the emerging alignment of the United States and Israel, culminating 
in the Skyhawk deal of 1966 and Eshkol' s bold declaration that the 
American Sixth Fleet protected Israel. He had constantly warned of the 
threat from 'imperialism', in the guise of this alliance, aimed at his 
revolution. Therefore Nasser must have assessed that launching an 
offensive against Israel or provoking it into war with the aim of 
defeating it on the battlefield would surely lead to American intervention 
to prevent Israel's destruction. He could not hope to defeat Israel 
in such circumstances. Given these considerations it seems unlikely 
that by blockading the Gulf Nasser intended to provoke a war with Israel 
with the aim of defeating it.on the battlefield, although he certainly 
55. Egypt's offensive capabilities were also limited by the ineffectiveness 
of its own missiles, due to guidance problems, and the fact that the 
Soviet Union had not supplied any significant quantities of anti-tank 
weapons. As Glassman notes: "These deficiencies reduced the flexibility 
and mobility of Arab fire-support and battlefield-interdiction capabilities. 
Because of this, Arab forces could be expected to have greater difficulty 
penetrating Israeli lines and Israeli forces would be relatively more free 
to deliver reinforcements to threatened points". Glassman also notes that 
Egypt possessed only thirty TU-16 strategic bombers equipped with Kennel 
air-to-ground missiles. If these missiles achieved even a 100% penetration 
only sixty tons of conventional warheads would have hit Israel - "a painful 
but inconsiderable sum". See Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, pp. 31-5; Cf. 
Safran, From War to War, pp. 282~4. 
56. See below, pp. 263-4 
57. In his speech in May 1965 Nasser had declared: "Supposing we were to 
attack Israel; will I attack while I have 50,000 of our soldiers in Yemen? •.• 
if I want to attack Israel, the first thing to be done is tb bring these 
50,000 soldiers from Yemen •.• ". See Nasser's speech, 31 May 1965, Arab 
Political Docwnents, 1965, p. 227. 
58 knew that he would be risking war. 
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Were there then pressures placed on Nasser to institute the blockade, 
pressures so great that he was incapable of resisting them? This also 
seems unlikely in the circumstances. Apparently the Soviet Union was 
not consulted on the closure of the Straits and, in the aftermath of 
Nasser's announcement, Moscow quickly sought to restrain Nasser from 
launching any offensive an& urged him to compromise. 59 The Soviet Union 
had certainly sought the remilitarisation of Sinai to deter Israel from 
an attack on Syria, but that had already been achieved and did not 
require the closure of the Straits. Nor, for that matter, did the 
desire to provide Nasser with an excuse for pulling his troops out of 
Yemen require this precipitate action. On the other hand, Moscow was 
keenly aware of American commitments to Israel concerning freedom of 
navigation in the Gulf, and Kosygin had received a veiled warning from 
President Johnson on 22 May about the risk that "our ties to nations of 
h ld b . . d. ff . 1 . ti 60 N I 1 f l t e area cou ring us into i- icu ties . asser s c osure o- t1e 
Straits raised the spectre of superpower confrontation which the Soviet 
61 Union wished to avoid at all costs. It therefore seems beyond doubt 
that the Soviet Union did not pressure Nasser to close the Straits. 
Pressure from Nasser's Arab critics may have been a factor in the 
decision, for as Nasser stated after the war: "This was one of the 
62 
things our Arab brothers had always insisted upon". However, after 
the withdrawal of UNEF, there appears to have been very little pressure 
from the other Arab states to blockade the Gulf. Jordan Radio did claim 
on 19 May that "logic, wisdom and nationalism" made it necessary for 
Nasser to close the Straits otherwise "what value would there be in 
58. In his 23 July speech Nasser revealed that at the meeting of the 
Higher Executive Committee on 22 May he had estimated the risk of war 
at 50%, and at another meeting at 80%, IDOP_, 1967_, p. 623. On 9 June 
Nasser explained: "We knew that there was a real possibility of armed 
conflict and accepted the risk''. President Nasser's Resignation speech, 
9 June, 1967, IDOP, 1967, Document 372, p. 597. 
59. Lall records that at the United Nations Soviet diplomats were 
taken by surprise by Nasser's announcement of the blockade "and assiduously 
inquired from all who might have special knowledge of Arab intentions 
why Nasser had taken this step and how far he intended to go". Johnson 
gives the Soviet Union the benefit of the doubt: "Although we cannot be 
sure, it seems likely that Nasser took this mortally dangerous action, 
independently of the Soviet Union". Arthur Lall, The U.ll. and the Middle 
East Crisis of 1967_, pp. 30-32; Lyndon Baines Johnson_, The Vantage Point_, 
p. 291; Yost_, "The Arab-Israeli War", p. 315; Y. Ro'i, From Encroachment 
to Involvement_, p. 438; Eric Rouleau (et. al.) Israel et les Arabes_, 
p. 103; Johnson, ibid._, p. 291. 
60. Johnson, ibid.,p. 291. 
61. Burdett, p. 273; Glassman, pp. 40-41; Safran, p. 295 
62. Nasser's Speech, 23 .July, 1967, IDOP, 1967_, p. 621. 
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.1 , d . II 63 mi itary emonstrations • Nevertheless, Nasser had already won a 
victory ove.r his Arab critics by remilitarising Sinai and forcing UNEF 
to withdraw and,had he wanted to resist what little pressure there was 
to close the Straits, he now certainly possessed the means to do so, 
having reestablished his anti-Israel credentials, and having supposedly 
deterred Israel from attacking Syria. What, after all, had the 
Jordanians done to protect the Arabs from Israel? Certainly, once the 
immediate crisis had been defused he would have inevitably faced growing 
pressure from his Arab critics to close the Straits. But Nasser would 
still retain a considerable ability to resist these pressures without 
jeopardising his refurbished popularity, just as he had resisted past 
pressure over the last ten years to take a more active role in confronting 
Israel. He might have argued that the time was not yet right for war 
because inter-Arab cooperation had not reached its full potential. He 
might have combated any such pressure by adopting a Syrian-style 
t t f . .f'.' d . . f . l G., S · 64 s ra egy o supportingJe ayeen incursions -rom t1e aza trip. 
Nor should Egyptian claims, made after the war, that once Egypt 
had repossessed Sharm el-Sheikh it could not fail to exercise its 
sovereignty by blockading Israeli shipping, be taken seriously. 65 For 
one thing, when Amer had proposed the removal of UNEF and the reoccupation 
of Sharm el-Sheikh in December 1966, he had explicitly recommended that 
the Straits not be closed and, according to Israeli reports of testimony 
taken from Egyptian prisoners, Amer had told his troops on 20 May not to 
66 
expect a blockade of the Gulf. Noreover, Badran's evidence shows that 
originally, when UNEF was withdrawn, there was no intention of closing 
the Gulf: 
I asked the Field Marshal [Amer] whether we were ready to go 
through with the battle and told him that the withdrawal of 
UNEF would lead to a confrontation. He told me that he intended 
to occupy Sharm in place of UNEF and agreed with me not to 
close down the Gulf.67 
63. Cited in Laqueur, The Road to War_, pp. 107-8. 
64. Safran suggests that such a strategy might have replaced the 
strategy of blockade. The Road to War_, p. 337. 
65. Heikal, p. 242; Yost, p. 314. 
66. Safran, p. 288 and Kimche and Bawly, p. 95. Safran also notes that 
during the period after the withdrawal of UNEF and before the closure of 
the Straits no suggestion of closure was made in the Cairo press. 
67. Badran's evidence cited in Burdett, p. 240. Badran also revealed that 
Amer had made no plans to implement the blockade: "A certain date was set 
to close the Gulf. The date was at very short notice, to the point where 
it was impossible to affect it. So the Field Marshal had to bring in 
paratroop units and light units to occupy Sharm ... He had to embark on a 
quick operation entailing many difficulties". Cited in Burdett, pp. 241-2. 
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If the explanation for Nasser's action in blockading the Straits 
does not lie in a miscalculation of Egypt's offensive capabilities, 
nor in pressure exerted by his Soviet patron and Arab adversaries, nor 
in the inevitability of the decision, where then can we find the 
explanation? The answer seems to lie in the complex calculation, which 
the evidence suggests Nasser made, that the combination of his will-power, 
Egypt 1 s defensive capabilities, the protection of his Soviet patron, 
the support of other Arab states, and his decision to await an Israeli 
first strike, would be sufficient to outweigh, in an essentially political 
contest, the combination of Israeli will-power, military strength, and 
American backing. Thus Nasser's action in blockading the Straits should 
be seen as the first step in a policy of brinkmanship, rather than an 
irrational action which led Egypt into a well-laid Israeli trap. 68 It 
was a calculated gamble on which he staked all Egypt's depleted political 
capital. Whereas previously he had explicitly rejected such action, 
now the cost-benefit calculation had altered because the costs appeared 
to have been reduced by the combination of Soviet backing and Arab 
support, while the prospect of benefit had increased as a result of 
his desperate isolation and the gains which he had already achieved with 
a minimum of effort. As such,Nasser's decision to close the Straits and 
risk war with Israel was a daring attempt to fight his way out of the 
corner he had boxed himself into. By crowning his earlier achievements with 
a political victory over Israel, he would demonstrate Israel's inability 
to protect what it regarded as its rights, its inability to deter Arab 
action by means of superior military force,and its isolation in the 
world arena, just as he would demonstrate Egypt's leadership of the 
Arab world, its vital role in the conflict with Israel, and its value to 
69 both superpowers. 
Nasser failed in this gamble because he miscalculated not only 
Egypt's military ability to resist an Israeli offensive but also - and 
in the event more significantly - because he underestimated Israel's 
68. For the argument that Nasser was trapped by the Israelis see Nutting, 
pp. 396-8; and Elias Sam'o, The June 1967 Arab-Israeli vlar: Miscalculation 
or Conspiracy?_, Wilmette, Illinois, 1971, pp. 147-162. 
69. An interest-ing, though biased, confirmation of Nasser's political 
rather than military purpose has been given by General Mohamed el-Gamasy, 
in -1973: " •.. the armed forces were surprised by political decisions of 
which they had no prior knowledge. When they began to carry out orders, 
it was purely a military demonstration to consolidate the political 
decision. The armed forces had to concentrate in Sinai without knowing 
the required strategic aim ..• " General Mohamed el-Gamasy, The Military 
Strategy of the October 19?3 War, International Symposium on the October 
1973 War, Cairo University, October, 1975, p. 10. 
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will-power and overestimated Egypt's political strength, the extent of 
Soviet support, and the desire of the United States to restrain its 
Israeli protege and renew its relations with Cairo. In earlier times, 
when the United States had been interested in wooing him and he had been 
less dependent upon the Soviet Union, such a daring ploy might well have 
succeeded. But in the international environment of 1967, Nasser no 
longer possessed the same leverage with the superpowers and could not 
regain this leverage through brinkmanship unless he combined his actions 
with a realistic appraisal of Egypt's position, cautious diplomacy and 
a demonstration of his willingness to consider measures which would bring 
Israel and Egypt back from the brink of war. In other words, Nasser 
failed yet again to understand the rules of the game of patronage and 
the limited value of the cards which he held in this game. He failed to 
understand that since Egypt lacked alternative patronage and was now 
entirely dependent upon the Soviet Union, what was needed was caution 
not daring in this duel at the brink. 
What was Nasser's strategy in closing the Gulf of Aqaba? By 
confronting Israel on the brink of war, he was aiming to test Israel's 
will to resist an encroachment on what it regarded as its rights. 
Nasser was throwing down the gauntlet to Israel by blockading Eilat. 
If Israel lacked the will to pick up this gauntlet, it would have to 
back down on the issue of freedom of navigation in the Straits and 
Nasser would thereby achieve a significant political victory without 
war. If Israel picked up the gauntlet and launched war then Egypt's 
defensive capabilities, Nasser calculated, would be adequate to hold the 
Israeli advance in Sinai while the superpowers intervened to stop the 
war and punished the Israeli 'agressor' by forcing it to withdraw, leaving 
Egypt in control of the Straits and with its political victory intact. 
This strategy was predicated upon three related assumptions: i) that 
Israel's leadership would not have the will~power to launch war without 
external support; ii) that Egyptian diplomacy could deprive Israel of 
this external support; iii) that if Israel's leadership changed, and/or 
a new will were forged in Jerusalem, in going to war, without external 
support, Israel would not win anything more than a limited victory, and 
certainly would not secure the political fruits of such a victory. 
To ensure the validity of these assumptions, and therefore the 
success of his strategy, Nasser would have to use his tactical skill 
during the crisis to intimidate the Israeli leadership, to isolate 
Israel from its external sources of support, and, if it came to war,. to 
maintain Israel's isolation and maximise Egypt's political support. In 
the event Nasser overplayed his hand and instead of achieving these 
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aims helped only to ensure that Israel gained American political support, 
neutralising Egypt 1 s political backing and leaving it militarily isolated 
as it failed to resist the Israeli onslaught. Nasser invalidated his 
own assumptions and this led to the collapse of his strategy and 
Egypt's denouement. 
IV - THE ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE ISRAEL 
At the outset of the crisis, Nasser had good reason to believe that 
he faced a weak-willed Israeli leadership, partly because of internal 
Israeli criticism of Eshkol for not taking a more forthright stand against 
fedayeen incursions, partly because of Eshkol's demonstrated unwillingness 
to test the Egyptian-Syrian defence pact in attacking Jordan rather than 
Syria in November 1966, but mostly because of Israel's weak reaction to 
the remilitarisation of Sinai, the withdrawal of UNEF and the closure 
of the Straits. At the beginning of May, Israeli leaders had filled the 
air-waves with dire warnings of retaliatory action against Syria~O so, 
by comparison, the Israeli reaction to Nasser's challenges must have 
appeared timid indeed. Israeli warnings of retaliation. ceased, only to 
be replaced by expressions of anxiety and concern addressed to the Western 
powers and the United Nations. 71 Although Eshkol did order partial 
mobilisation, his first verbal response to the withdrawal of UNEF and 
the massing of Egyptian troops on Israel's border was mild. On 22 May, 
while Nasser was deciding to close the Straits, Eshkol appealed to the 
superpowers for diplomatic action 11 to ensure continuation of the quiet", 
and a restoration of the status quo "on both sides of the border". Far 
from emphasising Israel's deterrent strength or its willingness to 
confront Egypt, Eshkol declared to the Arab states: 
... we harbour no aggressive designs. We have no possible 
interest in violating either their security, their territory 
or their legitimate rights. Nor shall we interfere in any way 
with their internal affairs, their regimes, or their regional 
or international relations. We expect of them, according to 
the principles of recfyrocity, the application of the same 
principles toward us.7Z 
70. See Middle East Record, 1.967, p. 179. 
71. Ibid., p. 194. 
72. Speech of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in the Knesset, 22 May, 1967, in 
Draper, Israel and World Politics, Appendix 17; Cf. Safran, p. 289. 
Instead, Nasser reciprocated by closing the Straits of Tiran to 
Israeli shipping and in so doing issued the challenge to Israel in 
forthright terms - terms intended to be interpreted as coming from a 
leader ready and determined to confront the Jewish state: 
The Jews threaten war. We say they are welcome to war, 
we are ready for war, our armed forces, our people, 
all of us are ready for war, but under no circumstances 
shall we abandon any o.f our rights.73 
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Eshkol's response to this challenge could only be interpreted by Nasser 
as a demonstration of weakness given Israel's earlier warnings about the 
importance of free passage in the Gulf and its declarations that any 
blockade there would be regarded as a casus beUi. 74 On 23 May Eshkol 
again emphasised Israel's reliance upon international action, this time 
to maintain its right to freedom of navigation in the Straits. Although 
he labelled Nasser's action as "an act of aggression against Israel", 
he repeated Israel's readiness "to reduce tension and to consolidate 
• • II 7 5 peace in our region . 
With this confirmation of the apparently·weak-willed nature of the 
Israeli leadership, Nasser set about intimidating it further by 
increasing the threatening tones of his rhetoric and emphasising his 
confidence in Arab strength. On 26 May he declared that Egypt was ready 
to do battle with Israel and, if Israel dared to take any action, there 
would be "total war with the basic objective of destroying Israel, which 
76 
we can do". Concurrently, Heikal argued that war with Israel was now 
inevitable because Egypt had succeeded in challenging Israel's security 
doctrine. To bolster Nasser's bluff he declared that Egypt was ready and 
waiting for just such an attack: "Let Israel begin! Let our second blow 
77 
then be ready! Let it be a knockout'." 
73. Nasser's speech, 22 May, 1967, IDOP_, 1967_, p. 540. 
74. In 1956 one of Israel's reasons for going to war had been Nasser's 
closure of the Straits in 1955. See Safran, pp. 228~9. 
75. Speech of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in the Knesset, 23May, 1967, 
IDOP., 1967_, Document 22, pp. 9-10. 
76. Speech of President Nasser to a Delegation of the Damascus Arab 
Workers Conference, 26 May, 1967, IDOP_, 1967_, Document 326, p. 548. 
77. Al Ah:Y'am_, 26 May, 1967. Most observers have argued that by thi.s stage 
Nasser had become carried away with his rhetoric and the illusion of power 
and was goading Israel into a war. However, by his own account, and by 
the accounts of his biographers, it would appear that Nasser did not believe 
that war was inevitable until 2 June, and rather believed that war might 
still be avoided. It is for this reason that I have argued that his 
rhetoric was designed to make Israel back down rather than go to war on 
the theory that the bigger the bluff the greater the chance of success 
and the greater the self-doubt engendered in the adversary. As Eban 
In gauging Israeli reactions to these threats Nasser was not privy 
to the attitudes of Israel 1 s leaders nor to the content of their 
deliberations. He relied on his own image of the Israeli character and 
his interpretation of press, embassy and intelligence reports, as well 
as the speeches of Israeli leaders. Nasser's articulated image of 
Israel was that of an imperialist pawn, dependent upon the West for its 
. d . d . 7 8 A 11 . l 1 creation an continue existence. sma paria1 state, vast y 
outnumbered by 30 million Arabs, and rent by internal disunity, Israel 
could not hope to stand up to the mobilisation of Arab might and when 
hard-pressed, he believed , like all the other imperialists which 
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h M "ddl E h d k h . . ld 79 H t e i e ast a nown over t e centuries, .it wou retreat. ~asser 
did not seem to understand at all that, as a Jewish state recreated after 
two thousand years of dispersion and oppression and comprising refugees 
from the pogroms, the holocaust, and the Arab states, Israel would 
fight for its survival when threatened,rather than allow its existence 
to be jeopardised. Thus, given this image, Nasser naturally tended to 
heed those indications which confirmed it and to ignore those which 
challenged its validity. 
Thus when Eban departed on 24 May, cap in hand, for the capitals 
of the Western powers, Nasser perceived this action as confirmation of 
Israel's lack of will-power to take matters into its own hands. And 
when his ambassador in Washington reported that on 25 May Eban had told 
Rusk, "Israel is going to be attacked and destroyed today", Nasser must 
have concluded that his threats were having the desired effect, since 
he had no intention of launching an attack. 80 Moreover, Eshkol's speech 
on 28 May could only have provided further confirmation of this trend. 
After all, Eban had returned from his consultations with the Western 
powers and the Israeli Cabinet had since engaged in lengthy deliberations. 
If Israel now showed no sign of a willingness to pick up the gauntlet, 
which Nasser had thrown down by closing the Straits and threatening Israel's 
77. (c:ont inued) commented: nThis showed a curious inability to read the 
Israeli character. Arab leaders here were beginning to believe the 
contemptuous picture they had painted of their adversary." St. John, Eban_, 
p. 435. See Nuttinz, pp. lf08-10; Stephens, p. 481; and Nasser's 23 July 
speech, IDOP_, 1967_, p. 623. 
78. See Nasser's 22 May speech, IDOP_, 1967_, p. 538,and Y. Harkabi, Arab 
Attitudes to Israel_, Jerusalem, 1972, p. 91. 
79. Harkabi, ibid._, pp. 89 and 322-3; Laqueur, The Road to War_, p. 100. 
80. The quote is from Heikal, p. 244. If this was in fact what Kemal had 
reported to Nasser it was an exaggeration, for Eban had only charged that 
Egypt was planning to launch an attack on 27 May. See above, Chapter Two. 
We have already noted that Eban' s alarm had convinced some in Washington that 
Israel feared an Egyptian attack and did not have the will to resist it, 
so it is not at all surprising that Nasser interpreted it in simi:lar terms. 
destruction, then it would surely be safe to conclude that the worst of 
the crisis was over and that Israel would soon back down. So, when 
Eshkol announced in faltering tones that Israel would continue to rely 
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on international action to secure freedom of passage in the Straits and 
demobilisation,nso that we shall not have to take action for self-defence 
with our military forces", Nasser must have thought tl1at his brinkmanship 
~1ad succeeded. 81 E.e could not have known, though he Tiight have guessed 
if he had paid careful attention to the statements of Eshkol and Eban on 
29 and 30 Hay, that the Israeli Cabinet had come close to a decision in 
favour of war and had only decided to wait until ArJerican efforts to 
82 
resolve the crisis had been exhausted. 
Thus, instead of taking a step back from the brink and reducing the 
tension which was rising to breaking point, Nasser, sensing that political 
victory was within his grasp, increased his threats of destruction and 
raised his deY.J.ands on Israel. On 28 Hay, in a press conference, he had 
declared that he would accept no basis "for coexistence with Israel" and 
h d d d d h . f h . 1 f h p 1 . . 83 
. a eman e t. e restoration o t ,e rigats o. Lie a_ estinians. 
Labelling Israel's existence as 11 an aggression", he had stated that under 
no circumstances would he allow Israeli shipping to pass through the 
Gulf. 84 Now, on 29 Hay, following Eshkol's announcement of Israel's 
decision to wait, he reiterated this stance in a speech to the National 
Assembly. Noting that the situation had been restored to what it had 
been before 1956, he claimed that the Palestinian cause could now be 
resurrected and the situation restored to what it had been before ·1948, 
i.e. before the creation of the State of Israel: 
81. Statement by Prime 'Minister Eshkol Broadcast to the Nation, 28 ~fay, 
1967, IDOP_, 196?_, Document 36, p. 23. 
82. On 29 May Eshkol stated that freedom of passage in the Straits was a 
"supreme national interest on which no concession is possible and no 
compromise admissable". He warned that international action to reopen 
the Straits would have to be carried out "in a short time" and that Israel 
was ready and able to protect its rights and "defeat the aggressors". 
Eban reiterated on 30 May that the time factor had to be taken seriously. 
The buildup in Sinai and the blockade would have to be rescinded "in the 
shortest possible time". He.warned Nasser not to assume that what had 
taken ten years of effort could be cancelled in ten minutes, and suggested 
that he take Israeli defence preparations seriously. Speech by Prime 
~1inister Eshkol in the Knesset, 29 Hay, 196 7; and News Conference 
Statements by Foreign Minister Eban, in IDOP_, 196?_, pp. 24-25 and 28, 
83. News Conference Statements by President Nasser, 28 ?lay, 1967, 
IDOP_, 196?, p. 553. 
84. Ibid._, p. 557. 
Our preparations are complete and we are ready to face 
Israel ... we are ready for a confrontation, we are 
ready to raise the whole question of Palestine. Today 
it is not a question of the Gulf of Aqaba ... nor of the 
Emergency Force. It is a question of the rights of 
the people of Palestine ... 85 
Throughout the Arab world Nasser's call for the destruction of Israel 
was echoed with ever greater vehemance. Even Faisal of Saudi Arabia, 
Nasser's sworn enemy, declared that he would be in the vanguard of any 
action against Israel and that there would be no peace until Israel 
ceased to exist. 86 A factor of even greater significance to Israel's 
threat perception was the surprising announcement, on 30 Hay, that 
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Hussein of Jordan had entered into a Joint Defence Agreement with Nasser, 
placing his forces under Egyptian command. The perceived threat to Israel's 
survival had become even more realistic with the spectre of a uar on three 
fronts against an apparently unified Arab world. 87 
Thus, far from intimidating the Israeli leadership into submission, 
Nasser had overplayed his hand and had made war inevitable, for as Eban 
pointed out at the time, Israel was not likely "to cooperate in [its] 
own annihilation". 88 On 1 June, ~foshe Dayan was appointed Israel's Defence 
:Minister in a new government of national unity and, as we have already 
noted, on 3 June the key ministers, taking account of ~asser's threats 
and the deteriorating situation on Israel's borders, as well as other 
considerations, decided to recommend to the full Cabinet that Israel go 
to war. Nasser's threats had helped to forge a united determination to 
resist with force Egyptian encroacho.ent on i·ihat Israel regarded as its 
rights. 
V - THE ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE ISRAEL 
If Nasser's post-war explanations can be believed, he realised on 2 June 
that the political changes in Israel and the Joint Defence agreement with 
85. President ifasser' s speec:i to the National Assenbly, 29 Hay, 1967, 
IDOP, 1967~ p. 564. 
86. Interview Granted by Saudi King Faisal, 31 :t-~ay, 1967, IDOP, 1967~ p. 570. 
For other statements to this effect by Arab leaders see pp. 571 and 575; and 
Middle East Record~ 1967~ pp. 203-4. 
37. As well as the mobilisation of the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian 
forces on Israel's borders, contingents were sent from Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria 
and Sudan. 
88. Cited in St. John, Eban, p. 435. 
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Jordan had made war inevitable. Nasser even warned his officers on that 
89 day that Israel would probably attack the Egyptian Air Force on 5 Jine. 
lfovertheles:_;, while he may have recognised that one of his calculations 
had gone awry, Nasser still seems to have believed that he had succeeded 
in his plan to isolate Israel from its American patron and that therefore, 
even if Israel went to war, it would be unable to secure a military or 
political victory devoid of·American support. As he soon discovered, 
this was no more than an exercise in wishful-thinking, for in his dealings 
with the United States he had overplayed his hand as surely as he had 
overplayed his hand in confronting Israel. Just as in his earlier 
relations with Washington Nasser had neglected to give the Americans 
anything to work with, so too in this crisis did he fail to realise 
that the only way to isolate Israel from its American patron was to hold 
out the prospect of a diplomatic compromise on the disputed issues. 
Because Nasser failed to do this, the Johnson Administration lost faith 
in the idea that diplomacy could solve the crisis and was not only 
prepared to acquiesce in Israel's pre-emption, but was also prepared to 
give political support to Israel. 
Consistent with his image of a weak-willed Israeli leadership, Nasser 
perceived that Israel would not dare to act without the external support 
of imperialism and, if imperialism so desired, it could restrain its 
protege. However, if Israel defied its patrons and this resulted in 
damage to imperialist interests in the region, then the protege would be 
punished and deprived of the fruits of its action. This perception appears 
to have been derived from Nasser's experience in the 1956 Suez crisis when 
Israel had launched a surprise attack on Egypt with French and British 
support and when the United States and the Soviet Union had intervened, 
first to force British withdrawal from Suez, and then to force Israeli 
withdrawal from Sinai. Thus, in his blockade speech of 27 Hay,Nasser 
observed that in 1956 Ben-Gurion had feared the Egyptian Air Force and 
had refused to attack until he had received a written guarantee that France 
would protect Israeli air-space while Britain would bomb Egyptian airfields. 
Nasser argued that if Ben-Gurion had feared Egypt's military strength in 
1956,then Israel's much weaker leadership in 1967 would surely fear 
Egypt's much enhanced military arsenal and would not dare to attack unless 
89. See Nasser's 23 July Speech, and the Battle Order of Field Marshal 
Amer cited in Safran, pp. 301-2. 
90 it was assured of external support. 
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Nasser's task during the crisis was therefore to ensure that Israel 
was deprived of this support. As far as Israel's fonner allies were 
concerned, Nasser had little problem. Britain and France would not 
repeat the debacle of 1956 and De Gaulle had announced that France would 
condemn whichever side fired the first shot (and later imposed an arms 
embargo on Israel before i~ had fired the first shot). Wilson was 
supporting Israel's right to freedom of navigation in the Straits,but he 
had emphasised that Britain would only act in concert with the United 
States. Accordingly, Nasser's attention was focussed upon Washington in 
his attempt to isolate Israel. From Nasser's speeches during the crisis 
he does not appear to have been under any illusion about the state of 
Israeli-American relations. He noted that Israel had received substantial 
arms from the United States, that there was "an alliance" between the two 
countries, that "today Israel is America". 91 He knew that the United 
States was committed to Israel's territorial integrity and, of perhaps 
greater immediate importance, he knew that President Johnson supported 
Israel's right to freedom of navigation in the Straits. For on 23 May 
President Johnson had declared publicly that the blockade of the Gulf 
was an "illegal act" and that the United States would "strongly oppose 
. b . h . II 92 
aggression y anyone 1n t e area • 
Yet, while Nasser had probably not deluded himself about the nature 
of Israel's external support, he had certainly erred in believing that 
he could exercise sufficient leverage over a superpower, which he had. 
already alienated, to deprive Israel of this support without relinquishing 
any of his gains. This is not to suggest that Nasser had no leverage 
with the United States, for he knew that Washington wish to avoid the 
outbreak of hostilities, or a superpower confrontation, or damage to its 
interests in the Arab world. He had the ability, during the crisis, to 
90. Nasser noted that in 1956 Egypt only had a few strategic bombers 
whereas in 1967 it had many. Moreover he argued that in 1956 tl1e. bulk of 
of the Egyptian army had been withdrawn from Sinai to face the British, 
whereas in 1967 the Egyptian forces were "face to face with Israel". 
Nasser's Speech of 22 May, IDOP~ 1967~ p. 538. 
91. Nasser's Speech to the Damascus Arab Workers Conference, 26 May, 1967, 
ibid.~ p. 548. 
92. Ibid.~ p. 11. In his 23 July speech Nasser noted: "It was clear to us 
that when America said she would guarantee the frontiers of all countries 
in this area, and would not allow any changes to be made, she did not mean 
the Arab countries but she meant Israel", 1:bid. ~ p. 623. 
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affect all three considerations. However, by disavowing offensive intentions, 
by raising the spectre of superpower confrontation, and by threatening 
American interests in the Arab world, Nasser could only encourage the 
United States to seek a diplomatic compromise and restrain its Israeli 
prot~g~. Such an exercise of leverage would only be decisive in 
depriving Israel of American support if Nasser convinced Washington that 
he was willing to compromise on the issue of the Straits and the deployment 
of his forces on the Israeli border. For Johnson had made it clear that 
the United States was committed to Israel's right to freedom of navigation 
in the Straits and therefore, in order to forestall hostilities, he would 
have to find some way of alleviating the blockade, obviating the need 
for Israel to take matters into its own hands. If American diplomacy 
failed to elicit such a concession from Nasser, Washington would have 
to find another way out of the crisis, either by using force to reopen the 
Straits, or by acquiescing in Israel's use of force to do so. If the 
United States did not act on its commitment to Israel, its prot~ge would 
take matters into its own hands. Washington would hardly be able to 
reprimand Isra<::'l for doing so since, having recognised Israel's rights, 
Washington would have failed to protect them. 
At the outset of the crisis, Nasser appears to have understood the 
necessity for a demonstration of his flexibility, but as the crisis 
proceeded he deluded himself into believing that the need for compromise 
had been reduced. It was again a case of Nasser only heeding that which 
confirmed, and ignoring those indications which contradicted, his image and 
strategy. And again this was only natural, for Nasser could not afford 
to compromise on what he had declared were Egypt's sovereign rights. If 
he emerged from any negotiations with something less than complete control 
over the Straits of Tiran, his position in the Arab world and between 
the superpowers would again be jeopardised by what would certainly appear 
to be a backing down. He might be able to trade concessions elsewhere, 
but that would hardly solve America's problem, for Israel would not 
compromise on its right to freedom of navigation. In short, there was no 
chance of compromise and Nasser would therefore have been wise not to 
attempt to deprive Israel of its American support. His mistake lay in his 
failure to realise that he no longer retained sufficient leverage with 
the United States to force it to abandon its commitment to its Israeli 
prot~ge once it became clear to decision-makers in Washington that no 
diplomatic compromise was possible. But had Nasser realised that, he would 
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probably not have engaged in brinkmanship in the first place. 
Instead, in the confident belief that his tactical skill would 
enable him to come between Israel and the United States, Nasser began 
to take action with this purpose in mind. At the outset of the crisis, 
on 23 May, he had received a letter from President Johnson and an 
accompanying memorandum explaining Washington's position. Johnson had 
written in friendly tones, ·emphasising his desire for improved relations 
and his interest in Egypt's independence and progress. He had urged 
Nasser to consider any proposals which U Thant might put on his visit to 
Cairo and had also suggested that he might send Vice President Humphrey 
to Egypt for negotiations. 93 The accompanying memorandum went further 
in outlining America's opposition to fedayeen raids, its desire for the 
preservation of peace, its support for U Thant's mission and, most 
importantly, its commitment to freedom of navigation in the Gulf. 94 
Thus, although Washington had restated Johnson's public commitment to 
Israel's right to freedom of navigation, Nasser had good reason to believe 
that the United States was interested in negotiating a compromise through 
the mediation-of U Thant and perhaps its own Vice President. It is 
hardly surprising that Nasser placed more emphasis on the indications of 
Washington's desire for negotiation, than on the restatement of •its 
commitment to Israel. 
U Thant arrived in Cairo on 23 May and held discussions with Nasser 
and Foreign Minister Riad the next day. In these discussions Nasser 
apparently demonstrated some flexibility. He first assured U Thant 
that Egypt would not initiate offensive action against Israel and suggested 
that the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission be revived. 95 On 
the question of the Straits he stood firm by outlining Egypt's general aim 
93. Message from President Johnson to President Nasser asking for a 
relaxation of tension in the area, 23 May 1967, IDOP_, 1967_, pp. 7-8. 
94. Memorandum from the U.S. Government to the U.A.R. Government on the 
Middle East Crisis, 23 May, 1967, ibid._, pp. 8-9. Some accounts claim 
that Ambassador Nolte also had made a number of specific demands on 
Nasser: UNEF should be allowed to remain in Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh 
until a consensus had emerged from the General Assembly; no Egyptian troops 
should occupy Sharm until freedom of navigation had been confirmed; no 
Egyptian troops should enter Gaza; the troops massed in Sinai should return 
to their bases. See Middle East Record_, 1967_, p. 199; Bar-Zohar, p. 83. 
95. What Nasser seems to have had in mind, in suggesting that the Armistice 
Agreement of 1949 be revived, was the section in the agreement which 
stipulated that neither party shall use the territorial waters of the other. 
Egypt claimed the Str~its as its territorial waters. See Nasser's Press 
Conference, 28 May, 1967, IDOP_, 1967_, p. 555. 
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as a "return to the conditions prevailing before 1956". 96 However, Nasser 
has later claimed that he also agreed to U Thant's request for a 
'breathing space' during which Egypt would not stop or search ships 
transiting 
h . 97 s ips. 
the Gulf if Israel did not test the blockade with its own 
If Nasser had indeed agreed to such a proposal it did not appear 
in U Thant's report of his mission, except perhaps in general terms in 
the Secretary General's call to all parties to exercise restraint and 
forgo belligerence. 98 
In any case, this proposal was quickly undone by Egyptian statements. 
When U.S. Ambassador Goldberg took up U Thant's suggestion of non-
belligerency in the Security Counci_l, Egyptian Ambassador El Khony rejected 
the proposal outright and argued t~at Egypt had every right as a belligerent 
to restrict Israeli navigation in t:he Straits. 99 Meanwhile, Egypt 
announced that from 23 May onwards neither Israeli ships nor strategic 
materials bound for Israel would be allowed to pass through the Straits. 
The Egyptian army was ordered to en.force the new regulations while 
Al Ahram reported that ships passing through the Straits would be inspected 
and Egyptian forces would open fire on any ship trying to break the 
blockade. Radio Cairo announced that the Straits had been mined and 
on 24 May warnings were broadcast t:o all ships bound for the Straits_lOO 
Moreover, Nasser made quite cLear, in public statements, that he 
would not brook any compromise on t=he issues of the Straits and the return 
96. Cited in Stephens, Nasser, p. !+78; Cf. Middle East Record, 1.967_, p. 198. 
97. See Nasser's speech on 23 July, 1967; Heikal, The Cairo Docwnents_, 
p. 243. 
98. See the Report of Secretary General U Thant to the Security Council, 
26 May, 1967, UN Document, S/7906, p. 5. 
99. Arthur Lall, The UN and the M£ddle East Crisis of 1967_, pp. 33-6. 
100. Middle East Record_, 1967_, p. 198. It has been suggested that Nasser 
never ruled out the possibility of allowing non-Israeli ships carrying 
non-strategic cargoes through the blockade. But that could hardly be 
regarded as a demonstration of flexibility given the fact that most of 
Israel's oil came through the Stra~ts. Was oil a strategic cargo? This 
was never made clear, but Nasser did make clear that strategic cargoes 
would be prohibited. See Nasser's Press Conference, 28 May, 1967, IDOP~ 1.967_, 
p. 556. Riad is reported to have stated that while the passage of 
Israeli ships would be regarded as "an aggression" the passage of non-
Israeli ships with strategic cargoes '>·Jould be regarded merely as "an 
uncordial act". Cited in Burdett, p. 279. If this was a genuine desire for 
compromise, rather than a public relations ploy, Nasser should have made 
his position clearer and should have seen to it that Egypt's official and 
semi-official media did not trumpet the measures supposedly taken to put 
the blockade into effect against all shipping bound for Israel. 
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of UNEF. On 26 May he declared: "We shall not relinquish our rights in 
the Gulf Of Aqaba" _ lOl A d 28 M h d h h . f h 
 .n on ay estate tat on t e issues o t ~ 
Straits and UNEF "there can be no argument whatsoever". 
to say: 
The peace-keeping forces are finished, gone for good: 
they won't come back again ... Under no circumstances 
[will] Israeli shipping ... pass through Egyptian 
territorial waters. This is a position I will not 
retreat from a single .inch.102 
He went on 
Instead, Nasser suggested that the right of the Palestinians to return 
to their homes was the only appropriate subject for negotiation. 
Meanwhile, Nasser sought to isolate Israel by applying direct 
pressure on the United States; something which he could not achieve by 
refusing to demonstrate flexibility on the issue of freedom of navigation. 
The most important thing was to assure the United States that he had no 
offensive intentions so that Washington should therefore concentrate its 
efforts on restraining Israel if it wanted to avoid hostilities. If 
Israel defied the United States and attacked Egypt, then his disavowal 
of offensive intentions would deprive the United States of a pretext 
for intervention on behalf of its client. Israel would incur the onus 
of aggression and would, he hoped, be condemned by Washington. 
Accordingly, Nasser decided to forgo an Egyptian first strike and await 
Israel's attack, if it indeed came. Some of his officers were unhappy with 
this decision but he and Amer convinced them of the wisdom of not 
providing the United States with a pretext. Thus Badran has recounted 
how Amer persuaded Mahmud, the commander of the Air Force, who had wanted 
to strike first, by asking him: "Would you like to mount the first strike 
and face America, or prefer to receive the first strike and face Israel 
only? 11103 Nasser has also testified to this argument in his 23 July 
explanation: 
... we knew, particularly in view of the international 
situation, that we absolutely had to keep from firing 
the first shot. Had we done that we should have 
exposed ourselves to disastrous consequences, which it 
was beyond our power to endure. The first thing we 
should have had to face was direct American military 
action against us, on the pretext that it was we who 
had fired the first shot.104 
101. IDOP~ 1967., p, 549. 
102. Ibid . ., pp. 550 and 557. 
103. Cited in Draper, "From 1967 to 1973: The Arab-Israeli Wars", 
Corrmentary~ December, 1973, p. 34; Cf. Burdett, p. 241. 
104. IDOP~ 1967.J p. 622. 
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Nasser's decision not to commence hostilities was conveyed directly 
to Washington on 26 May, when Ambassador Kemal assured Rostow that Eban's 
report of an imminent Egyptian attack was untrue and that Egypt would 
1 h ff · · I 1 lOS l . 1 not aunc an o ensive against srae . T1is intention was a so 
announced publicly at Nasser's press conference on 28 lfay: "We are 
leaving the initiative to Israel; if she wants to respond, with or without 
f f h d .. 106 
-orce, to our exercise o our rig ts, we are rea y ..• 
This tactical sacrifice was not the only means for pressuring 
Washington not to support Israel. Nasser also threatened American 
interests in the Arab world in order to make Washington more reluctant to 
underwrite Israel's rights. In his speech to the Arab Workers' Conference 
on 26 May, while noting the revival of Arab solidarity, Nasser declared 
that "America is the enemy of the Arabs, for she is completely aligned 
with Israel". He called upon his Arab brothers to treat the United 
States as their enemy •.• 
.•• and we can treat them like this because we are not countries 
with no weight, worthless countries. On the contrary we are 
countries of importance, located in an important part of the 
world. 107 
Nasser went further in his press conference on 28 May, which he 
devoted almost entirely to American policy. He warned that if a power 
"however mighty" challenged Egyptian sovereignty, such a move would be 
regarded as an act of aggression, not only against Egypt, but also against 
the "whole Arab nation" and would do the aggressors "greater harm than they 
can possibly conceive" 108 Assuming the mantle of spokesman for the Arab 
world he warned: 
In these coming days the Arab world will learn who are 
its friends and its enemies, and its future conduct 109 
will be based on the conduct of its enemies and friends. · 
105. Lacouture, p. 308; Nutting, p. 411. 
106. IDOP, 196?_, p. 563. Nasser stated earlier in the press conference: 
'' ... we are now waiting to see what Israel will do ... If Israel wants war .•• 
she is welcome to war". Ibid., p. 554. 
107. Ibid., p. 548. This threat was reinforced by Jum'ah, the Prime 
Minister of Jordan - America's most reliable client in the Arab world. On 
27 May he declared: " ... the U.S. has adopted an attitude which, if it is 
maintained, bodes much ill for the future of American relations with the 
Arab world. The Arabs, in whatever country they live, call on America in 
this critical situation not to adopt an attitude of support for baseless 
Israeli claims of hostility to the whole Arab nation. The Arab countries, 
united in their support for the cause of Palestine, will never forgive such 
an attitude of support for Israel on the part of the United States ... " 
See statement by Jordanian Premier Jum'ah, 27 May, 1967, IDOP, 1967,p. 549. 
108. Ibid., p. 550. 
109. Ibid., p. 556. 
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He then called upon the United States riot to align itself with Israel, 
claimed that the only problem in Arab-American relations was the Jewish 
state, and that as a result of this alignment "America intends to injure 
the whole Arab nation". Having raised the stick of Arab enmity, Nasser 
then waved the carrot of Arab friendship by declaring that the United 
States could play a "major role in the Middle East", and that the Arab 
world was ready to be "extremely friendly with America" if Washington 
would only take a just view of things and not support or align itself 
with Israel. Hoping that the United States would revert to its 1956 
policy he noted that all Washington had to do was to behave as Eisenhower 
110 had behaved and its position in theArab world would be enhanced. 
Finally, sensing that the United States might restrain Israel and 
be more reluctant to intervene in support of Israel's rights if it 
thought that hostilities in the Middle East could lead to a superpower 
confrontation , Nasser sought to use the support of his Soviet patron 
to raise this spectre. On 23 May, Moscow had released its first 
statement on the crisis since Nasser's closure of the Straits. While 
making no mention of the blockade it declared that any aggression in the 
Middle East would be met "not only with the united strength of Arab 
countries, but also with strong opposition to aggression from the Soviet 
• II 111 Union and all peace-loving states . Although Moscow had clearly drawn 
a distinction between the "united strength" of the Arabs and the "strong 
opposition" of the Soviet Union, Nasser ignored the caution of his patron 
and blandly declared on 26 May that the Soviet Union would not only 
resist "with the Arabs" any aggression, it would also resist any 
"interference". In his press conference on 28 May he repeated this claim 
of Soviet readiness to oppose any external intervention: 
The USSR has supported us and issued a statement saying 
that the Arab countries will not be alone, and that the 
USSR will resist any interference.112 
In his speech to the National Assembly.on 29 May, he went still further 
in claiming that the Soviet Union was prepared to confront the United 
States if it interfered in support of Israel's rights in the Gulf. Having 
again threatened America with Arab enmity if it aligned with Israel and 
110. Ibid.,- pp. 556-564. 
111. Statement by the Soviet Government on the Middle East Situation, 
23 May, 1967, ibid., p. 12. 
112. Ibid., p. 556. 
266 
continued to ignore the whole Arab nation, he went on to read a letter from 
Kosygin which supposedly had been delivered by Badran on his return from 
consultations in Moscow the previous day: 
..• Mr Kosygin ... says that the Soviet Union supports us in 
this conflict, and will allow no country to interfere until 
the situation returns to what it was before 1956.113 
Nasser thanked the Soviet Union for this support and then directly raised 
the spectre of superpower confrontation by declaring that he did not 
want the Soviet Union to intervene "because we do not want a confrontation 
that might lead to a world war 11 • 114 
Washington displayed a mixed response to these pressures. The State 
Department was certainly sensitive to Nasser's threats of damage to 
America's interests in the Arab world and its officers accordingly urged 
the President to pursue a compromise settlement which would modify 
Israel's right to freedom of navigation. However, the locus of decision-
making had been transferred to the White House where the President 
and his advisors were concentrating on ways to fulfil America's commitment 
to Israel. Nasser's warning that the Soviet Union would oppose outside 
interference was not taken seriously because Johnson had been in direct 
communication with Kosygin and had been assured that the Soviet Union 
would work for a peaceful settlement. The Egyptian commitment not to 
commence hostilities had produced the desired effect since Washington had 
been leaning heavily on Israel not to pre-empt. But Israel had made it 
clear that it would take matters into its own hands if the United States 
proved incapable of alleviating the blockade. Thus when Israel decided, 
on 28 May, upon American urging, to wait "a week or two" for the United 
States to try to resolve the crisis, Washington embarked on a new attempt 
to make its diplomacy work. As· we have already noted, Nasser by this 
stage had ruled out any compromise on freedom of navigation in the Straits, 
and had raised his demands to a renegotiation of the whole Palestine 
question. At the same time, Israel had refused any suggestion of accepting 
a compromise on its right to freedom of navigation. Since Israel, not 
Egypt, was threatening to go to war, and since the United States was 
committed to Israel's rather than Egypt's rights, Washington could only 
hope to forestall hostilities by persuading Nasser to alleviate the blockade. 
113. Ibid., p. 565. 
114. Ibid. 
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Thus, if Nasser had appraised the situation realistically he should have 
now taken a step back from the brink and encouraged the belief in 
Washington that a compromise was in the offing. Unfortunately Nasser 
believed that events were moving in his favour and therefore ignored his 
last chance to salvage something from his KPiegspieZ when Washington 
launched a new effort to negotiate with him at the end of May. 
On 31 May Robert Anderson, a special envoy from President Johnson, 
arrived in Cairo and met with Nasser. After a lengthy discussion in 
which Anderson found Nasser intransigent on the issue of the Straits, ·it 
was agreed that Vice President Mohieddin would be sent to Washington for 
talks with Johnson on 7 June. 115 Meanwhile, the State Department had sent 
Charles Yost to Cairo (apparently at the suggestion of the Egyptian 
Ambassador in Washington) to take over discussions from the inexperienced 
N 1 h h d 1 . k h' .d . b d ll6 y o te w o a on y JUSt ta en up J_s u ties as am assa or. ost was 
unable to see Nasser, but on 1 June he met with Foreign Minister Riad and 
specifically questioned Egypt's willingness to compromise. Riad 
suggested a number of ideas which might be negotiated when Mohieddin 
arrived in Washington: an agreement akin to the Battle Act, restricting 
the blockade to strategic cargo, or a decision by the World Court on the 
status of the Straits. 117 However, it was clear to Yost that Egypt was 
not prepared to take any immediate action to "revoke, suspend or moderate 
the blockade" and unless some such action was mooted Israel was likely to 
k · . h d ll3 H d N h . ta e matters into its own an s. a asser at t is stage sent 
Anderson and Yost away with an impression of his flexibility on the question 
of the blockade, Washington might well have been more willing to restrain 
Israel, and might .well have regarded Israeli action as precipitate and 
condemned it as such. However, as matters now stood, Nasser had made 
action by the multilateral fleet a necessity and if this effort failed 
then Washington would have no alternative but to acquiesce in Israel's use 
of force. 
115. Heikal, The Cairo Docwnents, p. 245; Bar-Zohar, p. 168. 
116. Laqueur, The Road to War, p. 193. 
117. Nutting, .p. 413; Stephens, p. 489; Lacouture, p. 307; Bar-Z6har, p. 167. 
118. Charles Yost, "The Arab-Israeli W:-ir: Ilow it Began", p. 316. 
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With the Arab world uniting behind him Nasser obviously felt unwilling, 
and perhaps unable, to compromise on the issue of the Straits. He may 
have also believed that there was no need at this stage to show 
flexibility because the United States was still interested in negotiation 
and there would be time to discuss these matters when Mohieddin visited 
Washington. As Nasser later declared: 
... there was wide-scale political and diplomatic activity 
which entitled us to believe that the explosion was not 
close at hand. 120 
Even when he realised on 2 June that Israel would have to go to war, he 
still felt confident that if Israel fired the first shot while Washington 
was apparently still interested in compromise, his plan for isolating 
Israel would yet succeed even if his plan for intimidating Israel's 
leadership had failed. 
Thus on 2 June Nasser replied to Johnson's letter of 23 May and, 
consistent with his statements on previous occasions, gave Johnson nothing 
to work with at a time when the American President was preoccupied with 
reopening the Straits. The letter was written in friendly tones with the 
notable absence of the threats which Nasser had used in his public 
statements about American policy. Nevertheless, he outlined the course 
of events from his Egyptian viewpoint: Sinai had been rernilitarised to 
deter Israel from attacking Syria; UNEF had been withdrawn for its own 
safety; once Sharm el-Sheikh was occupied logic dictated the exercise of 
Egypt's sovereign rights. As far as the blockade was concerned, it 
eliminated "the last consequences of the Tripartite Aggression in conformity 
with the principle that the aggressor must not be rewarded for his 
aggressio~'. Egypt's right to prevent the passage of Israeli shipping 
or strategic materials bound for Israel was, Nasser wrote, 11 quite 
indisputable". He made it clear that there was nothing to discuss on 
this issue and nothing to justify the atmosphere of crisis, but the issues 
which did concern him and needed to be discussed were the rights of the 
people of Palestine and Israel's constant violation of the Armistice 
121 
Agreements. Finally, he stated that he would be glad to receive Humphrey 
120. Nasser's 23 July Speech, IDOP~ 1.96?~ p. 622. 
121. As for Johnson's call for the avoidance of military action, Nasser 
claimed that Egyptian forces had "never started any aggression" and as 
for the President's objection to the fedayeen riads, Nasser absolved any 
government of responsibility because it could not control the anger of the 
Palestinians and their desire to return to their homes. 
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and was ready to send Mohieddin to Washington immediately "to explain 
f II 122 our point o view to you . 
Clearly, Nasser was confident that he was entering into a new dialogue 
with the United States, a dialogue which, at the outset, only required 
an outline of Egypt's general position - specific issues could be dealt 
with in future discussions.· Even if Israel launched war, as Nasser 
later claimed he believed they would, the fact that he had now agreed to 
negotiations with the United States would surely convince Washington that 
Israel was again the aggressor, as in 1956. However, in Washington, 
decision-makers were taking a rather different view of the situation. 
The failure of the Anderson-Yost mission had meant that unless an 
international flotilla could be sent through the Straits to break the 
blockade, the United States would be left with only one option: to allow 
Israel to deal with the blockade on its own. 
Nasser was not about to countenance any interference by an international 
fleet with Egypt's rights and therefore set about discouraging any such 
action to reopen the Straits. In his press conference on 28 May he 
issued a warning that any attempt to infringe Egyptian territorial rights 
in the Gulf would be "an aggression against the Egyptian people and the 
whole Arab nation". He also declared that "if the United States interferes 
with our sovereignty we shall resist such interference with all our 
strength", and issued a general warning that "in case another country 
intervenes, there will be no Suez Canal" 123 In the Pentagon, the fear 
that Egypt would fire on a fleet which attempted to test the blockade had 
convinced those with resp<;nsibility for organising this fleet that it. 
should be cancelled in order to avoid any American involvement in conflict 
with Egypt. It is not possible to ascertain what role Nasser's threats 
played in the decisions of other countries not to participate in the 
international flotilla, but by 3 June there were only five nations 
prepared to entertain the idea,or even sign a declaration that the Straits 
were an international waterway. 
122. Letter from President Nasser to President Johnson, 2 June, 1967, 
IDOP, 1967, pp. 573-5. 
123. Ibid., pp. 552 and 557. 
270 
Thus by 4 June, the idea of an international fleet aimed at testing 
the blockade had collapsed. Nevertheless, with both the United States 
and Britain now placing .emphasis on the United Nations as the appropriate 
forum for international action, Nasser again contributed a warning aimed 
at discouraging any such moves, especially a maritime declaration, which 
was now Washington's only remaining, and rather forlorn, hope that 
diplomacy might extinguish the crisis. Nasser declared: 
•.. we shall not recognise any statement by the maritime 
nations, and shall regard any such statement as an act 
of aggression against our sovereignty and our legitimate 
rights. We shall regard such action as the prelude to 
hostilities, and we shall resist all aggression _124 
For good measure, and to ensure that nobody was under the misapprehension 
that Egypt was willing to compromise on the issue, he added: 
As for talk 
we say that 
Aqaba, and 
about freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, 
we have recovered our rights in the Gulf of 125 
that no power on earth can deprive us of them. 
By this stage, however, the "Watch" comnittee in the Wbite House 
had already decided that there was little alternative to acquiescing in 
Israeli action to reopen the Straits, and little purpose to be served 
by further attempts at diplomacy. If Hohieddin's visit had held out 
any hope that the blockade might be moderated, and it was only a faint 
glinuner at the time of Anderson's report on his talks in Cairo, Nasser's 
subsequent letter and statements had ensured that this glimmer had 
faded. 126 With the collapse of the international fleet and strong 
domestic and bureaucratic opposition to unilateral action to reopen 
the Straits, the President and his advisors were realising that their 
conunitment to Israel's freedom of navigation could best be met by 
allowing Israel to deal with the situation on its own, free of outside 
interference. Thus on the eve of Israel's pre-emptive strike the 
Egyptian and American perceptions of what the United States should or 
would do in the event of hostilities had seriously diverged. While 
124. Speech of President Nasser after Iraq's Accession to the Joint 
Defence Agreement, 4 June, 1967, ibid., p. 578. 
125. Ibid. 
126. Johnson noted that he did not view Mcl1ieddin's forthcoming visit 
with any optimism be.cause he had assessed that persuading Nasser "to 
reverse himself and reopen Aqaba would not be easy". Johnson, The Vantage 
Point, p. 295. 
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Washington felt that Nasser had overplayed his hand, Nasser believed 
that he had only just started playing and that with war new opportunities 
would open up in the politics of patronage. 
VI - THE FAILURE TO RESIST ISRAEL 
If Nasser's post-war claims can be believed, he now regarded war 
as inevitable and was expe~ting an Israeli air strike on the morning of 
5 June. Yet Nasser approached Egypt's demise with apparent complacency, 
for he believed that even if his first assumption about Israel's will-
power had proved invalid, his second assumption about isolating Israel 
127 had now been proved correct. Therefore, he was confident that his 
third assumption, that if Israel fought a war in isolation it would be 
unlikely to win anything more than a limited victory which would be 
undone by international action, would now be confirmed. The validity of 
this third assumption was now crucial, for if Egypt proved unable to 
resist Israel on the battlefield, and Israel were able to win a decisive 
victory, then Nasser might well lose all that he had gained in the last 
days of May, and more. If international action were not forthcoming and 
Israel were not pressured into withdrawal, then all Nasser's calculations 
would have gone awry and Egypt would have to face the political 
consequences of its.military defeat. Nasser had always regarded war as 
an extension of politics and he was depending upon politics to undo 
any military defeat which Egypt might suffer. But this time both war 
and politics were on Israel's side, for not only would it prove capable 
of destroying Egypt's forces, it would also prove capable of maintaining 
American political support and therefore capable of resisting Egyptian 
and Soviet demands for withdrawal. 
What went wrong with Nasser's third assumption? On the military 
level he made the mistake of believing the estimates of his General 
Staff. Badran and Amer had assured him that Egypt's numerical superiority 
on the ground and in the air would enable successful resistance. Badran's 
confidence is illustrated by his testimony after the war when one 
127. Nutting claims that Nasser's complacency was based on the belief 
that Israel would not fight without external support, that Washingt.on 
would be able to restrain Israel, and that his forces could in any case 
match Israel's. See Nutting, pp. 408-410. 
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might have expected him to be more circumspect about his miscalculation: 
We were confident that our army was ready and that Israel 
could not attack because intelligence estimates pointed to 
the fact that we were superior in armored weapons, artillery 
and air power. It was calculated that Israel would not 
walk into an open grave •.. No one believed that the Jews 
would be so capable of undertaking the operation against 
us because of our superiority in weapons and air power 
and our excellent plan which would have obstructed any 
confrontation. 128 · 
Amer's Battle Order Number 2, issued to his forces on 2 June, and 
containing a warning that Israel would attack within the next two 
weeks, illustrates his confidence in the face of the imminent onslaught: 
Our objective is to defeat the main forces of the Israeli 
army. Our armed forces, in terms of their numbers and 
the means at their disposal, can fulfil this task. 129 
But perhaps most disastrous of all was Commander of the Air Force Mahmud's 
estimate that the Air Force would only suffer a loss of 20% from an 
Israeli first-strike. 
That Nasser accepted these estimates is evident from his decision 
to absorb the costs of an Israeli first strike and his shock when the 
actual results became known. So surprised was he that Israel had been 
able to render his air force ineffective in a matter of hours that he 
refused to believe that Israel had been unaided. On 7 June he told 
Hussein that "the enemy attacked all our airfields in far greater number 
h d f Ii 130 t an allowe by our estimate o his air strength . On 9 June, in his 
resignation speech, Nasser charged that Israel was operating with an 
air force three times its normal strength - i.e. three times Egypt's 
131 
estimate of Israel's strength. 
128. Cited in Burdett, pp. 240-1. 
129. Cited in Safran, p. 302. 
130. Cable from President Nasser to King Hussein on the Progress of 
Hostilities, 7 June, 1967, IDOP, 196?, pp. 592-3. 
131. Ibid., p. 597. In this speech Nasser also explains that he had 
calculated that Israel would have had to devote aircraft to air defence 
because of Egypt's strategic bomber force. Accordingly, he believed it 
impossible for the IAF to attack all Egypt's airfields simultaneously. 
Evidence for this calculation also comes from Nutting who recounts that 
thirty-six hours before the war Nasser told him that the IAF was no 
match for the Egyptian Air Force and that the Israeli army would therefore 
be exposed to air-attacks as it entered Sinai. In November 1967 Nasser 
blamed the commander of the Air Force for bis miscalculation: " ... the 
command of the air force evaluated the situation wrongly. It was responsible 
for the disaster that befell the air force on the morning of the 5th, and 
consequently, it was responsible for the outcome of the war". Nutting, 
pp. 408-9; President Nasser's Speech to the National Assenbly, 23 November, 
1967, IDOP, 1967, p. 704. 
He went on to say: 
A careful appraisal of the strength of the eneriy had 
convinced us that, given the standard of the equipment 
they possessed and the training they had received, our 
armed forces were capable of resisting and repelling 
him.132 
Thus, having miscalculated the relative strengths of the Egyptian 
and Israeli forces, Nasser had gone on to calculate that Israel might 
only achieve success on the battlefield if it had the military support 
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of the United States. As we have seen, Nasser concentrated his diplomatic 
efforts on ensuring that Israel would be denied this support. Part of 
the calculation had been that if Israel struck first the United States 
would be denied a pretext for intervention, but Nasser was also relying 
upon the Soviet Union to deter American intervention. By 2 June Nasser 
clearly believed that the Soviet Union's support for Egypt had achieved 
this end. In his Battle Order issued on that day, Amer revealed the 
thinking of the Egyptian leadership: 
It is now clear, ... that in view of the strong position 
of the government of the Soviet Union and its 
readiness to intervene immediately if any big power 
should go to war against Egypt, it is no longer to be 
expected under any circumstances that the United 
States government should join in a military 
adventure on Israel's side.133 
Because Nasser had assumed that he would only need the support of the 
Soviet Union to deter American intervention he appears to have ignored 
the fact that he might need Soviet military intervention to protect his 
forces from the advance of the Israelis, and had therefore done nothing 
to ensure such support. In any case it should have been clear to Nasser, 
by the time Israel struck, that the Soviet Union was keen to avoid 
hostilities and could not be counted on for any such intervention. On 
27 May the Soviet ambassador had woken Nasser in the middle of the 
night and had warned him not to commence hostilities because it would 
place Egypt in an untenable political situation. When Badran visited 
:Moscow, on 28 Hay, what Kosygin told him was very different to what Nasser 
had later claimed in his speech on 29 May. According to Heikal, Kosygin 
had warned Badran that Egypt had gained its point and won a political 
• " • • • • 1 1. . 11 ,. 134 victory, so it is time now to compromise, to worK po itica y·. 
132. Ibid., p. 597. 
133. Cited in Safran, p. 302. 
134. Heikal, 'l'he Cairo Docwnents, p. 242. 
Thinking that Soviet support was.only necessary to deter the United 
States, Nasser ignored Moscow's wavering and exaggerated the extent 
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of Moscow's commitment. But he must have known that Soviet support would 
135 be limited to the political sphere. 
Before the war this change in Moscow's position, from one of 
encouragement prior to the remilitarisation of Sinai, to one of 
advising restraint and comp-romise after the blockade of the Straits, 
presented Nasser with neither cause for alarm nor cause for reconsideration, 
because Moscow was committed to its client and could hardly back away 
from Egypt's political position without a serious loss of prestige and 
reputation. However, on the military level, once the Egyptian Air 
Force had been all but destroyed on the ground in the first few hours 
of hostilities, Soviet military support represented the only way that 
the situation on the battlefield could be prevented from deteriorating 
into a total defeat. Theoretically, there were two ways in which the 
Soviet Union might have assisted Nasser during the war: by immediate 
resupply of aircraft; and by threatening military intervention or 
actually intervening if the Israelis did not cease firing. 136 That the 
Soviet Union was not prepared to offer assistance in either of these 
ways demonstrates, in stark terms, the consequences of Nasser's 
dependence upon his Soviet patron. Having encouraged Nasser to remilitarise 
Sinai, the Soviets bore a serious responsibility for what ensued, even if 
they had not been consulted about the closure of the Straits, and even 
if they had urged Nasser to exercise restraint. Nevertheless, they were 
neither sufficiently concerned about their loss of face, nor about the 
imminent defeat of their Egyptian client, to offer military assistance 
or to threaten intervention. 
135. Heikal recounts that Badran was responsible for giving Nasser the 
impression that Moscow would back Egypt to the hilt. However, when 
el Fekki, the man who had taken the minutes of the meeting with Kosygin, 
heard Nasser's speech claiming that the Soviet Union would not allow any 
country to interfere until the situation returned to what it had been 
before 1956, he sent Nasser the minutes and suggested that he read then. 
Ibid. 
136. According to the Churchills onlylOO of Egypt's 350 pilots were killed 
in the Israeli strike. Thus, theoretically, Soviet re-supply of aircraft 
might have enabled Egypt to fly air-cover for its ground forces. In 
practice, the IAF would have probably destroyed these aircraft as well 
since, according to Israeli figures, in the air-to-air combat which 
actually took place fifty Egyptian MIGs were shot down for the loss of no 
Israeli Mirages. Randolph and Winston Churchill, 1'he Six Day War., London, 
1967, pp. 89 and 91; Glassman, Arms for the Arabs., p. 46. 
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Egypt's inability to gain immediate Soviet resupply of weapons,or 
Soviet intervention,can partly be explained by the sudden collapse of the 
Egyptian forces and the acceptance of a cease-fire by Israel 
because it had been able to achieve its objectives in such a short time. 
The Soviet Union had apparently concurred with Nasser's assessment that 
immediate hostilities wereunlikely and that in the unexpected event of 
such hostilities Egypt had ·the ability to resist the Israeli attack. 
In these circumstances, Moscow had probably not seriously considered the 
logistical problems involved in resupply until the destruction of the 
Egyptian Air Force on June 5. 137 Nasser himself did not learn about the 
true extent of Egypt's setback until the evening of 5 June because 
Amer had withheld reports from the battle-front and had issued false 
communiques about Egyptian advances~38Thus valuable time for pressuring 
the Soviet Union into resupply was lost because Nasser was unaware of the 
seriousness of the situation. As for military intervention, the Soviet 
Union would have had to have a pretext for such a move and had it wanted 
to intervene, which is unlikely, Israel's acceptance of a cease-fire on 
6 June, and its implementation on 8 June, deprived the Soviet Union of 
any such pretext. 
Notwithstanding these considerations, the main reason for Soviet 
unwillingness to support Egypt militarily was the fear of a possible 
confrontation with the United States. Thus Nasser is reported to have 
told one of his associates that, after Israel attacked, the Russians 
"had been frozen into immobility by their fear of a confrontation with 
.America". The Soviet Union had apparently considered sending replacement 
aircraft first directly, then through Yugoslavia, but feared that they 
might be intercepted by aircraft from the Sixth Fleet. 139 Moreover, 
when Egypt charged, on 6 June, that American and British planes had 
d d f I 1 d f . s· .140 h . provi e air cover or srae i groun orces in inai, t ese accusations 
were apparently angrily rejected by the Soviet Union on the basis of a 
message received from Washington. According to one report, Moscow accused 
137. The Soviet resupply effort did not begin until two weeks after the 
war had ended. Glassman, ibid.~ p. 53. 
13.8. See Nutting, p. 419; Heikal, p. 247. 
139. Arms had apparently been dispatched by sea before the war started 
but the ship supposedly turned back for fear of Israeli bombing. See 
Nutting, p. 419. 
140. See Middle East Record~ 1967~ pp. 242-3. 
Cairo of attempting to draw it into conflict with the United States 
"on charges that have absolutely no basis in truth11 • 141 
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At this stage,Nasser apparently believed sincerely that there had 
been collusion between the United States and Israel and therefore sought 
· S · 142 B h" d f an appropriate oviet response. ut t is attempte exercise o 
leverage failed, simply because the Soviet Union was not willing to 
confront the United States ·on behalf of its Egyptian client. Had there 
been a serious possibility that Egypt might fall into America's sphere· 
of influence as a result of the war, either through the replacement of 
Nasser with an anti-Soviet leader, or through an exchange of patrons by 
Nasser, the Soviet Union might have been more anxious about its future 
position of influence in Cairo, and therefore more willing to risk 
confrontation with the United States on behalf of its Egyptian client. 
However, Nasser was already heavily dependent upon the Soviet Union. 
and would become even more dependent, as a result of Egypt's defeat, 
on Soviet political support and military assistance in the future. The 
risk of Nasser changing patrons was non-existent because, in the process 
of charging the United States with collusion, Egypt had broken relations 
with Washington and had closed the Suez Canal. With Nasser blaming 
the United States for Egypt's debacle, relations with the United States 
had reached their nadir, so the threat to the Soviet position in Egypt 
was minimal. The threat could only come from the replacement of Nasser 
by an anti-Soviet leader and, although this could not be ruled out as 
a possibility, it was more likely that any replacement for Nasser would 
also view American action during the crisis critically. In any case 
this threat encouraged Moscow to seek an immediate cease-fire which would 
obviate the need for Soviet intervention to protect the regime of its 
client. When the cease-fire went into effect, any intervention on the 
military level became unnecessary. 
The Soviet leaders had exhibited a strong interest in preventing 
a disruption of relations with the United States since the outset of the 
crisis over the Straits. On 22 May Johnson had sent a message .to 
Kosygin urging a joint effort to calm the sitliation and warning that the 
ties of the superpowers to their respective clients in the region could 
142. Heikal recounts that Nasser was at first sceptical of American 
involvement, but when he received reports of two American fighters flying 
over Egyptian positions, together with an explanation from Kosygin that they 
were going to the aid of the American communications ship Liberty (which 
had been attacked by Israeli aircraft) he suspected that the United States 
was attempting to blind the Soviet Union to an operation which had been 
b . l . d. ff. 1 . 143 Tl S . h d d d b. . ring t 1em into i ·icu ties. 1e oviets . a respon e y assuring 
f "f . " 144 A 1 d Johnson o their irm interest in preserving peace . · s a rea y 
noted, in response to a request from Johnson to restrain Egypt, Moscow 
had warned Nasser, on 27 May, not to commence hostilities. At the same 
time, Moscow did its duty by Egypt in warning Johnson that the Soviet 
145 Union would come to the aid of the Arabs if they were attacked. 
However, once war had broken out, Kosygin activated the "hot line" for 
the first time to assure Johnson that the Soviet Union had no intention 
of becoming militarily involved in the fighting and would work for a 
146 
cease-fire. Egypt's plight failed to alter this Soviet attitude and 
its support, as we shall see, was confined to the political level. In 
short, the Soviet Union exhibited a greater interest in preventing a 
superpower confrontation than it did in preventing an Egyptian def eat 
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and this attitude can only be explained by the fact that the Soviet Union 
did not regard its interests in Egypt as sufficiently threatened by 
the prospect of an Egyptian defeat. Thus Nasser lacked the leverage over 
his Soviet patron to involve it in hostilities against its wilL 147 
If the sudden collapse of the Egyptian forces and Soviet reluctance 
to support Egypt militarily had confounded Nasser's calculations on the 
military level, he was to be even more seriously disappointed by his 
failure on the political level, where his attention had been focused 
throughout the crisis, and where he had confidently believed that any 
military setback would be redressed by international action to deprive 
142. (continued) conducted against Egypt: "He did not know exactly how 
they were involved, but everything pointed toward it and he reasoned 
that as we had not learned the full facts of the British and French 
collusion with Israel until four or five years after Suez, so American 
collusion could also be shrouded in mystery". See Heikal, The Cairo 
Documents, pp. 247-8. 
143. The text of the message is in Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 291. 
144. M1:ddle East Record,· 1967, p. 196. 
145. This warning was mentioned by Johnson in his letter to Eshkol on 
28 May. See above, Chapter Two. 
146. Johnson, p. 298; Middle East Record., 1967, p. 235. 
147. Perhaps surprisingly, this was not the case in regard to Syria, where 
the Soviet Union was prepared to threaten intervention to stop the Israeli 
advance. However, here the Soviet Union perceived a real threat to the 
regime in Damascus, on whose behalf it had promoted the crisis in the 
first place, and here political efforts to enforce a cease-fire had not 
stopped the Israelis. However, as we shall see, in Sinai Israel had 
already achieved its objectives by the time the United Nations had passed 
a cease-fire resolution and had stopped its advance as soon as Egypt 
agreed to cease firing. 
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·Israel of its military gains. For, on the political level, Nasser was 
soon to discover that American policy supported Israel despite the fact 
that it had struck first and despite the fact that such a policy would 
cost the United States dearly in terms of its influence in the Arab world. 
Part of the explanation lies in Israeli adeptness in securing American 
support, but Nasser's own actions during the crisis had helped to 
consolidate this support. And in the final analysis, just as Nasser 
lacked the leverage to gain Soviet military support during the war, so 
too did he lack the leverage to gain American political support after 
the war. 
As already noted, while Nasser had been concentrating, during the 
crisis, on isolating Israel from its American patron, the United States 
had been working at cross purposes in seeking ways to fulfil its commitment 
to Israel. Thus, whereas Nasser had expected that his forswearing of 
offensive intentions, and his interest in negotiation through Mohieddin, 
would cause the United States to condemn Israel's pre-emption, Washington 
was instead rather relieved that it had been taken 'off the hook' by 
Israel's pre-emption because its own attempts to alter the status of 
the blockade had, or would have, failed. As far as the President was 
concerned, Israel had been subjected to ample provocation, had demonstrated 
restraint, and was now acting in self-defence rather than launching 
. 148 h ' aggression. T us Nasser s hope for an American condemnation of 
Israeli aggression did not materialise. Instead, Washington first declared 
that it was not clear which side had started the hostilities, and then 
concentrated on securing a .cease-fire resolution in the Security Council 
which would the way for the reestablishment of 149 pave peace. 
The crucial question was whether Washington would pressure Israel 
into immediate withdrawal from the territories it was occupying as its 
army advanced. Nasser could rely on the Soviet Union to call for 
withdrawal, but the only hope for effective pressure would come from a 
concerted superpower effort to impose withdrawal on Israel - if the United 
States opposed immediate withdrawal there was little chance that Israel 
would comply. Nasser's leverage over the United States at this stage 
148. See William B. Quandt, United States Policy in the Middle East: 
Constraints and Choices~ pp. 45-6. 
149. See White House Statement on the Outbreak of Hostilities; and 
Secretary of State Rusk's News Briefing, 5 June, 1967, Department of 
State Bulletin~ 26 June, 1967, pp. 949-50. 
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was minimal because of the earlier deterioration in relations which 
had now been compounded by the blockade, the Egyptian accusations of 
American involvement in the war, and the breaking of diplomatic relations 
150 by six Arab states (a move which had been encouraged by Egypt). 
Thus Washington was hardly keen to provide Nasser with a political 
exit from his military debacle. While the State Department could be 
depended upon to argue that. America's interests in. the Arab world 
dictated a policy of pressure on Israel to recoup its influence, public 
and Congressional opinion strongly supported Israel, and the President 
himself was determined to ensure both that the blockade was lifted and 
Sinai demilitarised in return for Israeli withdrawal. So the United 
States worked in the Security Council for a simple cease-fire in place, 
and resisted Soviet attempts to introduce a resolution which would have 
condemned Israeli aggression and would have called on it to withdraw to 
the pre-war lines. However, the United States did agree with the 
principle of Israeli withdrawal, as long as it was accompanied by a 
commitment from all parties to refrain from "acts of force regardless 
of their nature11 , and was prepared to introduce a cease-fire resolution 
. . h . . 1 5 J 151 incorporating t ese princip es on une. 
If Nasser had been able to reassesshis position realistically on 
5 June, he might have realised that such a cease-fire resolution, in 
which Israel would be forced to withdraw while Egypt would only have to 
relinquish its gains of May, represented the best terms that Egypt could 
get. However, on that day, the political consequences of Egypt's imminent 
military defeat were not understood in a stunned Cairo; Nasser probably 
did not even know, at this stage, that he faced imminent defeat. So, 
despite Goldberg's warning to El Khony that this resolution represented 
Egypt's last chance to salvage the situation, Cairo rejected its wording 
and held out for a resolution which would only require a withdrawal of 
Israeli forces. 152 
On the morning of 6 June the United States and the Soviet Union came 
close to agreement on a similar resolution, which would have dropped the 
150. The six were: Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Sudan and the Republic 
of.Yemen. 
151. Ambassador Goldberg made it clear during the cease-fire negotiations 
that what the United States meant by these words was the lifting of the 
blockade and the demilitarisation of Sinai. Middle East Record3 196?3 
p. 237; Johnson, p. 298. 
152. Johnson, ibid. 
Soviet demand for a condemnation of Israel, but would have called on 
Israel to return to its pre-war positions and on all other parties 
to abstain from the use of force everywhere, including the Gulf of 
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153 Aqaba. However, by the afternoon, Moscow began to realise the urgency 
of an immediate cease-fire to stave-off Egypt's total collapse and 
obviate the need for a more forthright and dangerous Soviet response. 
Thus the Soviet Union abandoned Egypt's demands for a condemnation of 
Israel and a call for its withdrawal and instead endorsed a resolution, 
passed. unanimously in the Security Council, which simply called for an 
immediate cease-fire. 154 On 7 June, the Soviet Union again demonstrated 
its urgent desire for a cessation of hostilities by calling for an 
immediate vote on a second resolution which demanded that the parties 
cease firing at a set time that same evening. No attempt was made to 
condemn Israel or to call for its withdrawal. Still Egypt apparently 
failed to appreciate the urgency of the situation, for its 'Ambassador 
rejected the resolution as "of no value" and again called on the 
Security Council to condemn Israel and order its withdrawa1. 155 
Egypt's rejection of this cease-fire resolution had two effects: 
on the military level, Israel continued its advance, occupying Sharm 
el-Sheikh on 7 June, and reaching the Suez Canal on 8 June; on the 
political level, the United States altered its position and on 8 June 
suggested a package proposal which would couple Israeli withdrawal with 
the renunciation of force, the maintenance of vital international rights, 
and direct negotiations for the establishment of a stable and durable peace. 
Thus, while Egypt accepted the cease-fire on 8 June, by this time the 
damage to Egypt's political prospects had already been done. Henceforth 
the United States would oppose any resolution which called for unilateral 
Israeli withdrawal and Soviet attempts to have Israel condemned and 
forced to withdraw would be to no avail. The United States had realised 
by 8 June that the war might create a new opportunity for negotiating 
a settlement of the basic disputes at issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
that Israel could use the occupied territories to bargain for peace, and 
that by using its 'good offices' to promote such a settlement the 
United States would be better able to protect its interests in stability 
and good relations with the Arab world than by gaining some momentary 
153. Middle East Record, 1967, p. 237. 
154. Middle East Record, 1967, p. 237; Lall, pp. 50-52. 
155. Middle East Record, 1967, p. 238; Lall, p. 57. 
. A b f f . I l · ~ d 156 prestige in ra eyes rom orcing srae to w1ti1 raw. 
All Nasser's hopes for American pressure to force an Israeli 
withdrawal had faded, and with them Nasser's crisis strategy for 
achieving a political victory over his Israeli adversary had collapsed. 
His miscalculations, misperceptions and rash manoeuvring had led 
Egypt into a devastating war which had resulted in the destruction of 
its armed forces, the loss of the Sinai Peninsula, the closure of the 
Suez Canal, and severe pressures on the Egyptian economy, as surely 
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as they had put paid to his.regional and international aspirations, 
alienated the United States, made him entirely dependent upon the Soviet 
Union, and created a great deal of human misery. Every part of his 
strategy had gone awry: Israel's leadership had not been intimidated 
by his threats of destruction, in fact these threats had been instrumental 
in Israel's decision to go to war; forgoing the first strike had given 
Israel a decisive military advantage, yet it had failed to encourage the 
United States to desert Israel; Egypt's forces were not capable of 
resisting the Israeli offensive, in fact they had been destroyed; Soviet 
support had not prevented Israel's victory and its political support had 
not achieved an Israeli withdra1:;>al; the United States had not condemned 
Israel for striking first and had protected its client from political 
pressure. 
What went wrong? Clearly, it was Nasser's utilisation of the political 
resources at his command, rather than any lack of such resources,which led 
to his failure in the politics of patroriage, his army's defeat on the 
battlefield, and Israel's continued occupation of Sinai. Nasser had 
overstepped the bounds of successful client behaviour, first by defying 
his Soviet patron in refusing to seek a political compromise, then by 
failing to realise that the threat of superpower confrontation would 
neutralise the support of his patron rather than encourage his American 
adversary to treat with him, further by refusing to consider a compromise 
which would have given the United States some incentive to restrain its 
Israeli protege, and finally by so alienating the United States that the 
powerful threat of blackmail, the threat that if the Soviet Union did not 
156. On 7 June Johnson created a special committee "to help build a new 
peace" in the Middle East. The committee's responsibility was to draft 
proposals for negotiations towards a peace settlement. The committee 
comprised: Rusk as chairman, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, General Wheeler, 
Helms, Walt Rostow, Clark Clifford and Fowler (Secretary of Treasury). 
M1:ddle East Recor'd_, 1.96? _, p. 235. 
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give Egypt sufficient support its client would be forced to ckrnge pnt::rons, 
became inoperative. In short Nasser misused his opportunity to play 
on the competitive interests of the superpowers and by precipitating 
war, and thereby raising the spectre of superpower confrontation, forced 
them into limited cooperation at Egypt's expense. Yet despite all 
these abuses of weak power leverage the outcome might well have been 
different had Nasser heeded· Fuller's criticism of Field Marshal Foch's 
theories on war, that "however high the assailants' morale it does not 
157 
render them bullet-proof". For while Nasser's will-power enabled him 
to resist the superpowers during the May-June crisis,it could not protect 
his army from Israeli bullets,and the consequent defeat of the Egyptian 
forces accordingly helped to render his political efforts worthless. In 
short, had Nasser been more cautious in his daring, his playing of the 
politics of patronage Tiight have met with a less disastrous outcome. 
157. Fuller, The Conduct; of rvm~~ London, 1962, p. 124. 
PART Timn,; 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE CONTEST FOR PATRONAGE I~J THE WAR OF ATTRITION 
I - INTRODUCTION 
The Six Day War represented a watershed in the history of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. As such it injected new elements into the politics 
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of patronage, for it not only changed the objectivesof both clients and 
patrons, but it also altered the value of their resources in the influence 
and resistance process. In the pre-war period, the policies of patrons 
and clients had not greatly conflicted - with the notable exception of 
A.~erican-Egyptian relations - so that support could be secured by serving 
the interests of the patron which, for the most part, also happened to 
serve the interests of the client. So Israel deterred and occasionally 
coerced the Arab States for its own sake, helping to serve the interests 
of the United States, while Egypt promoted instability and this served 
the interests of the Soviet Union. The end result was a new and rigid 
polarisation between the superpowers on either side of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, which lasted until the October 1973 Har, even though it became 
slightly less rigid at times. However, together with this polarisation, 
the Six Day Har had injected conflicting imperatives into the patron-
client relationships on both sides, making the task of resistance nore 
crucial to the securing of the objectives of the clients than it had 
been in the pre-war period. 
In formulating their objectives and conducting their conflict on 
the political and military levels, the example of the 1957 Israeli 
withdrawal from Sinai loomed large in the calculations of both Israel 
and Egypt. Having created a new geographic reality which provided the 
country with strategic depth and shorter and more easily defensible 
borders, Israel sought to maintain its positions in the occupied 
1 
territories until the Arab states agreed to its peace terms. In these 
1. The Suez Canal, the Jordan river, and the Golan Heights, provided Israel 
with what it regarded as "natural" boundaries. The length of Israel's land 
borders was reduced from 600 to 400 miles, and the Sinai Peninsula, the West 
Bank and the Golan Heights provided buffer zones and potential battlegrounds 
beyond the population centres of the JeHish state. See Bandel, Israel's 
Political-Maitary Doctrine~ p. 50; J.C. Hurewitz, Changi.ng Military 
Perspectives in the :diddle East~ Rand Corporation, P.M-6355-FF, September, 
circumstances Israel sought to avoid a repetition of its experience in 
1956-7 when, in the face of American economic sanctions and Soviet 
military threats, it was forced to withdraw from Sinai in exchange for 
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the flimsiest of guarantees concerning freedom of navigation. The 
experience of May 1967, when Nasser had remilitarised Sinai, evicted UNEF, 
and closed the Gulf to Israeli-bound traffic, while Israel's guarantors 
stood by idly, had fortified its determination only to withdraw from 
occupied territories in exchange for Arab recognition of its right to 
exist in peace and security. Since-Israel believed that the Arab states, 
after their humiliating defeat in 1967~ were in no mood to recognise and 
make peace with the Jewish state, and since these states sought the return 
of their territories, it was felt that if Israel could maintain its hold 
on these territories, it could induce its neighbours to adopt a more 
realistic attitude. Thus Israel's primary task was perceived to be the 
resistance of any attempt, either by military means or by political and 
economic pressure, to force it to withdraw in the absence of a contractual 
peace. 
Moreover, because Israel's experience had led it to regard the last 
line of withdrawal as the next line of Arab attack, its leadership was 
only prepared to consider withdrawal to secure and defensible borders. As 
far as the Israelis were conc~rned, this precluded a return to the pre-
1967 lines, even with "minor rectifications", because these were regarded 
as neither secure nor defensible. 2 Further, as a sign of Arab willingness 
to recognise Israel's right to exist, and as a means for resisting 
external interference in the terms of the settlement, Israel insisted on 
direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict. Thus Israel's 
secondary task was to convince those who were interested in a settlement 
1. (continued) 1970, p. 36; Steven J. Rosen, Military Geography and 
Military Balance in the Arab-Israeli Conflict~ Paper presented at Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1976, pp. 4-8. 
2. Although the Israeli government refused to specify the rectifications 
it required, simply because it could not reach a consensus between the 
parties, the Labour Alignment did adopt an 'oral law' which suggested that 
Israel would have to retain control over Sharrn el-Sheikh, the Gaza Strip 
and the Golan Heights, and would have to have a military presence along 
the Jordan River. See Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy~ 
pp. 460-2. 
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of the Arab-Israeli conflict that this could only be achieved through 
direct negotiations, leading to the delineation of boundaries which 
provided for Israel'· s security and which were recognised by the Arabs. 
In the interim, while the Arabs came around to accepting and negotiating 
peace with Israel, its short-term objectives were the establishment of 
a stable cease-fire on all its borders, the maintenance of its deterrent 
strength, and the continued growth of its economy. 
Political, military and economic assistance from tl1e United States 
was the necessary prerequisite for the attainment of all these objectives, 
especially in the face of the support which Egypt received from the 
Soviet Union. If, instead of supporting Israel's political demands, the 
United States sought an imposed solution, as it had in 1956-7, then 
Israel might be forced to withdraw to unsafe positions in the absence of 
a "real" peace. If Washington did not support Israel's deterrent strength 
by providing the necessary arms, then Israel might be unable to maintain 
a stable cease-fire and prevent an Arab attack aimed at regaining the 
occupied territories. In other words, were Israel to resist an imposed 
settlement by the superpowers, and were it instead to promote its ovm 
concept of a settlement, it required American support, not only for its 
principles, but also for its tactical manoeuvres aimed at the fulfilment 
of these princ~ples. 
Egypt's objectives were almost diametrically opposed to those of its 
Israeli adversary, but were also predicated on the 1956-7 experience. 
Because of the humiliating defeat which his army had suffered, and because 
much of the responsibility lay in his own actions, Nasser was determined 
to "erase the traces of aggression" by avoiding the political consequences 
of the military debacle. Thus, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all 
the territories occupied during the fighting, without any political 
concessions to Israel in the process, became his and the Arabs' most 
important objective. As formulated in the resolutions of the 1967 Khartoum 
Arab summit,· all political, military and economic efforts would be 
consolidated to eliminate the effects of the aggression~ and this would be 
done within the framework of the following principles: "no peace with 
Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiation with it, and insistence on 
the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country''. 3 Withdrawal, 
3. Cited in Middle East Record., 1967., p. 264. 
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in the absence of any substantive concessions to Israel, was to be 
achieved by an orchestration of political and military pressures which 
would encourage the superpowers to impose a settlement, as they had in 
1957, or short of that, would enable Egypt to resist the imposition of 
an Israeli settlement, neutralise Israel's American support and engage 
the Soviet Union in active support for Arab military pressure on Israel. 
Given the state of Egy·pt 1 s armed forces and its economy after the 
War, Soviet backing was essential for the achievement of these objectives. 
Were military pressure to be applied against Israel, the Egyptian army 
would have to be reequipped; were political pressure to be applied, 
Soviet advocacy in international forums would be essential; were Israel 
to be isolated from its American patron, the Soviet Union would have to 
become more actively involved in the conflict. Moreover, beyond Soviet 
support, Nasser also sought American backing for an Israeli withdrawal, 
and a reduction in American support for Israel's military posture and 
political demands. In other words, were Egypt to pressure Israel into 
complete withdrawal without political concessions, were it to promote a 
superpower imposed settlement on Israel while resisting Israeli terms, 
it needed Soviet support for its principles and strategy, and it needed 
4 
to neutralise American support for Israel. 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union confronted conflicting 
imperatives in the post-war environment. On the level of their global 
relations, the 1967 War had emphasised the dangers that their involvement 
on either side of the Arab-Israeli conflict could present to the conduct 
of their own relations. Their inability to restrain their proteges, and 
the risks this involved in terms of escalation to a superpower confrontation, 
encouraged both to seek solutions which would minimise the dangers of 
their involvement while.maximising their control over the local combatants. 
Thus, as their global conflict began to be mitigated by the commencement 
of SALT negotiations, the gradual acceptance of the status quo in central 
Europe, and the winding down of American involvement and the exercise of 
4. See Shimon Shamir, Nasser and Sadatj 1967-1.973: Two Approaches to the 
Crisis., The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel 
Aviv University, December, 1974, pp. 3-6. 
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Soviet restraint in Vietnam, both superpowers expressed an interest in a 
political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and both showed a 
5 
willingness to try to persuade their proteges to accept such a settlement. 
However, while the United States and the Soviet Union expressed a 
common interest in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict, they were still 
competing for influence in the region. Accordingly, the United States 
wanted a settlement which would end the polarisation of the region and 
enable it to reassert its influence in the Arab world, while the 
Soviet Union sought a settlement which would maintain the regional 
polarisation and thereby keep the 'radical' Arab states as its own preserve. 
Moreover, Moscow had become committed to reequipping the Egyptian army and 
to securing the return of all Arab territory (by political means) in 
order to stabilise its own position of influence, maintain Egypt's 
allegiance, allow its client to negotiate from a position of strength, 
and recoup its prestige by absolving itself from the guilt associated with 
its failure to prevent Egypt's defeat in the war. Conversely, Washington 
had become committed, as a result of its own inactivity during the crisis, 
to negotiating a better deal for Israel in exchange for its withdrawal 
than it had arranged in 1957. And, with the Soviet Union supplying 
Israel's adversaries while France embargoed its arms, the United States 
also felt it necessary to maintain the balance of military power in Israel's 
favour as a means for deterring another war and for pressuring Egypt and 
the Soviet Union into a more reasonable attitude towards the settlement 
negotiations. 
Thus, while Israel and Egypt faced the new danger of a superpower 
rapprochement at their expense, they also enjoyed new opportunities to 
exploit the competitive interests of the superpowers in order to resist 
the consequent political settlement, should it be inimical to their interests. 
Who prevailed in this post-war settlement process was determined, as it 
had been in the pre-war period, by the interactions between clients and 
patrons, between the local adversaries, and between the superpowers. It 
was a feature of this period, however, that while Israel and Egypt fought 
the War of Attrition over the Suez Canal, their American and Soviet patrons 
engaged in Two Power and Four Power Talks in New York, lJashington and Moscow. 
5. See Lawrence Whetten, The Canal fv'ar_, Four Po1Jer ConfZ1:ct in the Middle 
East_, Chapter 3; Bernard Lewis, "The Consequences of Defeat 11 , Foreign Affairs_, 
Volume 46, No. 2, January, 1968. 
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This fighting between the clients on one level, while the.patrons discussed 
their fate on another, did much to determine who prevailed and who 
·submitted on the third level, where the politics of patronage were played 
out. 
II - PRELUDE: 1968 TO MARCH 196 9 
Like all good preludes, the events which led up to the War of 
Attrition foreshadowed the movements which followed; the four players 
providing glimpses of the performance each would give over the next two 
years. On the superpower level, attempts to cooperate in finding a 
political solution culminated in Soviet and American proposals which were 
the harbinger of Two and Four Power Talks; on the regional level, 
Egyptian artillery barrages and Israeli retaliations against strategic 
targets set the stage for the ensuing war across the Suez Canal; and on 
the level of patronage, both clients experienced their first problems in 
securing arms from their patrons while attempting to ensure political 
support for their maximum demands. 
(i) Israel and the Johnson Administration 
The first notes of discord in Israeli-American relations were not 
sounded until after Eshkol's visit to the LBJ Ranch in January 1968. 
The Prime Minister had pressed the President to agree to the sale of fifty 
Phantom F-4 fighters on the basis that France had embargoed the fifty 
Mirage fighters which Israel had ordered and paid for. The President had 
been briefed by the State and Defense Departments to refuse this request 
because of their assessment that, following Israel's victory, the balance 
remained in its favour despite the Soviet resupply of arms to Egypt and 
Syria. 6 Nevertheless, far from turning Eshkol down, Johnson announced in 
the communique that Israel's military defence capability would be kept 
"under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of 
all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others 
to the region" 7 
6. IntervievJ 1,1ith Lucius D. Battle., Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
East and South Asian Affairs (1967-1968), Washington, June, 1975; Interview 
with Robert ,J. Pranger., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs (1968-1970), Washington, 12 June, 1975. 
7. Department of S-tate Bulletin., (DSB) 5 February, 1968, p. 174. 
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Johnson had apparently reemphasised to Eshkol his determination 
to maintain the balance of power, but before the United States gave a 
new boost to the arms race, he sought first to try to reach an agreement 
with the Soviet Union on the limitation of arms supplies to the region. 8 
When the Soviet Union, after Nasser's visit to Moscow in July, began to 
supply Egypt with equipment under a new agreement which went beyond 
restoring its pre-war strength by providing it with SU-7 fighter-bombers, 
9 
the pressure to accede to Israel's request mounted. 
The imperatives of an election year in American domestic politics 
also worked in Israel's favour. The two Presidential Candidates expressed 
their common belief that Israel should get the Phantoms, with Nixon going 
even further than Humphrey in his declaration: 
Israel must possess sufficient military power to deter an 
attack. As long as the threat of Arab attack remains direct 
and imminent "sufficient power" means the balance must be 
tipped in Israel 1 s favour ... For that reason ... I support a 
policy that would give Israel a technological military margin 
to offset her hostile neighbours' numerical superiority. If 
maintaining that margin should require that the U.S. supply 
Israel with supersonic Phantom-F4 jets - we should supply 
those Phantom jets.10 
Moreover, on 19 September, Congress placed a rider on the Foreign 
Assistance Act, calling on the President to negotiate an agreement for 
the sale of the Phantoms "to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent 
force capable of preventing future Arab aggression by offsetting 
11 
sophisticated weapons received by the Arab states". 
8. See, "Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol in the Knesset on 
the Political and Security Situation", International Docwrzents on Palestine_, 
1968 (IDOP)_, Document 187, p. 148; Prittie, Eshkol of Is1~ael_, pp. 326-7. 
9. The 90 SU-7s which were delivered to Egypt by mid-1969 were far in 
excess of what Egypt had received, in terms of similar aircraft, before 1967. 
MIG-2ls were also supplied under this agreement, but only up to 85% of the 
pre-war level, while Egypt's bomber inventory was also not fully replenished. 
See Glassman, Arms for the Arabs_, pp. 105-6. 
10. Address to B'nai B'rith Convention, 8 September, 1968, cited in 
New York Times_, 9 October, 1968. 
11. For the text of Section 651 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 
see DSB_, 28 October, 1968, p. 452. 
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However, despite these domestic pressures, and despite Moscow's 
formal rejection of an American proposal for regional arms control, 12 it 
was not until 9 October that the President announced that he would instruct 
the Secretary of State to enter into negotiations for the sale of the 
13 Phantoms to Israel. And it was not until 27 December 1968 that the 
State Department finally announced the conclusion of an agreement to sell 
fifty F-4s to Israel, with the deliveries to begin before the end of 1969 
14 
and to be concluded before the end of 1970. 
This concrete reaffirmation of patronage was particularly important 
for Israel, since it now lacked an alternative source for sophisticated 
weapons, and since the Soviet Union had made it clear that the Arab 
arsenals would not be in want of arms. Moreover, the Phantoms would prove 
to be a crucial element in Israel's conduct of the War of Attrition, for 
without them, the IAF would be unable to conduct its deep-penetration 
raids into Egypt. The Skyhawk may have been the first clearly offensive 
weapon which the United States had supplied Israel, but the Phantom, with 
its supersonic speed, longer range, and larger bomb-carrying capacity, 
represented a qualitative improvement in Israel's arsenal which would 
ensure its air superiority into the early 1970s. 15 
Nevertheless, during the nine months of delay and three months of 
negotiations, some disturbing elements had emerged in Israel's relations 
with the United States - elements which were soon to be confirmed by the 
new Nixon Administration. First, the State Department's opposition to 
the arms supply was as vehement as ever, especially because of the 
deterioration of the American position in the Arab world following the 
Six Day War and the severing of diplomatic relations by Egypt, Syria and 
Iraq. Thus, throughout 1968 State Department officers had done their best 
12. At the beginning of October Rusk had met Gromyko in New York and had 
discussed the question of arms limitations. At the end of the year Rusk 
revealed that although Hashington had pressed Moscow for arms limitations 
"they have been very reluctant to get into it until there is a more general 
settlement of the political issues of the Middle East". See DSB_, 23 
December, 1968. 
13. DSB_, 28 October, 1968; Ne~ York TiJnes_, 10 October, 1968. 
lLr. Cf. Bernard Reich, "The Israel-US Relationship, The Impact of the 
June War", Weiner Libra:ry Bulletin_, Volume XXIII, No. 4, 1969, pp. 9-10; 
William B. Quandt, United States Policy 1:n the Middle East: Constr'aints 
and Choices_, p. 48. 
15. With a speed of Mach 2.4, an ability to carry up to 16,000 pounds of 
ordnance, and a fast rate of climb, the F-4 was considered to be an 
excellent offensive fighter-bomber, superior to the MiG-21 in its intercept-
ion capabilities and to the SU-7 in its ground-attack capabilities. See 
Alvin J. Cottrell, "The Role of Air Power in the Military Balance of the 
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to persuade Egypt that the United States was objective and 'even-handed', 
that it did not condone Israel's retention of, or settlement in, the 
occupied territories, that it did not recognise Israel's annexation of 
East Jerusalem, that it objected to Israel's policy of 'massive retaliation' 
against its neighbours for fedayeen raids, and that it expected Israel 
16 to allow Palestinians who had fled the West Bank to return. If this 
approach were to reap dividends, it was essential that the United States 
not identify itself yet again as the protector of Israel by supplying 
it with weapons which would enable it to retain its hold on the occupied 
territories. In fact, it was reported in Cairo that Assistant Secretary 
of State Battle had· pointed to the President 1 s refusal (before October) 
to sanction the Phantom sale as testimony of Washington's good faith 
17 towards Egypt. Thus Israel could expect continued opposition from the 
State Department over future requests for arms. 
The second disturbing element arising out of the prolonged arms 
negotiations was a new Defense Department reluctance to support Israel's 
requests beca~se of the fear that this would escalate the arms race in 
the Middle East and lead to increased superpower involvement. Granting 
the Phantom request, International Security Affairs argued, would represent 
a "quantum leap forward" in the arms race - a destabilising action. 18 
Moreover, whereas it is probably safe to assume that Israel's nuclear 
option tacitly reinforced the argument for supplying it with conventional 
sufficiency, this leverage was offset by Pentagon concerns over the possible 
use of the Phantom as a delivery vehicle should Israel develop nuclear 
weapons. The three months of negotiations following President Johnson's 
15. (continued) Middle East - the Function of the Phantom", NeUJ Middle 
East, April 1970, pp. 12-16. 
16. For a summary of the various statements made by Secretary Rusk, 
Ambassador Ball, and Assistant Secretary Battle, see Middle East Record, 
1968, pp. 71-72. 
17. "Middle East Trends: Danger of War or Fears of Peace", New l4.iddle 
East, November, 1968, p. 6. Battle, who had just retired as Assistant 
Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, left for Cairo on 
September 17, 1968 (Middle East Record, 1968, p. 78). He blamed domestic 
politics for Johnson's decision and claimed that the President had conceded. 
to him that there was no military justification for the sale of Phantoms 
at that stage. Interv1:ew with Lucius Battle. 
18. Intervie1u Iuith Robert J. Pranger. Both Pranger and Battle felt that 
General Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint.Chiefs of Staff, was in favour 
of the Phantom deal because it would keep Israel strong and thereby avoid 
American involvement. 
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decision to sell Israel the aircraft indicated that there was some 
"tough bargaining" over technical details. 19 The Pentagon was apparently 
insisting that Israel sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a 
20 quid pro quo for the Phantoms. Although this demand appears to have 
been quashed by the White House, and although it is possible that Israel 
provided some other forms of assurance (such as restraint on plutonium 
separation, and further American inspection privileges), Israel's nuclear 
option had become a double-handed lever, providing those who opposed 
Israel's arms requests with an argument for restricting its access to 
sophisticated weapons which might be used as delivery vehicles, and reason 
21 for attaching conditions to the supply of such weapons. 
Finally, and probably the most disturbing element in American-Israeli 
relations, was the divergence in views concerning the principles of a 
peace settlement, and the apparent willingness on the part of the American 
Administration to use arms supplies as a lever for greater Israeli 
compliance in the settlement negotiations. Although both patron and 
client had accepted UN Resolution 242 as the basis for negotiations, 
Israel had made it clear, amongst its other principles, that it was only 
prepared to enter into face-to-face negotiations with its Arab neighbours 
and that, on the Egyptian front, Sinai would have to be demilitarised, 
the Gaza Strip could not be returned to Egyptian control and Israel would 
have to retain control of Sharm el-Sheikh. 22 When preliminary discussions, 
conducted by UN envoy Gunnar Jarring, ground to a halt over Israel's 
insistence on direct negotiations, leading to a contractual peace, before 
any withdrawal, and Egyptian insistence on complete Israeli withdrawal 
19. New York 'l'imes_, 22 December, 1968; Pranger noted that the United 
States used the F-4 as a delivery vehicle and that, by supplying them 
to Israel, the U.S. was contributing to Israel's nuclear weapons capability. 
20. New York T?:mes_, 20 November, 1968; George Quester, "Israel and the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June, 1969, 
p. 7. 
21. On the 1968 negotiations concerning the NPT and Johnson's intervention 
see New York Times, 18 July, 1970; Leonard Beaton, "Hhy Israel does not 
need the Bomb", New Middle East_, April, 1969, p. 11; Interview Di th Tlilliam 
B. Quandt_, Consultant to the Rand Corporation (1968-1973), Member of the 
Staff of the National Security Council (1973-1974), New York, 3 June, 1975. 
22. For an exhaustive summary of Israeli statements about these principles 
during 1968 see "Israel: The Conceptual Approach to Peace", Middle East 
Record, 1968, pp. 242-261. 
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without direct negotiations or a peace agreement, the Johnson Administration 
began to express its own opinions about methods for resolving the impasse 
which were not completely consistent with the demands of its client. First, 
the Administration pressured Israel to proceed into substantive negotiations 
with the Arabs by indirect means (Le. through Jarring). 23 ·when Israel 
responded, that in its eyes "direct negotiations do not constitute a point 
of procedure, but a principle embodying the very fact of recognition for 
Israeli sovereignty and independence", the President replied by telling 
an American Jewish audience that progress towards peace depended upon the 
willingness of the leaders of the Middle East "to begin talking the 
substance of peace .•• How the talking is done at the outset is not very 
important. 1124 American pressure apparently peaked when Eban arrived in 
New York for the United Nations General Assembly Plenary in October. Rusk 
told him that the United States held Israeli intransigence on the issue of 
direct negotiations responsible for Jarring's lack of progress. While 
there may have been no overt connection between Israel's willingness to 
cooperate with Jarring and American willingness to provide Israel with 
the Phantoms, the ten month delay in processing Israel's request, and the 
existence of this bone of contention between patron and client, were 
responsible in large measure for Eban's initiative in the UN General 
Assembly on 8 October. Declaring Israel's willingness to make a new 
effort to cooperate with Jarring, he added: "we are ready to exchange ideas 
on certain matters of substance, through Ambassador Jarring, with any 
A b b . h 1 1125 ra government willing to esta lish a just and lasting peace wit Israe . 
One day later, President Johnson announced his decision to sell Israel the 
23. 'Reliable sources' disclosed in February 1968 that Rusk had written to 
Eban urging Israel to accept unequivocally Resolution 242 and to enter into 
substantive negotiations through Jarring. New York Times 3 23 February, 
1968. When Ball and Bundy visited Israel in July they were reported to 
have urged Israel to convey its substantive posil:.tion to Jarring. New York 
Times3 18 July, 1968. 
24. Address by Foreign Minister Eban to the Knesset, 3 June, 1968, cited 
in Jerusalem Post3 4 June, 1968; Address by President Johnson before the 
125th Anniversary Meeting of B'nai B'rith, DSB~ 7 October, 1968. 
25. Cited in Middle East Record3 1968, p. 248. Eban expanded on Israel's 
willingness to engage in indirect negotiations on matters of substance in 
an interview on 11 October: "We continue to believe that there must be normal 
negotiations and. that the refusal to meet cannot be condoned. But if in 
order to reach that position it is necessary to have a preliminary stage 
in which we exchange views, principles, ideas on certain matters, then we 
are prepared for that preliminary stage". He went on to point out the 
beneficial effect that his declaration had achieved: '' ... it has allayed 
certain apprehensions lest our devotion to principle might inadvertently lead 
to a deadlock". See BBC/Sf'1B, 14 October, 1968, ME/2899 I A/1. 
26 Phantoms it had requested in January. 
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The second position adopted by the United States which caused Israel 
considerable concern, and which could not be resolved by a verbal 
compromise, was that in the context of a final peace settlement, the 
United States expected Israel to withdraw to its pre-war border with Egypt, 
including withdrawal from Sharm el-Sheikh, but excluding withdrawal from 
the Gaza Strip. This position had been hinted at on various occasions, 
but it was actually· set down 'in precise form' and conveyed to both Israel 
27 
and Egypt in early November 1968 by Secretary of State Rusk. 
It is not at all clear why a 'lame-duck' Administration, in its 
final days, should have embarked on a new initiative, but it certainly 
established a precedent for American policy which would be handed on to 
the new Administration, and coincided with a Soviet initiative which called 
for complete Israeli withdrawal. Israel rejected both proposals; the 
former because it did not provide for Israeli control of Sharm el-Sheikh 
and the demilitarisation of Sinai; the latter because it did not require 
a contractual peace, and made no mention of Israeli rights to transit 
the Canal, nor of protection for Israeli navigation in the Straits of 
Tiran. 28 The Rusk proposal was also rejected by Egypt and therefore 
could not form the basis for negotiations at that stage. Nevertheless, 
the United States had made it clear to the parties that it did not support 
all Israel's political demands,.and thus clear to Israel that, if and when 
settlement negotiations actually proceeded, a conflict between patron and 
client would be inevitable unless one or both changed their positions. 
Moreover, Israeli sensitivity about the constancy of American patronage 
was also aroused by remarks made by Governor Scranton during his visit to 
26. In a further interview on 20 October, Eban noted how different 
Israel's position had become when compared with the situation at the 
beginning of October. He noted that a "frontal dispute" was expected with 
the American government, that Jarring's mission was expected to come to an 
end, and that Israel was worried about maintaining the balance of forces, 
mainly in the air: "There was a certain impasse concerning one category 
of vital military equipment· we needed". He observed. that since his speech 
the differences with the United States had been settled. See BBC/STvB., 
22 October, 1968, ME/2905/A/4. 
27. Ne11J York Times, 5 December, 1968; Cf. Eugene Ros tow, "Tlw American 
Stake in Israel", Commentar-y., April, 1977, p. 45. In his address to the 
B'nai B'rith Johnson had stated: '' ... Israel must persuade its Arab neighbours 
and the world community that Israel has no expansionist designs on their 
territory ... There must be secure and there must be recognised borders ... 
At the same time it should be equally clear that boundaries cannot and 
should not reflect the weight of conquest. Each change must have a reason 
which each side, in honest negotiation, can accept as a part of a just 
compromise"; Zoe.cit._, p. 349. 
28. Middle East Record_, 1968_, p. 82; Ha 1a1'etz_,20 January, 1969. Except 
where otherwise indicated, references to Hebrew , Russian and Egyptian 
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the Middle East in December. Scranton, who was sent by President-elect 
Nixon on a fact-finding mission, pronounced on his arrival in Israeli-held 
territory that American policy should become more "even-handed", dealing 
with all countries in the area "and not necessarily espousing one" 29 
Thus, by the time of the Nixon inauguration, tension already existed 
between patron and client as a result of the mistrust which had developed 
since the halcyon days of the 1967 victory. 30 
(ii) Israel and the Nixon Administration 
The first year of a new Administration has traditionally been a 
period of innovation and initiative in American policy towards the Middle 
East. It is a time when the State Department has an opportunity to propose 
new policies and be heard by a new President looking for new initiatives. 
This was particularly the case for Richard Nixon in 1969, because he had 
an abiding interest in foreign affairs, because he had pledged to move 
the United States from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation, 
but, most importantly, because he regarded the Arab-Israeli confrontation 
as dangerous: 
... I believe we need new initiatives and new leadership 
on the part of the United States .in order to cool off 
the situation in the Mideast. I consider it a powder 
keg, very explosive. It needs to be defused ... because 
the next explosion in the Mideast, I think, could involve 
very well a confrontation between the nuclear powers, which 
we want to avoid.31 
On 1 February, the National Security Council spent the day 
discussing position papers drafted by the new Assistant Secretary 
of State for Near East Affairs, Joseph Sisco. Three options were 
available to the Administration: to remain relatively inactive, leaving 
the negotiations to Jarring and maintaining the status quo; to pursue 
28. (continued) newspapers during the period 1969-1970 are based on the 
drafts of the Mid.dle East Record., 1969 and 1970 which had not yet been 
published at the time of writing. 
29. Cited in Mid.dle East Record., 1968., p. 73. 
30. Cf. William B. Quandt, 'l'he Arab-Israeli Conflict in American Foreign 
Policy., 1967-1973. The Shiloah Center For Middle Eastern and North African 
Studies, December, 1974, p. 5. 
31. President Nixon's News Conference of 27 January, DSB., 17 February, 
1969, pp. 142-3. 
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actively a comprehensive settlement through mul tilatercil diplomacy; to try 
32 for partial and interim agreements. Sisco argued that the Administration 
should adopt the second option and, in particular, engage the Soviet 
Union in discussions designed to test the good faith of Moscow. The fact 
that during the change-over of Administrations the Soviet Union had 
proposed a settlement formula which, although short of the American 
conception of a settlement,· nevertheless contained some constructive points, 
reinforced the President's own penchant for negoticiting with Moscow on 
the 'big issues'. The judgement was made that, because the Soviet Union 
shared American desires to avoid a superpower confrontation in the 
Middle East, it would be interested in stabilising the rivalry by 
sacrificing some competitive interests in the region for the sake of its 
cooperative interest in a settlement of the local conflict. 33 
Beyond that, Sisco also outlined a policy for the United States 
which would enable it to exploit the stability that was expected to 
result from the superpower rapprochement to promote American influence 
in the Arab world. In other words, Washington sought to exploit Moscow's 
interest in cooperation to promote its own competitive interests. 
Israel would be encouraged to withdraw from occupied territory, with 
only "insubstantial" border changes. Even if this approach did not succeed 
the consequent strain in Israeli-American relations would help to persuade 
the Arab states that American policy was strictly objective, balanced 
32. Quandt, The Arab-Is1~aeli Conflict in American Policy~ p. 7. 
33. The rationale was explained by Nixon in his 4 March Press Conference: 
'' ... at the same time that the Soviet Union has gone forward in providing 
arms for potential belligerents ... the Soviet Union recognises that if these 
peripheral areas get out of control, that the result could be a confrontation 
with the United States ... And I think it is that overwhelming fact ... that is 
giving the Soviet Union second thoughts and leads me to what I would say is 
a cautious conclusion at this point, that the Soviet Union will play 
possibly a peace-making role in the Mideast ... we are going to explore that 
road all the way that we can, because, let's face it, without the Soviet 
Union's cooperation, the Mideast is going to continue to be a terribly 
dangerous area ... ", DSB~ 24 March, 1969. This judgement was elaborated by 
John C. Campbell: "They [the Soviets] have reasons to want a settlement or 
at least an arrangement that will reduce tensions and check certain trends 
dangerous to them: they do not want to be drawn into a war; they do not want 
to see their present assets disappear, as would happen if the Nasser regime 
should lose out to the fedayeen or other local elements; and they have 
reason to question the magnitude of their involvement in a situation they do 
not control". See Campbell, "There is a new look in Washington", Nezv Middle 
East~ June 1969, p. 12. Cf. Robert .J. Pranger, American Pol1:cy for Peace 
in the f1Hddle East~ 1969-1971~ American Enterprise Institute, Foreign 
Affairs Study 1, December, 1971; Bernard Lewis, "The Great Powers, The 
Arabs and the Israelis", Foreign Affairs~ Volume 47, No. 4, July, 1969, p.648. 
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34 
and 'even-handed 1 • 'iloscow would be encouraged to pressure its Arab 
clients into making some concessions to Israel in return for withdrawal, 
thereby hopefully causing a strain in Soviet-Arab relations which would 
further promote American influence in these Arab states. The inherent 
contradiction between cooperative and competitive interests may not have 
been appreciated in Washington, but it soon became clear that Hoscow well 
appreciated it and sought to reverse the process by claiming credit with 
the Arab states for any changes in the American positions by charging that 
Washington had not gone far enough. In other words, to the extent that 
the policy of 'even-handedness' succeeded in promoting American influence 
in the Arab world, to that extent would it reduce Soviet influence. 
The Soviet Union could hardly be expected to cooperate in its own demise, 
and the policy therefore became a recipe for competition rather than 
. 35 
cooperation. 
The second and related problem which does not appear to have been 
considered in the National Security Council on that Saturday in February, 
was the amount of mistrust and opposition the new policy of superpower 
discussions would generate in Jerusalem, and the amount of hope and then 
disillusionment that the policy of 'even-handedness' would generate in 
Cairo. In fact two assumptions seem to have been made at the outset: that 
the superpowers could and would be willing to push their clients in the 
direction of a settlement; and that even if the new policy failed, the 
American position would be no worse than if it had made no effort at all. 36 
The ability of the weak states to resist the imposition of a settlement 
inimical to their individual interests, and their ability to play on the 
competitive interests of the superpowers to undermine their cooperative 
34. See Rowland Evans, Jr., and Robert D. Novak, Nixon in the ~!hite House: 
The Frustration of Power, New York, 1971, p. 88; Marvin and Bernard Kalb, 
Kiss1:nger, New York, 1975, pp. 216-7. Campbell described this policy as 
a "willingness to allow a sliver of daylight to appear between the position 
of the United States and that of Israel ... it is at least possible that the 
period of virtually parallel American and Israeli policies following the 
1967 war may be coming to an end". Campbell, ibid., ·pp. 11 and 14. 
35. Cf. Steven Spiegel, The Patron Meets the Pygmies, U.S. Trials in ·the 
Arab-Isx'aeli Theater_, California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, 
September, 1973, pp. 9-16. 
36. Campbell, op.cit., p. 12; Lewis, op.c1:t., pp. 648-9; Quandt, The 
Arab-Israeli Conflict in American Foreign Policy, p. 7. 
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efforts and therefore make matters worse, seems to have been underestimated, 
if not ignored, in those heady days of the new Administration when 
everything seemed possible - even in the Hiddle East. 37 
Thus the Administration decided to engage in Four Power Talks, 
between the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France, as well 
as Two Power Talks between Sisco and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, with the 
professed aim: "to exercise.whatever influence it [the United States] has, 
in whatever way would be useful and effective, to help bring a lasting 
peace ..• ". 38Israel was put on notice immediately by Secretary of State 
Roger's statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in 
announcing the new diplomatic initiative: 
Clearly, withdrawal should take place to established 
boundaries which define the areas where Israel and its 
neighbours may live in peace and sovereign independence. 
Equally, there can be no secure and recognised boundaries 
without withdrawal. In our view rectificat,ions from the 
preexisting lines should be confined to those required 
for mutual security and should not reflect the weight 
of conquest.39 
Israel's reaction was swift and vehement. Before the talks had even 
begun Israel expressed its opposition to Washington on the grounds that 
it would divert attention from the need for direct negotiations; it was 
not a "balanced framework" because the Soviet Union and France supported 
the Arab claims, while Britain and even the United States were neutral; 
and it would undermine the Jarring mission. Foreign Minister Eban flew 
to Washington in mid-March and in meet:ings with Nixon and Rogers 
40 
unsuccessfully tried to persuade them to abandon the talks, The 
37. The Ka.lbs claim that Kissinger had doubts about the willingness of 
the Soviet Union to cooperate and the willingness of the Arabs and 
Israelis to accept an imposed solution. However, he was apparently 
ordered by Nixon to keep a low profile on the Middle East so that Rogers 
could have something to keep him satisfied. Kissinger's apparent 
foresight is, however, probably hindsight and possibly calculation that 
if Rogers failed in this area, while Kissinger succeeded in others, the 
bureaucratic battle would be won. See Kalbs, Kissinger, p. 217. 
38. Statement by Secretary Rogers before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 27 March, 1969, DSB., 14 April, 1969, p. 305. 
39. 1bid. 
40. !Jew York Times_, 21 March, 1969; Ha'aretz_, 16 March, 1969. Eban noted 
later that the Israeli fear of the talks stemmed from the fact that while 
the Soviet Union had tied itself to the Arab position, the United States 
was not similarly tied to all Israel's positions: "On the territorial issue 
it clearly envisaged less substantial revision of the previous lines than 
Israel thought essential for its security". Eban, My Country, p. 259. 
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newly-appointed Prime Minister, Golda Meir, reiterated Israeli opposition 
by claiming that "even our best friends do not have the right to decide 
for us what our conditions for peace and security should be" 41 Finally, 
on the eve of the talks the Israeli Cabinet published its decision to 
renounce the Two or Four Power Talks: 
Israel rejects from the outset any trend towards 
convening representati:ves of states outside the 
Middle East to work out recommendations in affairs of 
this region. Such an attempt is contrary to the 
responsibility that falls upon all states of the 
region to reach peace between them. Israel rejects 
any arrangement or procedure not agreed upon by the 
governments concerned in the matter. It is not and 
will not be the object of the policy of a great power 
or great powers, and will not accept any recommendation 
that is contrary to its vital interests, rights and 
security ... 4 2 
Given the fact that the talks had not yet begun on the substantive 
issues, Israel's American supporters, in their reactive roles, could not 
have much impact. Moreover, the leaders of the Jewish community were 
concerned not to attempt to push Nixon too hard since he was not beholden 
to the Jewish vote - he had won only 17%. Nevertheless, Rabbi Wexler, 
Rabbi Shachter and Max Fisher, representing the Conference of Presidents 
of Major American Jewish Organisations, met with Rogers, Sisco and Nixon 
to express their concern over the Talks. They were sent away with the 
enigmatic assurance that there had been no change in the principles of 
American policy in the 1'1iddle East. 43 Congress issued a declaration 
in April, endorsed by 61 Senators and 243 Representatives which called for 
"face-to-face" negotiations and opposed "any attempt by outside powers to 
impose halfway measures not conducive to a permanent peace". 44 
The Administration reacted with equal determination to proceed with 
the talks. However, some attempt was made to allay the mistrust by 
41. Jerusalem Post_, 27 March, 1969. 
42. Israel Home Service, 30 March, 1969, BBC/SfvB_, HE/3039/A/9. 
43. Near East Report_, Volume XIII, 1969, p. 32. To back up Israel's 
opposition AIPAC published a special edition of the Hear East Report in 
April which retold the story of American pressure on Israel in 1956·-7 and 
wondered whether those "blunders" would be repeated. See "Special Survey: 
Lest We Forget ... Blunder at Suez - 1957, Sequel at Suez - 1967", Near East 
Report_, April, 1969. 
44. Ibid._, pp. 35 and 38. 
continuous repetition of what Nixon told the press on 4 March: 
The four powers cannot dictate a settlement in the Middle 
East. The time has passed in which great nations can 
dictate to small nations their future where their vital 
interests are involved.- 45 
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Instead, the Four Powers' task was merely "to indicate those areas where 
they believe the parties directly involved could have profitable discussion 
and then provide guarantees· for the settlement. But the message was still 
clear: the purpose of the talks was to reach an agreement between the 
superpowers on the formula for a settlement and then induce their proteges 
to agree. Israel disagreed before any agreement had been reached. The 
American response: "We recognise the dangers that the Government of Israel 
cites; but we do think it is important to proceed along this line and we 
. 46 intend to do it". 
(iii) Cairo and Moscow in the Aftermath of War 
On the other side of the Canal, Egypt fared better in its relations 
with the Soviet Union despite its increased dependence and much weakened 
position after the 1967 defeat. Nevertheless, there was a significant 
divergence in the priorities of patron and client which caused considerable 
tension because it brought the issues of influence and resistance to 
the fore. However, because both client and patron were locked in a position 
of mutual dependence both sought comprocises; neither could afford to 
abandon the other and thus neither was prepared to push the other beyond 
what it could accept without damage to its vital interests. 
45. DSB~ 24 March, 1969, p. 240. 
Lf6. Secretary Roger 1 s News Conference of 7 April, DSB~ 28 April, 1969, 
pp. 360-1. In the same Conference, Rogers indicated how he expected to 
influence the Arabs and Israelis: " ... if the world community should 
agree on a certain general formula for the settlement of the Middle East, 
then I think the governments in that area would want to think long and 
hard before they turned it down", p. 362. It is interesting to compare 
this statement with President Carter's thoughts on the issue of influence 
at the prospective Geneva Conference: "I think if a particular leader 
of one of the countries should find that his position is in direct 
contravention to the position of all the other parties involved, including 
ourselves and the Soviet Union, ... there would be a great impetus on that 
leader to conform with the overwhelming opinion". See Time, 8 August, 
1977, p. 22. 
Nasser's vital interest - his preoccupation - was the ~ithdrawal 
of Israeli forces from all the occupied territories, by political means 
if possible, by force if necessary, and without any concessions which 
would further weaken Egypt's position in the Arab world. Thus, beyond 
the rejection of recognition, direct negotiations, or peace with 
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Israel, Egypt also insisted that not an inch of occupied territory could 
be surrendered (although Gaza did not necessarily have to be returned to 
Egypt), and that there could be no separate settlement between Egypt and 
L17 
Israel. 
Moscow's vital interests were the reestablishment of its reputation 
as the protector of the 'forces of progress' in the Middle East, the 
stabilisation of its position of influence in Egypt, and the avoidance 
of a superpower confrontation. The pursuit of the first two interests 
required the Soviet Union to assist Nasser in regaining the occupied 
territories, thereby proving the value of its patronage in undoing the 
consequences of 'aggression'. To that extent the interests of patron and 
client were compatible. However, if the "elimination of the consequences 
of aggression" required military action, this could conflict with the 
third, and overriding, Soviet interest in avoiding a superpower confrontation. 
Another war also ran the risk of further damaging Soviet prestige, if its 
clients were yet again defeated, as well as increasing the already heavy 
burden of Soviet patronage. 
Thus while Nasser believed that "whatever is taken by force can only 
be regained by force", and that "political measures are only worth anything 
insofar as one backs them up with force or with the promise of force", 
the Soviet leaders argued that "the liquidation of the consequences of 
aggression can and must be accomplished first of all by political means" 48 
47. Within these strict limits Egypt was apparently.prepared to grant 
Israel freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, to demilitarise 
Sinai as long as the Negev was also demilitarised, and end the state of 
belligerency. See Middle East Record, 1968, pp. 205-214; Nasser's interview 
with De Borchgrave, Neu.JsWeek, 10 February, 1969. 
48. Address by President Nasser at the opening of a new session of the 
National Assembly, IDOP, 196?, Document 444, pp. 709 and 711; Kudriavtzev 
in Izvestia, I~ June, 1968, cited in Middle East Record, 1968, p. 23. Kosygin 
told a press conference in July, 1968: ''We want a political solution to 
the problem of the Near East to be found". Tass in English, 14 July, 1968, 
BBC/SIVB, 16 July, 1968. 
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The difference in approach lay in the divergent attitudes of patron and 
client to the military balance of power in the region. Nasser believed 
that Egypt's ends could only be achieved by political means if Israel's 
military preponderance were reduced and Arab military superiority achieved, 
since this would prevent Israel from laying down the law, and would 
encourage the United States to pressure Israel into conceding Arab demands 
. 49 
for fear that they would otherwise go to war. The establishment of an 
Egyptian position of strength, however, required Soviet military support, 
at levels which created too many risks for Moscow because of its fear that 
the negation of Israeli preponderance would either encourage Israel to 
fight a preventive war, or encourage the Arabs to launch an offensive to 
regain their territory and press the Palestinian cause. After the 1967 
experience, the Soviet Union wanted to avoid an all-out war because a 
defeat for its clients could force it to intervene, a defeat for Israel 
could force the United States to intervene, and intervention could quickly 
lead to superpower confrontation. Thus the Soviet Union was prepared to 
supply Egypt with the means necessary to defend itself from Israeli attack, 
but it was not prepared to supply Egypt with a new offensive capability. 
Instead it sought to commit its client to a political effort to force 
·I 1 · hd 50 srae to wit raw. 
A compromise between these two approaches was apparently reached 
during Nasser's trip to Moscow in July 1968, after an exchange of what 
h ,- f d 11 f k • II 51 t e communique re erre to as ran views . According to Heikal, who 
was present at the talks, Nasser argued the need for military action because 
49. On the balance of power, Nasser declared on 23 July, 1968: "As long 
as Israel knows that we have not yet attained overwhelming offensive military 
power, she will remain in her positions in the hope of attaining a political 
victory ... We are developing the armed forces to achieve superiority over 
the enemy ... This is a lengthy business which needs patience and steadfastness 
until we achieve victory, until we achieve superiority over the e1:emy and 
then triumph". Address to the A.S.U., 23 July, 1968, IDOP_, 1968_, Document 
36~-i~P-:--464-5. (emphasis supplied). 
50. By mid-1968, the Soviet Union had reequipped the Egyptian armed forces 
to their pre-war level, but had refused to supply surface-to-surface missiles 
or MIG-23s which could challenge Israeli air superiority. In June, 
disappointment was publicly expressed in Cairo and Noscow was called upon to 
provide offensive weapons. !Je1;J York Times_, 18 June, 1968; Akhbar al-Yom_, 
22 June, 1968, cited in M1:ddle East Record_, 1968_, p. 37; Robert Hunter, 
The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East_, Part I: Problems of Commitment_, 
Adelphi Paper No. 59, September, 1969, p. 12. 
51. The communique stated: "Frank views were exchanged regarding several 
matters connected with the development of comprehensive cooperation between 
the U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R., the Middle East situation, and methods of 
eliminating the consequences of Israeli and imperialist aggression". Radio 
Moscow, 10 July, 1968, in Y. Ro'i, From Encroacmnent to Involvement_, p. 484. 
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of the pressures he faced internally and in the Arab world, but agreed 
first to give "ample opportunity for a political solution". Nevertheless, 
he insisted that the basic goal remained the withdrawal of Israeli forces 
without conceding an inch, without direct negotiations with Israel, and 
without recognition of Israel. And, if he failed to achieve this by 
political means, "then war will not be an option ..• it will be a necessity". 
In return, the Soviet Uriion·appears to have agreed to supply Egypt with 
additional arms, and apparently also agreed that if a political solution 
continued to remain out of reach the quality and quantity of arms shipments 
would be increased. 52 On this basis, reported Heikal, "we agreed to 
try out a political settlement, accepted the 22 November Security Council 
resolution, and cooperation with Gunnar Jarring 11 • 53 
This compromise reflected the degree of mutual dependence which had 
developed in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Nasser needed Soviet 
political, military and economic backing for the achievement of his aims, 
but the Soviet Union had come to depend on Nasser for the pursuit of its 
objectives in the Middle East. Thus, Nasser had granted the Soviet Union 
naval and air facilities to support its enlarged Mediterranean squadron, 
had purged the top-ranking officers (who had, amongst other things, 
complained about dependence upon the Soviet Union), and had issued the 
'March 30th Manifesto' to strengthen the Arab Socialist Union through 
mobilisation of "the popular forces" to provide "the speediest and safest 
54 path towards progress". 
52. The arms deal was reported to involve some 150 MIG-2ls and SU-7s, 500 
T54/55 tanks and several hundred self-propelled artillery pieces. Neu.1 York 
Times, 13 October, 1968; Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, pp .. 68·-9; Ro'i, 
ibid~, pp. 483-4. 
53. Radio Cairo, 12 July, 1968, BBC/SWB, 15 July, 1968. The communique 
stated: "The two sides again state the need for settling the Middle East 
crisis on the basis of the UN Security Council resolution passed on 22 
November 1967. The U.A.R. has declared its readiness to implement the 
resolut:i,.on as soon as possible and to take important and practical steps 
towards doing so ... The Soviet Government appreciates and supports the 
U.A.R.'s initiative on this issue •.. The U.S.S.R .... [has] offered and continues 
to offer the U.A.R. all kinds of political and economic support, as well as 
assistance in improving its defence capability". Ro 1 i, ibid., pp. 485-6. 
54. See Jaan Pennar, The U.S.S.R. and the Arabs, pp. 78-80. Since the end 
of 1967, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron had enjoyed free access to 
Alexandria and Port Said; in May 1968 the land-based air arm of the Soviet 
Navy used the Cairo West airport for regular reconnaissance flights over 
the Sixth Fleet. J.C. Hurewitz, "Weapons Acquisition: Israel and Egypt", 
in F.B. Horton, A.G. Rogerson, E.L. Warner (eds.) Comparative Defense 
Pol.icy, Baltimore, Maryland, 1974, p. 488. In the political struggle which 
followed the defeat, Field Marshal Amer criticised the socialisation process 
as leading to Communism, charged the Soviet Union with conspiracy over the 
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In return, the Soviet Union had reequipped the armed forces, provided 
some 3,000 advisors to train them,and had arranged assistance for the 
extension of the Helwan steelworks as well as oil prospecting teams for 
the Western Desert. On the political level, the Soviet Union launched 
its initiative on 30 December 1968 by presenting the United States with 
its 'action plan' for the implementation of Resolution 242: a phased 
Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 borders over a period of three months; 
at the time of the initial withdrawal each state would deposit documents 
with the U.N~ declaring an end to the state of war and the recognition 
of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state in the area; 
the principles governing freedom of navigation, the refugees, demilitarised 
zones, and secure and recognised borders would be worked out under 
Ambassador Jarring's auspices; U.N. troops would be deployed in Sharm el-
sheikh and the Gaza sector "thus restoring the situation existing in May 
1967"; the Security Council would confirm the principle of freedom of 
navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba; a Four Power guarantee of the borders 
was possible; and all aspects of the settlement should be dealt with 
55 together as a "package deal". 
As Riad stated, after Gromyko had brought the plan to Cairo on 21 
December: "We reached agreement in principle on the need for a political 
1 d h • 1 h • II 5 6 tl b h • d th • sett ement an t e means to imp ement t is . owever, e in is 
formal acceptance of the Russian proposal, lay increased tension between 
patron and client. Having agreed to pursue a political settlement as a 
tactical expedient, Nasser faced conflicting pressures which made it 
difficult for him to comply with the compromise which had evolved. In 
Egypt's much weakened position, Nasser's task was somewhat akin to .that 
which Israel faced during the May-June 1967 crisis. Lacking an alternative 
patron, but having secured a Soviet commitment to his aims, Nasser had to 
persuade Moscow that political methods would be inadequate in securing 
54. (continued) war, criticised Moscow for not fulfilling its arms 
pledges and its undertaking to intervene in the war, and suggested that 
Egypt should effect a rapprochement with the United States. See Y. Ro'i, 
ibid., p. 470. 
55. "A just and stable peace in the Middle East is an urgent necessity", 
Pravda, 25 January, 1969, reprinted in Ne1J Middle East, March, 1969, pp. 
60-1; cf. Arab Report and Record, 1-15, January, 1969. 
56. Cited in Christian Science Monitor, 8 January, 1969. 
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those aims unless Egypt's military means were boosted. So, just as Israel 
had allowed time for the United States to realise that its political 
efforts to reopen the Straits would not succeed, so too did Egypt have 
to support the Soviet political effort "to convince the Russians that 
there was no diplomatic solution and to get them more and more involved". 
As Nasser is reported to have told Foreign Minister Riad: 
I want the Russians to.be in daily touch with us so that they 
can see the impossibility of a diplomatic solution; that way 
they will increase their help to us.57 
Yet, just as Israel's leadership had been under strong pressure to take 
matters into its own hands before its patron had come to the realisation 
that it could not achieve redress, so too was Nasser under strong pressure 
to take military action before the Soviet peace plan had been tested and 
discarded. 
Demonstrations in February and November 1968 had emphasised the 
discontent which existed in Egypt over the defeat, the dependence upon 
the Soviet Union, and the lack of political freedoms. For the first time 
the demonstrators attacked Nasser, depicting him as a tyrant and capitulator~8 
The domestic challenge to Nasser's regime was reinforced by the challenge 
to his traditional position of leadership in the Arab world from the 
Palestinian fedayeen. In the wake of the war and the devastation of the 
Arab armies, the fedayeen were perceived to be the one Arab force carrying on 
the struggle under the banner of a popular war of liberation, while Nasser 
spoke of a political solution. Thus, the longer he waited for the 
Soviet Union to realise that a political settlement was unobtainable in 
the present circumstances of Egyptian inferiority, the greater the danger 
that he would be toppled from power. 
Moreover, there was the further danger that in the diplomatic process 
of give and take, the Soviet Union might be persuaded to shift its position 
on the terms of a settlement and attempt to pressure Egypt into compromising 
57-:- Cited in Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, pp. 56-7, 
58. In February students and workers had demonstrated against the leniency 
of the sentences meted out to those officers held responsible for the 
defeat; anti-Soviet slogans were given voice. Meanwhile the military began 
to object to the infiltration of the armed forces by Soviet advisors. In 
November, 1968, students demopstrated at Mansura and Alexandria, reiterating 
their demands for greater political freedoms and protesting Soviet as well 
as American imperialism. Clashes were reported between Communists and 
Moslem Brothers. See Mahmoud Hussein, Class-Conflict in Egypt, 1945-1971, 
New York, 1973, Chapter 8; Jean Lacouture, Nasser, London, 1973, pp. 318'-
322. 
its own demands for complete Israeli withdrawal without political 
concessions. This was akin to the compromise danger which Israel faced 
in the American attempt to resolve the 1967 crisis short of war. 
Thus, while the Soviet Union had to be allowed the time to 
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test its peace plan and find it wanting, Egypt had to show that this was 
a matter of urgency and that in the process its aims could not be 
compromised. However, the s·ituation lacked a sense of crisis, so that 
Moscow might not see the matter in as urgent a light as Cairo, especially 
because the patron was concerned with its other interests in Europe (where 
the dust had not yet settled over Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakia), on 
the Chinese border (where tensions were rising), and with the United States 
(where a new Administration was about to be sworn in). What Nasser needed 
was some means of applying pressure on both the Soviet Union and the United 
States to speed up the diplomatic process and produce either a superpower 
imposed withdrawal on Israel, or the Soviet realisation that nothing could 
be achieved on the political level "until the enemy comes to realise that 
59 
we can force him to pull back by means of war". 
A strategy of controlled tension suited this purpose well: by 
raising tension along the Canal, Nasser could demonstrate Egypt's 
willingness to fight for the return of its territory if the superpowers 
did not quickly arrive at a solution; by fighting, Nasser could answer 
his critics on the home front and in the Arab world and provide proof that 
he had not abandoned the struggle; by endless pounding of the Israeli 
positions, Nasser might succeed in wearing down the will of the Israelis 
to maintain their positions on the east bank of the Canal, forcing them 
to withdraw or to soften their demands for a settlement; and by taking 
action, Nasser might coalesce the eastern front, increasing the military 
pressure on Israel and the political pressure on the superpowers to 
accommodate Egypt's demands. Of course, launching a new war, however 
limited, could have costs as well as benefits: the Soviet Union, preferring 
stability, might not continue to provide Egypt with the means necessary 
for pursuing the war of attrition; if war led to a further defeat, Nasser's 
59. Address by President Nasser to the Inaugural session of the New 
National Assembly, 20 January, 1969, IDOP, 1.969., Document 363, p. 575. 
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domestic position might be undermined rather than strengthened; instead 
of withdrawing from the Canal, the Israelis might escalate the fighting, 
attempt to cross the Canal and fight a war which better suited their 
agility; def eat in a war of attrition might divide rather than unite the 
eastern front. 
To put the military calculus to the test, Egyptian artillery 
bombardments and commando r.aids across the Canal were launched in 
September/October 1968. Egyptian forces succeeded in inflicting some 77 
casualties on the Israelis, but were countered by the heavy bombardment 
of Suez, Port Said and Ismailia. Then on 31 October, an Israeli commando 
raid was made on Naj Hammadi in the Nile Valley which involved the 
blowing up of two bridges and a transformer station, cutting power supplies 
60 
to a large area. This fighting led to the evacuation of those who had 
remained in the Canal cities and acted as a catalyst for the demonstrations 
which took place a few weeks later. 61 
However, far from concluding that the costs of a strategy of 
attrition would outweigh the benefits, Nasser sought instead to reduce 
some of the costs by bolstering the defence of strategic targets in the 
Egyptian interior. Moreover, the prospect of benefit had grown because, 
by the end of 1968, both superpowers had taken initiatives aimed at a 
solution, which included Egyptian demands for a total withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from Sinai, and they were about to enter into substantive 
negotiations - the political solution would quickly be tested. Further, 
the demonstrations had increased the pressure for military action since 
the immediate costs of inaction outweighed the future costs of defeat. 
In other words, by the beginning of 1969, with the superpowers about to 
engage in Two and Four Power Talks, and with pressure growing for military 
action, the stage had been set for Nasser's launching of his War of 
Attrition. 
Thus, in this new phase of the politics of patronage, both clients 
faced the familiar task of maintaining the support of their patrons while 
60. Middle East Record~ 1968~ pp. 275-77. 
61. Mahmoud Hussein notes; "Those who participated in these events 
at one of Egypt's universities ... did not have the slightest doubt 
regarding the anti-Israeli preoccupation ~f the students. This was 
their primary concern, and the Naga Hammadi raid was the direct cause 
of the feverish political climate". Class Conflict in Egypt~ p. 312. 
resisting the inimical effects of superpower policies. However, the 
prospect of a superpower rapprochement or a reconciliation between the 
United States and Egypt raised new fears for Jerusalem and Moscow and 
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new opportunities for Cairo and Washington. This competition between the 
superpowers for Cairo's allegiance, between the clients for Washington's 
support, and between the clients and their patrons to resist the inimical 
effects of a superpower rapprochement, determined the conduct of the War 
of Attrition, not only across the Suez Canal, but also in Moscow and 
Washington where the actions of the clients would have a marked effect 
on the policies of their patrons. 
III - THE FIRST PHASE: MARCH - JUNE, 1969 
(i) The Egyptian Message 
The War of Attrition was launched in earnest on 8 March as Israeli 
positions were shelled by massive artillery bombardments. The purpose was 
soon made clear in a speech on 27 March, which Nasser addressed in part, 
to the superpowers. He first declared that a new phase of the crisis had 
been opened, "characterised by the continued escalation of military 
operations on the Egyptian front". Noting that the Four Power Talks were 
about to begin, he stated that they would do so "against a background of 
pressures which make it perfectly clear •.. that the Middle East crisis 
cannot possible wait any longer for a solution". To add to these pressures, 
Nasser declared that the attitude adopted by each of the four powers would 
enable the Arab world "to distinguish between friend and foe" and would 
determine "the nature of its relations with the Arab nation for years to 
come". Addressing himself directly to the United States, Nasser held that 
it shared responsibility for the dangerous course the crisis .was taking 
because its views were identical with those of Israel. Noting that the 
United States had "enormous interests in the Arab wor·ld", he stated that 
Egypt had tried and was still trying to alter the American attitude, but 
"so far" there were no indications of change. 
If Nasser was serving notice on Washington of an expected change in 
its attitude towards Israel's demands, he was also serving notice on the 
Soviet Union that Egyptian demands were not negotiable. Repeating the 
principles of no direct negotiations, no peace, not an inch of territory, 
and no .bargaining with the rights of the Palestinians, he declared: 
"nobody can dictate to the Arab nation anything that it regards as 
encroaching on justice or infringing its legitim<Jte historical rights". 
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And, perhaps in case the Soviet Union was considering withholding the 
artillery and ordnance necessary for continuing the fighting across the 
Canal, Nasser heaped praise on Moscow for "supplying us with the weapons 
we need" without imposing any restrictions or attaching any conditions. 
In particular, Soviet arms had enabled Egypt to attain the present position 
"from which we could retaliate or repel the enemy" and "in the last few 
months we have benefited greatly from the Soviet experts and advisors who 
are with our units". In other words, Nasser was implicating the Soviet 
Union in the War of Attrition and implicitly warning Moscow that Egypt's 
attitude might change from gratitude to hostility if its patron's policy 
62 
changed. Nasser's counselling of patience to his people, "we must not 
rush things to make the battle take place before its due time", may have 
also been designed to reassure the Soviet Unipn that at this stage Nasser 
1 . d . 1. . d fl. 63 was on y intereste in a imite con ict. 
The political message of the War of Attrition was first addressed 
to Israel by Heikal, but elaborated on by Nasser during his Hay Day speech. 
In an articl~ published the day before the commencement of the artillery 
barrage, Heikal noted that Israel was satisfied with its present positions 
and would hesitate before attacking because further moves would bring its 
forces into heavily populated areas; moreover, the Arab fronts, especially 
the Egyptian front, were almost impossible to penetrate. Thus the Arab 
forces had to take action to prevent the cease-fire lines from "freezing" 
and becoming a fait accompli. A war of attrition on all fronts was 
necessary, a war which would take account of Israel's technical superiority 
. 64 
but would inflict unbearable losses on Israel. A month later, Heikal· 
elaborated on the strategy: while a·limited war could not inflict a 
decisive defeat on Israel, it could inflict a limited defeat through the 
destruction of two or three Israeli divisions; the Israeli army could be 
forced to retreat even if only a few kilometres; the myth of Israeli 
invincibility would be destroyed and with it the philosophy of an impo'sed 
65 peace. 
62.· Cf. 
1977, p. 
Nasser repeated this line of thought on 1 May, when he declared 
Alvin Rubinstein, Red StaJ:' on the Nile, Princeton, New Jersey, 
81. 
63. Speech by President Nasser at the Inauguration of the Second Session 
of the General National Congress of the A.S.U., 27 March, 1969, .IDOP, 1969, 
Document 387, pp. 646-655. 
64. Al Ahram, 7 March, 1969. 
65. Al Ahram, 11 April, 1969. 
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that Israel's desire to turn the cease-fire lines into permanent borders 
was unacceptable. In these circumstances, the Egyptian forces had set 
their objective as the destruction of the Israeli fortifications (he 
claimed that 60% of the Bar-Lev line had already been destroyed): "either 
the Israelis withdraw from the occupied territories or fighting will 
• 11 66 
continue . 
(ii) Israel's Response 
If Nasser's aim was to use military pressure along the Canal to 
force Israel to withdraw and to encourage the superpowers to apply 
political pressure in this direction, then Israel's response was designed 
to counteract this strategy. On the military level, the October prelude 
had served notice that Israel would have to decide whether it intended 
to def end its positions on the Canal or withdraw to positions beyond 
Egyptian artillery range. The Egyptian army, which had been deployed 
along the west bank of the Canal; enjoyed a manpower superiority of 
12:1 and a fire-power superiority of 20:1 over Israeli forces. In 
October, the Israeli forces had been vulnerable to the Egyptian artillery 
barrage; had the barrages continued at that stage, Israel could well have 
been forced to withdraw from the Canal. However, the raid on Naj Hammadi 
exposed Egypt's vulnerable interior and forced it to abandon its artillery 
offensive ·on the Canal while it bolstered its defence of strategic 
installations. This breathing spell gave Israel time to prepare itself 
for the new threat. 
Although the construction of a static defence line went against all 
the instincts of the IDF, which had always emphasised mobility, tactical 
ingenuity and command flexibility, it was nevertheless decided that the 
positions on the Canal would have to be defended for fear that a withdrawal 
to interior positions would enable the Egyptians to gain a foothold on 
the east bank and then protect this position by political action in the 
United Nations. Thus Defence Minister Dayan and Chief-of-Staff Bar Lev 
ruled .out a unilateral withdrawal to less vulnerable positions and instead 
decided to fortify the Canal positions so that they could be maintained 
without sust<.1ining heavy casual ties. In the breathing space between the 
66. Labour Day Speech by President Nasser, IDOP~ 1969, Document 397, 
pp. 679 and 682. 
incidents of October 1968 and the War of Attrition which began in March 
1969 the IDF built twenty-six fortresses along the length of the Canal 
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to protect the troops from the artillery bombardments while they prevented 
1 1 E . . 67 h B . d . a arge-sca e .•gyptian crossing. T e ar Lev Line serve its purpose 
well, with only seven Israelis killed in March. However, as the artillery 
bombardments increased in intensity and were accompanied by commando 
raids across the Canal, Israeli casualties mounted, so that by mid-July 
68 
the IDF had sustained sixty-eight dead and two hundred wounded. A 
raid on Naj Hammadi on 29 April, aimed at restoring tranquillity along the 
Canal, failed in its intent because little damage appeared to have been 
inflicted - the bombardments and raids continued. 
Although the mounting casualties caused the Israeli leadership 
considerable concern, at this stage they were preoccupied with the effect 
that the Canal war would have on the deliberations of the superpowers. 
One of Egypt's purposes in launching the war had been to emphasise to 
the superpowers that there was "a time bomb in the shape of the cease-fire 
lines' 1 • 69 Since both superpowers wished to avoid an outbreak of full-scale 
war because of the risks it held for superpower confrontation, this 
Egyptian leverage could only be neutralised by Israel if it could demonstrate 
its capacity to maintain stability in the region, thereby removing the 
necessity for superpower diplomatic intervention. However, in maintaining 
stability, Israel faced the same dilemma as it had before 1967 when 
dealing with Syrian bombardments, because the United States was opposed 
to the retaliatory measures necessary for forcing the Arab states to adhere 
to the cease-fire. Moreover, in the environment of Two Power Talks, an 
Israeli attempt to use retaliatory means could be counter-productive because, 
unlike before 1967, the United States was considering ways of dealing with 
the instability by devising a plan for the settlement of the conflict which 
would involve the withdrawal of Israeli forces. A short-term exacerbation 
of the conflict, aimed at restoring tranquillity, might instead produce 
greater pressure from Washington for an Israeli withdrawal. Thus, in the 
67. The fortresses were in fact completed one week after the bombardments 
recommenced in March. For the debate between the generals about the Bar 
Lev Line see Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement, London, 1975, Chapter l; 
cf. Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, Tl;,e Israel1: Army, London, 1975, pp.318ff; 
Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, (1870-1974), San Francisco, 1974, 
pp. 242-246. 
68. Casualty figures are taken from Middle East Record, 196.9, Unpublished 
Draft. See also Edgar 0' Ballance, The Electron£e IVar> in the 1111:ddle Em;L, 1968-
1970, London, 1974, pp. 60-62. 
69. Heikal, "A Glance at the Cease-Fire Lines", 27 March, 1969, BBC/8WB, 
ME/3038/A/2. 
period from March to July 1969, Israel undertook only one, surprisingly 
70 
unsuccessful, commando raid against Egyptian targets. 
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Instead, Israel resorted to a policy of belittling the significance 
of the fighting along the Canal and rebutting Egyptian charges that 
full-scale war was imminent. Thus on 6 April Defence Minister Dayan 
stated: 
... by heating up the lines along the Suez Canal, the 
Egyptians want to provide a basis for the claim that the 
Middle East is like a powder keg and that war can break 
out at any moment. This is only a fiction; the Middle 
East is not on fire; there is no danger of a Soviet-U.S. 
confrontation in the Middle East because there is no 
danger of an Arab-Israeli war.71 
On 12 April, Israel's military commentator, General (ret.) Haim Herzog 
went a little further in slighting the Egyptian activities: 
.•. it should be clear to any trained military and political 
observer that the danger of war in the Middle East does not 
exist at the moment, because war requires somebody to wage 
it and that somebody does not exist today in the Middle East ... 
Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, it is apparently 
possible by the expenditure of a few thousand shells to 
create the impression abroad that war is imminent. .. 72 
These denigrations were repeated by Foreign Minister Eban, Deputy Prime 
Minister Allon, and Prime Minister Meir on various occasions during this 
period, often accompanied by appeals to Egypt to observe the cease-fire. 
Meanwhile, the outcome of the Two and Four Power Talks were awaited with 
trepidation and Israel's opposition continued to be expressed with 
73 
vehemance. However, as Golda Meir noted at the end of May, "it was 
70. The political counter-productiveness of Israel's policy of retaliation 
was demonstrated in the reaction to the Karameh (Jordan) raid and the 
Beirut Airport raid in 1968. Israel was condemned unanimously in the 
Security Council on both occasions and severely criticised by the United 
States. However, at that stage the United States was still following a 
policy of 'containment' and had not yet embarked on its endeavour to find 
a settlement to the conflict. 
71. Israel Home Service, 6 April, 1969, BBC/SWB, ME/3043/A/6. 
72. Israel in English, 12 April, 1969, BBC/SWB, ME/3048/A/6-7. 
73. See Statement by Yigal Allon, 6 April, 1969, BBC/SWB, ME/3043/A/6; 
Golda Meir's Objections to Four Power Talks, 12 April, 1969, BBC/SWB, 
ME/304 7 /A/ 5-6; Moshe Dayan on the Cease-Fire Lines, 29 April, 1969, BBC/SWB, 
ME/3062/A/5; Abba Eban on the Cease-Fire; 1. Hay, 1969_, BBC/SWB, ME/3064/A/15; 
Golda Meir's Speech to the Knesset, 5 May, 1969, BBC/SvlB, HE/3067/A/4; 
Statement of Abba Eban, 14 May 1969, BBC/SWB, ME/3075/A/5. 
313 
regrettable that Israel had not yet been able to bring their talks to an 
d" 74 en . 
Although there was certainly no consensus within the National Unity 
government about Israel's terms for peace, there was solid opposition to 
any diplomatic intervention by the external powers which might seek to 
deprive Israel of the fruits of victory. There was also complete 
·agreement that, since the Arab states were not willing to make peace, 
Israel should maintain its positions in occupied territory. The only 
debate in Israel at this stage was about where Israeli settlements should 
be established and whether the present administrative status of the 
territories should be maintained. Since, in the absence of peace, the 
status quo was thought to be preferable to any change, Israel's leadership 
had decided to await events and react with determination when developments 
threatened its interests. 
(iii) The Supe.!_Eower Reaction 
The superpowers were less sanguine about the deteriorating situation, 
but remained calm in their reaction to it. The United States was 
preoccupied with the Two and Four Power Talks and hardly needed the 
added impetus of tension along the Canal to spur it into action. However, 
given Israel's ability to defend itself and its willingness not to escalate 
the conflict, there appeared to be little danger that the War of Attrition 
would turn out to be the prelude to all-out war and therefore little reason, 
at this stage, to expend energy in attempting to end it, if, instead, the 
patrons could reach agreement about the terms of an overall settlement. 
In retrospect, that attitude clearly showed an error in judgement, for 
events on the battlefield did much to determine the attitudes of Egypt and 
the Soviet Union to the Talks. However, at the time, with Nixon and 
Kissinger preoccupied with more monent·ous issues, and with Sisco and Rogers 
focusing their attention on the Talks .in New York and Washington, the 
American reaction to the initial phase of the Har of Attrition was limited 
to expressions of concern that the breakdown of the cease-fire would hinder 
efforts towards a settlement, and words of caution to Israel not to 
75 
undertake large-scale reprisals. 
·=rz;~-Pr-i~e t:Unister Meir's Speech at Bar Ilan University, 30 Hay, 1969, 
BBC/SWB, ME/3087/A/2. 
75. See New York Times, 23 April, 7 May, 1969. Eban disclosed in June 
that Washington periodically advised Israel, where there were fears of a 
dangerous escalation, to abstain from reprisals against Egyptian prcivocations. 
Jerusalem Post, 22 June, 1969. 
314 
On the other hand, there were indications that the Soviet Union was 
not averse to some tension on the cease-fire lines, as long as the 
fighting remained strictly limited and Egypt still paid lip-service to a 
political solution. Thus, in February there were reports that Soviet 
arms shipments to Egypt were increasing, and in May, that these arms 
supplies included canal-crossing equipment. 76 By mid-1969, the Soviet 
Union had increased Egypt's· stock of medium, heavy, and self-propelled 
guns, from several hundred to six hundred and fifty, and had also 
supplied the ordnance which was being expended in such vast quantities. 77 
Other things being equal, it seems likely that the Soviet Union would 
have preferred that Nasser not launch his War of Attrition since there 
was the danger that Israel would escalate the hostilities and that this 
might lead to full-scale war, an Egyptian defeat, and a superpower 
confrontation. However, other things were not equal, and once Egypt's 
defensive capabilities had been strengthened and strategic targets 
protected from Israeli commando raids, the risk of escalation may have 
appeared limited. After all, Israel's stated purpose was the maintenance 
of the present cease-fire lines; the occupation of more Egyptian 
territory could serve little purpose especially since that could only be 
achieved at high political as well as military cost. Rather, the danger 
to the Soviet position came from the consequences of trying to restrain 
Nasser from taking any military action. The mass demonstrations at the 
beginning and end of 1968 had driven home to the Soviet Union the message 
that anti-Soviet feeling was growing in Egypt, that Nasser was under 
considerable pressure to take action to reassert Egypt's pride and its 
leadership of the Arab world, and that therefore Nasser's position and its 
own influence in the region were by no means secure. 
76. Newsweek_, 16 February 1969; International Herald Tribune-' 16 and 20 
February, 1969; Arab Report and Record_, No. 9, 1-15, May, 1969. Cf. O'Ballance 
who claims that while the Soviet Union was prepared to supply endless 
ordnance, it was tardy in sending items such as amphibious vehicles, and 
four-wheel drive trucks. (p. 63). It is of course possible that, while 
tardy, the Soviet Union did in fact start supplying this equipment in May 
1969. Heikal states that Shelepin provided Nasser with a list of the arms 
that would be supplied on his visit to Cairo in January, 1969. Nasser is 
reported to have told Shelepin: '' ... even if the Russians are slow, in the end 
they give us what we want". (The Road i;o Ramadan, p. 67). It seems likely 
that the arms deliveries were part of those agreed to when Nasser visited 
the Soviet Union in July 1968. 
77. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs_, pp. 105 and 108; J.C. Hurewitz, "Weapons 
Acquisition: Israel and Egypt", loc.c1:t."' p. L;89. Agence France Presse 
reported that in the period from March to May, Egyptian artillery fired some 
57,000 shells. See Arab Repor•t and Recor>d~ r'lo. 10, 16-31 May, 1969. 
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The threat that Nasser's regime might collapse while the Soviet Union 
sought a diplomatic solution may have led Moscow to conclude that Soviet 
as well as Egyptian interests could be served if the fighting could be 
restricted to the Canal zone. First, and most importantly, Nasser would 
bolster his position domestically and in the Arab world by demonstrating 
that he was taking action to liberate the land; the Soviet Union would 
be identified with this new. sense of purpose since its advisors were at 
the front and its weapons were being used. Second, controlled tension 
could prove useful in the context of the Two Power Talks, by demonstrating 
to the United States that the status quo was unacceptable and that Israel 
would have to be pressured into withdrawal; the Soviet Union could claim 
that without progress on the diplomatic front it might be unable to 
restrain its client from taking more drastic action. Third, the alternative 
of attempting to restrain the Egyptian forces was bound to be counter-
productive; it would damage Soviet-Egyptian relations, increase anti-Soviet 
feeling in Egypt, and perhaps encourage its client to deal directly with 
the United States rather than through the agency of Moscow. 
Thus,it seems likely that in the initial stages of the War of 
Attrition the Soviet Union not only acquiesced in Egypt's strategy, but 
actually supported it for lack of an alternative means of bolstering 
Nasser's position - a position which had come to be identified with its 
own. At this stage the question of who was influencing whom was not very 
important since there was still a modicum of convergence between the 
interests of patron and client and each was acting within the limits set 
down by the other's vital int~rests. However, the real test of the power 
of the weak came in June, when the interests of client and patron did 
appear to diverge. 
The Talks between Ambassador Dobrynin and Assistant Secretary of 
State Sisco had been proceeding since March when the United States had 
responded to the Soviet proposals of December. Amidst reports that there 
was an approximation in the positions of the superpowers and positive 
statements from Moscow about the need for compromise and the possibility 
of direct negotiations, Sisco presented formal proposals to Dobrynin on 
26 May, reflecting the discussions which.had been held. As Secretary of 
State Rogers later explained the Soviet-American understanding: 
... there is a general agreement that any settlement has to 
be a comprehensive settlement and that no part of it can 
go into effect until the agreement is signed, and it is a 
contractual agreement and the future of Israel is guaranteed. 
And at that point, aft.er the com8rehensive agreement is 
signed, then it is implemented.7 
That the agreement had to be a package - that Israeli withdrawal 
would be part of the settlement, but would not take place before it -
h b d .b l d 1 . 1 . k 7 9 Th seems to ave een accepte y tle patrons an c ients a_ i e. e 
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concept of° a "contractual agreement" was designed to overcome the 
Egyptian commitment not to sign a 'peace treaty' with Israel; it would 
bind each party in specific obligations to the other. It was understood, 
though perhaps not stated in these formal proposals, that Israeli 
withdrawal in Sinai would be to the pre-1967 border, and that the Gaza 
Strip would remain under UN control until some agreement was reached between 
Israel and Jordan. However, the general principle concerning Israeli 
withdrawal was that it should be to frontiers providing reasonable 
security for all states, rather than an automatic return to the pre-1967 
borders on all fronts. Beyond that, the United States proposed a number 
of other general principles while eschewing any attempt to set out, in 
precise words, the terms of the contractual agreement: freedom of navigation; 
demilitarised zones in areas evacuated by Israeli forces; termination of 
the state of belligerency; Jerusalem and the refugees to be dealt with 
later, perhaps in direct negotiations, and a Palestinian settlement based 
on the principle of compensation for most in lieu of repatriation; 
peacekeeping forces to be placed between the states, under the control of 
1 f ' 1 80 the Security Council; and internationa guarantees o tne sett ement. 
78. DSB., 12 January, 1970, p. 25. 
79. The Egyptian Ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammed Hassan el-
Zayyat was reported to have announced Egyptian acceptance of the 'package 1 
arrangement in April. See Arcib Report and Record., No. 7, 1-15, April, 1969. 
80. Ne11J Yo.r•k Thne.s .. 8 June, 1969; Le Monde., 15 and 16 June, 1969, cited in 
!t1'cib Report and Record_, No. 11, 1-15 June, 1969. Heikal revealed what he 
claimed to be the American proposals on 27 June. He said that they covered 
thirteen points; termination of the state of war between Israel and Egypt and 
replacement by state of peace; inadmissability of the use and threat of 
force; the end of any form of aid for the fedayeen; the end of the Arab 
boycott against Israel; the end of reciprocal campaigns of incitement in 
the Middle East; the border between Israel and Egypt will be that between 
Egypt and .Mandatory Palestine but territories evacuated by Israel will be 
demilitarised; absolute freedom of navigation; the Gaza Strip would be 
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(iv) The Egyptian Camel and the Russian Bear 
These proposals were the first real test of Soviet interest in a 
peaceful settlement, since they reflected the consensus reached by Sisco 
and Dobrynin, but they did not provide either Israel or Egypt with all 
its demands. The United States let it be known that if the Soviet 
Union accepted these written principles it would be interpreted as a 
positive sign of Soviet int~ntions. 81 The assumption seemed to be that 
if the superpowers now reached agreement on these principles, it would be 
possible for them jointly to deliver their clients. However, on 18 June, 
three weeks after Sisco had presented Dobrynin with the American proposals, 
the Soviet Union responded: its note called for Israeli withdrawal from 
all the occupied territories; no direct negotiations on any subject; 
no 'package' deal, but rather Israeli withdrawals before the declaration 
of an end to the state of belligerency; demilitarised zones on both sides 
of the frontiers rather than just in the areas evacuated by Israel; and 
a restoration of the political 'rights' of the Palestinians, instead of 
. . . . d. "d 1 b . 82 repatriation or compensation on an in ivi ua asis. 
As well they might, American officials expressed disappointment at 
the Soviet reply, and in a press conference on 19 June President Nixon 
had to admit "that I see very little defusing" of tensions in the Middle 
East. Whereas previously the United States had spoken of getting the 
Soviet Union to agree to the terms of a settlement, the President now 
spoke only in terms of trying to get the Soviet Union to use its influence 
"to defuse the crisis 11 • 83 In those three weeks, the weary Egyptian camel 
had succeeded in leading the Soviet bear. 
The first signs that the policies of patron and client had begun to 
diverge appeared at the beginning of May when Soviet officials at the 
80. (continued) placed under Jarring's supervision and discussed with 
Israel, Egypt and Jordan; action on refugees would be taken, but would 
not delay the attainment of a final settlement; at some stage in the 
negotiations there would be direct contacts; a contractual peace would be 
signed; the Security Council to guarantee the settlement and station forces 
in the region to be withdrawn only by Security Council decision; no proposal 
on Jerusalem (l:-Ieikal inferred that the United States supported the idea of a 
united Jerusalem under Israeli control). AZ. Ahram., 27 June, 1969. Cf. John 
C. Campbell, ''American Efforts for Peace", in Malcolm H. Kerr, (ed.), The 
EZ.usive Peace in the M1:ddl.e East,Albany, New York, 1975, pp. 291-2. 
81. Nei,1 York T1:mes, 8 June, 1969. 
82. New York Times, 26 June, 1969. 
83. New York Times, 21 June, 1969; President Nixon's News Conference of 
19 June, DSB, 7 July, 1969, p. 4. 
United Nations were heard to complain that Egypt had rejected Soviet 
advice to reduce the artillery bombardments in order to make a good 
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84 impression on the Four Power Talks. On 8 Hay, Soviet Ambassador Malik 
handed a note to U Thant which emphasised the Soviet desire for a political 
settlement. The note was described as unusual because it implied an 
admonition of Egypt and was notable for its lack of invective against 
85 Israel. At the same time·soviet commentators began to express distinctly 
moderate positions on the issues of direct negotiations, freedom of 
86 
navigation, and the settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem. 
More disturbing still for Egypt were the reports in the international press 
that the Soviet Union was suggesting to the United States that 'minor 
adjustments' in Israel's borders might be acceptable if Israel committed 
itself to the principle of withdrawal. 87 
The spec'tre of the Soviet Union compromising Egypt's demands in the 
Two Power Talks for the purpose of reaching a superpower agreement at the 
expense of Egypt raised the alarm in Cairo. Forei~n Minister Riad called 
in Ambassador Vinogradov for talks on 10 May and again on 19 May; Kosygin 
met with Egyptian Ambassador Ghaleb on 13 May; and finally Nasser talked 
with Ambassador Vinogradov on 17 May. These talks were described as 
"very important 11 by the Egyptian press, but as "stormy" by the international 
88 press. Vinogradov is reported to have told Nasser that the United 
States and the Soviet Union intended to seek a .Middle East settlement, 
that there were "reckless risks" of escalation in continuing the Canal war, 
and that Egyptian forces were in no condition to match the Israelis. 
Nasser is reported to have been "incensed" by the idea that the Soviet · 
Union had compromised Egyptian demands in agreeing to minor territorial 
adjustments: if the Russians were discussing Egyptian interests with the 
84. Observer, 3 May, 1969. 
85. New York Times, 9, 10 and 22 May, 1969. 
86. On 6 May Pravda's Beliaev endorsed the principle of direct talks. Later 
in the month he published ari article in Internai:ional Affairs which called 
for compromise, a peaceful settlement, Israeli use of the Suez Canal, the 
possible development of wasteland outside Israel for the Palestinians, and 
pointedly suggested that what was needed was ''common sense and the urge to 
jettison obsolete dogmas and confrontation ... ". See L Beliaev, "Ways of 
Ending the Middle East Crisis", Internat1:onal Affairs, (Moscow), No. 10, 
October, 1968; New _York Times, 22 May, 1969; cf. Alvin Rubinstein, Red Star 
on the Nile, p. 83. 
87. International Herald Tribune, 7 l'-1ay, 1969 ;. New Yo1?k Times, 26 May, 1969. 
88. Ill ,Jumha.rr1:ya_, 11 May, 1969; MENA, 13 and 19 May, 1969, in FliIS_, 20 May, 
1969; Christian Science Monitor_, 15 Nay, 1969. 
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Americans, it would be better for Egypt to discuss these matters with. 
T.l l . d. 1 89 was11ngton irect y. 
The strain in relations was exacerbated by the tabling of the American 
proposals on 26 May. Instead of coming to realise the futility of 
negotiating a political solution from a position of Egyptian weakness, it 
appeared that the Soviet Union was about to accept a formula which would 
fall short of Egypt's political demands. The crucial tes.t of Egypt's 
ability to resist this superpower design came on 10 June when Foreign 
Minister Gromyko arrived in Cairo to persuade Nasser to accept the 
package deal, amidst warnings in Pravda of the need for Egypt to adopt 
a "sober and realistic approach to the conflict's solution by political 
. 90 
methods". In meetings with Nasser, Foreign Minister Riad and Mahmoud 
Fawzi (Nasser's assistant for Foreign Affairs), Gromyko outlined the 
settlement proposals and tried to convince Nasser that by agreeing to 
sign the accord he would recover lost territories and eliminate the effects 
of the 1967 defeat. Nasser apparently flatly rejected the proposals; he 
would accept nothing short of total Israeli withdrawal and Egyptian 
reoccupation of Sinai and Sharm el-Sheikh; there would be no demilitarisation 
of Sinai and no international force there; negotiations on the issues of 
non-belligerency, freedom of navigation and recognition of Israel could 
only follow complete Israeli withdrawal. 91 
In the words of Heikal: "since it is always the strong who take and 
the weak who give, what [was] there to prevent the conclusion of a 
transaction at the expense of ... the Arabs in their struggle with Israel ... 
particularly since the Arabs depend upon the Soviet Union to supply them 
with the arms they require ... ?1192 What leverage indeed did Egypt possess to 
prevent the Soviet Union and the United States from imposing a settlement 
inimical to Egyptian interests? The most potent lever in Nasser's 
possession was the threat of collapse as a result of the domestic and 
89. "Letter from Cairo", Neu) Middle East_, July, 1969, pp. 7-9; Christian 
Science Monitor_, 15 May, 1969; Observer_, 20 May, 1969. 
90. New York Times_, 7 June, 1969. 
9L Neh1 York Times" 18 June, 1969; "Letter from Cairo", Neh1 Middle East_, 
July, 1969, pp. 7-8; Jean Lacouture, Nasser_, pp. 330~1. 
92. Heikal, "The Psychological Warfare Attempts", 20 June, 1969, BBC/Sf/B_, 
ME/3106/A/2. 
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inter-Arab reaction to Egyptian acquiescence in the superpower design. 
The Soviet Union was already aware of the impatience of the army officers 
and their resentment at not receiving the arms which they believed necessary 
for offensive action; Moscow was also aware that the Egyptian people 
were calling out for action not capitulation. Thus Nasser could claim 
that he was bound by army and public opinion to reject the compromise. 93 
The Soviet- Union then had to consider whether, by pressuring Nasser to 
accept the proposals, it would precipitate the collapse of his regime 
and jeopardise its own position of influence in Egypt. 
The second form of leverage which Nasser possessed was the threat 
of instability. Given that there was an intense exchange of fighting 
along the Suez Canal, and that the Soviet Union had become committed to 
supporting the War of Attrition, Nasser had the ability to escalate the 
fighting and bring the area back to the brink of full-scale war. 
As Heikal asserted in his weekly column just before Gromyko's visit: 
"next winter will be a hot winter of explosions, flames and fire 11 • 94 
Thus the Soviet Union would have to choose between promoting an unacceptable 
compromise which might encourage Nasser to step up the Canal war, and 
abandoning the American proposals, which might prevent a full-scale war 
even if it did not put an end to the War of Attrition. In this regard, 
it was no mere coincidence that the apparent superpower rapprochement had 
been accompanied by the heaviest fighting which had yet been experienced 
95 
along the Canal. Nasser was demonstrating Egypt's ability to disrupt 
the carefully negotiated plans of the superpowers. 
Nasser's third source of leverage was his ability to play on the 
competitive interests of the Soviet Union. As Gromyko's visit ended, 
Heikal began publishing a series of editorials which revealed the argument 
which had presumably been put to the Soviet Union: the American proposals 
were part of a campaign to show that "the Soviet Union was about to sell 
out the Arab position in a political deal with the USA"; the aim was to 
93. According to Lacouture, General 
can no longer answer for the army". 
conveyed to Gromyko, See Lacouture, 
Fawzi told Nasser; "If you sign, I 
This attitude was presumably 
Nasseri, p. 331. 
94. Heikal, 11Yesterday 1 s Grief and Today's Challenges", 6 June, 1969, 
BBC/SWB_, ME/3049/A/l. 
95 .. In May there had been 63 separate artillery exchanges reported; in 
June there were 311 of these incidents - the highest monthly rate for the 
whole period of the War of Attrition. U Thant rc~ported to the Security 
Council that "open warfare" had been resumed with artillery exchanges on 
86 consecutive days, and warned that it might be necessary to withdraw the 
UN observers for their own safety. Arab Report and Record_, :'.'lo. 13, 1--15 
July, 1969. 
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drive a wedge between Egypt and the Soviet Union, between Egypt and the 
Arab masses and their governments; the intent of the American settlement 
proposals was in fact to drive the Soviet Vnion out of the Middle East. 96 
That Moscow took this argument seriously is demonstrated by a commentary 
in Pr>avda on 13 June: 
•.. the calculations of the enemies of Soviet-Arab 
friendship, of the opP.onents of peace in the Middle 
East, and of all who believed that they were able to 
impose on the Arab people a peace settlement 
convenient for the Israeli aggressor and his 
imperialist protectors have failed.97 
Finally, Nasser was also able to suggest to the Soviet Union that in 
the diplomatic process, its services were dispensable. In discussions 
with Ambassador Vinogradov, Nasser had apparently hinted that if Egyptian 
demands were going to be compromised it would be better for Cairo to deal 
directly with Washington. This same threat may have been aimed at 
Gromyko as well since, on the last d9Y of his discussions in Cairo, Heikal 
published an article which emphasised Egypt's belief that the address for 
a political settlement was Washington, not Moscow: 
The USA wants to embarrarn the USSR before the Arabs. 
Since the USA alone is in a position to apply pressure 
on Israel why should it bring in the USSR to share in 
the privilege of solving the crisis or even participating 
in the decisive phase of settling the crisis ... The USA 
alone can achieve a settlement: so there is no 98 
settlement, and all those concerned are kept waiting. 
This argument may have touched the most sensitive of all Soviet 
concerns. The Two Power Talks had accorded the Soviet Union the recognition 
it had long sought as America's equal in the Middle East; Cairo was now 
suggesting that it had no role to play in the diplomatic process because 
only the United States could force Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab 
lands. 99 
96. This argument was made three times, in different forms, in Heikal's 
editorials. See "The Devil's Advocate and his Attitude Towards the Middle 
East Crisis", 13 June, 1969, BBC/SWB_, ME/3100/A/4; "The Psychological 
Warfare Attempts", 20. June,. 1969, BBC/SWB_, ME/3106/ A/4; and "Nothing New 
Under the Sun'', 27 June, 1969, BBC/Sf./B_, ME/3112/A/3. 
97. Pr>avda_, 13 June, 1969. 
98. Heikal, op. cit. _,ME/ 3100/ A/ 4. 
99. See Lawrence Whetten, .The Carzal Tvar, pass1'.nl_, for the argument that the 
Soviet Union sought equal status with the United States in the Middle East. 
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Under these pressures, Moscow appears to have accepted, with 
reservation, and for the time being, Nasser's strategy for settling the 
conflict: since only the United States could pressure Israel into 
withdrawal, the role that the Soviet Union could and should play was to 
pressure the United States into doing so; this pressure could only be 
effective if Hoscow built Egypt's military strength, since "diplomatic 
policy in any struggle involving armed force cannot but reflect the 
military position on the fighting front'';lOO any compromise on Egyptian 
demands would only be playing into American hands, by making it unnecessary 
for Washington to pressure Israel and possible for it to cause a rift 
between Cairo and Moscow; thus, beyond military support, the Soviet 
Union could best promote Egyptian interests, and therefore its own, by 
remaining steadfast in its support for Egyptian demands in negotiations 
· h I u · d s· 101 wit tle nite . tates. 
Thus the Soviet Union responded to the American proposals on 19 June 
with the hard-line settlement formula which had in effect been dictated 
in Cairo, not so much by the Egyptians as by a consideration of Soviet 
competitive interests in the Middle East. Neanwhile, official Soviet 
statements and commentaries reflected the new no-concessions approach to 
the negotiations and a more positive approach to the Egyptian conduct of 
the War of Attrition, while still insisting that the conflict be solved by 
102 
'peaceful' means. Perhaps reflecting Soviet sensitivity over the 
Egyptian suggestion that only the United States could achieve a settlement, 
16-0:--iieikal, 13 June, 1969, BBC/SWB, ME/3100/A/l. 
101. It is interesting to note that in articulating this policy, Heikal 
was careful to draw a distinction betweeri possessing the military means 
to force Israel to withdraw, and actually employing those me~ns on the 
battlefield: ''Israel cannot possibly be persuaded to withdiaw to the pre-
Sth June lines unless the Arabs actually prove to it that they are capable 
of imposing such a withdrawal, or it becomes certain ... that the Arabs are 
capable of doing so even if they do not actually attempt it". And: " ... the 
result will be the same whether the change is brought about by Arab force 
in an actual battle, or Israel is convinced that there would be this change 
if an actual battle took place.'' This was a restatement of Nasser's 
November 1967 formulation, possibly designed to allay Soviet fears of a 
full-scale war as a result of its military support. See Heikal, 6 June, 
BBC/SWB, ME/3094/A/l; 13 June, 1969, BBC/SWB, HE/3100/A/l. 
102. See "The Soviet Press and the Middle East", Ne11' Middle East, September, 
1969, p. 10. In July, Beliaev published an article which rejected direct 
negotiations, called for 'unconditional' Israeli withdrawal, suggested that 
the necessary starting point for negotiations on borders was the Partition 
Plan borders of 1947, and insisted on demilitarised zones and UN troops on 
both sides of the borders. See Aziia i Afrika Sevodn-i,a, July, 1969. 
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the Two Power Talks were shifted to Noscow, where Sisco sought to focus 
Soviet attention on the issue of arms limitations, now that the political 
negotiations had reached an impasse and American Phantoms were due to be 
delivered to Israel. However, the Soviet Union was less willing than ever 
to consider an arms limitation agreement given the sensitive state of 
Egyptian-Soviet rel~tions. Sisco was apparently told that Soviet officials 
did not believe a major explosion in the Middle East was iITlI'linent and 
returned to Washington at the end of July with no sign of substantive 
progress in the Two Power Talks. 103 
For his part, Nasser declared that Brezhnev had assured him in July 
that the Soviet Union would not agree to anything in talks with the United 
States "unless the Arab nation agrees to it too", and that Moscow had 
responded to all Egypt's military requests. He spoke of a new phase in 
the battle with Israel, "the phase of liberation", but warned that it would 
be a long battle to exhaust Israel and undermine its will, which might 
104 
take three or four years.- As Heikal noted: 1 'one round of the political, 
or psychological, war over the Middle East crisis ended and a new story 
began ... the only story with real influence11 • 105 
103. New York Times, 17 July, 25 July, 1969. 
104. See President .Nasser's Speech to the A. S. U., 23 July, 1969, IDOP, .1969, 
pp. 738-751. 
105. Heikal, 20 June, 1969, BBC/Sr.4B, ME/3106/A/4. 
PART THREE 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE BATTLE FOR THE CEASE-FIRE - 1970 
So far Israel had beerr fortunate enough to benefit from Egypt's 
ability to prevent a superpower rapprochement on the terms of a settlement. 
But Israel's decision-makers were now in agreement with Heikal - the time 
had come for an Israeli response on the battlefield. While the prospects 
of a superpower agreement appeared remote, for the m01aent, there remained 
the possibility that Washington and Moscow would try again and that American 
support for Israel's demands might deteriorate further as Washington tried 
to accommodate Moscow's problems with a recalcitrant Egypt. The 
approximation of Soviet and American positions in May had caused considerable 
alarm in Israel too, and it was now necessary to shore up American support 
by impressing on Washington that the Talks held no prospect, that 11 when 
our problems are being dealt with it is we and our Arab neighbours that 
have to meet and decide ..• not two and not four and not fourteen and not 
forty will make that decision". 1 Accordingly, Prime Minister Meir decided 
to request a meeting with President Nixon to put Israel's arguments 
directly and forcefully; it was announced that the visit would take place 
in September. In the meantime, there appeared to be good reason for an 
escalated response to Nasser's announcement of the new 11 liberation phase", 
aimed at forcing Egypt to respect the cease-fire. 
I - ISRAEL'S "SEVENFOLD" RESPONSE 
First, the situation on the ground had become intolerable with the 
increase in Egyptian bombardments in June. Forty-five Israelis had been 
killed and one hundred and forty-one wounded in five months of fighting, 
and the lack of an effective Israeli response had apparently encouraged 
Nasser to believe that he was achieving his aims. Second, while the Talks 
had been making progress, the United States was able to persuade Israel 
to exercise restraint along the Canal, but now that it was clear that the 
negotiations were deadlocked and that Israeli restraint had only encouraged 
Nasser to increase Egyptian activity, the United States could hardly object 
1. Golda Meir, in an address to the 11th Congress of the Socialist 
International in London, New York Times., 13 June, 1969. 
to an Israeli reaction. 2 Third, in terms of the politics of patronage, 
an escalation now made good sense. Since American efforts to achieve a 
settlement had so far failed, Israel could argue that it was necessary 
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to force Egypt to accept the cease-fire, that stability was the precondition 
for meaningful negotiations, that Egypt might become more flexible 
politically if its military option were foreclosed, and that a short, sharp 
escalation might better provide long-term stability than the exercise of 
restraint, which only seemed to encourage the Egyptians to take more 
daring actions. Moreover, an Israeli escalation might serve indirectly 
to emphasise to Washington that Israeli requirements would have to be 
met in future negotiations, that an improvement in Arab-American relations 
could not be achieved at Israel's expense. An escalation would emphasise 
Israel's ability to polarise the conflict even further by antagonising the 
Arab states with its use of Arnerican arms, while making Egypt even more 
dependent upon Soviet arms. 
Thus, on 30 June, Golda Meir warned the Arab leaders that whoever 
disregarded the cease-fire should not be surprised if Israel responded 
"sevenfold". 3 On 20 July, the Israeli Air Force was ordered to attack 
the Egyptian positions along the Canal. This 'aerial artillery' aimed 
to silence first the anti-aircraft defence and then Egyptian artillery 
positions. The political purpose was clear: "to hit where it hurts most .•. 
and to persevere until the cumulative effect will be such as to make the 
maintenance of the cease-fire more attractive to Nasser". 4 The air raids 
succeeded in inflicting heavy casualties and sharply reducing the volume 
of Egyptian artillery fire, but they seemed to make no impression upon 
2. U Thant reported in July that Egypt had been responsible for 21 out of 
26 incidents along the Canal during June, thereby providing proof that 
Israel had exercised restraint. Abba Eban told an interviewer in July 
that Israel now had evidence to prese~t to the United States that the 
Soviet Union was not prepared to pressure Egypt: " ... _the only American 
predicament is whether to 'confess their disappointment openly or half-
heartedly. I know that their disappointment is authentic and profound". 
Jewish Observer and Middle East Review_, ( JOMER) _, 11 July, 1969. 
3. Prime Minister Meir's Speech to the Knesset, 26 July, 1969, BBC/SWB_, 
ME/3114/A/3. 
4. Chaim Herzog on the Military Situation, 26 July, 1969, BBC/Sf.VB_, ME/3137 I 
A/4. Chief-of-Staff Bar Lev explained that the aims were to bring home 
to the Egyptians that they were far from ready for war; and to increase 
Israeli pressure along the cease-fire line, to bring about a decrease in 
tension. Jerusalem Post_, 27 July, 1969. 
5 Nasser's determination to continue the war. Thus in August, while 
military spokesmen emphasised that Israel's actions had deterred Egypt 
from launching a Canal-crossing offensive, political spokesmen began 
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to suggest that a new regime in Egypt would be more amenable to negotiations, 
that if Nasser did not change his conduct he might have to 'disappear', 
and that Nasser's removal from power would see a new opportunity for peace. 6 
In September, Israel received the first Phantom jets from the United 
States under the December 1968 agreement. The IAF now devoted more of its 
air power to the destruction of the Egyptian air-defence system. However, 
far from persuading Nasser to return to the cease-fire, Israel only 
succeeded in increasing Egyptian antagonism towards the United States, 
while strengthening its resolve to fight on. 7 Moreover, the overthrow 
on 1 September of King Idris of Libya, and his replacement by the 
Nasserite regime of Colonel Quaddafi, heightened American fears of 
increasing polarisation and lessening American influence in the Arab 
world. From Israel's perspective the threat of polarisation should have 
forced the United States to increase its support for Israel with the aim 
of lessening anxiety in Jerusalem and promoting moderation in the knowledge 
of steadfast American support. Viewed from Washington, the threat of 
polarisation in fact encouraged the United States to placate the Arab 
world by stressing that its position was not identical with Israel's. Thus 
it was an inauspicious time for Mrs Meir to argue in Washington that 
Israel should be supported in its use of American aircraft and ordnance 
to make Nasser respect the cease-fire, and that there was no need for 
superpower involvement in the search for .a settlement. 
In fact, the Israeli Prime Minister had very few levers at her 
disposal to achieve her three objectives: to impress upon Washington the 
futility of the Two Power Talks while attempting to gain full support for 
Israel's negotiating position; to ensure a continuing flow of military 
5. Artillery incidents had dropped from 207 in July to 72 in August to 
56 in September. Cf. Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army_, pp. 319-320; 
O'Ballance, The Electronic War_, pp. 84-5. 
6. See statements by Golda Meir and Abba Eban in BBC/SWB_, 8 August and 
30 August, 1969; Israel Government Press Office, T,./eekly News Bulletin_, 
9-15 September, 1969; and Ma'ariv_, 23 September, 1969. 
7. In August, Heikal cited the Phantom delivery as final proof that 
American policy under Nixon had retreated to the anti-Egyptian policy of the 
Johnson era. See Heikal, "Nixon and the Middle East Cr.isis", 15 August, 1969, 
BBC/SWB_, ME/3154/A/3-4; "What then with America?", 29 August, 1969~ BBC/ST./B_, 
ME/3166/A/3-5. 
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supplies, including an additional 25 Phantoms and 80 Skyhawks; and to seek 
8 American economic assistance for Israel's heavy defence burden. \~1ile 
Israel's economic and military requests were not rejected, the President 
made it clear that the United States did not feel that there was any need 
for an immediate decision given the fact that the first fifty Phantoms were 
only just being delivered. Because of the Arab reaction to this original 
supply, at a time when the United States was attempting to rebuild its 
bridges to the Arab world, the new Israeli requests were an embarrassment 
for the Administration. In any case, Washington believed that Israel 
was adequately equipped to defend itself. 9 
On the political level, Mrs Meir made little progress in attempting 
to convince the United States to abandon the Two Power Talks and support 
direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs. Her visit happened to 
coincide with the convening of the UN General Assembly where Secretary of 
State Rogers engaged Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Egyptian Foreign 
Minister Riad in negotiations. On 24 September, a few days after speaking 
with Rogers, and the day before the Israeli Prime Minister's arrival in 
Washington, Riad had told reporters that Egypt was prepared to enter into 
'Rhodes formula' talks if Israel renounced expansion. 10 This signalled 
a moderation in the Egyptian attitude which provided the superpowers with 
a new impetus for their discussions. In this situation, Golda found it 
impossible in her discussions with Rogers to convince the Secretary that 
the Two Power Talks held no prospect, for Sisco and Dobrynin were already 
8. New York Times, 26 September, 1969. 
9. The Times, 25 September, 1969; New York 'Times, 26 September, 1969; 
Jerusalem Post, 28 September, 1969. 
10. The 1949 Rhodes Talks between Israel and its Arab neighbours had 
established the armistice agreements and defined Israel's pre-1967 borders 
(although final borders were to be negotiated). The Talks had been 
conducted by UN mediator Ralph Bunche who moved between the two parties, 
situated in separate rooms. Once agreement had been reached the Israeli 
and Arab negotiators met to sign the accords. The Egyptians regarded these 
talks as a formula for indirect negotiations, while the Israelis insisted 
that they implied direct negotiations. Riad's announcement appeared to the 
Americans to be a breakthrough following the breakdown of negotiations in 
June. To the Israelis, however, it appeared to be a clever public 
relations ploy designed to undercut Golda's arguments that the Two Power 
Talks held no prospect. See New Middle East, :'fovember, 1969, pp. 7 and 50; 
Interview with Shaul Ben-Haim, Press Counsellor, Embassy of Israel, 
Washington (1968-1972), Tel Aviv, 23 March, 1975. 
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11 
wbrking together on a draft proposal. Thus, although Nixon and Meir 
had established a personal rapport, and although the Israeli Prime Minister 
claimed she had received a commitmen-t from the President that Israel 
would only be expected to withdraw in the context of a peace settlement, 
12 there was a "complete deadlock" on the issue of the Two Power Talks. 
Nevertheless, while the Prime Minister clearly failed to persuade 
the Secretary of State to abandon the Talks or to adhere to Israel's 
positions, the IAF's action on the battlefield would soon deal the coup de 
grace to the American plan for a superpower settlement to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
II - THE ROGERS PLAN 
Just how far American and Israeli policies had diverged became clear 
on 28 October, when the United States submitted to the parties its 
proposals for an Israeli-Egyptian settlement. Once the Egyptians had 
agreed, however half-heartedly, tci 'Rhodes Talks' the Soviet negotiators 
had argued in the Two Power Talks that, in the light of their experience 
in June 1969, they could only persuade Egypt to commit itself to peace 
if the United States committed itself to virtually full Israeli withdrawal 
in the context of a settlement. Since this had always been the American 
position, since it had already been submitted to Israel and Egypt by 
Dean Rusk one year ago, since the delivery of the Phantoms had antagonised 
and now threatened to coalesce the Arab world, since the fighting had 
reached a turning point and could well lead to further escalation, since 
Nixon was keen to make progress in these talks to 'link' them with other 
superpower negotiations, and since Sisco and Rogers believed that the 
Soviet Union had been forthcoming and was now prepared _to reach agreement 
11. The Soviet Union was apparently as surprised as the United States by 
the Egyptian announcement but decided that this new flexibility provided 
an opportunity to recommence the Two Power negotiations. While Dobrynin 
participated in the drafting of the new proposals and the text contained 
many of the principles which Moscow had previously supported, the Soviet 
Union refrained from co-sponsoring the brief. See Whetten, The Canal War~ 
pp. 75-6. 
12. New York Times~ 27, 28 September, 1969; BBC/SWB~ ME/3202/A/l-2, 13 
October, 1969. Cf. Golda Meir, My Life~ pp. 324-330. It is clear from 
Golda's speeches in Washington and her subsequent autobiography that 
she was overwhelmed by the reception which she received in Washington. With 
elections looming in October she clearly chose to obscure the differences 
in approach and the lack of tangible achievements by emphasising that 
"we have a great friend in the White House". 
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on a "draft of principles'', the United States decided to reveal its fall-
13 back position on the requirements for a settlement. 
Setting down what Washington regarded as the basic principles for 
a settlement, the American proposal left only the details to be worked out 
between the parties in 'Rhodes Talks'; withdrawal would be conditional 
upon "an official state of peace", but the plan stipulated that the "secure 
and recognised frontier between Egypt and Israel should be the old 
international frontier between Egypt and the Mandated territory of 
P 1 . 14 a estine. 
Israel objected strongly to this American declaration of its position 
on the final border between Egypt and Israel, arguing that it would 
undermine Israel's negotiating position if the Egyptians thought they could 
get all of Sinai back and would make them reluctant to concede anything. 
Moreover, Israel expected to retain control over Sharm el-Sheikh, but 
the plan spoke only of 11effective security measures" to guarantee freedom 
of navigation; there was no mention of direct negotiations, nor of a final, 
contractual, peace treaty. However, this divergence in the positions of 
patron and client had to be treated with care, especially if the reports 
that Moscow and Washington had reached agreement on most of the points 
in the proposal were accurate. A precipitate reaction on Israel's part 
might exacerbate the divergence. 
Nevertheless, the battle continued over the Suez Canal, and the United 
States had only recently supplied Phantoms and ordnance for the IAF to 
carry out its sorties. Washington could not blame Israel for responding 
to Nasser's War of Attrition and in fact had not made any overt attempt 
to restrain Israel in its response; some in Israel suspected that the 
United States favoured military pressure as a means for softening Egypt's 
13. Kissinger is reported to have opposed the concept of the Rogers Plan 
because it let the Russians share the credit for an arrangement which would 
largely be due to American pressure on Israel. He was apparently ordered 
by Nixon to yield the Middle East to Rogers and Sisco. See H. Brandon, 
The Retreat of American Power, New York, 1973, p. 116; Marvin and Bernard 
Kalb, Kissinger, New York, 1974, p. 217. On the reasons behind the 
Rogers Plan see William B. Quandt, "The Middle East Conflict in U.S. 
Strategy, 1970-1971", Journal of Palestine Studies, Volui;ne I, No. 1, 
Autumn, 1971, p. 42; William B. Quandt, 1'he Arab-Israeli Conflict in 
American Foreign Policy, Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African 
Studies, December, 1974. 
14. For the text of the American proposals, as published in An Nahar on 
9 December, 1969, see IDOP, 1969, Document 181, pp. 141-2. 
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15 political stance. In these circumstances, Israel could turn the War 
of Attrition to its own advantage in the diplomatic negotiations, just 
as Nasser had tried to do in the first place. By the beginning of 
November, after intensive bombardment, Israel had succeeded in destroying 
Egypt's air-defence system; the IAF was now free to roam Egypt's skies. 
To emphasise the point, on 4 November an Israeli Mirage made a low-level 
pass over Cairo; on 10 November, an Israeli spokesman announced that all 
Egyptian missile bases, from Port Said to the Gulf of Suez, had been 
d d . h 1 . k 16 estroye in t e a.st six wee s. 
Given the situation at the front, Nasser was hardly in a position 
to tell his people that Egypt had been defeated yet again and that he was 
now prepared to accept the American peace proposals. Instead, on 6 
November, he declared that political efforts had been to no avail, that 
the United States "stands against us as an emeny", that American soldiers 
and pilots were fighting for the Israelis, and that the only alternative 
was to fight "over a sea of blood and an horizon of fire" . 17 Foreign 
Minister Riad, in a speech to the Arab League Defence Council on 8 
November, specifically rejected the American proposals (which he had 
apparently just received) as "even worse than the old ones" because they 
had raised questions of Egypt's sovereignty; were an attempt to divide 
Egypt from the Arab world by encouraging a separate settlement, and did 
not call for an unconditional Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Sharm 
el-Sheikh. 18 
15. Golda Meir notes, enigmatically: 11 •• ,it wasn't my skill as a cook that 
mattered in Washington; it was the bond of friendship between the U.S.A. 
and Israel and the U.S. attitude to our· counter-attrition policy". (emphasis 
supplied). My Life., pp. 329-330. One Israeli Foreign Ministry official, 
who worked on the American Desk at the time, insisted in an interview that 
the United States had not opposed Israel's retaliatory methods and had 
supplied all the ordnance necessary to carry them out. 
16. New Middle East., December, 1969, p. 49. 
17. President Nasser's speech to the National Assembly, 6 November, 1969, 
IDOP., 1969., pp. 808-9. According to Heikal, Egypt did not receive the 
proposals until 8 November but Nasser was aware of the "rosy'' reports of 
the American position on the territorial issue. See Heikal, "A U.S. 
Manoeuvre of Varying Shades", 14 November, 1969, BBC/SWB., ME/3231/A/l-2. 
18. N~v York Times., 9 November, 1969. On 18 November the National Assembly 
rejected the proposals and charged the U.S. with adopting Israel's positions. 
Ghorbal gave Rogers the official Egyptian response at the end of November. 
It stressed that a piecemeal approach to a settlement was not acceptable. 
(Al Jumharriya., 27 November, 1969; Al Ahram.,29 November, 1969). This 
particular objection seems strange since the American plan specifically 
linked an Israeli-Egyptian agreement to an Israeli-Jordanian agreement and 
suggested that "neither of the agreements shall come into effect until such 
time as a comprehensive settlement is agreed on". IDOP., 1969., p. 142. 
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The deterioration in Egypt's military position apparently determined 
the Soviet reaction to the American proposals as well. Given its 
commitment to Egypt's defence, the humiliation it would suffer if Egypt 
were defeated yet again by Israel, the pressure placed on the Soviet-
Egyptian arms relationship by the delivery of the Phantoms, and the danger 
that any attempt to pressure Nasser into accepting the American proposals 
would only create tension between patron and client to America's benefit, 
the Soviet Union decided to reject the proposals. The Americans had 
expected that, having revealed their fall-back position, the Russians would 
now deliver their end of the bargain by coming out in favour of a final 
peace agreement. Instead, on 31 October, Leonid Zamyatin, the Foreign 
Ministry Spokesman, read out a long statement which blamed Israel for 
torpedoing a political settlement, charged the United States with 
supporting Israel's aggression with military and economic assistance, as 
well as American citizens for the Israeli army, suggested that American 
talk of a political settlement was merely a smokescreen for this 
aggression, claimed that the Two Power Talks had not led to "any tangible 
results", because of the obstructive attitude of Israel· and the biased 
attitude of the United States, called for Arab unity to overcome the "web 
19 
of intrigue", and pledged "comprehensive" aid to the Arab states. 
If Israel thought that the Soviet and Egyptian reactions had put paid 
to the American proposals, at least for the time being, it was sorely 
mistaken. Dismayed at the Egyptian and Soviet reactions, and suspecting 
that the Russians had set them up, Rogers and Sisco denied the Soviet 
claims and attempted to get Egypt to reconsider. On receiving Zamyatin's 
statement, Rogers met with Dobrynin to express disappointment and to question 
20 
whether the Soviet Union really wanted a peaceful settlement. In 
response to Nasser's speech, Rogers issued a statement which denied 
American involvement in Israeli military actions and declared that "Nasser 
. 21 
is mistaken in describing the United States as an enemy". On 8 November, 
19. For the text of the statement see IDOP, 1969, Document 185, pp. 149-
151. 
20. New York Times, 1 November, 1969. 
21. Near East Report, Volume XII, 1969, p. 111. 
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he sent a personal note to Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad urging him to 
give attention to the new plan, and stressing that it was an opportunity 
which might be missed. 22 
However, by the time that Ghorbal transmitted Egypt's rejection to 
Rogers, it had become clear to Washington that Moscow had reneged on its 
undertaking and was not prepared to put any pressure on Cairo to accept 
the draft. On 26 November,. Sisco told the Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations that "the attitude of the Soviet Union 
in the bilateral talks and in its public expressions raises doubts regarding 
its willingness to play an actively constructive role on behalf of 
" 23 peace in the Middle East. 
If Rogers and Sisco had failed to appreciate ·the connexion between 
Egypt's losses on the battlefield and the Soviet-Egyptian attitude in 
the negotiations, they now realised that the effort to reach superpower 
agreement had all but come to an end and that, in this situation, it was 
necessary to salvage whatever Arab goodwill remained. This became an 
urgent matter by early December because of the convening of another Arab 
summit at Rabat on 20 December, and their fear that this would lead to 
further moves to reduce American influence in the Arab world. Thus Rogers 
decided to 'go public' with the settlement proposal and to produce a 
parallel proposal on a Jordan-Israel settlement, in the hope that this 
would convince the Arabs of American sincerity, demonstrate that Washington 
was prepared to distance itself from Israel, undermine Soviet charges of 
bias and Egyptian charges of trying to divide the Arab world, and emphasise 
that the United States still sought a political settlement which would 
24 
return all of Sinai to Egypt. 
22. See Heikal, "A U.S. Manoeuvre of Varying Shades", BBC/SivB_, ME/3231/A/3. 
23. NeUJ York Times_, 27 November, 1969. The following day, all the Warsaw 
Pact countries except Rumania published a statement on the Middle East 
which again charged Israel with deliberately disrupting the possibility of 
a political settlement, and the United States with actively encouraging 
Israel. These countries pledged to provide "all round aid" to the Arabs. 
Pravda_, 27 November, 1969. 
24. Concern about the damage to America's position in the Arab world had 
heightened after the coup in Libya because of the fighting which had broken 
out in Lebanon between the fedayeen and the Lebanese Army. American oil-men 
and financiers were also pressing the Administration to distance itself from 
Israel in the hope that this would forestall the nationalisation of 
Western-owned oil companies in the Arab world. Heikal recounts a conversation 
with an American businessman in November (either Robert Anderson or David 
Rockefeller) in which the American charged Egypt with aiming to mobilise all 
Arab public opinion against the U.S. by the time of the Rabat summit. See 
New York Times, 10 December, 1969; Near East Report, Volume XIII, 1969, 
p. 123; Heikal "The Crisis of U.S. Conscience", 28 November, 1969, BBC/SfvB, 
ME/3243/ A/l. 
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Thus, on 9 December, Secretary Rogers revealed to the Galaxy 
Conference on Adult Education the American view of "a lasting peace in 
the Middle East". In the preamble he noted that peace could not be 
imposed on the parties but that the superpowers could act as a catalyst, 
stimulating the parties to negotiate and defining the framework for an 
agreement~ He also observed that while there had been some measure of 
understanding with the Soviet Union, "very substantial differences remain"; 
he regretted that the Soviets had delayed responding to the proposals. 
Then he declared that American policy "is and will continue to be a 
balanced one", aimed at encouraging the Arabs to accept a permanent peace 
based on a binding agreement and urging the Israelis to withdraw from 
occupied territory "when their territorial integrity is assured". Repeating 
the American attitude towards peace, security, territory, the refugees and 
Jerusalem, Rogers then addressed himself to the specific proposals for an 
25 Israeli-Egypt settlement which had constituted the 28 October plan. He 
rebutted the charge that the United States was seeking to divide the Arab 
states, emphasising that "implementation of the overall settlement would 
begin only after complete agreement had been reached on related aspects". 
He spe~t out the three elements of the proposals (a binding peace, 'Rhodes 
Talks' to work out the detailed security provisions, and withdrawal of 
Israeli forces) and then emphasised that in exchange for a binding and 
specific Egyptian commitment to peace, Israel would be required to withdraw 
"to tlie international border between Israel [or Mandated Palestine] and 
Egypt". Rogers then concluded by restating the purpose of his speech: 
We believe this approach is balanced and fair. We remain 
interested in good relations with all states in the area. 
Whenever and wherever Arab states which have broken off 
relations with the United States are prepared to restore 
them, we shall respond in the same spirit.26 (emphasis supplied). 
The speech did nothing to alter the position on the ground and ii1 the 
air over the Canal zone and so made no impression on either Egypt or its 
Soviet patron. An Egyptian spokesman rejected American claims to a 
25. There should be a binding peace agreement which defined in specific 
terms navigation rights and respect for sovereignty; security arrangements 
should provide for demilitarised zones but this should be left to 
negotiations between the parties; the pre-war boundaries were armistice lines 
not final political borders, but any changes should not reflect the weight 
of conquest and should be confined to "insubstantial alterations" ; a just 
settlement for the refugees would have to take account of their 
aspirations as well as the legitimate concerns of the governments in the 
area; Jerusalem should be a unified city with open access to all peoples and 
with roles for both Jordan and Israel in administrative arrangements. See 
"A Lasting Peace in the Middle East: An American View. Address by Secretary 
Rogers", Department of State Bulletin_, 5 January, 1970, pp~ 9-10. 
26. Ibid._, p. 11. ' 
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11 balanced 11 position because of the continuous supply of Phantoms to 
27 Israel; the Soviet Union reJected the plan, point-by'-point, and urged 
28 the Arabs to reject it also. Thus, the Rogers Plan had no possibility 
of becoming a workable formula for an immediate settlement of the conflict. 
Nevertheless, the American assertion of a 'balanced' position at a time 
when the Soviet Union was giving full support to its Egyptian protege was 
a cause for concern in Jeru.salem. Moreover, the Israeli government well 
understood that the Rogers Plan was a statement of principles rather than· 
an action plan for a settlement. This alarmed Jerusalem for, while it 
was possible to disrupt an American plan for a settlement by refusing to 
cooperate, it was far more difficult to change the mind of the American 
Administration on the principles it believed were essential to a settlement 
of the conflict. The alarm grew even greater when, after Eban had met with 
Rogers and explained Israeli objections, the Administration proposed to 
the Four Powers a plan for a Jordan-Israel settlement about which Eban had 
b . f d 29 not een in orme . 
27. See Statement by Abd al-Majid, EBC/SWB, 19 December, 1969. 
28. The formal Soviet response was given to Rogers on 23 December. It 
termed the American. proposal as one-sided and pro-Israel; rejected the idea 
(which it had previously accepted) of a superpower agreement on a directive 
for the revival of the Jarring mission; proposed a two-month timetable for 
Israeli withdrawal; end of belligerency to come into effect after complete 
Israeli withdrawal; demanded Egyptian sovereignty over Sharm el-Sheikh and 
control over Gaza; demilitarised zones on both sides of the border; wanted 
compliance with past UN resolutions on refugees rather than a plan for 
compensation; proposed that navigation in the Suez Canal te controlled by Egypt, 
which could close it to Israeli shipping; qualified the freedom of Israeli 
shipping in the Straits of Tiran; and rejected the 'Rhodes Talks' formula. 
Clearly, the Soviet Union had gone back on points which had already been 
agreed upon in the Two Power Talks and some of which had originally been 
proposed by Moscow. New York Times, 13 January, 1970; cf. Whetten, The 
Canal- T¥ar, pp. 79-80. 
29. On 18 December, two days after Eban's meeting with Rogers and two days 
before the Arab Summit, the United States presented its proposals for an 
Israel-Jordan settlement to the Four Power Talks which had been reconvened 
for the purpose. There were twelve points: the parties would determine 
procedures aii? a timetable for Israeli withdrawal "from substantially all of 
the West Bank; a state of peace to be established; the permanent frontier 
would 'approximate' the pre-1967 armistice lines; a unified Jerusalem 
administered jointly by the two states; arrangements for the Gaza Strip to 
be left to the parties; demilitarised zones on the West Bank; freedom of 
navigation for Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba; refugees to be given a 
choice between repatriation or compensation; mutual recognition of sovereignty 
territorial integrity and political independence of each state; accord 
recorded in a signed document and deposited at the UN; the Security Council 
would endorse the accord, to go into effect simultaneously with the Israel-
Egypt accord. (fleui York Times, 22 December, 1969). One can only speculate 
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However, since the Plan had been rejected by Israel's adversaries, 
and the divergence between the American and Israeli positions was now out 
in the open, Israel did not feel inhibited about responding. Eban and 
Rabin were called home for consultations and, after a short deliberation, 
the Israeli Cabinet issued a statement which was scathing in its criticism 
of the Rogers Plan and the Yost Document (for a Jordanian settlement): 30 
The Cabinet rejects these American proposals, in that they 
prejudice the chances of establishing peace; disregard the 
essential need to determine secure and agreed borders through 
the signing of peace treaties by direct negotiations; affect 
Israel's sovereign rights and security in the drafting Df the 
resolution concerning refugees and the status of Jerusalem; 
and contain no actual obligations on the Arab states to put 
a stop to the hostile activities of the sabotage and terror 
organisations ... The proposals submitted by the U.S. cannot but 
be construed by the aggressive Arab rulers as an attempt to 
appease them at Israel's expense.31 
The Secretary of State responded immediately, demonstrating his 
determination to adhere to the principles he had espoused and his desire 
to curry favour with the Arab states. Asked about the Israeli charge of 
appeasement, he responded: 
I think it is an unfortunate word. It suggests that the 
Arabs are enemies of the United States, and somehow we 
are appeasing them. Of course that isn't true. We have 
had friendly relations with the Arab states for a number 
of years, for many years ... our position is that we hope 
the parties can begin negotiating ... 
29. (continued) on Rogers'motives for not informing Eban but it seems 
highly unlikely that such an important issue could simply have been over-
looked. Rogers probably wanted to avoid an Israeli denunciation of the 
proposals before the Arab summit at which they were aimed. Whatever the 
reason, Rogers seriously embarrassed Eban in the eyes of his fellow 
ministers - an inept move given Eban's dovishness. But Rogers seems to 
have been only concerned with persuading the Arabs of American 'evenhandedness' 
and uninterested in the Israeli or American domestic reactions to his 
diplomatic initiatives. 
30. This was in fact the second Israeli statement in response to the Rogers 
Plan. The first statement was made on 11 December. It stressed that a durable 
settlement would require a peace treaty reached through direct 
negotiations without preconditions or external pressures. The prospects of 
peace would be seriously damaged if external powers continued to raise 
territorial proposals which only encouraged Arab extremism. A durable peace 
would only be achieved when the Arab states were prepared to enter into 
negotiations with Israel for the signing of a peace treaty. See Jerusalem 
Post, 12 December, 1969. 
31. Jerusalem Post, 23 December, 1969. 
In answer to the Israeli call for direct negotiations without external 
interference, Rogers stated clearly: 
Well, we just don't agree with that. We think we have 
a role, as a member of the Security Council, to play in 
these discussions ... we have a responsibility to do all 
we can to bring the parties together. Now that doesn't 
sugges.t that we want to impose a settlement ... I can 
understand why Israel is concerned and why they don't 
necessarily agree with" everything we do. But we have 
to conduct our own foreign policy in a way that we 
think is best for our national interests.32 
Mrs Meir refused to accept the validity of Rogers' claims. In a 
resolute speech to the Knesset,she again explained Israel's objections 
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to proposals which required the parties to negotiate on "marginal matters 
only"; did not require them to enter into a contractual peace agreement; 
did not impose on the Arabs the "positive duty" to put an end to terrorist 
actions; failed to insist on explicit Arab recognition of Israel's 
sovereignty; and endangered Israel's security: 
Both [proposals], if enforced, would gravely endanger 
Israel's very existence. They amount to a return to the 
geography of 1967 and the demography of 1947 ... We have 
the right to demand that U.S. policy not be conducted 
at the expense of our vital interests ... alienation of 
the U.S. from Israeli interests is tantamount to an 
alienation from its own principles ... we unequivocally 
reject the direction taken by the talks of the powers 
and the proposals which have been made. The Government 
of Israel, expressing the will of3§he people, cannot 
even contemplate such proposals. 
Thus, even though the Soviet Union and Egypt had rejected the 
American proposals and Washington was now expressing its "deep disappointment" 
at what was regarded as "Soviet bad faith", the year had ended in a severe 
crisis for relations between Israel and its American patron. 34 
32. Secretary Rogers News Conference, 23 December, 1969, DSB_, 12 January, 
1970, pp. 21-3. 
33. See "Israel Rejects Rogers' Initiative", Neu Middle East_, February, 1970, 
p. 49. The Knesset endorsed Mrs Meir's rejection of the Rogers proposals by 
a vote of 57 to 3, with 2 abstentions. See Brecher, Decisions in Israel's 
Foreign Policy_, pp. 485-6. 
34. In January, State Department spokesman Mccloskey explained that the 
Soviet response to the Rogers Plan had been "negative and retrograde and 
has retarded the chance of a renewal of the Jarring mission. It constitutes 
a hardening of the Soviet position, notably in respect of the Rhodes 
formula as a form of negotiation. In other matters it marks a backward 
step''. International Herald Tribune_, 14 January, 1970. 
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llith or without Soviet cooperation, Rogers seemed determined to pursue 
his attempt to settle the conflict and, if he managed to gain Egyptian or 
Jordanian acquiescence, Israel might be forced to accept arrangements which 
it clearly regarded as incompatible with its vital interests. By the end 
of 1969, therefore, Israel had resolved not merely to resist the Rogers 
Plan, but also to persuade the United States, at best to drop the plan, 
or at least to put it back in the State Department drawer until the Arab 
states were more prepared to accept Israel's demands for peace, recognition, 
and secure borders. 
On the other side, Egypt had ended the year in a much weakened 
military situation but had achieved much of what it had set out to do. 
The Soviet Union had remained committed to Egypt's political demands and 
had come to appreciate the need and urgency for strengthening Egypt's 
military capabilities; the United States had moved towards the Egyptian 
position on negotiations, peace, and Israeli withdrawal, precipitating a 
crisis with its Israeli client. Thus despite the fact that Israel was 
winning the War of Attrition, it appeared to be losing the battle for 
patronage. 
III - COMBATING ROGERS 
The Israeli government decided to deal with the Rogers Plan on the 
two levels where it possessed the greatest leverage: in the war against 
Egypt, and on the level of American domestic politics. Now that the 
Egyptian air-defence system had been destroyed, Egyptian air-space l'ay 
open to the IAF. The General Staff, naturally wishing to exploit the new 
advantage which it had won and the new Phantoms in its possession, 
recommended to the Cabinet that Israel embark on a series of deep 
penetration air raids on strategic targets to bring the war home to the 
Egyptian people, make the costs unbearable, forestall any Canal-crossing 
offensive, and force adherence to the cease-fire. The political calculus 
had to take other factors into account: if Israel wanted the United States 
to shelve the Rogers Plan, it would have to off er a viable alternative 
which would better end the instability of continual warfare. In other 
words, if Israel wanted to avoid an imposed American settlement, it would 
have to impose its own settlement, at least to the fighting; it would have 
to prove that the "powder-keg 11 theory was false and therefore that all this 
American activity was unneccessary. Once this were achieved - once Nasser 
had been forced to accept the cease-fire - negotiations on Israel's terms 
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might be possible; confronted with the reality of its military inferiority, 
Egypt would have no alternative but to sue for peace. 
Moreover, just as a short, sharp escalation had made sense after the 
June impasse in the Two Power Talks, so too did the time seem opportune 
now that the Two Power Talks had been abandoned. The first escalation, 
it was believed in Israel, had not achieved its purposes because Nasser 
had been able to shield the· Egyptian people from the true situation at the 
front. If the war were now brought home to the Egyptian people, if they 
were told through Israeli bombs, "listen, people of Egypt, your leaders 
are not working for your good, what they say about your chances to destroy 
Israel are not true", then it was hoped that the chances would be improved 
for a negotiated settlement based on Egyptian acceptance of Israel's 
. 35 
existence. 
Although this strategy seemed to ignore all historical evidence on 
the morale boosting effects of bombing strategic targets, the Cabinet 
clearly believed that the deep penetration raids would achieve their 
purpose, that the only reason for Nasser's ability to continue fighting 
was the ignorance of the Egyptian people about the true conditions at the 
front. Some of Israel's leaders even hoped, at first, to bring about Nasser's 
36 downfall. The Israelis were about to commit the same error as Nasser had 
made in 1967; they had underestimated Egypt's will to resist. 
A further co11sideration was the possibility of an adverse reaction 
from its American patron and its Soviet adversary. Here again the Israeli 
government miscalculated their likely responses. Israel had already 
experienced the American reaction to its July escalation in the form of 
the Rogers Plan; if anything, the use of the IAF as 'aerial artillery' 
had spurred the United States into. further efforts at superpower 
agreement on the terms of a settlement. However, the Israeli Cabinet 
appears to have believed that Washington, or at least influential elements 
within the Administration, were keen to see the American strategy of 
bombing Vietnam to the negotiating table applied by proxy to Egypt. 
35. This message was outlined by Dayan, who also listed three objectives 
for the deep penetration strategy: to ease the position of Israeli t'roops 
on the front line; to show the UAR that it was no position to resume all-
out war; and to bring the truth about the Egyptian regime to its people. 
See Jerusalem Post, 18 January, 1970. 
36. In January, Mrs Meir stated that she would not waste many tears if 
Nasser were knocked out of power. Jerusalem Post, 14 January, 1970. Eban 
suggested that if a new regime were established in Egypt there would at 
least be a 50% chance to achieve peace, compared to zero under Nasser. 
FBIS, 20 January, 1970. Galili argued that no successor to Nasser could 
be worse than he was. Da:var, 23 January, 1970. 
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.Ambassador Rabin firmly advocated the deep penetration strategy on the 
basis of his understanding that the .Americans were in favour of it and 
that it was consistent with their decision to supply the Phantoms. One 
senior State Department official was reported to have pointed out that, 
while the United States objected to Israeli activities against Jordan and 
Lebanon, it showed a purely technical interest in attacks on Egypt. 
Israel may not have received formal American approval but Rabin claimed 
that there was certainly tacit approval for the strategy. 37 
This belief in .American support for the strategy lessened the fear 
of a forthright Soviet response. The Soviet intervention which followed 
the Israeli deep penetration raids was clearly not foreseen by Israel's 
decision-makers, although some had argued that increased Soviet involvement 
38 
was a possible result. In this regard, Israeli claims that the Soviet 
Union had been planning to intervene since October 1969 and that therefore 
the deep penetration raids were not responsible for precipitating this 
action, were beside the point. If Israel had known of Soviet preparations, 
it would have made no sense to provide Moscow with such provocation; it 
could hardly have been in Israel's interests to have the Soviet Union 
37. Ezer Weizmann notes that Rabin's calls for continuous bombing raids 
inside Egypt surprised even him: " ... 'hit 'em hard!' he wrote from Washington. 
Quite correctly, he held to the view that not only didn't the .Americans 
oppose the raids, but. possibly even approved of them". Weizmann, On Eagles' 
Wings~ p. 283; Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, p. 249; Dan 
Margalit, "The Politics of the Phantoms", Ha'aretz~ 8 September, 1972, 
reprinted in Jow:'nal of Palestine Studies, Volume II, No. 2, Winter, 1973, 
pp. 151-3. Cf. Rubinstein who states that it was Sisco who argued that the 
Egyptians might become more amenable "if they took a further clobbering from 
the Israelis", Red Star on the Nile, pp. 99-100. Subsequently the .Americans 
denied ever encouraging the bombing in depth (see Margalit, pp. 152-3). 
In interviews I conducted with State Department officials, the suggestion 
of .American encouragement was vigorously denied by all. As one State 
Department policy planner put it: "it was like clobbering a mosquito with 
a baseball bat". When asked why American objections had not been voiced, the 
uniform response was that the Administration was preoccupied with the planning 
and implementation of the Cambodian operation. When asked why Israel had 
received continual supplies of ordnance - 8,000 tons of bombs were dropped on 
Egyptian positions in the first four months of 1970 - and whether the 
Israeli claim, that their ordnance requests were cleared at record speed, was 
accurate, State Department officials replied that ordnance requests were 
cleared by the Pentagon. Department of Defense officials argued that they 
had to have State Department approval for such requests but, in this case, 
approval came from higher up. For a list of the officials interviewed see 
the Bibliography. 
38. See Margalit, Zoe.cit.~ p. 152. 
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39 involved in an operational capacity in Egypt. Thus, Israel's decision-
makers must have dismissed the threat of Soviet intervention on the basis 
of one or more of the following calculations: that the likelihood of Soviet 
intervention was small because Moscow would not be prepared to risk a 
superpower confrontation; that the United States would deter Soviet 
intervention as it had done in 1967; and that the benefits of Egyptian 
acceptance of the cease-fire, in terms of maintaining the status quo and 
Israel's occupation of Sinai, outweighed the risk of a Soviet response. 40 
In the face of common, though not concerted, pressure from both the 
superpowers and the Arab states to withdraw without a final peace 
settlement which would provide secure and defensible borders, Israel's 
leadership was clearly preoccupied with maintaining its hold on the 
occupied territories. The alternative of indirect negotiations was 
unpalatable,not only because it did not require Arab recognition of Israel, 
but also because, now that the United States had revealed its fall-back 
position, the value of Israel's bargaining cards had been reduced - Egypt 
would expect American pressure for full Israeli withdrawal, and Israel 
would not be able to bargain territories for peace. So, were Israel to 
maintain its position in the territories as well as its position on the 
terms of a negotiated settlement, it would have to force Egypt to accept 
the cease-fire and would have to persuade the United States to abandon the 
Rogers Plan. Because their minds were focused on these two objectives, 
Israel's decision-makers miscalculated the reactia1sof Egypt and the 
superpowers. 
Israel's deep penetration strategy was clearly designed to achieve the 
first object~ve of a stable cease~fire, and this would in turn hopefully 
39. The claim that deep penetration raids were not responsible for the 
Soviet intervention is put by Yigal Allon: ''Some maintain that [the Soviet 
decision] was taken when it became clear to them that their anti-aircraft 
defences had failed ... This is backed up by information gathered by Israel's 
intelligence services ... Others claim that the escalation of Soviet 
involvement came as a direct result of the Israeli air raids deep into 
Egyptian territory ... For my part, I think we can rely on Israel's intelligence 
services". However, the fact is that the Soviet intervention came after the 
Israeli raids, and thus if they had not caused the intervention they 
certainly had provided a cover for it. If Allon had been able to rely on 
Israel's intelligence services in January 1970 was it possible that he 
would still have advocated deep penetration? See Allon, ''The Soviet 
Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict'', in Shmnir anrl Confino (eds.), 
The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East, p. 152; cf. Uri Ra'anan, "The USSR and the 
Hiddle East: Some Reflections on the Soviet Decision Making Process 11 , 
Orbis~ Volume 17, No. 3, Fall, 1973, pp. 946-977. 
40. Cf. "Ups and Downs in Dayan' s Defence Strategy", !JeLJ M-iddle East, 
March, 1970, pp. 17-19. 
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reduce the incentive for the United States to promote the Rogers Plan. 
However, Israel had another form of leverage which could be used to 
discourage the implementation of publicly stated .American policy. Since 
the Plan had already been rejected by Egypt and the Soviet Union, the 
reluctance of .American domestic forces to express their opposition to the 
policy had been reduced. Their task was not to prevent the implementation 
of the Plan, since there were no prospects, at that stage, for its 
acceptance by any of the other parties, but rather to demonstrate the 
domestic opposition which would have to be overcome if the Administration 
attempted to promote the Plan on a more auspicious occasion, thereby 
helping to deter such action in the future. 
Thus, in January 1970, the IAF raided supply centres and army camps 
on the outskirts of Cairo, close to Egypt's main industrial area of Helwan 
and its scientific research establishment at Inshas. Twelve such raids 
were carried out with impunity, inflicting heavy damage and in one case -
on 12 February at Abu Zaambal - killing 68 and injuring 98 Egyptian 
41 
workers. At the same time, 500 Jewish organisationsconverged on 
Washington for a National Emergency Conference on Peace in the Middle East. 
Amid statements of support for direct negotiations and arms sales to 
Israel from such public figures as Governor Rockefeller, Cardinal Cushing, 
George Meany (President of the AFL-CIO), and a plethora of influential 
Senators, both Houses of Congress issued declarations sponsored by 239 
Congressmen and 60 Senators which stated: 
The parties to the conflict must be the parties to the 
peace achieved by direct and unhampered negotiations. 
We emphasise these significant points of policy to 
reaffirm our support for the democratic state of Israel ... 
It is not in the interest of the United States or in the 
service of world peace to create the impression that 
Israel will be left defenceless in face of the 
continuing flow of sophisticated offensive armaments to 
the Arab nations ... 42 
41. this raid was apparently a mistake; the target should have been the 
air force supply base at El Khanka, two miles away. For a summary of these 
raids, see O'Ballance, The Electronic War in the Middle East_, pp. 102-110. 
42. Cited in Near East Report_, Volume XIV, 1970, p. 55. For the statements 
of Rockefeller, Cushing, Meany and the Senators, see Nev York Times_, 25 and 
31 December, 1969; Near East Report_, Volume XIV, 1970, pp. 2 and 51. 
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A letter writing campaign was directed at the State Department, calling 
on it to reconsider its proposals, and the Conference of Presidents of 
Major American Jewish Organisations met with Rogers and Sisco to express 
its "profound concern" at a policy which it believed was not in the long 
term interests of the United States, and which contributed neither to 
Israel's security nor to the cause of peace in the Middle East. 43 
However, while the deep penetration raids and the mobilisation of 
domestic opposition to the Rogers Plan were certainly impressive signs 
of Israel's resistance capabilities, they would quickly be dwarfed by the 
Soviet and Egyptian reactions to Israel's escalation of the War of 
Attrition. These latter considerations altered the value of the levers 
at Israel's command, causing the immediate failure, but ultimate success, 
of Israel's strategy for resisting American policy. They were actions 
which Israel could not control but which it had, perhaps unintentionally, 
provoked, and they were actions which ultimately boosted its importance 
to the United States and thus its ability to resist the policy of its patron. 
IV - THE SOVIET INTERVENTION DECISION 
The chronology of events which followed Israel's raids in depth is 
easy to establish: on 22 January, Nasser made a secret visit to Moscow; on 
15 March, the first of a large number of Soviet manned SAM-3s arrived in 
Egypt; and on 17 April, Israeli reconnaissance aircraft were intercepted 
by Russian-piloted MIG-21 fighters near Cairo, signalling that the Soviet 
Union had taken over Egypt's air-defence system. What is more difficult and 
probably impossible to establish with any certainty, is whether the Soviet 
decision to intervene actively in Egypt's air-defence was taken reluctantly, 
as a result of Egypt's leverage with Moscow, or whether it was taken on 
Soviet initiative, in order to expand and solidify its position in the 
44 Middle East. 
43. New York Times_, 23 December, 1969; Near East Report_, 1970, pp. 1 and 5. 
44. There are conflicting and contradictory accounts of this decision. 
Heikal recounts in detail the negotiations in Moscow and makes it plain 
that as far as he is concerned Nasser convinced a reluctant Soviet leadership 
to save him from defeat and to prevent him from turning to the United States. 
This version appears to be the received wisdom in official circles in Cairo. 
Two high Egyptian officials gave the same account of the negotiations, both 
adding that when Nasser met with Soviet reservations he ordered his plane to 
be prepared for his immediate return to Cairo and threatened to inform his 
people that Moscow would not support them in their struggle against 
Imperialism. See Heikal, The Road to Ramadan_, pp. 83-90; Interview u.n:th 
Tahsin Bashir_, Presidential Spokesman, Cairo, 8 January, 1975; Interview 
w1:th Osana el-Baz_, Advisor to the Foreign Minister, Cairo, 9 January, 1970. 
On the other hand, Ra'anan has argued that the Kremlin had been 
discussing the intervention since July, 1969, when it had been proposed 
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44. (continued) by a top Soviet military delegation. According to this 
account, the decision to intervene was taken in principle in November, 
1969. Moscow then took advantage of Nasser's plight by inviting him to 
visit, whereupon he was confronted "almost alone, with the full, united 
and awesome pressure of the Kremlin at a time when he was in dire need of 
Soviet help". See U. Ra'anan, "The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East: Some 
Reflections on the Soviet Decision-Making Process", Orhis, Volume XVII, 
No. 3, Fall, 1973, pp. 956-965. 
Alvin Rubinstein supports the Ra'anan thesis on its main point -
that the decision was taken in November, 1969. He argues that geo-strategic 
and bureaucratic considerations were responsible for this decision. 
However, he disputes Ra'anan's suggestion that it was one big Soviet ploy 
by pointing out that Nasser had wanted such intervention to strengthen 
Egypt's defence and exacerbate superpower tensions. See Rubinstein, 
Red Star on the Nile, pp. 103-113. 
There are problems with all three accounts. The Egyptian account 
is too ego-centric and requires one to accept the claim that the Russians 
were taken by surprise by Nasser's request for Soviet personnel and pilots, 
but decided on the spot, after hastily convening a meeting of the Politburo, 
to agree. The Ra'anan account is too mechanical, lacks any supporting 
evidence, and is based in part on spurious reasoning. For example, he 
argues that Egypt's plight was already clear to the Soviet military chiefs 
in July, 1970, when he claims, they put their suggestion for intervention to 
the Soviet leadership. But that assumes considerable foresight on the 
part of these people, since the IAF did not begin its air raids on Egyptian 
positions until the end of that month and did not succeed in destroying 
Egypt's air-defence until November. On the one hand Ra'anan argues that 
the Soviet Union could not have planned and implemented its intervention 
"in a matter of weeks" in January 1970, but on the other hand, he expects 
his readers to accept his claim that the military chiefs could have 
worked up a proposal for intervention in a matter of weeks in July when 
the military outcome of the new phase of the war was by no means certain. 
Ra'anan also states, wrongly, that Israel's deep penetration raids began 
in December 1969 - they did not begin until January 1970. His suggestion 
that the Rogers Plan was interpreted as a sign of American weakness is 
totally spurious, since Moscow was well aware of this American position 
as early as December 1968 when Rusk had proposed it. The Rubinstein 
account, though backed by more evidence, glosses over, too quickly, the 
reasons why the Soviet Union would have been reluctant to take such a 
momentous decision. Although geo-strategic considerations must have been 
important, it seems unlikely that they alone would have outweighed the 
risks involved. 
Certainly, Nasser had good reason for seeking Soviet intervention. 
The destruction of Egypt's air-defences had not only left Egyptian air 
space open to Israel's whims, it threatened also to expose the failure 
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of his strategy of attrition and destroy his credibility and legitimacy in 
the eyes of his people. For this reason, Sadat and General Fawzi had been 
sent to the Soviet Union in December 1969 to request more arms, especially 
aircraft to defend Egypt. When Israel began its deep penetration raids in 
January,with the express intention of pointing out the true situation 
to the Egyptian people, Nasser became desperate. He was faced with the 
choice of capitulating to Israel or requesting Soviet intervention. The 
Rabat Summit in December proved that he. could not depend upon any Arab 
support for his position, 45 so that left the Sov~et Union or the United 
States. To turn to Washington would be the last resort since Egypt's 
proven military inferiority would require him to make concessions to 
Israel, concessions which would damage his credibility (and his pride) 
perhaps more than the deep penetration raids would. 46 Thus Nasser had to 
seek Soviet intervention. Part of his original strategy, in launching 
the War of Attrition, had been to persuade Moscow to supply him with the 
military equipment necessary to negotiate from a position of strength. 
His original calculation would not have included Soviet combat personnel, 
for that would have made Egypt look too much like a Soviet satellite 
and would have weakened his bargaining position with the United States. 
However, he could no longer afford to consider what would better suit 
his bargaining position; he needed a complete air-defence system 
immediately. 
If Nasser had the motivation, he also possessed considerable 
leverage with which to pry such a momentous decision out of his Soviet 
patron. First, the threat of collapse was more real now than it had ever 
been. A refusal to meet Nasser's request would undoubtedly lead him to 
45. The Arab Summit had broken up in disagreement and without issuing a 
corrununique. No agreement could be reached about concerted measures for 
war and the oil states were reluctant to increase their contributions. 
At one stage Nasser, frustrated by the arguments, walked out. See 
J. Gaspard, "85 Days to the Rabat Summit - Pan-Arabism at the Crossroads", 
New Middte East_, February, 1970, pp. 10-13. 
46. Nasser told a closed session of the National Assembly on 24 March that 
"America cannot give us a peaceful solution because a peaceful solution 
means full Israeli withdrawal ... and this would mean that we should win a 
political victory ... ". He repeated his often-stated maxim: "there [is] no 
hope for agreement on a political solution until we become so strong that 
our enemies realise that we can use force to obtain our rights ... ". See 
Report of President Nasser's Remarks, 25 Harch_, 1970_, IDOP_, 19?0_, pp. 773-4. 
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blame Egypt's plight on the Soviet Union for the sake of his own survival; 
were he toppled from power, his successor was also likely to blame the 
Soviet Union and turn to Washington in the face of a Soviet refusal to 
supply the wherewithal necessary for the defence of Egypt. 
Second, Nasser's threat to swap patrons - to turn to the United 
States - was equally credible, given his plight. He had threatened to 
do so before and it was his· final alternative now. Moreover, the United 
States had made it clear, through Rogers' accent on American 'even-
handedness' in announcing his plan, that it would welcome such a move and 
respond accordingly. There seems no reason to doubt Heikal's account 
of what Nasser told the Russians in this regard: 
If we do not get what I am asking for everybody will assume 
that the only solution is in the hands of the Americans. We 
have never seen the Americans backward in helping the Israelis. 
But Egypt is an anti-imperialist outpost in the Middle East ... 
as far as I can see you are not prepared to help us in the 
same way that America helps Israel. This means there is only 
one course open to me: I shall go back to Egypt and I shall 
tell the people the truth. I shall tell them that the time 
has come for me to step down and hand over to a pro-American 
President. If I cannot save them, somebody else will have to 
do it ... I have the courage to tell our people the unfortunate 
truth - that, whether they like it or not, the Americans are 
masters of the world.47 
If Nasser did indeed present his plight to Brezhnev in this light, then 
he was not merely threatening the Soviet position of influence in Egypt, 
but also threatening implicitly to damage its reputation in the Third 
World as the defender of the 'forces of progress'. If the Soviet Union 
refused to protect Egypt from American Phantoms, what country in conflict 
with the United States or its clients could rely on Moscow's support? 
Moreover, the threat to swap patrons also played on Moscow 1 s geo-
strategic interests in Egypt. Continued access to Egyptian port facilities 
and air bases, which the Soviet Navy had enjoyed since 1968, was important 
for the effective deployment of the Mediterranean Squadron. If Nasser 
turned to the United States and condemned the Soviet Union he might also 
end these privileges or barter them for greater American support. 
Conversely, since the Soviet Union now had Nasser in a completely dependent 
47. Heikal, The Road to Ramadan_, pp. 86-7. 
position, it could demand greater use of Egypt's air bases as a 
"d f . . 48 qu~ pro quo or intervention. 
In making its decision, which was clearly not taken in haste and 
without careful consideration, 49 the Soviet Union would have had to 
weigh these risks and threats to its position in Egypt and its 
reputation elsewhere against the dangers involved in an operational 
commitment to Egypt 1 s defen·ce. 
346 
Clearly, the greatest danger was that of a superpower confrontation 
as a result of American opposition to the Soviet intervention. The supply 
of SAM-3s would be unlikely to provoke any reaction since these were 
'defensive' weapons, but the provision of Soviet crews to operate them 
and Russian piloted MIG-2ls to protect them was unprecedented in the 
Middle East, or for that matter, outside the Warsaw Pact; and MIG-2ls 
had an offensive capability as well.SO However, Moscow appears to have 
calculated that it could place the onus on Israel for having provoked 
the intervention, while assuring Washington that its response was purely 
defensive, was not the first move in a joint Soviet-Egyptian campaign 
to oust Israel from Sinai, and that the Soviet Union remained interested in 
48. The Soviet Union in fact took over control of six of Egypt's air 
bases. See Strategic Survey_, 1970, pp. 46-SO. Cf. Rubinstein, Red Star 
on the Nile_, p. 109; George S. Dragnich, ·"The Soviet Union's Quest for 
Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to the June War of 1967", in 
MichaelMccGwire, et.al. (eds.) Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and 
Constraints_, New York, 197S, pp. 237-277. 
49. Soviet publications and statements in October and November 1969 
prepared the ground for the Soviet decision by accusing the United States 
of supplying American personnel for the Israeli forces and by singing the 
praises of the 'progressive forces' in the Arab world, led by Nasser. 
On 31 October, Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Zamyatin, declared that the 
Soviet Union would extend "comprehensive aid" to the Arab states "against 
the encroachment of Israel and its imperialist protectors". On 27 November, 
the Communist Parties of the Warsdw Pact (excluding Romania) issued a 
statement which pledged "in the future to provide all-round aid to the 
Arabs, who were engaged in the struggle for the protection of the progressive 
achievements of their people against the inroads of Israel and its patrons". 
In the communique issued after Sadat's visit in December, the Soviet Union 
promised to combine the struggle for a political settlement "with active 
measures to strengthen the defence capability of the UAR and other Arab 
states". See Y. Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement_, pp. SlS-7, S28-9; 
f>riavda., 27 November, 11 December, 1969; Rubinstein, pp. 100-lOS. 
SO. Only in Cuba in 1962 had the Soviet Union deployed such large numbers 
of its military personnel. The IISS estimated that by July 1970 there 
were some SS SAM-3 sites manned by 8,000 Russian troops and some 120 MIG-21Js 
operated by some lSO Soviet pilots. Beyond this Moscow supplied an improved 
version of the SAM-2 and the ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft gun. The estimated 
'free market' value of this equipment was $2.S. billion. See IISS, Strategic 
Survey_, 1970_, p. 46-7. 
peace in the Middle East. To make sure, however, the Soviet Union 
decided to test the American reaction in a note addressed to 
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Nixon from Kosygin on 31 January. He warned that Israel's actions would 
have "highly risky consequences" both for the Middle East and "international 
relations as a whole"; if Israel were not restrained in its bombing of 
Egyptian territory, "the Soviet Union will be forced to see to it that the 
Arab states have means at their disposal" to rebuff the attacks; the four 
powers would have to compel Israel to desist and establish a lasting peace 
. h . 51 in t e region. 
President Nixon responded on 4 February that "the United States has 
always opposed steps which could have the effect of drawing the major 
powers more deeply into the conflict''. He noted that this "could only 
complicate matters further" and suggested instead that a restoration of 
the cease-fire and an arms limitation agreement were more appropriate 
means for controlling the conflict. He in turn warned that the United 
States was watching the balance of forces and "will not hesitate to 
provide arms to friendly states as the need arises 11 • 52 Implicitly, Nixon 
was saying that the need to provide further arms to Israel had not yet 
arisen, that the balance was in Israel's favour. Two weeks later, in his 
report to Congress on American Foreign Policy, the President repeated 
these points, making Washington's likely response to the Soviet move 
clearer: the Administration would oppose attempts by the Soviet Union to 
exploit the local conflict for its own advantage; it would view a Soviet 
53 
attempt to seek predominance "as a matter of grave concern". Thus, as 
long as the Soviet moves were regarded as defensive, as long as the United 
States did not think that by committing personnel to the defence of Egypt 
the Soviet Union was seeking predominance in the region, the United States 
was unlikely to react. Moreover, if the United States reserved for itself 
the right to supply arms to its clients "as the need arises", it could 
hardly deny the same right to the Soviet Union (even if the Soviet move 
included personnel) when the need arose to protect Moscow's protege. 
51. Unofficial text cited in IDOP, 1970, pp. 26-7. 
52. Unofficial text cited in IDOP, 1970, pp. 30-31. 
53. See "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, a New Strategy for Peace. A 
Report to Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States", 18 
February, 1970, DSB, 9 March, 1970, p. 304. 
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Accordingly, beyond drawing attention to Egypt's plight, the Soviet 
Union apparently informed Washington that it would provide Russian crews 
to operate the SAM-3s it now intended to supply "for the defence of a hard-
pressed protege", and that the missiles would only he emplaced around 
Alexandria, Cairo and the Aswan Dam. 54 That the United States accepted 
this as a defensive move,rather than an attempt to seek predominance, was 
attested to by Rogers on 23 March and then by Kissinger four months later: 
One has to distinguish here what may be the original intention 
of the Soviets and what may be the long-term consequences of 
their actions. I consider it quite arguable that the Soviets 
originally went into Egypt with combat personnel in order to 
prevent Nasser from being overthrown by the deep penetration 
raids that the Israelis were launching ... 55 
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the Soviet Union 
apparently did not inform the United States of its intention to provide 
Soviet-piloted MIG-21Js. 56 This was probably because the United States 
might have regarded such a move, had it known about it in advance, as 
ambiguous, if not offensive, in intent. Instead, after the SAN-3s with 
their Soviet crews had arrived quite openly in Alexandria, and after the 
United States had announced its decision on 23 March to hold in abeyance 
Israel's request for additional aircraft, the Soviet Union must have felt 
that the United States did not object to the Soviet defensive deployment 
and thus decided that it could safely dispatch the aircraft which 
would be used to .protect the Soviet missile system. 
However, if the fear of Nasser's imminent collapse or capitulation 
had provided the reason for the Soviet Union to take such an unprecedented 
move, and if careful signalling to the United States of Soviet interests 
had created the right conditions for the implementation of the decision, 
neither of these factors proved whether the Soviet Union was reluctantly 
doing the bidding of its protege,or whether it was cautiously exploiting 
the situation to establish a secure foothold in Egypt from which it would 
54. This iS reported by J.C. Hurewitz in his Changing Military Perspectives 
in the Middle East, Rand Corporation, September, 1970, RM-6355-FF. Hurewitz 
repeats this account in at least two other places, although at no time does 
he state his sources. See "Superpower Rivalry in the Middle East", in 
Confino and Shamir (eds.), The USSR and the Middle East, p. 160; "Weapons 
Acquisition: Israel and Egypt", in Horton, Rogerson and Warner, (eds.), 
Comparative Defense Policy, p. 489. 
55. Background Briefing by Henry Kissinger, The White House, San Clemente, 
26 June, 1970, p. 22 (mimeo, in the possession of the author). 
56. Hurewitz, lac.cit. 
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be able to probe eastward and southward towards the Persian Gulf and the 
Indian Ocean as well as to control Egypt's military policy. Nasser's 
plight may have forced the Soviet Union to adopt an operational role, or 
it may have provided the opportunity, which at least some in the Soviet 
leadership had been waiting for, to consolidate the Soviet position in 
Egypt and extend its use of Egyptian naval facilities and air bases. 
What is clear, however, is· that, on the one. hand, Nasser sought this Soviet 
support to protect Egypt from the Israel Air Force and his own regime from 
57 
the wrath of his people; on the other hand, the Soviet Union was acting 
in its own interests, whether it sought to protect its position of 
influence, or improve it. As Henry Kissinger observed: "Intentions are 
58 irrelevant when you are talking about historical processes". Thus, if 
the Soviet intervention represented a case of patron and protege both 
acting in their own convergent interests, the historical process which 
had brought this convergence about was clearly Egypt's ability in June 
1969 to resist the superpower rapprochement on the terms of an Arab-Israeli 
settlement. Had Egypt been unable to resist the proposals brought by 
Gromyko to Cairo, the War of Attrition would probably have ended some time 
ago, Egypt would not have needed the Soviet intervention, and Moscow would 
not have needed to bolster its client, or alternatively, would not have 
had the opportunity to expand its presence in Egypt. 
V - ROGERS RESURGENT 
In retrospect, the American reaction to the Soviet supply of some fifty 
missile sites manned by 8,000 Russian personnel and some 120 MIG-21Js 
manned by Russian pilots may appear puzzling. The rejection of the Rogers 
Plan in December had been regarded as an act of Soviet 'bad faith' and 
the United States could be forgiven for believing that the Soviet Union 
was playing on its desire for a settlement to reduce American support for 
Israel, while Moscow stood firm in its support for Egypt's maximum demands. 
Since some at least in the Administration had tacitly encouraged Israel 
to undertake its deep penetration raids with the intention of softening 
57. In a speech on 23 July 1970, Nasser explained that he had sought the 
January meeting in Moscow: "In fact we found out in those days that our 
air defences were unable to check this serious Israeli threat which also 
enjoyed U.S. support. To us as a command, the filatter was very hard and 
serious because the people had been exposed to the escalation of Israeli 
operations. On 22 January, 1970, I sent a letter to the Soviet leaders 
in which I told them: I want to make a secret visit to Moscow to review 
with you the situation we are facing ... 11 • See Speech by President Nasser 
to the Fourth Ordinary Session of the A.S.U., 23 July, 1970, IDOP., 1970_, 
pp. 866-7. 
58. Loe.cit. 
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59 the Egyptian attitude to the Rogers Plan, a forthright response to the 
Soviet inte.rvention might have been expected, especially because an 
important reason for attempting to achieve a settlement had been to woo 
Nasser away from his Soviet patron rather than allow Soviet lodgement 
in Egypt. Certainly, the Israelis expected such a response. Instead, 
on 23 March, Secretary of State Rogers announced that Israel's arms requests 
would be held in abeyance, that Israel was expected to maintain its 
military superiority, and that Soviet intentions in supplying the Russian 
d. SAM d .b d f · 60 manne s were assume to e e ensive. 
The explanation for this restraint and tolerance of Soviet actions 
did not lie so much in America's unwillingness to confront the Soviet 
challenge in the Middle East, but rather more in the fact that Rogers and 
Sisco did not perceive those actions as a challenge to the balance of 
power. And it was their perception which ensured that Israel's attempt 
to resist, and thereby alter, American policy failed. With the President 
and his National Security Advisor preoccupied with the Cambodian invasion, 
Rogers and Sisco had been left to implement the policy which, despite the 
year of war in the Middle East and the failure of the Two Power Talks, still 
aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement. Determined to prove 
himself in the one area left to his jurisdiction, and having established 
what he believed were the essential terms for a settlement, Rogers had 
decided that if the Soviet Union was not prepared to cooperate, the United 
States should press for a settlement on its own. 
Rogers' experience at the end of 1969 had persuaded him that the first 
step in the implementation of his plan was to create the right conditions 
for the necessary negotiations. This required him to convince the Arab 
states that the American approach was indeed 'balanced' and that Washington 
could therefore be trusted to act as an 'honest broker' in negotiations 
between the Arabs and Israel. 61 The public declaration of the Rogers Plan 
59. In speeches on 1 May and 23 July, President Nasser claimed that on 
2 February he had received a demarche from an American envoy: "He ... advised 
us to announce immediately that we accepted a cease-fire, and that if we 
did not accept, the Israeli raids deep into the country would continue on a 
greater scale and would increase ... They thought this would frighten us and 
make us hesitate and accept, submit or surrender". Labour Day Speech by 
President Nasser at Shubra al-Khaina, IDOP_, 1970_, p. 789; cf. President 
Nasser's Speech tci the A.S.U., 23 July, 1970, IDOP_, 1970_, p. 867. 
60. Secretary Rogers News Conference of 23 March, DSB_, 13 April, 1970, pp. 
477-484. 
61. This policy of balance was encapsulated by Nixon in January, 1970: 
" .•• as far as our own policy toward the Mideast is concerned, let me put one 
thing in context: ... We are neither pro-Arab, nor pro-Israel. We are pro-peace". 
President Nixon's News Conference of 30 January, DSB_, 16 February, 1970, p.174 
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had not achieved that purpose because of the discrepancy between American 
words and its deeds in supplying the Phantoms and Skyhawks which were 
being used to bomb Egypt. The Phantoms had become the barometer of 
American 'even-handedness'. Thus, if the Arabs were to be convinced 
of American 'good faith', Rogers could not accede to Israel's requests 
for additional.Phantoms. However, given the pressure the President was 
experiencing from Israel's ·congressional and domestic supporters, and 
their opposition to the Rogers Plan, such a manoeuvre would not be easy 
to implement. It was therefore decided that Israel's requests for 
additional aircraft would not be denied, but rather held in abeyance. 
This decision could be justified on the grounds that "Israel's air 
capacity is sufficient to meet its needs for the time being" - that the 
balance of power in the Middle East was still in Israel's favour. 62 
Israel was assured by both Rogers and Nixon that a close watch would be 
kept on the military balance in the area, that it would receive additional 
assistance if the balance tipped against it, and that in the meantime it 
would receive $100 million in military credits to finance earlier purchases 
and $30 million· in PL 480 aid. 63 
If Israel had expected a forthright response to the supply of 
Soviet missiles and crews, it was sorely disappointed. The decision had 
in fact been made before Washington received intelligence reports of the 
new developments in Egypt. Nevertheless, both Rogers and Nixon admitted 
that they were aware of the missiles and crews, but that it was too early 
to say whether they would change the balance. 64 In other words, the 
decision to defer Israel's arms requests was not based on the Soviet response 
to Israel's deep penetration raids; but rather on the desire to proceed 
with the implementation of the Rogers Plan. As the Secretary of State 
explained,' the purpose of the restraint was to achieve a cease-fire; 
62. Rogers' News Conference of 23 March, DSB, 13 April, 1970, p. 477. 
According to one report, International Security Affairs had made an 
"exhaustive11 analysis of the balance of power and had concluded that the 
Soviet Union would not "soon if ever" supply its own pilots to fly Soviet 
aircraft in Egypt! Since Egypt lacked pilots and ground crews, Israel's 
air superiority would not be threatened hy an increased supply of Soviet 
aircraft. See Washington Post, 26 March, 1970. 
63. In a move designed to lend Presidential authority to the decision, 
the President briefed reporters on the background to the decision two days 
before Rogers announced the delay. See President Nixon's News Conference 
of 21 March, DSB, 6 April, 1970, pp. 437-440. 
64. Nixon, ibid., p. 437 and 440; Rogers, Zoe.cit., p. 477. 
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encourage the parties "to reappraise positions which have become roadblocks 
to peace"; promote negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices; and 
provide the basis for arms limitations talks. 65 As part of this process, 
Assistant Secretary of State Sisco was dispatched in April to the Middle 
East to "deepen the dialogue" and demonstrate America's desire to be "a 
friend of all peoples in the area11 • 66 Sisco's task was to convince Nasser 
that American policy was 'balanced' and 'flexible', and that only the 
United States could persuade Israel to withdraw. His message to Nasser 
1 "T II 67 was simp e: ry us . 
By the time Sisco arrived in Jerusalem, the true extent of Israel's 
failure had been brought home. Far from being shelved, the Rogers Plan 
had been resurrected; far from forcing Nasser's adherence to the cease-
fire, Israel's deep penetration bombing had led to Soviet involvement in 
the defence of Egypt, and Sisco now claimed that Israel was responsible 
68 
and that the United States had never encouraged the raids; far from 
securing greater American support, Israel had been placed on a 'short 
leash'. What had gone wrong? Israel had underestimated the determination 
of the American Secretary of State to achieve a settlement. Israel may 
have had the will to resist this settlement, as evidenced by its outright 
rejection of the Rogers Plan, but it did not possess the ability to 
persuade the United States to abandon its policy. Congressional and 
domestic opposition had been effectively circumvented by emphasising that 
the Administration would be attentive to Israel's needs, but that Israel's 
security would be better served if the settlement initiative 
65. Rogers, ibid., pp. 477-8; cf. Nixon, ibid., p. 437. 
66. New York Times, 11 April, 1970. 
67. W.B. Quandt, "The Middle East Conflict in U.S. Strategy, 1970-71", 
Journal of Palestine Studies, Volume I, No. 1, p. 44; Heikal, The Road 
to Ramadan, p. 92. 
68. See Dan Hargalit, "The Politics of the Phantoms", p. 153. 
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69 
succeeded. Had Israel been able to demonstrate that it could maintain 
a stable cease-fire by force of arms, then the urgency of a settlement 
might have been questioned and Rogers' determination undermined. But in 
the circumstances of escalating conflict and increasing Soviet involvement 
Rogers had an even greater incentive to press his political initiative, 
as well as the justification for it. Had Israel been able to demonstrate 
that the balance was tipping against it, then Rogers would have been 
unable to hold its arms request in abeyance. But Israel's deep 
penetration raids had vividly demonstrated Israel's complete superiority, 
so it could hardly object to an 'interim' deferra1. 70 
However, now that the Soviet Union had intervened in an operational 
capacity in the conflict, Israel could try to argue that the balance was 
likely to tip against it, that a deferral of supply in these circumstances 
was likely to be interpreted as a sign of American weakness, and that 
unless the United States supplied Israel with the arms it had requested, 
the Soviet Union and Egypt would not be deterred from launching a canal-
crossing offensive. At the time of Sisco's visit to Israel, Soviet 
behaviour was still conforming to the American assumption that its efforts 
were defensive in nature; thus, Israel's arguments made little impression. 
However, on 17 April, Israel and the United States discovered that 
Soviet pilots were flying operational missions over Egypt. Consequently, 
Israel's deep penetration raids ceased as Defence .Hinister Dayan attempted 
69. Thus President :'-lixon had sent a message to the Emergency Conference 
of Jewish Organisations which had convened in Washington in January, in 
which he stated: 11 The United States stands by its friends. Israel is one 
of its friends ... The United States believes that peace can only be based 
on agreement between the parties ... achieved only through negotiations 
between thern ... The United States will not impose the terms of peace ... We 
would prefer restraint in the shipment of arns to the area. But ... we 
will not hesitate to supply arms to friendly states as the need arises. 
The United States has as its objective helping the people of the Middle 
East build a peaceful and productive future". Cited in Near East Report_, 
Volume XIV, 1970, p. 54. 
Of course nothing in that statement contradicted either the Rogers 
Plan (which called for an agreement between the parties and negotiations 
between them according to the Rhodes formula) or the subsequent decision 
to defer Israel's arms requests (on the grounds that the need had not yet 
arisen). 
70. In fact, Israel's objections to the decision were based on the argument 
that it would have the psychological effect of weakening Israel's deterrent 
posture in the future. See Eban's Interview, 27 March, 1970, IDOP_, 1970, 
p. 75; Allan's Interview, 28 March, 1970, New Middle East, May, 1970, p. !+5. 
71 to establish a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union in Egyptian air space. 
Almost immediately, fighting intensified along the Canal as Egypt 
became emboldened by Israel's caution and the reduction of its own 
vulnerability, and as Nasser announced that the initiative was now in 
72 Egypt's hand. The IAF undertook a desperate battle to prevent the 
movement of the SAM sites into the Canal sector where they would be 
able to interfere with Israeli air-space on the east bank. Clearly shaken 
by these events, Defence Minister Dayan called on the United States to 
be ''a true tiger with teeth that bite in the face of Soviet pressure 
d . . d . 11 73 an expansionist ten encies . Mrs·Meir argued that the Soviet intervention 
had implications for the "international pattern11 , for the 11 entire basis 
f h • 11 74 o uman existence . 
The United States was slow to react. While it was concerned about 
the Soviet involvement, it was in no hurry to make an overt response which 
might jeopardise the Arab goodwill it had created as a result of the 
arms deferral. On 1 May, Nasser had signalled his willingness to negotiate 
a 11 genuine peace based on justice" through the United States, but had 
declared that if the Arabs were not finally to close the door on the 
U "t d St t · ld h t t 1 · t·o Israe1. 75 ni e a es it wou ave o s op supp ying arms 
Consequently, President Nixon reacted with caution by stating, on 8.May, 
that i~ the reports of Soviet pilots flying operational missions were true, 
and if the Soviet role continued to increase, "this will dramatically shift 
the balance of power and it would make it necessary for the United States 
to reevaluate its decision with regard to the sale of jets to Israel11 • 76 
71. In speeches and articles Dayan delineated the line beyond which Israel 
would not go and the line beyond which he hoped the Russian pilots would 
not go. He pointed out that the IAF required 11a minimum of operational 
space" to give ground support to the forces on the Canal front. Were they 
attacked by "foreign aircraft" in the Canal zone they would fight back. 
On the other hand, the IAF would nci longer attack targets in the Nile 
Delta. See Jerusalem Post, 8 May, 1970; Radio Interview by Defence 
Minister Dayan, 9 May, 1970, IDOP, 1970,.pp . .139-143. 
72. See Nasser's Labour Day Speech, IDOP, 1970, pp. 790 and 791. 
73. Speech by Defence Minister Dayan to Haifa Students, 4 May, 1970, 
IDOP, 1970, p. 135. 
74. U.K. Television Interview with Prime Minister Meir, 4 May, 1970, 
ibid., p. 138. 
75. Nasser's May Day Speech, IDOP, 1970, pp. 792-3. 
76. President Nixon's News Conference of 8 May, DSB,25 May, 1970, 
pp. 644-5. On 29 April Nixon had ordered a full evaluation of the political 
and military aspects of the Soviet involvement. New York Times, 30 April, 
1970. 
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When Eban arrived in Washington on 20 May to request Phantoms and 
other equipment to counter the Soviet build-up, as well as an unequivocal 
American commitment to support Israel ag_ainst this new threat, he was 
told by Nixon and Rogers that an overt American commitment would only 
force Egypt further into the Soviet embrace, that the United States was 
about to undertake a new cease-fire initiative, that Israel would receive 
at least part of its arms requests, but this would be done quietly, and 
that a statement of Israel's wiilingness to withdraw on the basis of 
77 Resolution 242 would be helpful. Reflecting Israel's anxiety over its 
arms supplies, now that the Soviet Union had committed aircraft and 
pilots to Egypt, Mrs Meir provided the United States with the quid pro quo 
it had requested. On 26 May, she stated in the Knesset that Israel was 
prepared to enter into indirect negotiations on the basis of Resolution 
242. 78 Finally, after 73 Senators had sent a letter to the Secretary of 
State calling upon him to announce America's intention "to provide Israel 
with the aircraft so urgently needed for its defence", Rogers stated 
. . 79 
that the Administration would soon decide to sell aircraft to Israel. 
However, he also made it clear that American policy had not changed: 
... we have to take whatever action we think is necessary to 
give [the Israelis] the assurance that they need that their 
independence and sovereignty is going to continue. At the 
same time we want to do it in a balanced and measured way 
so that we don't signal to the Arabs that we are so behind 
Israel that we'll support them in no matter what they do. 
The reason for that is that we want to keep the door open 
for negotiations .•• 80 
Thus, if Soviet actions had enabled Israel to pry loose some 
additional American aircraft, in a covert manner, they had not yet provided 
77. New York Times_, 22 and 26 May, 1970; Jerusalem Post_, 22 and 24 May, 1970. 
78. See Speech to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir, 26 May, 1970, IDOP_, 
1970_, pp. 154-160. Although Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations had 
accepted Resolution 242 in May 1968, the Government had avoided restating 
this acceptance - especially the word "withdrawal" - because the Herut 
faction of the National Unity coalition refused to countenance Israeli 
withdrawal. When the vote was taken on the Prime Minister's speech, Herut 
abstained. See Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy_, p. 488. 
79. The letter from the Senators added that the aircraft would serve "as a 
significant element of a credible response to the reckless Soviet escalation 
of the Mideast conflict". See Near East Report_, Volume XIV, 1970, p. 122. 
80. Television Interview with U.S. Secretary of State Rogers, 7 June, 1970, 
DSB_, 29 June, 1970, p. 791. 
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sufficient cause for the abandonment of American settlement policy. On 
the contrary, just as the United States had sought a stabilisation of the 
conflict from the outset of the Nixon Administration, so too did it now 
seek to combine its response to the Soviet intervention with a new cease-
fire initiative. On 19 June, Roger_s transmitted this new proposal to 
Israel, Egypt and Jordan: an agreement to restore the cease-fire for at 
least a limited period; a commitment to enter negotiations under Jarring's 
auspices "taking into account as appropriate each side's preferences as 
to method of procedure"; the purpose of negotiations to he "the establish-
ment of q just and lasting peace based on (i) mutual acknqwledgement of 
each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, 
and (ii) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, 
both in accordance with Resolution 242"; and strict observation of the 
f . 81 cease- ire. · 
While Israel might have been relieved that the December 1969 Rogers 
Plan had been excluded from the text of the agreement (there were no 
substantive proposals on borders, Jerusalem and the refugees) the Cabinet 
was deeply disturbed by the explicit links between the cease-fire, 
negotiations, and Israeli withdrawal. Behind the word "withdrawal" 
lurked the Rogers Plan, since Israel's patron had clearly defined the 
borders to which it believed Israel should withdraw. Moreover, since it 
did not believe that the Arab states had any intention of honouring the 
peace provision, it did not want to commit itself to the withdrawal 
provision. Mrs Meir also expressed the fear that if Egypt accepted the 
proposal it would merely provide a cover for the movement of missiles into 
the Canal Zone. 82 However, the greatest immediate cause for alarm was 
the apparent linking of Israel's arms supplies to the acceptance of the 
American proposal. This was especially the case, both because the United 
States was granting Israel's requests on a piecemeal basis, and because 
on 30 June two Israeli Phantoms and one Skyhawk had been shot down by SAMs 
which the Egyptians had managed to establish in the Canal zone, despite 
continual Israeli bombardments; Israel's electronic counter measures had 
apparently failed to protect these aircraft from a new Soviet terminal 
81. For the text see,IDOP~ 1970~ pp. 178-9. 
82. These reservations were stated by Mrs Meir in a speech to the Knesset 
on 29 June. See Jerusalem Post~ 30 June, 1970. Another consideration was 
that the Herut alignment threatened to leave the National Unity Government 
if the proposals were accepted. 
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"d d 83 gui ance ra ar. For these reasons, Mrs Meir had wanted to reject the 
proposal, but had been persuaded by the American Ambassador, Walworth 
Barbour, and Israel's Ambassador in Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, to defer 
Israel's rejection until Egypt had responded; the Cabinet was apparently 
assured that Nasser's response would be negative. 84 
In the meantime, the Cabinet reconsidered its position. Israel 
had sought .a cease-fire since the start of the war, seventeen months ago. 
However, the cease-fire was to have been dictated by Israel's military 
strength rather than by its superpower patron. Nevertheless, if Israel 
now defied American policy, the chances of achieving a cease-fire on its 
own terms would be remote, both because of the Soviet intervention in 
Egypt (which had bolstered Egypt's military capabilities, boosted its 
determination to fight on, and deterred Israeli air raids) and because 
defiance might lead to a cut in arms supplies (which Israel needed to 
continue the war). Faced with a situation in which, if fighting continued, 
it might have to confront the Soviet Union, Israel could not afford to 
alienate the United States. Instead, Israel decided to rely, as it had 
in the past, on Egyptian and Soviet rej ectionsof the American initiative 
to enable it to resist its patron. If Israel's adversaries renounced 
American policy, it was now clear that new possibilities were likely to 
develop in Israel's relationship with the United States. For on 26 June, 
in a background briefing, the President's National Security Advisor had 
stated that American policy would be directed towards "expelling" the 
85 Soviet personnel from Egypt; on that issue Israeli and American policies 
would converge and Israel could expect that its military position would 
be bolstered. This was confirmed by the President on 1 July, when 
83. Jerusalem Postj 26 and 29 June, 1970; Ma'ariv~ 22 and 29 June, 1970; 
O'Ballance, The Electronic War in the ~1iddle East~ p. 123. 
84. See Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy~ p. 491; Margalit, 
"The Politics of the Phantoms", p. 153. 
85. Kissinger stated inter alia: 11 The danger that arises from the 
persistence of a Soviet combat base in Egypt is that the Eastern 
Mediterranean may become a Soviet lake as a result ... the oil supplies of 
the Middle East may become totally at the mercy of the Soviets and their 
radical clients ... We are trying to get a settlement in such a way that 
the moderate regimes are strengthened, and not the radical regimes. We are 
trying to expel the Soviet military presence, not so much the advisors, but 
the combat pilots and the combat personnel, before they become so firmly 
established". Background Briefing by Henry Kissinger~ The White House, 
San Clemente, 26 June, 1970, pp. 23-4 (mimeo, in the possession of the 
author). · 
he stated: 
... we recognise that Israel is not desirous of driving 
any of the other countries into the sea. The other 
countries do want to drive Israel into the sea .•. 
once the balance of power shifts where Israel is weaker 
than its neighbours, there will be a war. Therefore 
it is in U.S. interests to maintain tlntbalance of 
power. That is why, as the Soviet Union moves in to 
support the UAR, it makes it necessary for the. United 
States to evaluate what the Soviet Union does, and 
once that balance of power is upset, we will do what 
is necessary to maintain Israel's strength vis-a-vis 
its neighbours, not because we want Israel to be in 
a position to wage war •.. but because that is what will 
deter its neighbours from attacking it.86 
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However, on 23 July these calculations were overturned by the completely 
unexpected: Nasser accepted the American cease-fire proposal. Now the 
onus was on Israel to decide on defiance or acquiescence. There could be 
no doubt that defiance would alienate the United States, for the Egyptian 
acceptance was the fruit of eighteen months of American labour. Moreover, 
despite the encouraging words emanating from the White House, both 
Kissinger and Nixon had made it clear that the United States would support 
Israel's existence, but not its conquests; that a cease-fire was important 
because witho~t it there would probably be a superpower confrontation. 
Washington's intensity of interest in the cease-fire was conveyed to 
Jerusalem on 24 July when the President wrote to Mrs Meir urging Israel's 
prompt acceptance of the cease-fire proposal. Nixon chose carrots rather 
than the big stick to encourage Israeli acquiescence, but the link between 
arms supplies and Israeli behaviour was quite explicit, as it had been 
since the deferral decision of 23 March. Mrs Meir was assured that if 
Israel accepted the cease-fire proposal the United States would continue to 
maintain Israel's strength, Israel would not be expected to withdraw until 
a just and lasting peace had been established, and the cease-fire would 
87 be monitored to prevent either side from achieving a military advantage. 
In weighing the costs of a refusal (and the continuation of the war) 
against the benefits offered by the United States, the Israeli government 
also had to take account of the situation on the Canal front. Despite 
86. President Nixon's Interview on 1 July, DSB~ 27 July, 1970. 
87. New York Times, 25 and 27 July, 1970; Jerusalem Post, 26 and 27 July, 
1970. 
359 
strenuous efforts to prevent tl~m,the Russians and Egyptians had managed 
to deploy some missiles in the SAM 'box' which covered the Canal; in the 
process Israel had lost six aircraft and yet had failed to prevent the 
missile movements. If Israel were now to prevent Egypt and the Soviet 
Union from jeopardising Israeli control of the air-space over the Canal, 
it would need a guaranteed supply of aircraft as well as the electronic 
counter measures and Shrike· air-to-surface missiles necessary to neutralise 
the SAMs. There was only one source for these arms and acceptance of the 
cease-fire was the price Washington demanded. Moreover, the benefits of 
continued warfare were now doubtful. Despite the fact that on 30 July 
the IAF had succeeded in downing four Soviet-piloted MIG-21Js, the 
prospect of continued warfare with the Soviet Union, while a side battle 
was fought with its American patron, could not have been appealing to 
Israel's leadership. 88 In any case, the elimination of the SAM 'box' would 
be an extremely difficult task without American backing, whereas an 
effective cease-fire with standstill provisions might forestall this 
development. Finally, Israel was war-weary: 260 of its sons had been killed 
and 716 wounded since February 1969; some people were beginning to question 
the government's desire for peace; and the government could hold out 
1 . 1 . . d f. l . 89 itt e prospect or purpose in continue ig1ting. 
Consequently, the Cabinet decided that there was a greater advantage 
in turning its acquiescence into a bargaining card to secure uncertain 
patronage, than in resolute defiance for doubtful gains. Thus, before 
acceding to the American request, Israel sought further assurances that it 
would receive the aircraft and equipment it required, that there would be 
a standstill provision in the cease-fire arrangements, that the 
Jarring talks would be held without preconditions (such as the Rogers Plan), 
and that the United States would veto any anti-Israel resolution ]n,the Security 
88. As Abba Eban observed: "A negative response by Israel would not only 
be interpreted in much of the world as a retreat from a traditional 
readiness to negotiate; it would also imperil the understanding on the 
basis of which American reinforcement was flowing in". Abba Eban, 
My Country, p. 265; cf. Brecher, Decision 1 s 'in Israel's Foreign Policy, 
pp. 467-9. 
89. Amongst Israeli students and academics there was a general demoralis-
ation caused by the continual conflict and the Lick of Israeli peace 
initiatives. The Government's refusal to allow the President of the World 
Zionist Organisation, Nahum Goldmann, to represent Israel in covert 
negotiations with Egypt raised doubts about the wisdom of its rigidity. 
Letters were sent to the Prime Minister from high school students 
questioning the wisdom of military service. See Brecher, p. 463. 
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Council 90 on the terms or procedures for a settlement. The United 
States was prepared to be responsive to some of these requests. On the 
most important question of arms supplies, the United States was reported 
not only to have provided assurances about the maintenance of Israel's 
91 
strength, but also to have commenced the supply of the necessary arms. 
President Nixon also assured Mrs Meir that the United States would not 
force Israel to agree to the Arab interpretation of Resolution 242 
(meaning that Israel would not be expected to withdraw from every inch of 
occupied territory), that Israel would not be expected to withdraw until 
a peace treaty had been signed, and that the cease-fire would ensure 
the prevention of missile movements. However, Israel received no 
assurances about the Rogers Plan, nor about the use of America's veto in 
h S . c ·1 92 t e ecurity ounci . 
On the basis of the assurances received, Israel decided to accept 
the Rogers initiative and the cease-fire. However, to make it quite clear 
that Israel had not altered its negotiating position, the government, in 
its official note of acceptance of the Rogers initiative, changed the 
wording of the key paragraphs: the purpose of negotiatons would be "to 
achieve an agreed and binding contractual peace agreement between the 
parties 11 ; the peace agreement would have to include the termination and 
prevention of all hostile acts including those committed by irregular 
forces; withdrawal would be to "secure, recognised and agreed boundaries 
II 
to be determined in the peace agreements; and negotiations should be 
conducted without preconditions. In announcing the Government's decision 
to the Knesset on 4 August, Mrs Meir stressed that Israel would not return 
to the pre-June 1967 borders and, in lieu of peace, would retain its 
positions on the cease-fire lines: 
.•. Israel was not asked to, and did not, take upon herself 
any territorial commitments. On the contrary the Government 
of Israel won support for its position that not a single 
Israeli soldier would be withdrawn from the cease-fire· 
lines until a binding, contractua~ peace agreement is reached ... 
In the formulation of the U.S. position; there have been in the 
past •.. and there may appear in the future, definitions which are 
not acceptable to us ..• There is no chang~ in our negation of 
these positions now ..• 93 · 
90. Nez,, York Times, 27 July, 1970; Je1'usalem Post, 27 and 28 July, 1970. 
91. Margalit claims that "in order to encourage Israel to agree to the 
initiative, arms started pouring into Israel in such vast quantities that 
the Minister of Defence was amazed and this profusion of arms induced Israel 
to agree to the initiative". See "The Politics of the Phantoms", Zoe.cit., 
p. 153; cf. Quandt, The Arab-Israeli Conflict in American Foreign Policy, 
p. 15-16. 
92. New York Times,lOAugust, 1970; Brecher, p. 496. 
93. Speech to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir, 4 August, 1970, IDOP, 1970, 
pp. 237-242. 
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Nevertheless, despite the restatement of its negotiating position, 
and its avowal that nothing had changed, Israel had been forced to submit 
to America's will. Israel had wanted a cease-fire of unlimited duration, 
preserved by its deterrent strength. In this way, Israel had hoped to 
retain occupied territories until the Arab states were prepared to enter 
into direct negotiations for a peace settlement which would provide for 
Israel's withdrawal to secure and recognised borders substantially 
different to what it regarded as the indefensible pre-1967 boundaries. 
Instead, Israel had now accepted a cease-fire of limited duration, which 
was explicitly linked to indirect negotiations and Israeli withdrawal. 
Moreover, Israel's concept of secure and recognised borders had been 
refuted by the Rogers Plan which, despite Israel's objections, had 
remained its patron's policy. And Israel's deterrent strength, far from 
serving to maintain the cease-fire, had been weakened by the injection of 
Soviet troops and pilots into the conflict; its air superiority in the 
Canal zone had been challenged, and its ability to deter an Egyptian 
Canal-crossing had become moot. 
Perhaps more significantly, in terms of the politics of patronage, 
Israel had failed to demonstrate that its military superiority could serve 
to maintain stability and tranquillity in lieu of a peace negotiated on 
Israel's terms. On the contrary, Israel's utilisation of its military 
capability had only served to emphasise the urgency of a settlement to 
prevent a superpower confrontation and a further deterioration of American 
influence in the Arab world. The fact that Israel's rewording of the 
cease-fire proposals to conform with its own negotiating positions was 
totally ignored by Washington, when the Israeli and Egyptian acceptances 
were transmitted to Jarring, was testimony to Israel's failure to resist 
American policy. As the newsletter of Washington's Israel lobby noted: 
"I 1 11 d h · ·d · · " 94 srae swa owe er protest to avoi a crisis • 
However, Israel's failure to resist American policy was not so much 
the result of its l~ck of leverage but rather the consequence of a number 
of factors which rendered that leverage ineffective. Nasser's determination 
to pursue the War of Attrition, and his ability to secure Soviet political 
and military support for this effort, had devalued Israel's claims to being 
a force for stability. Roger's determination to pursue a negotiated 
94. Near East Report~ Volume XIV, 1970, p. 145. 
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settlement and to depolarise the region had enabled him to overcome, or 
rather ignore, the American domestic opposition to his policy, and to 
reject the argument that support for Israel served American interests in 
the Middle East. The simple truth, which would soon be demonstrated, 
was that Israel's power resources were worth more in a period of 
confrontation than they were in a period of negotiation. 
VI - NASSER's LAST STAND 
If Israel had failed, Nasser appeared to have succeeded. He had 
initiated the War of Attrition with the purpose of resisting the fait 
accompli of Israel's occupation by demonstrating that there would be 
no stability until Israel was forced to withdraw, and that there would be 
no negotiations until Egypt had achieved a position of strength. He 
had been rewarded by American pressure on Israel to withdraw to the 
pre-1967 Egyptian border, by the deferral of Israel's arms requests, and 
by strong Soviet support for Egypt's defence; The apparent success of 
his strategy was reflected in his May Day speech, when he announced that 
the initiative was now in Egypt's hands, that the Soviet Union was giving 
Egypt its full support, and that if the United States wanted peace and 
good relations with the Arab nation it would have to order Israel to 
withdraw or, failing that, should give "no new support to Israel as long 
as it.continued to occupy Arab territories 11 • 95 The United States 
responded, as we have seen, with the Rogers cease-fire initiative. 
Nasser's decision to accept this cease-fire proposal has generally 
96 been credited to Soviet pressure, but there were good reasons for him 
to do so which were little related to considerations of Soviet patronage. 
First, the war had exacted a heavy price in terms of Egyptian casualties, 
and the effort to establish missiles in the Canal zone, in particular, 
had cost Egypt dearly. Heikal states that "no fewer'' than 4,000 civilian 
engineers and workers were killed in the attempt to move the missiles 
95. Nasser's May Day Speech, loc.cit. 
96. See for example, IISS, Strategic Survey_, p. 43; Y. Ro'i, From Encroach-
ment to Involvement., p. 529. In a background briefing on 24 August, 1970, 
Assistant Secretary of State Sisco observed: "I might say that we would not 
have gotten this far to this date with respect to this American initiative 
if the Soviets had not played a role in Cairo". Background Briefing at the 
White House (San Clemente) with Dr Henry A. Kissinger and ,Joseph J. Sisco_, 
24 August, 1970, p. 28 (mimeo, in the possession of the author). In a long 
report from Moscow, Le Monde claimed that the Soviet Union exercised 
"considerable pressure" on Nasser to accept the proposals and respond to 
them positively. Le Monde_, 18 July, 1970. 
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f d 97 orwar • In terms of attrition, Egypt had paid a far heavier price than 
Israel and the missile movements had only just begun to meet with success. 
A lull in the fighting would enable the completion of this task, without 
casualties. Although the cease-fire proposal contained a standstill 
provision, and although the Israelis were bound to scrutinise Egyptian 
movements, the uncertainty which would surround the actual implementation 
of the cease-fire, the fact'. that it would come into force at midnight when 
accurate surveillance would be difficult if not impossible, together with 
Nasser's ability to justify the movement on defensive grounds and the 
obvious determination of Rogers to make the cease-fire work, were all 
factors which favoured acceptance of the cease-fire as a cover for the 
missile movement. Moreover, Israeli retaliation, once the missile screen 
had been established in the Canal zone, was likely to be ineffectual as 
well as costly, both in terms of aircraft losses and its relations with 
the United States. As Heikal has noted, an operational pause for this 
'purpose fitted Nasser's military strategy: 
The most important thing in Nasser's view was to finish 
building the missile wall. When completed this would 
not only protect our armed forces on the West Bank of 
the Suez Canal, but would give protection over a strip 
fifteen-twenty kilometres wide on the east bank, 
and so give cover for our troops crossing the Canal 
when the time came.98 
Second, acceptance of the cease-fire initiative also conformed with 
Nasser's political strategy. The purpose of the War of Attrition had been 
to pressure Israel into withdrawing while avoiding any concessions on 
territory, peace or direct negotiations. ·While military pressure had not 
achieved that purpose, it had served to encourage the United States to 
move away from the attitude it had adopted immediately after the 1967 war -
that Israel should retain the occupied territories until the Arabs were 
ready to sue for peace. In his May Day speech Nasser had explained that 
one of his purposes had been to link the June 1967 cease-fire resolution 
9}. Heikal also reports Nasser's explanation to Arafat of his reasons 
for accepting the American initiative: "Continuing the War of Attrition 
while Israel enjoyed complete air superiority was simply bleeding 
ourselves to death ... ". The Road to Ramadan,, pp. 82 and 97. Israel 
estimated that Egypt suffered 10,000 casualties in the war. 
98. Ibid.,, p. 93. 
364 
(which made no mention of withdrawal) with the November 1967 peace 
settlement resolution (which called on Israel to withdraw). The Rogers 
initiative explicitly linked the cease-fire with Israeli withdrawal - it 
was a direct response to Nasser's speech. If Nasser now turned down the 
American proposals he would in fact be slamming the door he claimed to 
have left open, forcing the United States back into Israel's room. 99 
Moreover, while the United ·states had deferred Israel's arms request, the 
Administration was under heavy pressure to change its mind because of the 
Soviet intervention. If Nasser refused the cease-fire, Rogers would 
have no grounds for resisting this pressure and Nasser's efforts to 
reassert the balance of power would have been to no avail. 
Moreover, the Soviet involvement in Egypt's defence had raised the 
question in Washington as to whether there was any point in attempting 
to woo what appeared to be a Soviet satellite. Kissinger had said that 
the United States wanted to ''expel" the Soviet advisors and troops; 
S . l d . d tl t th t d tl . h 1 1 . . 1 1 lOO isco la sai la ·. e way o o us was t roug l a po itica sett ement. 
If Egypt rejected the Rogers initiative, and another American attempt at 
negotiation failed, then the United States might revert to confrontation 
and 'contairnnent' tactics. Nasser had experienced the effect of the 
resultant polarisation in 1966 and 1967, when the United States had 
abandoned its relations with Egypt and hacl given full military and 
political backing to his adversaries. Now that a gap had been created 
between the positions of the United States and its Israeli client, Nasser 
understood that it was necessary to offer the United States some 
encouragement to go further; acceptance of the cease-fire was the minimum 
incentive. Once negotiations recommenced, relations between the United 
States and Israel were bound to become more strained because of Israel's 
objections to the Rogers Plan which now constituted the basis of American 
settlement policy. Moreover, Nasser had a fall-back position if negotiations 
became stalemated and American behaviour did not meet up to his 
99. See Nasser's May Day Speech, lDOP~ 1970~ p. 787 and 792. In an 
address to the National Assembly in March he h;id discussed the question 
of a cease-fire: 11 ••• from our point of view, the cease-fire is linked 
with the implementation of the provisions of the Security Council resolution 
for withdrawal from the occupied territories". See Press Conference 
Report on Nasser's Remarks to a Closed Session of the National Assembly, 
25 March, 1970, ibid.~ p. 773. 
100. On 12 July Sisco had been asked to comment on Kissinger's remark: 
'' ... we are interested in reducing Soviet influence in the area. The best 
possible way to reduce the Soviet influence is to achieve a political 
settlement. .. 11 • See Television Interview with Assistant Secretary of State 
Sisco, 12 July, 1970, ibid.~ p. 209. 
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expectations; Egypt could threaten to start another war of attrition, and 
if the threat failed, could actually go to war to encourage further 
pressure on Israel. As Nasser stated in accepting the cease-fire: 
When we embark on political action we expect it to succeed. 
But when political action is exposed to failure, we shall 
only have military action before us ••. We can move in the 
political field as we like .•. in accordance with 
continuously changing .circumstances. But the final word 
in any conflict and specifically with the enemy we are 
facing - Israel - will always belong to force ... If 
political action succeeds well and good. If it fails, 
we the Egyptian people will have only the alternative of 
fightingJOl 
The Soviet Union also had good reason for wanting the cease-fire, 
although it could hardly have been enamoured by the idea that it was an. 
American initiative designed to improve relations between Washington and 
Cairo, predicated in part on America's ability to pressure Israel to 
withdraw (something the Soviet Union had failed to do), and in part 
on an Egyptian willingness to court American patronage. Nevertheless, 
for the Soviet Union the risks of continued warfare outweighed the 
risks of an American-Egyptian rapprochement. The United States had 
made it clear, in direct correspondence and indirectly through public 
statements, that the Soviet attitude to the cease-fire initiative would 
102 determine whether relations would continue on a confrontation course. 
101. Nasser's 23 July Speech, IDOP, 19?0, pp. 875-6. 
102. The first warning came on 29 April when Under Secretary of State 
Richardson stated in an address: "I believe that the Soviet Union should 
realise that any immediate gains it might mak.e by attempting to take 
advantage of the troubled Middle East situation are far outweighed by the 
danger of stirring a wider conflict. When in such an area one of us - in 
this case the Soviet Union - involves itself militarily, the other will 
take notice and react". Address by Under Secretary of State Richardson on 
Controlling Local Conflicts, 29 April, 1970, DSB, 18 May, 1970, p. 629. 
On 26 June, Henry Kissinger spoke of the possibility of a direct confront-
ation between the superpowers 'in the Middle East with serious consequences 
.if events got out of control: "What they are doing in the Middle East, 
whatever their intentions, poses the gravest threats in the long term for 
Western Europe and Japan and,· therefore for us." Background Briefing by 
Henry Kissinger, The White House (San Clemente), 26 June, 1970 (mimeo, in 
the possession of the author). On 30 June, Assistant Secretary of State 
Sisco revealed: " ... there is a very serious question in our minds as to 
whether Soviet objectives in the Middle East in fact are parallel with 
those of the United States ... Do the Russians really want the kind of stable 
peace that the United States is talking about, or do they see sufficient 
advantage in the turmoil ,:;rhich, if it can be controlled, works in support 
of the objectives of the Soviet Union in the area and to our corresponding 
disadvantage?" DSB, 10 August, 1970, 'p. 177. On 10 July the American 
Ambassador in Moscow was reported to have delivered a warning to Gromyko of 
the possibility of a superpower confrontation if the Soviet Union increased 
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Moreover, the Soviet Union shared Egypt's interest in avoiding a new 
commitment of American aircraft to Israel, partly because it would make 
th~ Israelis bolder in their reactions to encounters with Soviet-piloted 
aircraft, and partly because it would undo the semblance of balance 
created by Soviet intervention in Egypt's defence, increasing the 
pressure.on Moscow to take more drastic measures. 
On the other hand, a stable cease-fire carried a number of benefits 
for Moscow: now that a Soviet presence had been firmly established in 
Egypt, a cease-fire would remove the risk of superpower confrontation, 
leaving the Soviet Union with a more stable position of influence in 
the region; Nasser's position had been strengthened and the Soviet Union 
had gained credit in the Arab world for its forthright response to his 
plight - further fighting might undo all that; Egypt's heightned military 
dependence on its Soviet patron might give Moscow greater control over 
its actions and therefore more to bargain with in negotiations with the 
U . d s· 103 nite tates. 
Thus, although Nasser spent eighteen days in the Soviet Union (some 
of them in a sanatorium) and conducted four sessions of negotiations at 
the Kremlin, there were no signs or reports of any Soviet-Egyptian 
d . .b t E I . d 1 R . . . . l04 isagreement a ou gypt s attitu e to t1e agers initiative. 
102. (continued) its military involvement. Emphasising the "imperative 
need" for a cease-fire, Moscow was informed that this might be the last 
chance for a settlement and that "lack of cooperation on its part might 
have dire consequences". NeUJ York Times., 15 July, 1970. This message 
was repeated by Sisco in an interview on 12 July: " ... The Soviet Union, 
in assessing as to whether it wants a political solution or not, must weigh 
whatever unilateral advantage it has been deriving in recent months ... 
against the risk of this thing getting out of control ... and confronting 
both the Soviet Union and the United States with some very difficult choices 
indeed". Television Interview with Assistant Secretary of State Sisco, 
12 July, 1970, IDOP., 19?0., p. 211. 
103. Cf. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile_, p. 123. The Soviet Union may 
also have calculated that moving the missiles after the cease-fire would make 
it easier to bolster Egypt, while undermining the American initiative. 
104. The communique avoided any mention of the proposals but emphasised 
that the meetings were characterised by "an atmosphere of openness, 
friendship and complete mutual understanding". Both sides agreed that 
"urgent measures" were necessary to end Israel's armed attacks and bring 
about its complete withdrawal in accordance with Resolution 242. Nasser 
expressed "profound gratitude" for the Soviet Union's decisive support 
in the struggle against Israel. For the text see Y. Roi, From Encroachment 
to Involvement_, pp. 530-533. 
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The Soviet press applauded Nasser's courage in accepting the cease-fire, 
and both client and patron did their best to ignore or play down its 
American origin, emphasising instead Soviet-Egyptian cooperation and 
the importance of the United Nations, the Four Power Talks, and Resolution 
242 h . f . k f . . l05 A d · 1 · as t e appropriate ramewor or negotiations. ccor ing y, it 
seems safe to conclude that unlike the American-Israeli experience, the 
interests of patron and client on the west bank of the Canal had 
remained convergent in the face of the Rogers initiative. The question 
of influence and resistance had not arisen. 
At midnight on 7-8 August, 1970, the War of Attrition ended in a 
stalemate. Neither side could claim victory, for both had suffered heavy 
casualties and had not achieved their stated aims: Israel remained in its 
east bank positions; Egypt had resisted Israel's imposition of a cease-fire 
and, with Soviet assistance, had challenged its air superiority in the 
Canal zone. However, in terms of the politics of patronage, Nasser had 
reason to be satisfied with the results of the war. On the one side, 
the United States and Israel had been engaged in a bitter disagreement 
since the beginning of 1969; Washington had committed itself publicly to 
complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai; Israel's arms requests had become 
linked to its willingness to negotiate and withdraw; and the United States 
had sought improved relations with Egypt. On the other.side, Egypt had 
retained Soviet support for all its political demands and, with Soviet 
military assistance of an unprecedented nature, had turned an imminent 
defeat in the war into a challenge to Israel's deterrent strength. As. 
Nasser noted in accepting the cease-fire: "we are not acting from a weak 
106 position but from a strong one". · That was testimony in itself to 
Nasser's success in rebuilding Egypt's army and reasserting Egypt's 
importance after the devastation of the 1967 defeat. Yet Nasser's success 
had not been achieved without one very significant cost which he would, 
in one month, bequeath as his legacy to Anwar Sadat: the reduction of 
Egypt's ability to resist its Soviet patron and to take independent action. 
105. FTavda noted that "the peaceful initiative of the UAR bears 
testimony to the high sense of responsibility of the Egyptian leaders for 
the fate of peace in the Middle East". FTavda, 2 August, 1970; cf. FTavda, 
30 July, 1970; New Tunes, 29 July, 1970; and Nasser's 23 July Speech, 
IDOP, 1970, pp. 864-876. 
106. Nasser's Speech of 23 July, IDOP, 1970, p. 874. 
As the authors of the Strategic Survey observed with considerable 
prescience: 
In some sense ... the UAR had mortgaged its freedom of 
military - and even political -· action to its Soviet 
ally in return for protection against the Israel Air 
Force. Conversely, the Soviet Union ... seemed during 
1970 to have established a very real ability to 
constrain, if it wished, the military policy of the 
UAR.107 
VII - EPILOGUE 
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It is ironical and yet typical of the nature of the game of patronage 
in the Middle East, that what was true on one day could be refuted on the 
next; that Israel's setback could be transformed into a triumph, while 
Nasser's success could be negated, as a result of one Soviet-Egyptian 
act. As soon as the cease-fire went into effect on 8 August, Egyptian and 
Soviet personnel began to finish the task they had only managed to start 
during the last three months of the war; by mid-October some 25 to 35 
SAM batteries had been added to the 16 batteries which had been established 
in the Canal zone before the cease-fire 500 to 600 missiles covered 
the air space over the west bank as well as a twelve I:Jile area over the 
Israeli-held east bank. 108 Militarily, the missile movements 
undoubtedly bolstered Egypt's strength, but politically Nasser had over--
played his hand and in one move had laid the basis for the healing of the 
American-Israeli rift. He had failed to account for the contradiction 
between the military and political tactics which lay behind his acceptance 
of the cease-fire. Militarily, the cease-fire gave Egypt a breathing space 
to consolidate its gains; but politically such consolidation could have 
a more adverse effect on American-Egyptian relations than a rejection of 
the cease-fire - it might be interpreted as cheating, an act of bad faith. 
Perhaps Nasser was expecting Washington to ignore the blatant violation 
of the standstill provision because of its desire to launch the 
negotiations. However, Washington was engaged in a tussle between the 
White House and the State Department for control of Middle East Policy and 
the White House was bound to see the missile movements as a Soviet attempt 
to exploit the situation. Moreover, the President had given a firm 
107. IISS, Strategic Survey~ 1970~ p. 50. 
108. IISS, Strategic Survey~ 1970~ p. 48. 
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assurance to Israel that the standstill provision would be respected. 
Nasser had ignored this assurance just as he had ignored the American 
commitment to freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba in 1967. Yet 
in the politics of patronage commitments and assurances were the sine qua 
non of successful resistance. 
The Administration did do its best to ignore the missile movement, 
casting doubt on Israeli claims, and averring that what had happened 
immediately after the cease-fire was not important, while negotiations 
110 
were. However, Israel was not about to let the matter pass. From the 
outset it had warned that Egypt would only accept the cease-fire in order 
to move its missiles, but it had been assured by Washington that the 
standstill provision would be respected. Now its control of the air space 
over its own positions had been threatened and it fully intended to seek 
redress. Washington was informed that unless the violations were 
rectified, Israel would not participate in the negotiations, and might 
. d . d . . l f. 111 bl d reconsi er its ecision to accept tle cease- ire. Una e to persua e 
Egypt and the Soviet Union to withdraw the missiles, the United States 
decided to supply Israel with the equipment necessary to neutralise their 
impact. Within a month of the cease-fire Israel had received Shrike air-to-
ground missiles, Walleye TV-guided bombs, and sophisticated electronic 
counter measures, as well as an American commitment to sell Israel an 
additional 16 Phantoms (with delivery to start in late September) . 112 
109. In the letter which Nixon had sent to Meir requesting Israel's 
acceptance of the cease-fire the President had assured Israel that the 
cease-fire would not permit Egypt to gain any military advantage. New York 
Times_, 25 July, 1970. In her speech explaining Israel's acceptance of the 
cease-fire, Mrs Meir noted that it did so "in the light of U.S. 
clarifications", which included the provision that Egypt and the Soviet Union 
"would refrain from changing the military status quo (by emplacing SAMs or 
other new installations in an agreed z.one west of the Suez Canal cease-fire 
line)': See Speech to Knesset, 4 August, 1970, IDOP, 1970_, p. 240. 
110. The first response came from Secretary of Defence Laird who stated that 
the United States could neither prove nor disprove Egyptian violations. The 
State Department spokesman then noted that there probably had been some 
forward movement after the cease-fire but called for a prompt start to the 
negotiations which should not be delayed by Israel's charges. New York Times, 
17 and 18 August, 1970. Rogers was reported to have refused to believe his 
own intelligence reports. As one State Department officer noted: "It was bad 
news, and he didn't want to hear it". Interview with State Department 
Official, Washington, June, 1975. 
111. This warning was conveyed to Sisco by Ambassador Rabin on 31 August. 
See New York Times, 1 September, 1970. Israel actually engaged in 
preliminary discussions with Jarring in August but after continued missile 
movements announced its withdrawal at the beginning of September. 
112. New York T1:mes_, 1 September_, 1970_; Jerusalem Post_, 10 September, 1970. 
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Israel was still on a 'short-leash', but the missile movement had 
enabled it to reverse the operation of arms leverage. Since the 23 March 
deferral decision, arms had been withheld to induce Israeli compliance, 
now the arms would have to be provided to get Israel back to the negotiating 
table. However, events in Jordan would unexpectedly put an end, for the 
time being, to this whole process of bargaining over arms.. The movement 
of the missiles had raised serious doubts in Washington about Soviet 
intentions in the Middle East, confirming a pattern of behaviour which 
had started with the Soviet rejection of the Rogers Plan and which had 
been seriously compounded by the injection of Soviet combat personnel. 
Suddenly, in September, while Washington was preoccupied with the cease-
fire violations, the conflict between King Hussein and the Palestinian 
f edayeen in Jordan erupted into a full-scale war as the army moved 
against Palestinian strongholds. In the midst of the fighting 200 Syrian 
tanks crossed into Jordan to offer support to the fedayeen. Hussein 
appealed to the United States for assistance and the President responded 
by alerting the Sixth Fleet, five American divisions based in West 
113 Germany, and Israel. In the end, Hussein's army and air force dealt 
with the Syrians on their own, but the utility of Israel's deterrent 
strength for American policy in the Middle East had been demonstrated, 
and the doubts about Soviet motives had been conf irrned (especially because, 
while standing to gain from the overthrow of Hussein's. regime in Jordan, 
it continued to assist Egypt in completing its missile screen). 
Consequently, Israel's importance to the United States in combating 
what was now perceived as Soviet expansion had been grea.tly enhanced. In 
October, the United States withdrew from the Four Power Talks stating that 
the Soviet and Egyptian actions had cast doubt on "whether there is a 
114 
sincere desire for peace" At the same time, the President announced 
that he would ask Congress to .appropriate $500 million for military 
assistance to Israel in the next fiscal year. In November, the cease-fire 
113. Agreement was apparently reached between Washington and .Jerusalem that, 
if necessary, Israel would provide air support for the Jordanian army. As 
the crisis worsened Israeli tanks were deployed in force on the Golan Heights 
and the West Bank and, in return for a commitment deal with the Syrians, 
. Israel was assured that the United States would deal with any Egyptian or 
Soviet moves on the western front. The Soviet Union was warned in no 
uncertain terms that unless its Syrian client retreated Israel an<l the 
United States would take appropriate action. See Henry Brandon, "Jordan, 
The Forgotten Crisis", Foreign Policy_, No. 10, Spring, 1973; Kalbs, 
Kissinger_, Chapter 8; Quandt, "The Middle East Conflict in U.S. Strategy, 
1970-1971", pp. 45-48. 
114. New York Times_, 6 October, 1970. 
371 
was extended for another three months without any commitment sought by 
the United States,or given by Israel, about negotiations. 115 Instead, 
Israel sought specific commitments from the United States before it 
resumed talks with Jarring: the Rogers Plan would be shelved; military 
and economic support would continue; no preconceived American ideas would 
. . f . h h . . 116 . . d d . h inter ere wit t e peace negotiations. Nixon respon e wit . 
assurances that Israel would continue to receive military and economic 
assistance, and that there would be no delay or deferral of requests if 
an impasse developed in the negotiations. While refusing to abandon the 
Rogers Plan, the President did agree to shelve it for the time being, 
stating publicly that American policy was based on Resolution 242 and 
h I . l' b d II f . . II 117 t at srae s or ers were a matter or negotiation 
In other words, the link between arms supplies and Israel's stance 
in the negotiations had been broken, the Two and Four Power Talks had been 
abandoned, the cease-fire had been renewed without binding preconditions, 
and the Rogers Plan had been put back into the State Department drawer. 
A new view began to be expressed at the highest levels in Washington: 
"For the first time, one began to hear American policy makers reflect the 
Israeli view that American-Israeli relations had a strategic dimension 
that was more important than the sentimental ties so frequently alluded 
ll8 to in the past as the basis for American support for Israel". As Mrs 
Meir explained to the Knesset at the end of the year: "Since August 9 
115. Dayan noted at the time that the cease-fire was renewed that as a 
result of the violations Israel was no longer bound to any of the 
commitments it had made in accepting the Rogers initiative. New York Times, 
7 November, 1970. 
116. These preconditions were conveyed to Rogers by Eban on 18 November. 
They were followed by a message from Hrs Meir to the President which 
repeated the preconditions and also requested a forceful declaration of 
America's commitment to Israel's security. Washington Post,19 November, 
1970; New York Times, 2 December, 1970. 
117. In a letter to the Prime Minister, Nixon also committed the United 
States to use its veto in the Security Council to prevent the passing of 
an anti-Israel resolution; and promised that negotiations on future borders 
would be left to negotiations between the parties. New York Times, 5 
December, 1970. The public statement which effectively shelved the Rogers 
Plan was made in response to a planted question in a news conference on 
10 December, 1970. See DSB, 28 December, 1970, p. 771. 
118. W.B. Quandt, The Arab-Israeli Conflict in American Foreign Policy, 
1967-1973, p. 18. 
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there has been a great improvement in our capacity to maintain our 
position" 119 By steadfastly refusing to participate in negotiations 
until the United States had rectified the military situation and provided 
Israel with the assurances which it had sought,but had been unable to 
achieve during the War of Attrition, Israel had managed to exploit the 
change in the political balance in the region. Its cautious submission 
to the Rogers initiative had been wise given its lack of an alternative 
patron in the face of hostility from a superpower adversary. However, 
its defiant refusal to participate in the negotiations reflected Israel's 
understanding of the new reality, that in the face of Soviet and Egyptian 
actions, the United States did not have, for the moment, an alternative 
Egyptian client. 
Although Rogers and Sisco would make one more vain attempt to 
negotiate a settlement (this time a partial settlement involving the 
reopening of the Suez Canal), and one more attempt to use arms as a 
bargaining lever, while the cease-fire was maintained the United 
States lacked the incentive and therefore the will-power to budge Israel 
from its positions in the territories or its attitude towards a negotiated 
settlement. Israel's military strength had not been responsible for the 
cease-fire in 1970, but the United States came to see the maintenance of 
its strength as the most appropriate means for preserving the stability 
and tranquility which the region enjoyed until the disruption in October 
1973. 
Circumstances beyond Israel's control had enabled this weak state, 
yet again, to secure the patronage of the United States - this time at 
unprecedented levels. However, despite this success Israel would have done 
well to remember that its newly acquired leverage with its American patron 
was contingent upon these circumstances, that beneath the surface of 
Israeli-American convergence lay fundamental differences, and that when 
119. Mrs Meir also outlined the assurances and commitments Israel had 
received from the United States that it would preserve the balance of power, 
deter the Soviet Union, veto any Security Council resolution which dealt 
with matters subject to negotiations between the parties, and ensure that 
Israel would not enter negotiations "from a position of weakness". She 
claimed that the United States believed Israel was entitled to defensible 
borders, did not accept the Arab claim that Israel should withdraw from 
all occupied territory and did not agree with Arab plans on the refugee 
problem. Moreover, she stated that Israel had been reinforced in its 
attitude that "in the absence of peace, Israel is entitled to maintain the 
cease-fire lines on all fronts without withdrawal", and that the United 
States regarded the maintenance of the cease-fire as "a continuous and 
uninterrupted obligation11 based on the June 1967 cease-fire resolution (not 
the Rogers initiative or Resolution 242). "It must be emphasised again and 
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the political environment changed - as it was bound to - those differences 
would emerge again. In 1971 and 1972 Israel missed the opportunity to 
negotiate from a position of strength and to make concessions which would 
have maintained the stability by increasing Egypt's stake in it. Instead, 
its leadership relied on military preponderance to preserve its position 
and its patronage and had received confirmation of the correctness of 
this strategy in the agreement between the superpowers that they would 
both seek military relaxation in the Middle East. The emerging detente 
seemed to be working in Israel's favour. But not for long: on 6 October 
1973 and thereafter Israel would suffer the consequences of its failure 
to appreciate the con:tingent nature of the power of the weak. 
119. (continued) again; the US initiative calling for talks under the 
auspices of Ambassador Jarring does not entail any undertaking on Israel's 
part to agree to proposals made by the Secretary of State". (i.e. the 
Rogers Plan). See Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir, cited 
in New MiddZe East~ February, 1971, pp. 45-6. 
PART THREE 
CHAPTER THREE 
DETENTE AND THE POLITICS OF PATRONAGE: 
HOW THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR STARTED * 
1972 was a good year for detente. In Hay President Nixon and 
Secretary-General Brezhnev emerged from their Moscow Summit to lay down 
the 'Basic Principles' of the era of detente. The implications for the 
conduct of the Arab-Israeli conflict were regarded as manifest: the two 
superpowers would do their utmost to avoid military confrontations; 
they both recognised that efforts by either to obtain unilateral 
advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, were 
inconsistent with the objective of reaching accommodation by peaceful 
means; and they declared their mutual support for a peaceful settler:Jent 
1 
and military relaxation in the Middle East. These principles were 
reaffirmed in June 1973 when Nixon and Brezhnev added the caveat that 
both would act "to prevent the development of situations capable of 
causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations 11 • 2 Yet some four 
months later, on 6 October, Egypt, in coordination with Syria,launched 
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a surprise attack on Israel and within three weeks American forces were 
placed on global alert to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining the 
unilateral advantage which the United States reserved for itself: the 
superpowers supposedly faced "the most difficult crisis we've had since 
the Cuban confrontation of 196211 • 3 The principles of detente had clearly 
been contradicted by the practice in the Middle East. 
The critics of detente were quick to charge that the Nixon 
Administration had been duped by the Soviet Union, that Moscow had acted 
with perfidy in exploiting the relaxation of tension for its own advantage, 
"that if the 'basic principles' of detente had been respected, the 
1. "The Soviet-American Summit, May, 1972: Communique of May 29, 1972 and 
Basic Principles of Relations 11 , reprinted in SITT'vival., Volume XIV, No. 4, 
July-August, 1972, pp. 190 and 191. 
2. "Agreement Between the USSR and USA on the Prevention of Nuclear War", 
reprinted in Survival, Volume XIV, No. 5, September-October, 1973, p. 243. 
3. Transcript of President Nixon's News Conference on Domestic and 
Foreign Affairs, New York Times,27 October, 1973, p. 14. 
* This chapter has been published in a slightly different form in 
Australian Outlook, Volume 30, No. 2, August, 1976, pp. 171-196. 
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4 Egyptian-Syrian attack should not have taken place". In levelling these 
charges at the Administration and the Soviet Union, the critics made 
precisely the same assumptions as those whom they criticised had made at 
the Moscow SullIDlit in May 1972. They all assumed that because of the 
dependence of regional belligerents on Soviet and American military and 
economic support, the superpowers would be able to exercise control over 
their clients to prevent an "increase in international tensions". They 
assumed that regional wars could be prevented by sacrificing the interests 
of dependent client states on the altar of detente. Thus, when principle 
and practice diverged in October 1973, the critics concluded that, instead 
of exercising control over its Egyptian and Syrian proteges, the Soviet 
Union had encouraged the war by supplying the military wherewithal which 
made it possible. The critics did not question the assumptions which had 
formed the foundations for the 'Declaration of Basic Principles' and were 
clearly confounded when Secretary of State Kissinger, in effect, denied 
that these assumptions had ever existed by declaring that the Soviet Union 
had not acted "irresponsibly" at the outset of the October War. 5 In his 
subsequent defence of the 'Basic Principles' Kissinger emphasised that 
detente was a "process not a permanent achievement", that the principles 
were a "yardstick" not a "legal contract", and that. competition and 
cooperation coexisted in what was an inherently ambiguous relationship. 6 
4. Theodore Draper, "Detente", Commenta:t'y.> June, 1974, p. 38. The first 
attack was in fact launched by Senator Jackson during the October War. See 
"Remarks by Senator Henry M. Jackson", Congressional Record.>(Senate), 
Volume 119, No. 158, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 18 October 1973. This was 
quickly followed by Draper in his "From 1967 to 1973: The Arab-Israeli 
Wars", Commentary.> December 1973, pp. 41-43; Uri Ra'anan, "The USSR and the 
Middle East: Some Reflections on the Soviet Decision-Making Process", 
Orbis, Volume XVII, No. 3, Fall, 1973, pp. 947-977; and Foy D. Kohler, 
Leon Goure and Mose L. Harvey, 11.'he Soviet Union and October 1973 Middle 
East Wa:t', The Implications for Detente, Center for Advanced International 
Studies, University of Miami, 1974. In 1976 Draper renewed the charge 
in his, "Appeasement and Detente"•, Commenta:t'y_, February, 197 6, p. 32. 
5. Kissinger declared on 12 October: "We ..• do not consider that Soviet 
actions as of now constitute the irresponsibility that on Monday evening 
I pointed out would threaten detente". New York Times, 13 October, 1973. 
6. See Henry A. Kissinger, "Detente with the Soviet Union: The Reality 
of Competition and the Imperative of Cooperation", Depa.rtment of State 
Bulletin_, 14 October, 1974, pp. 505-519; Draper, "Appeasement and Detente", 
Commentary, February, 1976, pp. 27-38; Henry A. Kissinger, "The 1976 
Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture", Survival_, September/October, 1976, 
pp. 194-203. 
In this way, Kissinger's obfuscation of what had clearly been the 
connnon assumption of the superpowers in 1972 (that detente could be 
preserved by sacrificing the interests of the weak clients), together 
with the attachment of his critics to the theory of Soviet perfidy, 
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served to obscure the essential lessons of the October decision: that 
Egypt was not only able to go to war in the face of an explicit superpower 
agreement to prevent such action, but was also able to gain Soviet support 
for actions which it had previously opposed; that, as President Sadat 
noted, "small and medium-sized powers can, if they wish and if they are 
determined ••• bypass .•. the rapprochement agreements concluded between the 
Big Powers, can decide their own fate, can take war decisions alone" 7 ; 
that some weak states have the ability to resist the connnon policies of 
the superpowers. 
Egypt's decision to go to war demonstrated that the politics of 
detente and the politics of patronage could become incompatible, that 
with skill and determination a weak protege could resist the inimical 
effects of detente between the superpowers by exploiting their competitive 
interests in regional rivalry to overcome their cooperative interests 
in the relaxation of tensions on the global level. Conversely, Israel's 
· decision not to pre-empt emphasised that for some weak states the 
politics of patronage and the politics of detente were mutually reinforcing, 
that the inimical effects of dependence on superpower patronage had been 
resisted by exploiting the cooperative interests of the superpowers in 
regional stability. 
I - EGYPT 1S DECISION TO GO TO WAR 
In 1972 Sadat had awaited the results of the Moscow Summit with 
trepidation. Since the cease-fire of August 1970 a stalemate had 
enveloped the Middle East. One way or another Sadat had determined that 
he would reject its soporific effect by awakening Israel and the superpowers 
to the need for redressing the deepfelt grievances of the Arabs. 
He had already declared 1971 to be the 'year of decision', but despite 
his diplomatic initiative in February and subsequent attempts by the 
United States and the United Nations to achieve diplomatic movement, 
Israel was consolidating its hold ort the occupied territories. In 1971 
7. President Sadat's Speech on the Fourth Anniversary of the Death of 
Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egyptian Gazette., 29 September, 1974. 
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Sadat had placed his hopes on changing the military balance. However, 
his Soviet patron had delayed the supply of sophisticated offensive 
weapons and instead had urged Egypt to exercise caution, seek a political 
settlement and not embark on a military adventure. Consequently, the 
8 
'year of decision' was postponed. 
Sadat tells us that he met the Soviet leaders in October 1970, May, 
July and October 1971, and February and April 1972. According to Heikal 
and Sadat, the Russians on each occasion urged him to seek a political 
settlement and to concentrate on the economic and social development 
of Egypt. Sadat argued that Egypt would have to be in a position to 
negotiate from strength were it to participate in a political settlement. 
To conciliate him, the Russians more than once agreed to release the 
arms which Sadat had requested. 9 But the arms would never be delivered.lo 
Domestically, Sadat was being driven to action by a stagnating economy, 
internal unrest and widespread questioning of his own credibility. If 
he were to achieve either military or diplomatic movement he would 
clearly have to alter, somehow, the policy of his Soviet patron. 
8. The reason Sadat gave at the time for postponing the 'decision' was 
that the attention of the world was focussed on the Inda-Pakistani War 
of December 1971. During that war, the Soviet Union had ferried arms 
to India through Egypt - including some arms the Egyptians thought were 
intended for their use. The contrast in Soviet action on the sub-continent 
and Soviet inaction in the Middle East demonstrated to Sadat the direction 
of Soviet policy. See Ya'acov Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement, 
p. 569. 
9. Sadat has outlined the substance of these negotiations in a speech to 
the Egyptian Students Union, Alexandria University, 3 April 1974, BBC/SWB_, 
ME/4569/A/l - A/10, 5 April, 1974. CL Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, The Road 
to Ramadan_, Collins, London, 1975, pp. 157-9; Marilyn Berger "Russia is 
Denounced by Sadat for Rejecting 1972 Arms Plea", International Herald 
Tribune~ 11 September, 1975; Arnold Hottinger, "The Great Powers and the 
Middle East", in William E. Griffiths, (ed.) The World and the Great Power 
T1~iangZes_, Cambridge, 197 5, pp. 137-145. 
10. From late 1970 to early 1971 Egypt received an average of two 
shiploads of arms per month. The shipments included Fr~ tactical ground 
rockets, ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns, TU-16 bombers, SU-7 fighter bombers 
and MIG-21 fighters. But these supplies did not meet Egypt's desire for 
advanced weapons to match Israel's deployment. What Sadat wanted, and 
what the Soviet Union would not give him, were the MIG·-23 fighters and 
the SCUD medium-range ballistic missiles. See Roger F. Pajak, "Soviet 
Arms and Egypt", Survival_, Volume XVII, No. 4, July-August, 1975, 
pp. 168-169. 
378 
At his final meeting with Brezhne~ irt April 1972, Sadat had 
apparently secured Soviet agreement to meet his arms requests after the 
Moscow Summit but before November 1972,so that Egypt would be in a 
position to negotiate from strength after the American elections. 11 
But after the Sununit Sadat n.:ce:Lved confirmation of his worst fears: 
the superpowers had agreed to seek a peaceful settlement and 'military 
relaxation' in the Middle East. Sadat wrote to Brezhnev requesting 
the fulfilment of the April agreement. Six weeks elapsed before the 
Soviet Union replied and when the answer finally arrived it made no 
mention of the arms agreement except to note that "war needed much 
12 preparation", especially the 'building up of morale'. 
Under heavy pressure from the army and the masses for action, Sadat 
responded with a bold but calculated move: he ordered the immediate 
removal from Egypt of the 20,000 Soviet advisors and personnel together 
with any equipment they were not prepared to sell or surrender to the 
Egyptians. 13 He had decided that if it proved necessary he would end the 
stalemate by military means. The first step in this plan was to convince 
the Soviet Union that he ~as indeed serious and therefore failure to 
comply with his requests would cost the Soviet Union dearly in the 
currency of Middle East influence. 
The Egyptian President had found it necessary to defy the superpower 
decision to seek 'military relaxation' in the Middle East. In AZ Ahrcon 
editorials Heikal argued that the Soviet Union benefited from the 'no war -
no peace' situation. The preservation of detente and the quiet growth of 
Soviet forward naval deployments necessitated stability in the Middle East. 
Since the superpowers had resolved to separate their relations from 
regional conflicts, Heikal argued that it was Egypt's responsibility to 
11. Sadat 1 s Alexmxh."ia Speech., ME/4569 /A/ 4. 
12. President Sadat's Speech to the A.S.U., 24 July, 1972, in Journal of 
Palestine Studies., Volume II, No. 1, Autumn 1972, pp. 176 - 183; Cf. 
Heikal, The Road to Ramadan., p. 174. 
13. The Russians complied with Sadat's demands quickly and quietly but 
they refused to sell Egypt the MIG-25 Foxbats and the radar system which 
together provided sophisticated reconnaisance for the Soviet forces in 
Egypt. Their presence had been one of the bones of contention between 
Egypt and the Soviet Union because the Russians refused to use the MIG-25s 
for Egyptian reconnaisance missions. When the advisors left they took 
this system with them, thereby seriously affecting Egypt's early-warning 
capability. See Sadat's 15th September Speech at Meeting with ASU and TU 
Leaders , BBC/SWB., ME/5009/A/12 - A/13, 17 September, 1975. 
.... 
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1 h bl f I I b · • • . . 14 so ve t e pro em o no war - no peace y its own initiative. These 
public ruminations reflected Sadat's private conclusions about the 
Soviet-American call for 'military relaxation': 
What did this mean? It meant that if such military 
relaxation took place in the area at a time when 
Israel was superior ••• the question would not be 
solved. It would be a case of the stronger side 
dictating conditions t? us ••. Whether we accepted 
it or not, they would sar We are staying where 
we are and that is all.I 
Sadat calculated that by expelling the Soviet military presence 
he would demonstrate the costs to the Soviet Union of the superpower 
attempt to control the Arab-Israeli conflict. The humiliation which 
accompanied the Soviet expulsion, together with the damage done to 
Soviet reputation by Sadat's public claim that it was not assisting 
Egypt in its struggle against Israel, 16 were calculated to play on the 
Soviet fear of a loss of influence and prestige in the Middle East. 
Sadat's aim was somehow to disrupt the status quo, thereby resisting 
the effects of the Soviet-American detente, and forcing Israeli withdrawal 
from occupied territories. The strategy had two branches: first he 
would try to achieve diplomatic movement by threatening military action; 
at the same time he would prepare for war so that if the threat of force 
failed, the use of force would succeed in altering the status quo. The 
military aim of the battle plan was to inflict "the heaviest losses on 
the enemy, to convince it that the continuation of its occupation of our 
17 
territory was too high a price to pay" But the political aim was to 
destroy Israel's 'security doctrine' and prove Egypt's ability to 
d . h d h' h h h d . d 18 h ff isrupt t e or er w ic t e superpowers a impose • By t reat o orce 
and then, if necessary, by the use of force, Sadat would prove to the 
14. See Heikal's editorials in Al Ahrarn, in BBC/SWB, 24 June, 1972, 
and 15 July, 1972. 
15. Sada-/; 's Alexandria Speech, ME/ 4569/ A/ 5. 
16. Sadat made these charges in a mild form in a speech to the Arab 
Socialist Union on 18 July 1972 (BBC/SWB, 20 July, 1972), but repeated 
them in harsh terms in an interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave in 
Newsweek, 7 August, 1972. 
17. General Mohamed El-Gamasy, .The fth:Utary Strategy of the October 1973 
War, International Symposium on the October 1973 War, Cairo University, 
27 October, 1975, p. 9. 
18. See Sadat's 30th September Speech to ASU, BBC/SWB, 1 October , 1974, 
ME/4717/A/3. 
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superpowers that Israeli military superiority would not deter Egypt from 
military action. Thus, there could be no 'military relaxation' in the 
Middle East unless Israel were forced to withdraw from the territories 
occupied in 1967. The strategy was designed to disprove the assumption 
that detente between the superpowers could create stability in the 
Middle East through American maintenance of Israel's deterrent strength 
and Russian restrictions orr the arms it supplied to Egypt. Thus, 
in the final analysis, even if the military action failed, the political 
and diplomatic aims would be achieved by the mere fact that Egypt went 
to war. Sadat could even win by losing. 
The first priority was to build Egypt's military strength to 
enhance the credibility of the threat, while ensuring some degree of 
military success if action were necessary. Thus Sadat began to exercise 
leverage over the Soviet Union. Having demonstrated the price 
Moscow would have to pay for the pursuit of 'military relaxation' in 
the Middle East, he began to emphasise the benefits to the Russians of 
renewing the relationship and supplying Egypt with arms. In December 
1972, without consulting Brezhnev, Sadat announced that he would renew 
the three year agreement on Soviet use of port facilities in Alexandria, 
Mersa Matruh and Port Said. 19 Two months later Sadat's complex gambit 
paid off when Moscow resumed arms shipments to Egypt, including some 
20 
new and sophisticated weapons which Sadat had for so long requested. 
Next, Sadat turned to the United States in an attempt to exercise 
leverage over his superpower adversary by threatening military action. 
But the Americans believed that the withdrawal of the Soviet advisors 
and their equipment represented a severe setback to Egyptian plans for 
the 'coming battle'. Their one positive response to the withdrawal, a 
h . h 1 1 . A . . 21 bl. h move w ic was c ear y in merican interests, was to es ta is a 
19. Sadat's Alexandria Speech,ME/4569/A/5. 
20. From February 1973 Egypt began to receive large quantities of T-62 
tanks, RPG-7 anti-tank weapons, SAM-6 batteries, SAM-7 Strelas, SCUD missiles, 
SU-17 fighter bombers as well as additional supplies of weapons already 
in hand. See Stockholm Peace Research Institute, World Arm.aments and 
Disarmaments: SIPRI Yearbook 19?3, New York, 1973; and International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 'l'he Military Balance, 19?2/3 and 1973/4, 
London, 1973, 1974. 
21. As Dr Kissinger had explained to the press, in a background briefing 
in 1972: "We are trying to expel the Soviet military presence, not so much 
the advisors, but the combat pilots and the combat personnel, before they 
become so firmly established''. Background Briefing with Dr Henry A. 
Kissinger, The White House, San Clemente, California, 24 August, 1970. 
(In the possession of the author). 
1 back-channel' of communication with Sadat. They assured 11im that 
America would renew its attempts at a negotiated settlement after the 
war in Vietnam had been concluded and after the Israeli elections 
22 
stheduled to be held in October 1973. But Washington retained its 
implicit confidence in the reliability of the Israeli deterrent. Thus 
when, in April 1973, Sadat announced that the Russians were supplying 
Egypt "with everything that·' s possible for them to supply" and warned 
that the resumption of the battle was "now inevitable", the Americans 
23 dismissed this new threat as bombast. They had already agreed to 
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supply Israel with 48 more F-4 Phantoms to maintain its deterrent strength. 
Because of their confidence in the Israeli army and their assumption that 
detente with the Soviet Union had reduced Egypt's ability to act 
independently, it was easy to ignore this new threat. 
Sadat tried again in May 1973. This time he backed his threat of 
military action by mobilising the army and conducting extensive 
manoeuvres in the Canal zone. The Israel Defense Forces mobilised in 
response and the lid of stability was again clamped, apparently firmly 
clamped, back onto the Middle East tinderbox. The fact that no clash 
took place reinforced the American and Israeli belief in Israel's ability 
24 
to hold the lid in place. But if Sadat's threat had no impact on the 
22. See William B. Quandt, The Arab-Isr>aeli Conflict in Ame1°ican Foreign 
Policy~ 196?-19?3_, Shiloah Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 
Tel Aviv University, December, 1974. Heikal reports Kissinger's reaction 
to the expulsion as: "I don't understand President Sadat. If he had come 
to me before this happened and told me about it I should have felt 
obliged to give him something in exchange. But now I've got it all for 
nothing". Heikal, The Road to Ramadan~ p. 184; Cf. Edward Sheehan, "Step 
by Step in the Middle East", Foreign Pol-icy~ No. 22, Spring, 1976, p. 9. 
For Sadat, however, the expulsion was aimed at the Soviet Union, not at 
the United States, since he was well aware that it was an election year. 
He sought leverage through threatening instability not, at this stage, 
through a change of patrons. The timing may also have been determined by 
pressure from the Army. See Hottinger, op.cit.~ p. 151. 
23. "The Battle Is Now Inevitable", Interview with President Sadat, 
Newsweek~ 9 April, 1973, pp. 45 and 49. 
24. The Intelligence and Research Section (INR) of the State Department 
did estimate, on 31 May, 1973, that "the resumption of hostilities by 
autumn will become a better than even bet" if no progress were made in the 
forthcoming U .N. debate. However this assessment was not taken seriously 
because the United States secured Egyptian agreement to talks in New York 
in November 1973. In April 1973, U.S. Intelligence had obtained the 
complete Egyptian battle plan but did not believe that a date had been 
fixed. Evidence of new roads and bridge-building equipment in the Canal 
zone was also in hand, but all these signs were either ignored or 
misinterpreted because of the prevailing American and Israeli conception 
that the Arabs would not dare initiate a new war, without air superiority; 
United States, it apparently did have an impact on the Soviet Union. 
According to Sadat, the Russians decided to supply him with additional 
d 1 t . . t f h M b·· 1 · . 25 S d weapons an e ec ronic equipmen a ter t e ay mo i isation. a at 
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now felt that he possessed the necessary ingredients to blow the lid off 
the tinderbox. 
The 1973 June Summit between Nixon and Brezhnev brought neither 
an indication that the Unit.ed States was about to change its policy, nor 
any sign that the Soviet Union was backing Egyptian policy with its 
political power. It was apparent to Sadat that his threat of war had 
become 11 inoperative" - 11Egypt and the Arabs were taken for still 
corpses11 • 26 It had therefore become necessary to pursue the second 
branch of his strategy and actually go to war - perhaps that would enable 
Egypt to regain some of its land and relieve the mounting internal 
pressure from a stagnating economy, an impatient army and dissident 
students. Most importantly, it would wake up the United States and the 
world to the need for a change in the sta-tus quo and perhaps destroy 
the belief in Israel's doctrine of deterrence. As Sadat stated after 
the war: 
In the calculations we made for the battle, the important 
criterion was not how many square kilometres would be 
liberated, but the shattering of the theory of Israel's 
security. To destroy that theory was more important than 
the destruction of the Bar-Lev line; to restore the world's 
confidence in us, in our words and in our ability to act, 
was more important than crossing the Canal.27 
One should not underestimate the gamble and risk which Sadat was taking~ 
Certainly by August 1973 he had reached agreement with Syria on a 
24. (continued) See Ray S. Cline, "Policy Without Intelligence", Fore-tgn 
Policy, No. 17, Winter, 1974-75, p. 132; John W. Finney, "War Signals 
Misjudged, U.S. Officials Concede11 , NezJ York Times, 31 October, 1973; 
George Sherman, "U.S. did not take Egyptian battle plan seriously11 , 
The Times, 5 December 1973; and Report of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, reprinted as "The C. I.A. 
Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read 11 , The Village Voice, 
20 February, 1976, Section 3, p. 30. 
25. Sadat interview with Mussa Sabri, Akhbar al-Yawn, 3 August, 1974; 
cited in Shimon Shamir, Nasser and Sadat, 1967-1973: Tz,Jo Approaches to 
the Crisis, Shiloah Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel 
Aviv University, 26-31 December, 1974, p. 11. 
26. Sadat's Alexandria Speech_, ME/4569/A/6. 
27. Sadat's 30th September Speech to the A.S.U., ME/4717/A/3. 
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coordinated attack that would have the advantage of surprise. He had also 
reached agreement with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia not only to finance 
Egypt's arms purchases but also to employ his oil reserves for political 
purposes. These factors, together with his knowledge that the army had 
.been training for the battle for six years and now had sophisticated 
weapons to match Israel in some spheres, may have lessened the risks. 
But against this remained the much vaunted power of the IDF, the fact 
that Israel retained air superiority, the poor reputation and fighting 
record of the Egyptian Army, American opposition to military action, 
uncertainty as to Soviet support, and the ultimate risk that, if he 
failed and Egypt's army were again destroyed, his country would be in 
ruins and he would be in disgrace. 
Thus, in the final analysis, it was Sadat's willingness to accept 
the risks and costs of battle - his determination to prevent Egypt's 
interests from being sacrificed on the altar of detente - which proved 
decisive. While Egypt controlled some powerful resources, they could 
only be used to influence events in Egypt's favour if its leadership 
had the will-power to defy the restraints imposed by the superpowers. 
Clearly, the United States and Israel did not believe that Sadat possessed 
this strength of will - that is why Sadat decided to go to war and why 
they were taken by surprise when he did. As Kissinger publicly acknowledged 
during the war: 
If the Arab objective was ..• to emphasise the fact 
that permanent stability cannot be assumed in the 
Middle East and that there is an urgency in achieving 
a negotiated settlement ... then it would be our 
judgement that the point has been made.28 
One problem which arises from this argument is that Egyptian 
willingness to act alone and decisively is uncharacteristic of the 
expected behaviour of a weak and dependent client state. Thus, some 
observers have been quick to find the guiding hand of the Soviet Union 
behind the Egyptian action. However, an examination of the Soviet dilemma 
in the pre-war period suggests that it was indeed the Egyptian camel 
which, yet again, led the Russian bear. 
28. Secretary of State Kissinger's Press Conference, Friday, 12 October, 
1973, reprinted in clerusalem Post, 14 October, 1973. After the war 
Kissinger told Heikal: "I had not yet opened the file on the Middle 
East crisis, I thought it would wait its turn. But the crisis has 
imposed itself on all unexpectedly. In this you succeeded, and I am the 
first to grant you this success". See "Kissinger Meets Heikal", clournal 
of Palestine Studies., Volume III, No. 2, Winter, 1974, p. 210. 
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Since 1970, it had been clear that the Soviet Union opposed military 
action as a means for forcing Israeli withdrawal. In public, as well as 
in the private discussions, the Soviet Union stressed the need for a 
political settlement in the Middle East. 29 Moscow shared the American 
and Israeli perception of the low military potential of the Egyptian 
army and this created a serious dilemma for Soviet policy. If it 
supplied Egypt with the weapons necessary to go to war that might well 
lead to a further humiliating defeat for Soviet arms and the almost 
certain prospect of confrontation with the United States. Soviet 
involvement in the defence of Egypt was so widespread at the time that 
it would have been difficult for it to avoid direct involvement. On the 
other hand, if Egypt entered into negotiations with the United States 
for a political settlement, those negotiations might well lead to a 
lessened Egyptian dependence on Soviet military aid, which remained the 
currency of Soviet influence in the region. 30 Thus, by supplying Cairo 
with some arms while holding out the promise of more, Moscow could prevent 
Egypt from going to war and also prevent it from achieving the 'position 
of strength' necessary for negotiations with the United States. By 
restricting arms supplies the Soviet Union established an escape route 
from its Middle Eastern dilemma which enabled it to exercise control 
over Egypt's belligerent aspirations while consolidating its position 
of influence and indeed benefiting from the 'no war - no peace' 
situation. The Moscow communique on 'military relaxatj_on' could 
therefore be interpreted as a formalisation of this Soviet policy. 
29. Thus, in May 1971, Soviet experts told a delegation of Syrian 
communists: "Some people maintain that the problem of eliminating the 
consequences of aggression must be solved through war, but without 
preparation this would lead to the liquidation of the progressive 
regimes. It could also lead to a confronation between the Soviets 
and Americans. We do not conceal the fact that we are not in favour of 
this except in the case of extreme necessity. Our opposition is not to 
a military solution per se, but arises only because we are realistic". 
See "The Soviet Attitude to the Palestine Problem", Journal of Palestine 
Studies., Volume II, No. 2, Autumn, 1972, p. 188. For other statements 
see Robert 0. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970., 
Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975, Chapter 3; Y. Ro'i, op.cit . ., Sections 
104, 107 and 110. 
30 See William Quandt, op. cit; Y. Ro'i and Ilana Dimant-Kass, 
The Soviet Military Involvement in Egypt., January 1970 - July 1972., 
The Soviet and East European Research Centre, Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, Research Paper, No. 6, February, 1974. 
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However, with the expulsion of the Soviet advisors in July 1972, 
the policy suddenly disintegrated and the Soviet Union had to seek a new 
way to escape its dilemma. Sadat had raised the stakes for the Soviet 
Union in the Middle East. Overnight the Soviet position in the region 
had deteriorated and the prospect of further deterioration now threatened. 
If Sadat was determined to go to war the best the Soviet Union could do 
was to supply Egypt with arms sufficient to obviate Soviet intervention 
and to prevent any new outbreak from engulfing the superpowers. The 
worst the Soviet Union could do was to give Sadat an opportunity to 
blame a new defeat on Soviet reluctance to supply arms. 
Despite the humiliating expulsion and the press recriminations 
which followed it, all was not lost for the Soviet Union. Sadat had 
not abrogated the 1971 Soviet Egyptian Treaty of Friendship, nor had he 
31 turned to the United States for support. Although, following the 
expulsion, there had been tense moments in Soviet-Egyptian relations, 
Sadat had publicly reaffirmed Soviet access to Egyptian port facilities. 
Moreover, despite attempts to buy arms in Europe, it was evident that 
Sadat really had no viable alternative source for military equipment. 
Perhaps most significant was the fact that the withdrawal of Russian 
personnel had indirectly reduced the dangers of superpower confrontation 
since the Soviet Union was no longer involved on the ground. In these 
circumstances the basis existed for a rapprochement between client and 
patron through the resumption of arms supplies; that would serve to recoup 
the. Soviet loss of face while not over-extending the Russian commitment 
32 
and thereby threatening the superpower detente. Thus, after Sadat had 
unilaterally announced the renewal of the agreement on port facilities, 
the Soviet Union resumed the shipment of arms, this time including some 
of the sophisticated weapons which had previously been a bone of contention~ 3 
31. Sadat has noted that the Soviet Union was concerned that the United 
·states might have been behind his decision to expel the advisers. He 
apparently had to reassure them on this count. See Sadat's Alexandria 
Speech, ME/4569/A/5. 
32. Cf. Abraham S. Becker, "The Superpowers in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
1970-1973", in A.S. Becker, B. Hansen, and M. Kerr, The Economics and 
Politics of the Middle East, New York, 1975, pp: 102-3. 
33. Monetary considerations may also have played a role in the Soviet 
decision, since Sadat, with the help of the Arab oil states, was now 
willing to pay in hard currency for Soviet arms. On this period see Alvin 
Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, Princeton, New Jersey, 1977, Chapter 7; 
Y. Ro'i, "The U~S.S.R. and Egypt in the Wake of Sadat's July Decisions", 
Soviet and Slavic Studies, No.l, September, 1975. 
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The closer Sadat came to war the more weapons the Soviet Union supplied. 
The shock which Sadat had administered by expelling the Soviet advisors 
had been sufficient to convince M.oscow that Egypt was determined to go 
to war, alone if necessary. In that situation Soviet interests dictated 
a policy of military assistance. 
What werethe implications for detente of Soviet acquiescence in 
Egypt's determination to ga to war? Critics of detente have seen in 
Soviet willingness to supply arms a defiance of the declared principles 
of detente. However, such an argument can only be sustained on the 
assumption that detente means the maintenance of a particular world 
order regardless of whether the costs and benefits of that order fall 
unevenly on the two superpowers. It assumes that the superpowers will 
be willing to control their clients, at the cost of their competitive 
interests,to benefit their mutual interest in detente. The rhetoric of 
detente can certainly be cited in defence of these assumptions. 
However, the reality of international relations, especially the 
fact that competition between the superpowers continues apace, requires 
a more realistic appraisal of the meaning of detente. Instead of 
assuming that particular national interests have given way to the 
interests of world order, it is more realistic to assume that the pursuit 
of national interest for both superpowers will take precedence and that 
the strength of detente will depend on the degree to which these national 
interests converge. It is more realistic to assume that the superpowers 
will not be prepared to bear, unilaterally, the costs of controlling their 
clients~ It is more realistic to recognise that the clients do have the 
ability to affect the national interest of their superpower patrons and 
therefore have the ability to affect the degree of their mutual interest in 
the maintenance of a particular superpower order. Detente is not, as 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home would have us believe, the "essence of good 
neighbourliness 11 • 34 It is rather an agreement between bad neighbours not 
to destroy the fence which separates them while each attempts to move that 
fence and extend its back-yard. 
34, Cited in A.S. Becker, op.cit., p. 77. 
Thus a realistic analysis of the events which led to the October 
war would emphasise not Soviet perfidy, but Egyptian ability to effect 
387 
a deterioration in the Soviet position in the region. The blow to Soviet 
prestige and influence reduced the degree of Moscow's interest in the 
maintenance of an order which had proven costly to its position while 
benefiting the American position in the Middle East. In that situation 
the superpowers only retained a mutual interest in preventing a new 
outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East from escalating to the leval 
of global confrontation. The critics of detente have argued that if this 
were true the Soviet Union should have warned the United States of the 
imminent outbreak of hostilities. Kissinger has dismissed this criticism 
by relegating such warning to an ideal world where the superpowers would 
be prepared to bear the responsibility of making known advance information~ 5 
However, the evidence suggests that the Soviet Union did make some attempt 
to warn the United States within the limits laid down by the need to 
protect its interests in the Middle East. 
During the June 1973 Summit, Brezhnev warned Nixon in explicit 
terms that the Middle East was indeed explosive and that war could occur 
at any time. 36 According to Nixon, there had been a "heated" discussion 
on the Middle East. For three hours Brezhnev "hammered" him, conveying 
to Nixon the following message: 
You must force the Israelis to withdraw from all 
occupied territories and they must do it soon. 
It is my concern that unless the Israelis do 
withdraw the Egyptians and Syrians are going to 
attack and they are going to do it soon.37 
Perhaps this warning could be dismissed, as it appears to have been at 
the time, as standard fare in the diplomatic exchanges between the 
Soviet Unioµ and the United States. However, the vehemance of Brezhnev's 
remarks suggests that the Soviet Union went somewhat further than usual 
in warning the United States. Ray Cline, the former head of Intelligence 
and Research in the State Department has stated indirectly that the 
35. See ,trcinscript of Secretary of State Kissinger's Press Conference, 
Ne1'.J York Times~ 26 October, 1973. 
36. Quandt, op. cit. _(Quandt was a member of the National Security 
Council Staff at the time). 
37. Excerpts from the Second Segment of Frost's Television Interview 
with Nixon, New York Times_, 13 May, 1977. 
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Soviet warning would have enabled the intelligence agencies to predict 
that a war was coming, had they known about it. In a letter he addressed 
to Kissinger after the October war, which admittedly attempted to 
justify the intelligence failure, he stated: 
... our.calculations would have.crystallised earlier and 
been more finely tuned to your needs if we had known 
about the exchanges you were having with the Russians. 
In retrospect,· the evidence of Russian concern appears 
to have been the missing element in the picture. You 
did not tell me about it, or anyone else who could 
have helped INR crank it into the equation.38 
(e1,uphasis supplied). 
Cline is clearly implying that Kissinger was well aware of Russian 
39 
concern about the outbreak of war. oreover, as the war 
approached, the Soviet Union issued a signal which might not have been 
ambiguous had those apparent Soviet warnings been taken seriously: in 
an unprecedented move the Russians evacuated their civilian advisors 
from Egypt and Syria 36 hours before the surprise attack was launched. 
According to Sadat and Heikal, the Soviet Union was not informed of the 
40 
timing of the attack until Thursday, 4 October. The almost immediate 
38. Cline, "Policy without Intelligence", p. 132. Further evidence of 
Soviet concern emerged in the report of the Pike Select Committee on 
Intelligence: "NSA information indicated that [ a foreign nation] had 
become extremely sensitive to the prospect of war and concerned about 
their citizens and dependents in Egypt". According to this report the 
CIA also concurred with Cline: "If the information contained in the NSA 
messages had been available prior to the outbreak of hostilities we could 
have clearly predicted that [ a foreign nation] knew in advance that renewed 
hostilities were imminent in the Middle Ea8t." See "The CIA Report the 
President Doesn't Want You to Read", Zoe.cit. 
39. The Pike Committee was unable to subpoena Kissinger's notes on his 
discussions with world leaders so this implication could not be 
substantiated by the investigation. 
40. Sadat claims that he only informed the Soviet Ambassador of the 
decision to go to war, but not the actual timing, when he saw him on 
Wednesday, 3 October. It was arranged that President Assad of Syria would 
inform the Soviet Union of the timing on Thursday, 4 October. See Sadat's 
15th September Speech at Meeting with ASU and TU Leaders, ME/5009 /A/ 4. 
It is likely that the Soviet Union was aware before this date of the 
imminent outbreak of hostilities since it launched the first of six 
satellites to orbit over the Middle East on Thursday, 4 October. These 
satellites require two weeks to prepare. The Soviet press began discussing 
the possibility of war in August, and there were reports of top-level 
meetings between Egypt and the Soviet Union in September, which might also 
indicate Soviet awareness of Sadat's decision. But none of these facts 
suggest that the Soviet Union knew the actual date for the attack. See 
Insight Team of the Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War, London, 1975, p. 112; 
Galia Golan, "The Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973", 
Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No. 7, June 1974, pp. llff; Rubinstein, 
R.ed Star on the Nile, pp. 253-6. 
Russian response was to request the evacuation, in a particularly 
conspicuous way, of Soviet citizens. Early Friday morning six TU-144 
transport planes collected Soviet advisors and their families from the 
Cairo military airbase; the same curious event was repeated in Syria. 
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Both the United States and Israel were aware of this evacuation but did 
not interpret this move as a Soviet warning. 41 Golda Meir has admitted 
that the evidence of evacuation led her to question Israeli intelligence 
. b l d h . . 42 estimates ut s1e was reassure t at war was not imminent. 
This evidence again suggests that the Soviet Union was balancing 
its interest in avoiding confrontation with the 1'nited States with its 
interest in seeing that Egypt was not defeated again and the Soviet 
Union humiliated. The Russians did give various warnings and signals, 
however ambiguous, but they were either ignored or misread. If they 
had explicitly warned the United States on 4 October that the Arabs planned 
to attack on 6 October, they ran the risk that the Gnited States would 
convey this information to Israel. The all-important effect of surprise 
would be forsaken and the likelihood of an Arab defeat would increase. 
They also risked the accusation of betraying the Arab cause. 
The Soviet Union complied with the principles of detente only in so 
far as such compliance did not irreparably damage its position of influence 
in the Middle East. Moscow did not so much seek unilateral advantage in 
the Middle East, as it did seek to limit the unilateral disadvantages which 
arose from the fact that its Egyptian prot~g~ was determined to go to war. 
II - ISRAEL'S DECISION NOT TO PRE-EMPT 
At 4 a.m. on 6 October, the Israeli Chief-of-Staff, General David 
Elazar, awoke to the news that Egypt and Syria intended to attack at 6 
that same evening. The day before, Elazar had already discussed a 
pre-emptive strike to disrupt such an attack with the Commander of the Air 
Force, General Binyamin Peled. At 5, Elazar ordered Peled to prepare the 
43 pre-emptive strike and issued a stand-by order to attack at l.OOp.m. 
41. Nehl York Times~ 31 October, 1973. 
42. Golda Meir, My Life~ Jerusalem, 1975, p. 356. Kissinger also queried 
American intelligence about the evacuation, thinking it a "sure sign of 
trouble". See Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger~ New York, 1975, p. 517. 
43. Chaim Herzog, The Wm0 of Atonement~ London, 1975, p. 52; Ze'ev Schiff, 
October Earthquake~ Tel Aviv, 1974, p. 39. 
At 9 a.m. Elazar took his plan to Prime Minister Meir for approval, but 
by 9. 25 Mrs Me.ir had decided "for political reasons" to cancel the pre-
. "k 44 emptive stri e. 
390 
In the wake of the October War any analysis of this decision has been 
buried under the wave of investigations and recriminations concerning 
another question: Israel's failure to predict the surprise attack. 
However, Israel's decision not to pre-empt provides an important contrast 
with Egyptian behaviour, thereby highlighting the differing effects of 
detente on the politics of patronage. 
Although the evidence is limited, it is clear that a pre-emptive 
strike would have been attractive to those few involved in tl1e decisions 
taken on that Saturday morning. Pre-emption had been the basic tenet of 
Israel's military doctrine, and both in 1956 and 1967 Israel had undertaken 
pre-emptive strikes against its Arab adversaries. 45 Defence Minister Moshe 
Dayan had been Chief-of-Staff in 1956 and Minister of Defence in 1967. 
Mrs Meir had been Foreign Minister in 1956 and had taken an active part 
in the decision to pre-empt at that time. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal 
Allon had developed a theory of the pre-emptive strike in his book on 
Israel's Army and had stated explicitly that after the 1967 war a pre-
emptive air strike remained "absolutely vital" in a situation where the 
f . " f ff . ti 46 enemy orces were concentrating in preparation -or an o ensive . 
On the military side, there were strong arguments in favour of pre-
emption. The standing theory of pre-emption emphasised the general 
objective of damaging the enemy's reactive capacities and exploiting its 
peace-time vulnerabilities. The theory identified several specific 
objectives for a pre-emptive air strike: disruption of the command and 
control network of the enemy forces (especially its radar system) ; 
destruction of enemy airfields and aircraft; destruction of ground-to-air 
and ground-to-ground missile system.s; bombardment of enem.y troop 
concentrations (including, in the case of Egypt, its canal-bridging 
equipment); and deep-penetration strikes on strategic targets. Given the 
44. Agranat Corrmission of Inquiry into Yom Kippur War_, Partial Report_, 
Israel Government Press Office, 2 April, 1974, Chapter II, p. 10. 
45. The first rule of Israel's military doctrine had been that ''the IDF 
will undertake a pre-emptive attack if the security of the State is 
endangered". Michael I Handel, Israel's Political-Military Doctrine_, 
Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers 
in International Affairs, No. 3, July, 1973, p. 66. 
46. See Yigal Allon, The Making of Israel1s !lrmy_, London, 1970, pp. 110-111. 
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existing conditions on both fronts in October 1973, it is true that the 
value of such missions would have been depreciated. The Egyptian Air 
Force, housed in reinforced hangars, had a measure of protection against 
air strikes. The existence of alert missile systems on both fronts 
would have necessitated concentration on air-defence suppression before 
bombardment of enemy concentrations or deep-penetration bombing could 
be carried out. 
Nevertheless, for Israel pre-emption still retained considerable 
advantages. Even if the Egyptian air-force could not be destroyed in 
a repeat performance of the 1967 strike, damage could be inflicted on the 
. f. ld d . . d. d d. 1 4 7 Of air ie s an enemy air sorties isrupte accor ing y. greater 
importance was the fact that the IAF could have begun the crucial task 
of air-defence suppression before the enemy attacked and it was forced 
to concentrate on the role of close air-support for the besieged Israeli 
army. To the extent that such suppression succeeded, the IAF would 
have gained greater manoeuvrability and effectiveness in its ground support 
role and in its interdiction of the Egyptian canal bridges once the 
enemy had attacked. This was precisely the strategy that the IAF had 
prepared for the coming war. 48 Moreover, air-strikes on the front-line 
missiles and troop concentrations would have disrupted the enemy offensive 
and communications. One authoritative writer has argued that the IAF 
could have delivered three thousand tons of bombs on enemy targets before 
49 the Arab attack reached full strength. As General Peled subsequently 
observed: 
47. According to General Peled the IAF succeeded in destroying 22 
Egyptian aircraft inside their shelters. This would suggest that the 
IAF placed a higher value on bombing airfields and achieved a higher 
rate of success than is commonly believed. See Peled, "The Air Force 
in the Yorn Kippur War - Main Moves and Lessons", in Military Aspects of 
the Israeli-Arab Conflict, p. 255. Moreover, it is clear that the 
IAF still accorded bombing of airfields a high priority in its operations, 
despite their hardening. On the second day of the war, while the 
ground forces still required considerable close air-support, seven Egyptian 
airfields were attacked. These attacks continued until the last day of 
the war. See Israeli Air Force Headquarters, The Air Force in the 'Yam 
Kippur fvar', Israel Ministry of Defence, February, 1975. 
48. Chaim Herzog, Isr~el's semi-official military historian, has stated: 
''The Israeli Air Force prepared for the coming war on the assumpt~on that 
at the outbreak of the conflict it would be given adequate time to 
concentrate on the missile threat, without being involved in interdiction 
or close support in the first phase •.. the Air Force was to enjoy a certain 
latitude without being obliged to care for the ground forces''. See Herzog, 
The fvar of Atonement, London, 1975, pp. 254-5. 
49. Edward N. Luttwak and Walter Laqueur, "Kissinger and the Yorn Kippur· 
War", Commentary, September, 1974, p. 39. 
At least the conduct of the people who make 
decisions on the enemy side would have been 
influenced somewhat or perhaps severely, by the 
fact that ... their surprise was no surprise. I 
would think that emotionally and psychologically 
maybe some things would have changed in their 
way of thinking and in the way the troops 
carried out their pre-planned orders.SO 
Thus Chief-of-Staff Elazar would have entered Mrs Meir's office on 
Saturday morning with some persuasive arguments in favour of a pre-
emptive air strike - he believed it to be "the most effective means of 
reaction". Pre-emption was expected to disrupt and retard the enemy 
offensive, allow Israel's army more time to mobilise, and destroy at 
51 least part of, the enemy air-defense systems. (In analysing these 
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expectations, it is well to remember that the Israeli decision-makers 
would not have known at the time just how lethal the combination of 
missiles and anti-aircraft guns would prove to be.) lfoatever the 
expected effectiveness of pre-emption, it is beyond doubt that Israeli 
casualties would have been reduced. This final argument was perhaps the 
most persuasive because for Israel the desire to minimise losses and 
casualties in any way possible was one of the principles "guiding all 
. " 52 tactical and strategic planning . 
Elazar's arguments were almost certainly supported by Peled and 
former Chief-of-Staff Haim Bar Lev who was now Minister for Commerce 
and Industry. However, Defence Minister Dayan disagreed. ~fuile concurring 
with the argument that a pre-emptive strike would disrupt Arab preparations, 
he did not believe that the benefits of a strike against an alert enemy 
protected by its missile defences outweighed the likely political damage 
which Israel would incur by striking first: "I feared that such moves 
would burden our prospects of securing the full support of the 
50. Peled, op.cit.~ p. 255. 
51. See David Elazar, "The Yorn Kippur Har, Military Lessons", in 
Military Aspects of the Is1•aeli-Arab Conflict~ p. 247. On Saturday 
morning the Israeli army had not yet been mobilised but the Air Force had 
been preparing a pre-emptive strike since Friday and its combat 
effectiveness was fully mobilised. The fact that the Air Force was fully 
prepared, while the army was not even deployed in its forward defence 
positions, not only increased the incentive for a pre-emptive air strike, 
but also provided the onJ:y means of reaction for a Chief-of-Staff keen 
to deny the enemy the advantage of surprise and to gain the offensive as 
quickly as possible. 
52. Handel, op.cit.~ p. 68. 
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. d 11 53 Unite States . 
Political considerations had guided Dayan's military strategy since 
the conclusion of the War of Attrition. In the period from 1970 to 1973 
the Syrian and Egyptian forces had been deployed in strength along the 
cease-fire lines and therefore retained the option to strike first. 
In this situation Israel had two strategic choices: 1) it could pre-empt 
at the first sign of Arab offensive intentions; and 2) it could 
mobilise and await the attack. While Israel retained the occupied 
territories and air superiority the first choice, pre-emption, was no 
longer a military necessity and Dayan had ordered the IDF to adopt the 
second option. Political considerations had determined Dayan's decision 
to await the enemy attack: he did not beleive that a policy of 
preventive war would be tolerated by the United States nor would it 
bring a settlement closer. Thus,instead of pre-emption, the IDF relied 
on early-warning to allow time for mobilisation,and on the ability of the 
quick-reaction forces (the air force and the regular army) to deal with 
54 
any enemy attack in its first stage. 
However, on 6 October, Israel did not have the benefit of early-
warning of the impending attack and for that very reason Elazar called 
for a tactical change in the original plan in order to deal with this 
unexpected situation. Dayan opposed the change to pre-emptive war and 
clung to the defensive strategy in the belief that the regular forces 
could hold the attack even in a situation of zero-warning when the reserves 
53. Moshe Dayan, The Story of My Life_, London, 1976, p. 376; Cf. Insight 
Team,The Yorn Kippur Elar_, p. 123. Dayan claims, in his autobiography, that 
the pre-,emption was planned against Syria alone and only against Syrian 
air bases. This does not seem very credible given Dayan's own admissions 
later in the book, that operational plans called for the IAF to play a 
crucial role in close~air support until the arrival of additional reserves, 
that both he and the General Staff knew long before the war that the 
missiles presented a serious threat to Israel's battlefield air superiority, 
that on the first day of the war the IAF was planning to strike both the 
Syrian airfields and the missiles "in order to neutralise them", that 
the IAF knew it had to neutralise the Eygptian missiles before operating 
against Egyptian forces on the Canal banks, and that "standard doctrine" 
was to attempt first to silence the anti-aircraft missiles. These 
statements not only cast 6oubt on his claim that the IAF was only planning 
to pre-empt against Syrian air bases, they also provide excellent military 
reasons for a pre-emptive strike. From his account, it is clear that 
Dayan was concerned about the American attitude, doubted the effectiveness 
of a strike against missiles, and was confident that pre-emption was, in 
any case, unnecessary because of Israel's strength. See pp. 378, 381, 383, 
389, 390, 391, 394, 395, 418-9. 
54. See Mabat Interview with Dayan, Israel Home Service, 14 October, 1973, 
BBC/SrvB_, ME/4425/A/13 - A/17. 
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had not been mobilised.SS He would later admit that he had misjudged the 
S6 
strength of the Arab forces, but at the time he did not consider it 
necessary to reassess his strategy. Having disparaged the military benefits 
of a pre--emptive strike, he believed the political damage Israel would 
incur from striking first would be far greater, and accordingly he 
opposed pre-emption. 
The decision rested with Golda Meir. The fact that Dayan opposed 
the strike should not be considered as decisive since Mrs Meir had already 
1 d h • • • 1 b · 1 • • s 7 '-T nl • d overru e is opposition to genera mo i isation. uow ~ azar apprise 
her of the military arguments in favour of pre-emption, but drew an 
important distinction between the situation in 1967 and the situation in 
1973. He explained that the occupied territories enabled defence-in-depth 
against an enemy attack so that, unlike Israel's predicament in 1967, "even 
11 S8 
if we do not strike first, we shall not lose the war. In other 
words, unlike 1967, pre-emption was not crucial to the survival of the 
state even though it carried substantial military benefits. According 
to Mrs Meir, she had already made up her mind: 
I know all the arguments in favour of a pre-
emptive strike but I am against it ... there 
is always the possibility that we will need 
help, and if we strike first, we will get 
nothing from anyone.S9 
The Prime Minister was concerned with the fall-out from a first 
strike on Israel's relations with its American patron. Secretary of State 
Kissinger had warned Israel long before in strong terms: 
55. So strong was Dayan's belief in the ability of the regular forces, that 
on 6 October he opposed general mobilisation, arguing that the mobilisation 
of two divisions would be sufficient for defensive purposes. See Agranat 
Report~ p. 10. 
S6. During the war Dayan briefed Israeli editors on the implications of 
the Arab attack and stated, inter alia; "It revealed to the entire world 
that we are not stronger than the Egyptians. The halo of superiority, the 
political and military principle that Israel is stronger than the Arabs 
and that if they dared to start war, they would be defeated, has not been 
proved here11 • See "We Cannot Push Egyptians Back Now", (Transcript of 
Defence Minister Dayan's briefing to Israel's newspaper editors, 9 October, 
1973), Jerusalem Post~ lS February, 1974. 
S7. Golda Meir, My Life~ pp. 358-9. 
S8. Elazar, op. cit.~ p. 258. 
S9. Golda Meir, op. cit.~ p. 3S9. 
Don't ever start the war. Don't ever pre-empt! 
If you fire the first shot, you won't have a 
dogcatcher in this country supporting you. You 
won't have Presidential support. You'll be 
alone,,_ all alone. We wouldn't be able to help 
you.6u 
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American opposition to an Israeli pre-emption was so well understood that it 
was unnecessary for Mrs Meir to consult with the United States before 
making the decision. 61 Tactically, it would have been wiser for Israel to 
seek a restatement of American opposition to pre-emption; in that way it 
might have been possible to saddle the United States with greater 
62 
responsibility in the ensuing war. · But there was no time for such 
manoeuvring in this crisis. In the belief that Israel would be 
sacrificing short-term military benefits for the sake of American patronage, 
Mrs Meir decided against a pre-emptive strike. At noon, the Israeli 
Cabinet met and endorsed, without dissent, the decision not to pre-empt. 63 
In contrast to Sadat's daring, Meir's caution is understandable and 
underlines the effect on Israel's behaviour of its dependence upon American 
patronage. The fear that Israel would be isolated in this crisis and unable 
to turn anywhere, other than Washington,for support, was clearly uppermost 
in the Prime Minister's mind. As she subsequently explained, if Israel 
had pre-empted, it would have been impossible to prove to a sceptical 
world that the Arabs had indeed been planning to attack: 
... we did not want to create a situation where we will 
talk ourselves blue in the face saying we did not start 
the war, we did not cause the war, and friends who are 
not so friendly and even our best friends will say: 
If only you had not don.e that we could have helped you 
more.64 
60. Cited in Malvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, p. 520. The Kalbs 
claim that this had been Kissinger's '~constant refrain" to the Israeli 
Embassy staff since his appointment as Secretary· of State. 
61. Mrs Meir informed the American Ambassador after the decision had been 
taken and asked him to convey this to Washington. Insight Team, p. 125; 
Golda Meir, p. 359. 
62. Kissinger clearly understood that the Israeli decision had been taken 
with regard for American interests and he quickly sought to absolve the 
United States of any responsibility for it. He told the press on 12 
October: " ... the U.S. had no occasion to warn any country against engaging 
in pre-emptive action". Jerusalem Post, 13 October, 1973. 
63. Agranat Report, p. 10. 
64. Transcript of Interview with Prime Minister f.1ei1' on CBS 'Face the 
Nation', Israel Government Press Office(IGPO), 28 October, 1973, p. 5. 
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In her autobiography, Mrs Meir went further in justifying her decision on 
the basis of considerations of patronage: "Thank God I was right to reject 
the idea of a pre-emptive strike! It might have saved lives in the 
beginning, but I am sure that we would not have had that airlift, which 
saved so many lives". 65 
However, that explanation is based on post hoc reasoning. On 
Saturday morning Mrs Heir d-id not know that an American airlift of arms 
would be necessary; Dayan had even suggested that full mobilisation was 
not needed in the initial stages. Moreover, a pre-emptive strike would 
have been expected to reduce the requirements for American military 
assistance. Thus Mrs Meir's political reaction was based on more than 
just immediate considerations of world opinion or military support. It 
was rather based on her perception of Israel's value to the United States 
as a force for stability in the region. For, since 1970, with American 
support, Israel had elevated its doctrine of deterrence to a political 
formula for the maintenance of the status quo. Now that deterrence had 
failed to prevent another war, the whole basis of Israel's post-1970 
'strategic relationship' with its American patron had become questionable. 
The spectre of an imposed solution, which had been laid to rest in 1970 
was again raised in the minds of Israel's decision-makers. 
It had not been easy to convince the United States that the maintenance 
of the status quo served American interests as well as Israel's. However, 
after the failure of the State Department's attempts to reach a comprehensive 
settlement in 1969 and 1970, and a partial settlement in 197~, and with 
the introduction of 20,000 Soviet advisors and operational personnel into 
Egypt in 1970, the White House had taken a greater interest in Middle 
East developments. The preoccupation of the President and his National 
Security Advisor with Soviet actions in the region altered the American 
perspective. Following the 1970 Jordanian crisis, Israel's strategic 
importance acquired a greater contingent value because the maintenance of 
Israel's deterrent strength could serve a number of American interests: 
it could promote stability by deterring war and thereby avoid a superpower 
confrontation; it could cause the Arabs to be dissatisfied with the military 
support of their Soviet patron, thereby reducing the influence of Moscow, 
while persuading Arab leaders that only Washington could get Israel to 
65. Golda Meir, p. 363. 
withdraw; and it could help to protect the 'conservative' Arab regimes 
from subversion by the 'radical' states, as it had helped deter further 
Syrian intervention in Jordan in 1970. 66 
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Egyptian actions had tended to confirm the American faith in Israel's 
deterrent strength. In 1971, despite Sadat's promise that it would be 
the 'year of decision' , Egypt proved incapable of taking military action. 
In 1972, the Soviet Union expressed greater interest in detente and was 
therefore content to seek 'military relaxation' in the Middle East -
a relaxation which was based on Israel's military preponderance. The 
subsequent expulsion of Soviet personnel from Egypt together with their 
sophisticated equipment, was interpreted as the ultimate confirmation of 
the policy of bolstering Israel's deterrent strength. The spectre of 
superpower confrontation appeared to have been exorcised with the departure 
of Soviet personnel and Egypt seemed even less capable of military action 
than in 1971. 67 The idea that Israel served American strategic interests 
in the Middle East became firmly entrenched in the policy of the United 
68 States government. The Rogers Plan for a political settlement had been 
69 
returned to the State Department drawer and the attempt to pressure Israel 
through the withholding of arms had been abandoned. 70 
66. See H. Brandon, "Jordan, the Forgotten Crisis", Foreign Policy, No. 10, 
Spring, 1973; Kalbs, Kissinger, Chapter 8. 
67. Abraham S. Becker, ."The Superpowers in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1970-
1973", in The Economics and Politics of the Middle East, p. 108. The Pike 
Intelligence Committee reported that the CIA, DIA and INR all believed by 
the summer of 1973 that "Egypt was not capable of a major assault across 
the Suez Canal". The Israeli perception was similar. Former Chief-of-Staff 
Haim Bar Lev has noted that "the eviction of the Russians by Sadat was 
interpreted in Israel as a sign of Egypt's withdrawal from the war". See 
"The CIA Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read", Zoe.cit; "Surprise 
and Yorn Kippur War", in Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict, p. 262. 
68. Quandt, op.cit., p. 18; Cf. Amos Perlmutter, "Israel's Fourth War, 
October 1973: Political and Military Misperceptions", Orbis, Volume XIX, 
No. 2, Summer, 1975. 
69. In August-September 1971 Rogers had made a final and fruitless attempt 
at diplomatic movement. Heikal reports that Rogers told the Egyptians at 
this stage: "the United States had no mea~s of convincing the Israelis of 
the need to [withdraw] or. of imposing such an obligation on them". Rogers 
subsequent demise and Kissinger's inexorable rise reinforced the convergence 
of American and Israeli interests since deterrence was consistent with 
Kissinger's 'balance of power' perspective and his desire to limit Soviet 
influence in the region. See Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 153; Quandt, 
ibid.; Becker, op.cit., p. 108 and footnote 70. 
70. In her December 1971 meeting with President Nixon Mrs Meir secured 
American agreement to supply 42 F-4 Phantoms and 82 A-4 Skyhawks. This was 
the first long~term military assistance programme concluded between the 
United States and Israel and included aid for the development of Israel's 
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Thus by October 1973, the Nixon Administration had come to accept 
that a strong Israel provided an interim means for ensuring stability in 
the Arab-Israeli theatre. Israel's leaders were prepared to accept, 
without question, this new emphasis on the strategic dimension, partly 
because it was something which they had argued since 1967, and partly 
because it took the relationship between patron and client off the 
moral and ideological plain· and placed it on a level where Israel could 
argue that it served American interests as well as American principles. 
It enabled Israel to gain greater American military and economic support 
while providing this weak state with the means to resist State Department 
diplomacy. 71 Thus, in March 1973, the former Israeli Ambassador to 
Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, argued that Israel's relations with the United 
States would be better served if there were no immediate solution to the 
conflict. He argued that the danger of an imposed solution had passed 
because it was in the mutual interests of Israel and the United States 
to prevent war and to prevent Israel from withdrawing "a single inch" 
from the existing lines : 
... the United States knows that removing Israel from the lines 
by force is not only a serious matter for Israel, but would 
also harm American interests ... The United States knows that 
if it wants to prevent war the guarantee for that is a strong 
Israel. 72 
70. (continued) defence industries. American diplomacy was now to be 
based on a policy of building Israel's strength in the belief that this 
would give it the confidence to make territorial concessions. See 
Testimony of Hon. Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
East and South Asian Affairs, Emergency Secur>ity Assistance Act of 1.9?3, 
Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd 
Congress, 1st Session, 3 December, 1973, p. 71. 
71. The following table illustrates the massive increase in aid in the 
1971 to 1973 period: 
U.S. Military and Economic Assistance to Israel, 1962-1973: (US $millions) 
1962-67 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Military Credit Sales 136.4 25.0 85.0 30.0 545.0 300.0 307.51 
Economic Loans 272.0 75.0 74.7 50.7 86.5 74. 9. 80.5 
Economic Grants 24.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 50.4 50.9 
TOTAL 432.8 100.5 160.3 81.1 631.8 425.3 438.9 
1 The 1973 figure excludes the $2.2 billion in emergency military assistance 
granted after the October war. 
Source: Agency for International Development, "llnited States Economic and 
Military Assistance to the Hiddle East, 1946-1973", cited in The Middle East, 
U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs, Congressional Quarterly, Washington 
D.C., April, 1974, pp. 10-11. 
72. Davar, 11 March, 5 April, 1973. Yael Marcus summed up the Israeli view 
in an article in Ha'aretz: " ... what we have done is to succeed in certain 
fields in merging our interests with American interests. Most of the 
fundamental arguments that. we used with the Americans have been proved true, 
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The essential point, wl1ich was well understood by Israel's decision-
makers, was that Israel gained American support for its policies as long 
as they served the cause of stability in the region. This was precisely 
the rationale behind President Nixon's understanding of the balance of 
power in the Middle East: 
... once the balance of power shifts where Israel is 
weaker than its neighb_ours, there will be a war. 
Therefore it is in U.S. interests to maintain the 
balance of power ... we will do what is necessary to 
maintain Israel's strength vis-a-vis her neighbours. 
Not because we want Israel to be in a position to 
wage war. .. but that is what will deter its neighbours 
from attacking it. 73 (emphasis supplied) 
Having failed to deter its Arab neighbours, if Israel now waged a 
pre-emptive war, it would contradict the very basis of American military 
patronage and damage the American interest in stability which Israel had 
sought to serve. For a short time Israel had been able to act 
independently and resist the effects of its dependence on the United 
States by claiming that its strength maintained stability. Now that 
Egypt intended to disrupt that stability with Soviet support, Israel 
retained only the traditional lever of appealing to American principles 
to offset the effects of its dependence on the United States. If Israel 
wanted American support, it would have to do America's bidding, and it 
was clear, without asking, that America would oppose a pre-emptive 
disruption of the stability that best served its interests. Israel could 
still rely on American support for its survival but Washington had always 
drawn a distinction between its commitment to Israel's existence and its 
74 
support for Israel's conquests. On 6 October it must have been clear 
that the United States would not condone a pre-emptive attempt to defend 
Israel's conquests. 
To go it alone is a crucial and risky decision for a dependendent 
state to take. Such a decision requires a strong will and the intensity 
72. (continued) and every time we have proved the truth of our arguments, 
the Americans have listened to the new arguments that we have adduced", 
Ha'aretz_, 7 March, 1973, cited in Journal of Palestine Studies_, Volume II, 
No . 4 , Summer , 19 7 3 , pp . 12 5-6 . 
73. New York Times:J 2 July, 1970. 
74. For example, in Kissinger's 1970 background briefing he stated: 
''We are trying to separate the issue of Israel's conquest, to which we 
cannot give an American position, from Israel's existence, to which we 
are now committed". Loe. cit._, p. 23. 
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of interest that accompanies it. Egypt had found the effect of detente 
unpalatable and consequently had a high intensity of interest and a strong 
determination to resist the order which the superpowers had attempted 
to impose. Israel had benefited from, had in fact been the instrument for, 
the imposition of that superpower order. None would doubt that Israel had 
a high intensity of interest in survival but, on 6 October, maintaining 
American support seemed to serve that interest better than pre-empting the 
Arab attack. Thus Mrs Meir made a rational decision not to go it alone, 
not to apply Israel's will-power, not to absorb the political costs of 
pre-emption while reaping its military benefits. Instead, she decided 
to await the Arab attack in the hope that the United States would act 
according to the principle of 'defending the Jewish democracy from 
aggression', now that its strategic interests were no longer served. 
With the failure of deterrence the Middle East equation had suddenly 
changed and Israel's leverage over its patron had been reduced accordingly. 
In the ensuing war, the fate of Israel would not only depend upon its 
success on the battlefield, it would also depend on the price which the 
United States demanded for its support. And that pri~e depended not so 
much on America's desire to maintain the structure of detente but rather 
more on its desire to seek unilateral advantage in the Middle East and 
improve its position in the Arab world. 
III - CONCLUSION 
In the future the October 1973 Middle East war may come to be regarded 
as the turning point for detente since it was the first real test of the 
principles laid down in the 1972 Moscow Corrununique and confirmed by the 
1973 Summit. If the verdict of historians is that detente did not meet 
up to its first test then that verdict ~ill have been based on false 
assumptions about the meaning of detente. For detente is not in itself 
a policy pursued by both superpowers, but rather the result of their 
individual policies. Detente is no more, and no less, than a reduction 
of tension in relations between the superpowers. It is, as Philip Windsdr 
h d II • f • • d" 1 1175 h h • as note , a recipe or competitive ip omacy , rat er t an a recipe 
for the construction of a superpower world order. 
75. Philip Windsor, "The Savior From the Sea", Foreign Policy, No. 22, 
Spring, 1976, p. 171. 
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By 1972 competitive diplomacy in the Middle East had resulted in a 
superpower agreement to seek 'military relaxation' in the region as the 
best way to consolidate their regional interests while protecting their 
global interest in a reduction of tension. This agreement not only suited 
the interests of the superpowers, it also suited the interests of Israel, 
since it enabled this dependent client to maintain its occupation of Arab 
territories - a position which it regarded as optimal in the absence of 
a peace settlement. Thus in 1972 the prevention of war in the Middle East 
served the national interests of the United States, Israel and the Soviet 
Union. However, as we have argued, the maintenance of the status quo did 
not at all suit Egypt's interests. Accordingly, Sadat expelled the Soviet 
advisors from Egypt as the first step in his plan to resist the superpower 
agreement. This move in itself altered the nature of the agreement and 
caused a new divergence in the regional policies of the two superpowers. 
Thus by 1973, while the prevention of war still served the national 
interests of the United States and Israel, it had only served to detract 
from the interests of the Soviet Union. So, while the United States 
pursued its interest in stability by providing arms to Israel, the Soviet 
Union pursued its interest in maintaining its position in the Arab world 
by supplying arms to Egypt (and Syria). Thus Egypt was able to go to war 
in October 1973 not because the structure of detente had collapsed in the 
face of Soviet perfidy, but rather because Egypt was able to play on the 
competitive interests of its superpower patron. And Israel was unable to 
pre-empt the Egyptian attack, not because it relied on the protection 
of detente, but because it too had been playing on the competitive interests 
of its superpower patron. The politics of patronage had resulted in a 
war which the politics of detente had been unable to prevent simply because 
they were not designed to prevent it. Only in the unlikely event that 
the pursuit of world order will take priority over the competitive diplomacy 
of the superpowers will the resultant detente be able to prevent the 
outbreak of regional war. 
402 
PART THREE 
CHAPTER FOUR 
COMPETITIVE COOPERATION: HOW THE OCTOBER WAR ENDED 
With the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli war, the politics of 
patronage and the politics of detente began to merge as both superpowers 
confronted a similar problem: how to promote their individual interests 
in this regional crisis without threatening their mutual interest in the 
reduction of tension which had .come to be known as detente? Competitive 
diplomacy in a regional conflict could easily escalate into a challenge 
to the central balance as the superpowers intervened to support their 
clients. In this way, as Dr Kissinger noted during the war, the Middle 
East could become what the Balkans were before 1914: 
... an area where local rivalries that have their 
own momentum will draw the great nuclear powers 
into a confrontation that they did not . 1 
necessarily seek or even necessarily start. 
Whether superpower confrontation could be avoided in the fac.e of 
competitive diplomacy in this war depended to a great extent on the 
degree of control which the superpowers could exercise over their warring 
clients. 
On the other hand, both regional clients confronted their own problem: 
how to achieve their war aims while resisting the control of their patrons? 
This problem would become acute if the clients, in pursuing their 
interests, failed to serve the regional interests of their patrons or if 
their conflict threatened to escalate to a superpower confrontation. In 
either of these situations the patrons would attempt to exercise control 
and the success of their clients would depend on their ability to resist 
this control or turn it to their advantage. 
This crisis interaction between the superpowers and their warring 
clients therefore provides a testing ground, in extremis., for the ability 
of the weak states to resist the policies of their patrons. Because, 
in times of war, the dependence of the clients for military and political 
support will be heightencd,the superpower patrons might be assumed to have 
greater control over their actions. It might also be assumed that, given 
1. Kissinger's Press Conference, 12 October, 1973, Jerusalem Post., 
13 October, 1973. 
their interests in preserving the structure of detente, the superpowers 
will exercise control to prevent a superpower confrontation. In the 
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face of such concerted superpower action, the warring clients are presumed 
to be unable to prevent the sacrificing of their interests for the sake of 
the superpower detente. 
However, the October War experience demonstrated that the reality 
of patron-client crisis interaction in an environment of superpower 
detente is rather more complex. Precisely because a crisis disrupts the 
established patterns of interaction, the superpowers face the danger 
that their regional interests will be damaged, but also face the prospect 
of increasing their regional influence if the crisis is carefully 
exploited. Thus, in the October War, the superpowers protected and pursued 
unilateral advantages, and attempted to exercise control over their clients 
for these purposes. In this situation, the ability of Israel and Egypt 
to resist superpower control depended upon the relative strengths of will 
in the contest between patron and client. The battlefield fortunes of the 
clients did much to determine their will-power; success strengthened their 
resistance; set-back weakened it. However, for Israel the lack of 
alternative patronage forced its leaders to act with caution, whereas for 
Egypt the prospect of swapping patrons encouraged it to act more defiantly. 
On the superpower level, considerations of reputation and prestige, 
which were now closely linked to the fate of their clients, did much to 
determine the strengths of will of the patrons. However, when the conflict 
and competition between all four parties reached the point where the pursuit 
of advantage threatened to involve the superpowers in confrontation, because 
of the need for direct intervention to preserve their competitive interests, 
both patrons developed a common interest in ending the game by stopping 
their clients. This connnon interest in preserving detente provided both 
superpowers with the strength of will to overcome the resistance of their 
clients. Thus the interests of dependent clients were indeed sacrificed, 
but only when the common interest of the superpowers outweighed their 
competitive interests. At that stage the superpowers were able to impose 
their will on their clients. In fact, that is how the October 1973 War 
ended. 
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I - CEASE-FIRE AND RESUPPLIES 
In the first week of the war, as Israel and the Arabs fought some of 
the largest tank battles in military history, both the United States and 
the Soviet Union sought an end to the fighting which would preserve or 
promote their regional interests. While Egypt was able to refuse the 
proposed cease-fires, Israel proved unable to resist the will of its 
patron and was forced to accept a proposal for a cease-fire on Friday, 
12 October, which fell far short of its declared war aims. Egypt's 
successful resistance of superpower.control forced the Soviet Union to 
resupply the Arab forces to preserve its interests and this in turn 
forced the United States reluctantly to resupply Israel, to preserve 
its interests. This discrepancy in the abilities of Egypt and Israel to 
resist the control of their patrons.and the resultant escalation in 
superpower involvement,was determined by the differing interests of the 
superpowers and the differing contests of will between patron and client 
on either side of the battlefield. 
The fact that the Soviet Union was unable to exercise control over 
Egypt during the first week of the war was a function of the relative 
independence of Egypt and Sadat's strength of will at the outset of the 
war. The reasons for Russian inability to do other than support Egypt's 
battle plan in the pre-war period remained germane for the opening stages 
of the war. Moscow feared another Egyptian defeat at the hands of a 
formidable enemy with a well-earned reputation for fighting skill and 
tactical flexibility. The Russians and Americans alike expected that once 
Israel recovered from the initial surprise, its counter-attack would 
be fierce and determined. 2 Another Egyptian defeat would prove costly 
for Soviet reputation, and if reputation required Soviet intervention to 
stave off defeat, superpower confrontation would become an immediate reality. 
Bound by its rhetoric to support "the liberation of all Arab territories 
occupied by Israel since 1967"; the Soviet Union retained as great an 
interest in a limited Egyptian victory as the Egyptians themselves. 
Thus, when the Arab attack met with surprising success on the first 
day, the Soviet Union saw its interests best served by a quick cease-fire 
before the Israelis had time to counter-attack. The Egyptian army had 
reconquered the east bank of the Canal and the Syrian army had regained 
much of the Golan. A cease-fire at this stage would leave them in 
2. For a discussion to this effect between Heikal and Soviet Ambassador 
Vinogradov, see Heikal, The Road to Ramadan_, pp. 218-9. 
3. Soviet Government Statement, 7 October, 1973_, BBC/Sf.JB_, Part I, 9 
October, 1973. 
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possession of these acquisitions, obviate Soviet resupply and reduce the 
threat to detente. Accordingly, on Saturday evening, 6 October, Soviet 
Ambassador Vinogradov sought Sadat's acquiescence in a cease-fire. But 
Egypt was not yet ready to stop fighting. After all, this was an all-out 
war aimed at inflicting heavy losses on Israel, breaking its doctrine of 
security, regaining as much land as possible and convincing the world 
of Egyptian determination. 4· Clearly such objectives could not be 
achieved in 24 hours. Sadat apparently replied to Vinogradov: "I am 
sorry. We are not going to have a cease-fire until we have achieved our 
battle objectives". 5 
Again on Sunday afternoon, 7 October, Vinogradov sought a cease-
fire, and again Sadat angrily refused. Instead, he sent the Soviet 
Ambassador away with a request for arms to enable Egypt to continue the 
battle. Yet again on Tuesday, 9 Oct.ober, with the battle turning against 
the Syrians, Moscow sought a cease-fire, and yet again Sadat refused; this 
time explaining that his aim was to advance to the strategic Gidi and 
Mitla Passes. 6 Moscow concurred and on Wednesday, 10 October, the Soviet 
airlift of arms to Syria and Egypt commenced. Thus Sadat was not only 
able to resist Soviet pressure for a cease-fire, he was also able to gain 
Soviet support for his objectives and an escalation of Soviet involvement 
in the war. 
Clearly, the Soviet Union lacked the will-power to force Sadat to 
accept a cease-fire by withholding arms. On the question of arms supplies, 
Sadat had the measure of the Soviet Union. As he told Heikal at the time, 
he felt sure that the Russians would not miss the opportunity "to regain 
most or all of their lost prestige in the Middle East''. 7 His calculation 
proved correct. Moscow could only deny arms at the risk of undermining 
Egypt's war effort and being charged with the responsibility for an 
Egyptian defeat. Such a move would be inconsistent with the Soviet policy 
. pursued since February 1973. While Sadat remained determined to fight, 
4. See Sadat's 30 September Speech to ASU, op.C1:t., A/3 - A/6. 
5. Sadat's 15 September Speech at Meeting with ASU and TU Leaders, 
op. cit. , A/ 3 • 
6. Ibid. For an account purported to be that of Soviet Ambassador 
Vinogradov see al-Safir (Beirut), 16 April, 1974, .reprinted in 
JoW'nal of Palestine Studies, Volume III, No. 4, Summer, 1974, pp. 161-163. 
7. Heikal, p. 214. 
the Soviet Union would have to support him. Considerations of prestige 
and reputation made Moscow unwilling to absorb the costs of imposing a 
cease-fire on Cairo by denying arms. 
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Instead, the Soviet Union tried to pressure Sadat into accepting a 
cease-fire by claiming, on both Saturday and Sunday, that Syria had 
requested it. While there is some conjecture about whether Assad had in 
8 fact made such a request, s·adat was not moved by the ploy. But by 
Tuesday the problem had become more serious for the Soviet Union. The 
battle was turning against Syra as the IDF forced the Syrian army back 
across the 'purple line' and the air force bombed oil refineries and the 
Army headquarters in Damascus. A cease-fire at this stage would have suited 
both Soviet and Syrian interests but it still held little attraction for 
Egypt. Two Israeli counter-attacks in Sinai had failed and, with the 
Egyptian bridgehead now consolidated, Sadat remained confident that the 
Egyptian army would soon advance to the Sinai passes. 
Somehow the Soviet Union had to reconcile the conflicting needs of 
its two Arab clients. While Sadat remained determined to fight on, 
resupply provided the only solution. Arms supplies would enable Syria to 
continue the battle in the North and strengthen Egypt's ability to advance 
to the passes. Moreover, arms supplies might retard the transfer of 
Israeli forces from the Golan to Sinai. 9 The only quid pro quo the 
Russians demanded, and apparently received, was payment in cash for the 
10 
arms supplied to Egypt. Having proposed three cease-fires and failed, 
Moscow urged Sadat to advance to the passes imrnediately. 11 
8. Vinogradov told Sadat that when Assad had informed the Soviet Union of 
timing of the attack on Thursday 4 October, he had also asked :Moscow to 
seek a cease-fire within 48 hours of the start of the fighting. Sadat 
replied that this was not what he had agreed upon with Assad and that he 
would have to check with him. On Monday, 8 October, Sadat received a 
reply from Assad denying that he had requested a cease~fire. Either Moscow 
had fabricated the story, in the sam.e way that it had fabricated Israeli 
troop movements on the Syrian border in May 1967, or Assad had changed his 
mind. See Sadat's 15 September Speech at Meeting with ASU and TU Leaders, 
A/4; Vinogradov's account, Zoe.cit., p. 161. For Assad's reply see 
Heikal, p. 213. 
9. Moscow was worried that once Israel had repulsed the Syrians it would 
be able to concentrate all its force against Egypt. SAM-6's were airlifted 
to Syria to increase the cost to the IAF of an Israeli advance into Syria. 
See Heikal, p. 218; Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, p. 277. 
10. This was agreed on during President Boumedienne's visit to Hoscow at 
the outset of the war. Washington Post, 19 November, 1973. 
11. Vinogradov's account, Zoe.cit.; Heikal, op.cii;. 
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.However, Sadat and his War Minister, General Ahmed Ismail, had a 
different plan. Mindful of the defeat in 1967, Ismail was preoccupied 
with the security of his armed forces and regarded it as essential that 
he not take risks which might lead to their destruction. Now that the 
bridgehead had been consolidated, he planned to move the mobile anti-
aircraft missiles across the Canal to provide air-defence for the advance 
to the passes. Thus Ismail's strategy required an 'operational pause' 
and this coincided with Sadat's aim of "making the enemy bleed 11 • 12 
Accordingly, as the situation deteriorated on the Syrian front, the 
Egyptian forces remained deployed in defensive positions on the east 
bank of the Canal. 
On Thursday, 11 October, the IDF launched its counter~attack 
against Syria. By Friday, 12 October, significant incursions had been 
made into Syria and the IDF appeared to be relentlessly advancing on 
Damascus - by nightfall the outskirts of Damascus were within Israeli 
13 
artillery range. At this stage, the Soviet Union attempted a slight 
variant on its cease-fire proposals. Instead of approaching Sadat 
directly, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin was instructed to inform Kissinger 
th t E t ld t h . 1 f f . . 1 l4 a gyp wou now accep is proposa or a cease- ire in p ace. 
Since the Syrian ploy had failed, Moscow hoped that international pressure 
for a cease-fire would be sufficient to persuade Sadat of the wisdom of 
such action. 15 The question of what pressure the Russians thought might 
thereby be brought to bear, quickly became academic. On Saturday morning, 
13 October, Sadat again refused the proposal, brought to him by the 
.British Ambassador, this time because the political price was not high 
enough; Egypt insisted on a cease-fire based on an Israeli undertaking, 
guaranteed by the superpowers, to withdraw to the pre-1967 lines. 16 
12. See Heikal's Interview with General Ahmed Ismail, al-Ahram, 18 
November, 1973, reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies, Volume III, 
No. 2, Winter, 1974, pp. 222-3; and Heikal, The Road to Ramadan,p. 212. 
13. Schiff, October Earthquake, p. 199; Herzog,The War of Atonement, 
pp. 129-139. 
14. Insight Team, The Yam Kippur War, p. 280. 
15. The Soviet Union could not itself propose a cease-fire resolution 
in the Security Council for fear that China would exercise its veto and 
claim for itself the mantle of protector of the Arab cause. Accordingly, 
Kissinger persuaded the British to propose the resolution. 
16. Sadat's preconditions for a cease-fire had been conveyed .to Kissinger 
on Wednesday, 10 October. He emphasised that only guarantees of a long-
term settlement would persuade him to accept a cease-fire. For the details 
of Sadat's preconditions see Heikal, The Road-to Ramadan, p. 224. The 
British Ambassador had to take the cease-fire proposal to Sadat twice on 
Sadat had made a critical mistake. Israel had already begun to 
transfer its forces from the north and the Syrians were now calling for 
immediate Egyptian action to relieve the pressure from the IDF. In 
rejecting a cease-fire at this stage he had committed the Egyptian Army 
to a battle in Sinai which, in the words of Ismail, had to be launched 
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11 b f h . h . " 17 M h 11 h e ore t e rig t time came oreover, as we s a see, Kissinger ad 
managed to pressure the Is~aelis into accepting this cease-fire despite 
the fact that they had completed the plans for an Israeli crossing of 
he 1 d .. h . · 1 h 18 f t e ana an were awaiting t e opportunity to imp ement t em. I-
Sadat thought that the Israeli counter-attack had been broken he was 
sorely mistaken. Kissinger later referred to Sadat's decision as a 
II • f h ·1 · . . II 19 misassessment o t e mi itary situation 
That being the case, it highlighted Moscow's inability to persuade 
Sadat to act, not only in Soviet and Syrian interests, but in Egypt's 
interests as well. Yet again the Soviet Union confronted the reality of 
its relationship with Egypt. Even before Sadat had refused the British 
cease-fire proposal, the Soviet Union had responded to the worsening military 
situation by stepping up its airlift of military supplies. By Saturday 
morning, as Sadat was turning down the British proposal, Soviet air traffic 
20 
over Cyprus had reached a peak of 18 flights per hour. The same 
Egyptian determination which had forced the Soviet Union to supply 
sophisticated weapons earlier in 1973 had proven strong enough, during 
the first week of the war, for Egypt to resist the Soviet cease-fire 
attempts and force the resupply of arms. If Moscow had possessed a greater 
intensity of interest in stopping the war, it would have also possessed 
the necessary will-power to absorb the costs of imposing a cease-fire on 
Egypt. However, in the first week of the war, the threat to the superpower 
16. (continued) Saturday, 13 October because Kissinger preferred to 
believe the Soviet claim that Sadat would accept the cease-fire rather 
than the British report that Sadat had refused it. See Insight Team, 
pp. 281-2. 
17. The Egyptian army had been unable to move the mobile missiles across 
the Canal, which meant that the air force would have to protect the 
advancing armour - 11 a task it was incapable of performing". Ismail 
interview, lac.cit.~ pp. 222-3. 
18. Heikal reports that the British Ambassador told Sadat that Israel 
"had already been compelled to agree to the cease-fire". Heikal, The 
Road to Ramadan~ p. 224. 
19. Transcript of Kissinger's News Conference on the Crisis in the 
Middle East, NevJ York Times~ .26 October, 1973. 
20. Insight Team, p. 278. 
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detente proved limited. In that situation, Moscow had a greater interest 
in a limited Egyptian victory than it had in imposing its will on Cairo. 
But as the threat to detente increased, so too did Moscow's interest in a 
cease-fire. 
On the other side of Sinai, Israel's relationship with its American 
patron reflected a very different reality. Whilst the Soviet position 
in the Middle East rested upon the success of its Egyptian client on 
the battlefield, the American position had come to depend on preventing 
the success of its Israeli protege. Thus, whereas Russian resupply 
conformed to Egyptian demand, American resupply remained under the firm 
control of Kissinger and he used it to bend the will of Israel and to 
serve the American interest. 
In the first days of the war, the Washington Special Action Group, 
under the direction of Kissinger, reached the conclusion that once Israel 
counter-attacked it would .win a quick victory. In these circumstances 
they decided that the United States could adopt a 'low profile' and 
"avoid visible involvement" since there would be no need for American 
arms supplies. 21 Such a policy minimised the risk of superpower 
confrontation, as well as minimising the .incentive for the Arabs to 
impose an oil embargo. Moreover, if Israel won without American support, 
the United States could act as 'honest broker' between the adversaries 
after the war. However, by Wednesday, 10 October, the battlefield picture 
revealed that American policy had been predicated on a false assumption -
Israel was not about to win a quick victory; were it to stave off a 
limited defeat it would need a large-scale infusion of arms from the 
United States. This unexpected setback created a new opportunity for 
American policy. If Kissinger could prevent an Israeli victory by delaying 
arms supplies,he would enhance America's standing in the Arab world and 
prevent increased Egyptian dependence on the Soviet Union ~s a result of 
its defeat. Moreover, by preserving Egypt's initial success, the United 
States might improve the chances for a settlement since Egypt could afford 
to be more tractable. And such a policy remained consistent with the need 
to avoid a confrontation and an oil embargo. Kissinger later explained 
his thinking in an interview with Heikal: 
21. "Schlesinger and the Resupply Crisis", Time, 1 July, 1974. 
If Israel crushed Egypt, Egypt would turn to the USSR 
to rescue her, and there were two possibilities: 1) that 
the Soviet Union would intervene in a way that would 
oblige us to intervene too, which would confront us 
with a terrible possibility; or 2) the Soviets would 
not intervene but would enter Egypt in such a way that 
they would never leave it. This too was a possibility 
we did not want.22 
On the evening of the 'first day of the war Kissinger had attempted 
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to prevent the expected Egyptian defeat by diplomatic means. He p~rsuaded 
the British to propose a cease-fire that would end the war before Israel 
had an opportunity to counter-attack. As he told Heikal: ''I thought 
that the proposal for a cease-fire was in Egypt's interests rather than 
23 Israel's''. However, as we have already seen, Sadat had made a different 
calculation and rejected the cease-fire proposal brought to him by 
Vinogradov. Now, after four days of fighting, Kissinger developed a new 
means for preventing the Egyptian defeat. In public, Kissinger expressed 
his intentions, as he was wont to do, in a nuance: the United States aimed 
to "end the hostilities in such a manner that they contribute to the 
maximum extent possible to the promotion of a more permanent, more 
lasting solution in the Middle East". 24 It would eventually become clear 
to Israel that in this war " . in such a manner" meant that the United States 
aimed to P.revent the defeat or victory of either side. The new means 
for achieving this aim was to delay arms supplies to Israel to ensure 
its compliance with American wishes. 
Obviously such a policy conflicted with the aims of Israel's decision-
makers, who were determined to avenge the 'treachery' of an Arab attack 
on Yorn Kippur. By Sunday, 7 October, the Israeli cabinet had decided that 
Israel would not accept a cease-fire until the enemy had been driven back 
25 
across the borders. Consequently, orders were issued for counter-attacks 
on both fronts. However, by Wednesday, 10 October, although the Syrians 
had been repulsed, two counter-attacks in Sinai had failed. Defence 
Minister Dayan, in a pessimistic mood, had called for a retreat to a new 
22. "Kissinger Meets Heikal", Zoe.cit._, pp. 212-3. 
23. Ibid._, p. 212. 
24. Kissinger's Press Conference, 12 October, 1973, ,Terusalem Post_, 
13 October, 1973. 
25. Jerusalem Post_, 8 October, 1973. This decision was conveyed to 
the United States. 
26 defence line between the passes and the Canal. The battles had cost 
Israel dearly in tanks, planes, ordnance and lives. 27 Moreover, on 
Wednesday the Russians had begun their airlift of arms to Syria and 
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Egypt and this posed a new and serious threat to Israel's military strategy. 
The installation of more SAM-6 missiles on the northern front would change 
the air balance which Israel had managed to assert at great cost. Any 
further setbacks on the battlefield might well leave Israel bare of 
f . . d 28 h l' b reserves o ammunition an weapons.· T us, Israe s a ility to do 
other than accept the Egyptian gains in 'Sinai now depended upon American 
resupply. The stage was set for a clash between patron and client. 
Israel's ambassador in Washington, Simcha Dinitz, first raised 
the question of resupply with Kissinger on Sunday evening, 7 October. 
At that stage reports from Israel had persuaded both Dinitz and Kissinger 
that it would be a short war and the Ambassador only sought the stepped 
up delivery of weapons already on order. The true extent of Israel's 
setback was not appreciated in Washington until the evening of Tuesday, 
9 0 b h D. . d . l.f f 29 h cto er, w en initz requeste an urgent air i t o arms. T e 
Jewish state had many friends in Washington, as well as the active and 
vocal support of the Jewish community, and the popular support of the 
majority of Americans; these forces could easily be mobilised at a time 
when the Nixon Administration simply could not afford a foreign policy 
fracas on top of its Watergate troubles. Thus, to implement his policy 
of delaying arms supplies, Kissinger devised an ingenious and certainly 
disingenuous ploy to allay domestic and Israeli pressure. 
26. See Dayan, "We Cannot Push Egyptians Back Now", lac.cit. 
27. The U.S. Defense Department estimated that by the end of the first 
seven days of fighting Israel had lost 88 aircraft, 600 tanks, and had 
suffered 2,000 casualties (i.e. killed and wounded). Time., 22 October, 
1973. ' 
28. On the assumption that a war would only require a few days of fighting 
the IDF had decided, before October, to reduce stocks of arrununition and 
weapons to save oh capital costs. Moreover, the high rate of attrition 
from the fierce fighting was also unexpected. The army and air force 
apparently consumed some 6,000 tons of ammunition per day. Thus by the 
end of the first week of the war Israel was running out of many kinds of 
ammunition and air ordnance. See Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The 
Israeli Army., London, 1975, p. 362; Drew Middleton, "Importance of U.S. 
Munitions to Israel Assayed", New York Times., 2 December, 1974. 
29. Wolf Blitzer, "Dinitz and the Arms Airlift Argument", Jerusalem Post 
Weekly., 22 October, 1974. 
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On 10 October, the President decided, in the light of the Soviet 
airlift, that the United States would resupply Israel. According to his 
own account, Nixon ordered the Pentagon to prepare a set of options and 
Kissinger "to provide the method for doing it". 30 With rJixon Is and 
Schlesinger's apparent concurrence, Kissinger informed Dinitz that the 
President had approved in principle all Israel's arms requests, but that 
he was experiencing bureaucratic problems from the Defense Department 
where Schlesinger was depicted as the man responsible for the delay. 
Kissinger protrayed himself as Israel's friend, working overtime to 
. 1 h p "d I . . 31 A h d I 1 1 d imp ement t e resi ent s instructions. s eac ay, srae s nee s 
became more desperate, Kissinger would devise a new scheme for resupply 
to divert Dinitz and the domestic pressure which was steadily mounting. 
On Monday he claimed that he had managed to secure two F4-Phantoms 
from the Defense Department; on Tuesday Israeli planes, with their 
identification obscured, were permitted to collect ordnance from a base 
in Virginia; on Wednesday he asked Schlesinger to charter civilian airlines 
for the supply operation; on Thursday he told Dinitz that the President 
had ordered Schlesinger to charter 20 transport planes and that he had 
secured another four Phantoms from the Defense Department; by Friday no 
charters were available, so he arranged a meeting with Schlesinger where 
Dinitz was informed that the U.S. would only supply 16 Phantoms and 
would only airlift ordnance to the Azores where it would have to be 
- 32 
collected by Israeli planes. Through this bureaucratic haze the message 
emerged loud and clear: if the U.S. did not mount its own resupply 
operation Israel would not receive the vital ammunition and spare parts 
bl ' IDF - h ff · · S · · 33 to ena e tne to go over t e o ensive in inai. 
30. "Frost's Television Interview with Nixon", New Y01~7<, Times~ 13 May, 
1977. 
31. Kissinger's claims to 'good guy' status in the "battle of 1600 
Pennsylvania Avenue" are outlined in Kalbs, Kissinger~ pp. 525-540. 
32. Kalbs, loc.cit. 
33. Whether there was a resupply crisis at all, and whether Kissinger 
was in fact responsible for it, has been the subject of considerable 
controversy since the war. The only supporters of Kissinger's account 
(i.e. that he was trying to get the arms out of a reluctant Pentagon) 
are the Kalbs, who presumably got their account from Kissinger hiDself. 
The Israelis are reluctant to talk about the crisis because, as Dayan 
explained, once the airlift had started "it was very important for Jewish 
leaders and senators to express appreciation and not criticism". ('i'he Story 
of My Life~ p. 444). Golda Meir makes it clear that there was a delay 
and that she was both furious and desperate about it. However, she notes 
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33. (continued) the account of Pentagon reluctance. (My Life, p. 362). 
Schlesinger has rebutted that charge as. "preposterous". When the Kalb 
version was published he responded: '' ... the suggestion that the 
Department of Defense was seen to be dragging its heels in resupplying 
Israel is wrong; there is a difference between dragging your heels and 
having your shoes nailed to the floor by' national policy". (Time, 1 July, 
1974). After he had been dismissed as Secretary of Defense, Schlesinger 
repeated that it had been White House policy that Israel should only 
receive arms on a "cash and carry" basis. He claims that it was not 
until Friday, 12 October that the White House asked him to consider an 
airlift. (Wolf Blitzer, "Schlesinger blames State Department for delays 
in arms to Israel", ,Jerusalem Post, 10 December, 1975). The former head 
of US Air Force Intelligence, General George Keegan, claims that he and 
General George Brown, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, had been 
planning and organising the airlift since the first day of the war on 
Brown's own initiative. Keegan blames Kissinger for the delay and 
claims that Schlesinger pressed repeatedly for the airlift decision. 
(Wolf Blitzer, "The Arab Plan to Destroy Israel", Jerusalem Post, 
International Edition, 9 August, 1977). 
Nixon's television account, which is consistent with the account he 
gave to Israeli and Jewish leaders, is revealing: " ... I'd asked the 
Defense Department, and they prepared an option paper ... for Kissinger to 
provide the, ah, method for doing it. At first we wanted to cover the 
situation, or they did, and •.. paint some planes differently .•. or have a 
chartered plane. And I finally cut through all of the red tape.~.As far 
as Dr Kissinger is concerned, I would have to say I didn't overrule his 
views ... the option that he presented was that the Defense Department 
thought we should send three of these big cargo planes and then, of course, 
he gave his own opinion as to their reasons and reasons which he thought 
I ought to have before me - that politically it would be perhaps 
dangerous for us to send a greater number and that it would, ah, destroy 
the chances for negotiations in the future if our profile was too high ... 
And I said, 11 Look Henry, we're gonna get just as much blame for sending 
three, if we send thirty or a hundred, or whatever we've got, so send 
everything that flies. The main thing is to make it work". (Frost's 
Interview, New York Times, 13 May, 1977). Kissinger has also gone some 
little way towards rebutting his own version in stating that there was 
no "basic clash" with Schlesinger: "the differences were in tempo and 
nuance, but not in basic policy". (Leslie H. Gelb, "Kissinger and 
Schlesinger Deny Rift in October War", New York Times, 23 June, 1974). 
With everybody wishing to claim credit for the resupply and no-one 
wanting to be blamed for the delay, the truth will have to await the release 
of the documents. However, it seems clear from the various accounts that 
a decision was taken to delay the resupply of arms on Wednesday, 10 October, 
after Israel had requested an urgent airlift. A four day delay may seem 
rather insignificant, but in a crisis situation, with the superpowers working 
for a cease-fire and Israel fast running out of reserves of ordnance, each 
day of delay made its chances of recovering from the surprise attack and 
dealing a blow to the Arab armies more difficult. 
Cf. Leslie Gelb, "Capital Is Taken With Kissinger", New York Times, 
21 March, 1974; Tad Szulc, "Is He Indispensable? Answers to the Kissinger 
Riddle?", New _York Magazine, 1 July, 1974; Edward N. Luttwak and Walter 
Laqueur, "Kissinger and the Yorn Kippur War", Commentary_, September, 1974; 
Edward R.F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger, New York, 1976, 
p. 33. 
Kissinger's ploy proved effective. The isolation Israel had feared 
at the outset of the war had quickly become a reality as France and Britain 
placed embargoes on arms supplies, member-states of the OAU broke off 
their relations with Israel, and Arab sta.tes from Algeria across to Iraq 
as well as North Korea and North Vietnam joined the fray. Moreover, the 
Soviet Union had begun to airlift weapons to Egypt and Syria to enable 
them to continue fighting and Arab oil ministers were planning a meeting 
in Kuwait to decide on the implementation of an oil embargo. In the face 
of this opposition Israel had to fight a muted side-battle with the 
American Administration to secure arms supplies. Thus, when Kissinger 
proposed a cease-fire in place on Thursday, 11 October, the Israeli 
decision-makers did not possess the necessary will-power to resist 
Kissinger's proposal. 
On that same Thursday, Israel's General Staff had completed plans 
for a crossing to the West Bank of the Canal and Mrs Meir had spoken 
to President Nixon stressing the urgent need for military equipment. 
On Friday the War Cabinet decided, in the face of a lack of any clear 
indication that American arms supplies would be forthcoming, to postpone 
the attack across the Canal until after the Egyptians had attempted to 
break out of their bridgehead. 34 At the same time, Kissinger was 
speaking with Eban and specifically linking the question of resupply to 
35 Israel's acceptance of his cease-fire proposal. Kissinger has since 
revealed that Israel accepted the proposal with extreme reluctance: "they 
f . 1 . h b 11 h ' ld d" 36 F 1 were urious y angry wit us ... ut eventua y t ey yie e . ortunate y 
for Israel, Sadat rejected the proposal on Saturday morning. But on 
Saturday night Mrs Meir was still hinting at Israel's willingness to 
accept a cease-fire in place. Asked whether Israel would rule out a 
cease-fire which left Egyptian troops on the east bank of the Canal, she 
replied that the Government "would not lose many mim.1tes sitting down 
and dealing with such a proposal with great responsibility for everything 
that was involved11 • 37 This statement stood in stark contrast to earlier 
34. Schiff, October Earthquake, p. 166 and 192. 
35. Washington Post, 14 October, 1973; Jerusalem Post, 15 October, 1973. 
36. Kissinger Meets Heikal, Zoe.cit., p. 213; Sheehan, The Arabs, 
Israelis and Kissinger, p. 34. 
37. Sraya Shapiro, "Golda Vows Victory", Jerusalem Post, 14 October, 
1973. 
pronouncements which had emphasised the aim of forcing the enemy back 
38 
"across the lines and beyond". 
Just as Israel had been unable to pre-empt for fear of American 
reaction, it proved unable to resist American pressure for a cease-fire 
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at a time when the battle was turning in its favour and when victory no 
longer seemed distant. Israel's acute dependence upon Ar.terican Bilitary 
support and Kissinger's determination to delay that support proved decisive 
in reducing Israel's resistance to American pressure for an outcome 
which would deny Israel the victory it sought. Thus, in this contest of 
wills between patron and client, the United States demonstrated a 
greater intensity of interest in a military stalemate than Israel in its 
attempt to gain victory. While Soviet intervention remained limited, 
Kissinger could afford to seek unilateral advantage by preventing an 
Egyptian defeat. Possessing the necessary will-power and ingenuity, 
and confronting a client ser.iously affected by its sudden isolation, 
military setbacks and heightened dependence, Kissinger's exercise of 
control over Israel proved successful. 
However Kissinger only momentarily controlled one of the pawns in 
this complex game and events on the Middle East board as well as at 
home threatened to put paid to his aim of improving America's position 
in the Arab World. Throughout the first week of the war domestic 
pressure to resupply Israel had been mounting. AIPAC (the Israel Lobby) 
and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organisations 
(the roof-body of the American Jewish Community) had focused their efforts 
on the President and the Defense Department leaving Ambassador Dinitz to 
deal with Kissinger. Congressional pressure had purposely been restricted 
to a low-key resolution and scattered appeals for support of Israel from 
39 
various Senators. The pressure had been partly stemmed by President 
Nixon's assurance, on Wednesday, that Israel would receive replacements 
38. See stater.i.ents of Golda Meir and Yigal Allon, Jerusalem Post_, 12 
October, 1973. 
39. 'Si' Kenen, AIPAC's Congressional lobbyist, restrained Israel's 
supporters in the first week because he believed that the military support 
would be forthcoming. In this regard Kissinger's ploy proved effective. 
AIPAC orchestrated a quiet campaign of pressure on the Defense Department 
in the belief that Schlesinger and Assistant Secretary Clements were the 
obstructionists. Cf. Jacob Stein's Letter to Commentary_, December, 1974, 
p. 4 and p. 6. IntervievJ with I. L. Kenen, Washington, 17 June, 197 5; 
Interview with Kenneth WoZZack_, (Congressional Liaison of AIPAC), 
Washington, 11 June, 1975. 
for all military losses. However, by Friday, Dinitz was threatening to 
'go public' with the charge of deliberate delays and then the full foroe 
of Israel's Congressional support would be brought to bear. Mrs Meir 
was pressuring Nixon and suggesting that she should come to Washington 
1 · h . · 40 M h . K. d to exp ain t e situation. oreover, at t is stage issinger receive 
advance copy of a speech that Senator Jackson would deliver on Sunday 
evening attacking the Secretary of State for his attitude to the Soviet 
41 Union's action and calling for immediate resupply of Israel. 
Such pressures might not have proved immediately decisive had they 
not coincided with a changing international situation. Since Wednesday 
the Soviet Union had been flying military supplies to Egypt and Syria, 
and by the end of the week these flights had reached 'massive' 
proportions. 42 Kissinger had publicly recognised Soviet interests in 
supporting the Arabs but had attempted, in the first week, to moderate 
the Soviet resupply effort. He had emphasised the common interest of 
both superpowers in preserving detente and preventing an escalation of 
the Middle East war and had been encouraged, in this respect, by Soviet 
efforts to achieve a cease-fire~3 However, there were growing doubts 
about Soviet behaviour. Moscow had encouraged other Arab states to join 
the fray and now its airlift had reached 'substantial levels' and its 
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44 
ships, stocked with materiel, were docking in Syrian and Egyptian ports. 
It was possible that the Soviet Union had interpreted the American resupply 
delay as a lack of resolve brought on by Nixon's Watergate troubles. 
Perhaps the Soviet Union sought a limited victory for its Egyptian patron 
and a change in the military balance in the Middle East. 
40. Kalbs, Kissinger, p. 534; Golda Meir, My Life, p. 362. 
41. In the speech Senator Jackson stated, inter alia: "There can no 
longer be any justification for withholding from Israel the arms she 
needs to defend herself. It's not enough for our government to promise 
re~upply at some point in the future. The question is how soon will 
vital equipment be arriving at the battlefield. I say it should be there 
now11 • See "Remarks by Senator Henry M. Jackson", Congressional Record, 
(Senate), 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Volume 119, No. 158, 18 October, 
1973. 
42. To justify the delay State Department spokesmen had originally termed 
the Soviet airlift 'moderate', then 'substantial' and finally, to justify 
the American resupply, 'massive'. 
43. See Transcript of Kissinger's News Conference, 25 October, 1973, 
New York Times, 26 October, 1973. 
44. See Brezhnev's Message to Bumadyan , BBC/SfvB, 11 October, 1973, 
ME/4421/A/5. 
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Whatever the case, further delay in resupplying Israel made little 
sense now that Egypt had rejected the cease-fire and Soviet SA..1'1s, ammunition, 
anti-tank missiles, tanks and other heavy equipment were arriving in 
Syria and Egypt to sustain the war effort. 45 vn1ile Kissinger had sought 
to forestall an Israeli victory, he did not want to produce an Israeli 
defeat which would only enhance the Soviet position in the Middle East 
and might well require American intervention. He had to convince the 
Arab states that a just settlement could only be achieved through American 
diplomacy and not through Russian arms. Thus on Saturday, 13 October, 
the American airlift to Israel commenced, carrying A4 aircraft 
1 . · 1 · 11 d . . 46 Tl U . d rep accment parts, m1ss1 .es, arti ery an amr.mn1t1on. ie nite 
States had decided to demonstrate its commitment to the maintenance of 
a military balance in the Middle East. Egypt's determination to fight on 
and its refusal to accept the cease-fire, which Israel would have had to 
accept, had forced Kissinger to reasses his policy. Paradoxically, 
Israel's reprieve had depended not on its ability to resist the control 
of its patron, but rather on Egypt's strength of will (however much it 
was misapplied). 
II - CONTROL THROUGH NUCLEAR ALERT 
By the end of the first week of the war, :with their clients immersed 
in devastating battle, the superpowers had increased their involvement in 
pursuit of their regional interests. However, with both superpowers now 
resupplying their clients, the probability of escalation increased 
dangerously. The promotion of victory by one superpower would lead to 
the prevention of defeat by the other and this dynamic would inevitably 
45. See Roger Pajak, Zoe.cit., p. 170; Insight Team, pp. 277-9. 
46. There is an interesting symmetry in the Soviet and American resupply 
efforts. The Soviet airlift delivered some 15,000 tons of materiel. The 
American airlift delivered 22,497 tons of materiel. On top of this, Israel 
transported 5,500 tons in its own civilian aircraft. The Soviet sealift 
delivered some 80,000 tons while the American sealift delivered some 
64,000 tons. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that the cost of 
Soviet equipment supplied was in excess of $2.6 billion while the United 
States set aside $2.2 billion to meet Israel's requirements. 
Contrary to popular belief, the American airlift included only 72 
'outsize' items such as tanks or artillery pieces. Only 14 bf these items 
were delivered before the cease-fire of 24 October, including only 4 tanki, 
which were aimed at giving Israel a psychological boost rather than 
strengthening its offensive capabilities during th~ war. According to the 
Comptroller General's report ''the quantities delivered were not significant 
enough to have affected the war's outcome". See Airlift Operations of 
·the Military Airlift Command During the 19?3 Middle East fvar, Report to 
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exacerbate tension and threaten confrontation. So, in this second stage 
of the war, the exercise of control over the battlefield fortunes of the 
regional adversaries became crucial were the superpowers to preserve 
their regional interests while avoiding a disruption of their detente. 
By the same token, as the threat to detente grew, the ability of the 
clients to resist this control or turn it to their own advantage became 
crucial were they to achieve the military and political victories which 
they both sought. 
At the start of the second week of the war, Sunday, 14 October, the 
battlefield picture began to change. After establishing its bridgeheads 
on the east bank of the Canal, the Egyptian army had decided to pause and 
allow time for the transfer of its mobile missile screen which would then 
h f h ff . d h s. . 4 7 covert, e next stage o t e o ensive - an a vance to t.e inai passes. 
However, Egypt had come under intense pressure from its Syrian ally to 
mount an offensive and thereby relieve Israeli pressure on the northern 
front. Accordingly, on Sunday, more tanks were transferred to Sinai and 
the Egyptian army launched its offensive without the benefit of its 
missile protection. 48 Thus, circumstances on the northern front had 
forced the Egyptian army to engage the IDF in mobile tank battles for which 
the Israelis were well prepared. By Monday morning, some 260 Egyptian 
49 
tanks had been destroyed. This defeat provided Israel with the opportunity 
it had been waiting for. Having already succeeded in repulsing the Syrian 
advance, and with the guarantee of American supplies, Southern Command 
launched its long-awaited Canal-crossing offensive. On Tuesday, 16 
October Mrs Meir announced to the world that Israeli forces had crossed 
46. (continued) the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United 
States, 16 April, 1975; Statement of Admiral Thomas IL Moorer, Fiscal Year 
.79 75 Authorisation for Military Procurement_, Research and Deve fopment _, 
Hearings_, Conunittee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 2nd 
Session, Part 1, pp. 197-200; Statement of General Paul K. Carlton, The 
Posture of Military Airlift_, Hearings_, Research and Development Subcommittee, 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st 
Session, 11 November, 1975, pp. 30-31. 
47. Heikal has been particularly critical of this 'operational pause', 
arguing that Egypt lost the initiative and therefore lost the opportunity 
to drive Israel back to the 1967 borders. Both War Minister Ismail and 
President Sadat have defended the strategy by arguing that they could not 
afford to expose the army to another devastating defeat. See Heikal's 
Interview with Ismail in al-Ahram_, 18 November, 1973, reprinted in 
Journal of Palest1:ne Studies, Volume III, No. 2, Winter, 1974, pp. 216-226; 
Heikal, The Road to ROJT1adan_, pp. 217-220. 
48. Heikal' s Interview with Ismail, ibid .. In the north the IDF had 
advanced into Syria and its artillery was shelling the outskirts of Damascus. 
49. Herzog, The War of Atonement_, p. 206. 
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into 'Africa•. 50 On the same day, while a still confident Sadat was 
publicly .reiterating his demand for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines, 51 
Premier Kosygin arrived in Cairo. In crossing the Canal, Israel had 
crossed into the realm of Soviet interests. The Soviet Union now urgently 
sought a cease-fire which would limit the Israeli offensive and prevent 
an Egyptian defeat. 
Soviet satellites had conveyed an accurate picture of the disastrous 
defeat of 14 October, and while Kosygin was in Cairo he received more 
detailed information on the growing Israeli incursions on the west bank 
of the Canal. For three days Kosygin tried to convince Sadat that what 
he was witnessing was not merely "television operations" but a serious 
threat to the rear of the two Egyptianarmies,and also to an almost 
unprotected Cairo. By Friday, 19 October, Kosygin had apparently managed 
to convince Sadat that it was in Egyptian as well as Soviet interests to 
k f . "kl "bl 52 B h" . h IDFhd see a cease- ire as quic y as possi e. y t is time, t e a . 
constructed three bridges across the Canal and had concentrated enough 
forces on the west bank for a three pronged advance to the north, south 
and south-west. Although thenorthern advance met heavy resistance and 
the Israeli corridor between the Egyptian armies came under heavy and 
constant attack, the Egyptian forces proved incapable of stemming the 
Israeli offensive. 53 Nevertheless, Kosygin left Cairo on 19 October, with 
a set of unrealistic preconditions which Sadat had laid down for the 
cease-fire he now appeared willing to accept. The demands included art 
Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 lines, to be followed by a peace conference 
which would include all fourteen members of the Security Council and all 
interested parties including the Palestinians. 54 If the Egyptian setback 
SO. MrsHeir's Address to the Knesset, BBC/SWB,18 October, 1973, ME/4427/ 
A/l. 
51. Sadat's People's Assembly Address of 16 October, BBC/SfvB, HE./4427/A/8. 
52. Sadat was not informed of the crossing until Tuesday evening and was 
apparently not aware of the extent of the invasion until Kosygin produced 
aerial photographs on Thursday, 18 October. According to Reik.al, Sadat 
cinly decided to accept a cease-fire on Friday, 19 October, after the 
Chief-of-Staff, General Shazli, had returned from the front to convey the 
gravity of the situation. See Heikal, The Road to Ramada.n, pp. 235-8. 
53. Herzog, op.cit., Chapter 16. 
54. Heikal, p. 235. 
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had increased Soviet leverage over its prot&g~. the leverage was not yet 
sufficient to moderate Sadat's preconditions for a cease-fire. 
However, Moscow now well understood the need for a cease-fire 
acceptable to the United States, since events could quickly get out of 
hand. Should the Israeli advance continue, the Soviet Union would be 
faced with the choice of intervention to save its client, or a serious 
humiliation stemming from another Egyptian defeat. There was no easy 
way out: intervention involved a serious threat to detente; an Egyptian 
defeat would lead to a serious loss of prestige and influence in the 
region. The only answer was an immediate cease-fire. The Soviet Union 
knew, from many years of discussions, that Sadat's demand for Israeli 
withdrawal as a precondition was totally unacceptable to the United 
55 States,let alone Israel. Thus while Kosygin returned from Cairo, 
Brezhnev decided that it was necessary to go over the head of his 
Egyptian client and seek a superpower settlement to this war. He 
dispatched a request to President Nixon to send Kissinger to Moscow "for 
urgent consultations on the Middle East''. Brezhnev warned that the 
situation was now such that the Soviet Union stood on the brink of 
d 11 b II 56 ecisions from which there could e no retreat . At 1 a.m. on 
Saturday, 20 October, Kissinger departed for Moscow. 
Kosygin~s inability to persuade Sadat to accept reasonable terms 
for a cease-fire forced the Soviet Union to seek a superpower agreement 
on the terms of a settlement which they could then impose on their clients. 
The exacerbation of tension caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict forced 
the Soviet Union to seek a moderation of tension which would, at the same 
time, preserve its position of influence in the Middle East. The United 
States concurred with the objective of a cease-fir~ since that would 
produce the military stalemate which Kissinger had sought from the outset 
of the crisis. Thus with tension mounting and confrontation threatening, 
both superpowers aimed to salvage detente by imposing a cease-fire which 
would also preserve their interests in the regional conflict. However the 
problem of how to impose the cease-fire remained. 
55. Ambassador Dobryin gave Kissinger a draft of a cease-fire proposal 
which included Sadat's demand for withdrawal on Thursday, 18 October. 
Kissinger apparently rejected the proposal as a 'nonstarter'. See Kalbs, 
Kissinger~ pp. 543-4. 
56. Insight Team, p. 373. 
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While Egypt's military setback had increased Soviet leverage over 
its protege, Israel's battlefield successes presented a problem for the 
exercise of American leverage. Israel, still smarting from the Arab 
attack on Yorn Kippur,would not willingly submit to an imposed cease-fire 
aimed at denying it victory. However, the psychological impact of the 
surprise attack, the mounting death toll, the American arms delay, and 
the sudden diplomatic isola·tion, had all served to heighten Israel's 
perception of its dependence on the United States. 57 Accordingly, 
Israel's willingness to resist the policy of its American patron had 
58 been severely reduced. Moreover, although the United States had begun 
to resupply Israel with arms, there is evidence to suggest that it may 
well have held its client on a 'short-leash'. Defense Secretary Schlesinger 
restricted the number of resupply flights to Israel to 23 per day, out of 
a possible 42 flights per day, "because of political considerations which 
59 
were more important than efficient airlift management". These flights 
brought much needed ammunition, missiles and spare parts but, according 
to one quasi-official account, they were "finely tuned" to help Israel 
. h h . l . . . . . 60 1 f l regain no more t an t e mi .itary initiative - on y our tanKs were 
61 delivered to Israel by 24 October. So, as Kissinger flew to Moscow, 
he must have felt confident that the United States still retained the 
ability to impose a cease-fire on Israel on terms negotiated with the 
Soviet Union. 
57. According to U.S. Defense Department estimates, Israeli casualties 
after 14 days of fighting had mounted to some 3,900 (i.e. killed and wounded). 
Israeli figures released at the end of the war put the death toll at 1,854. 
See Time, 29 October, 1973; Jerusalem Post_, 7 November, 1973. 
Israel's diplomatic isolation was manifest in the British arms embargo, 
the breaking of diplomatic relations by almost every African nation, and 
the refusal of Greece, Turkey, Spain, Italy and Britain to grant the 
American resupply aircraft landing or overflight rights. 
58. Israel's leaders continued to stress their willingness to consider 
a cease-fire throughout this stage of the war. In particular see "Dayan: 
Could Accept Cease-Fire in Place", Jerusalem Post_, 21 October, 1973. 
59. Report of the Comptroller General of the United States_, p. 31. The 
report also reprints a letter from Arthur I. Mendolia, Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Installations and Logistics), which states: " ... the method by 
which support was to be provided and the rate at which the airlift could 
proceed, once the decision to employ MAC was made, were both due to 
-~itical factors and not due to any lack ... of recognition of requirements 
or inability to plan for the efficient movement of material once provision 
of such material was. approved". (emphasis supplied). 
60. Kalbs, Kissinger_, p. 541. 
61. See footnote 46 above. 
For their part, the Israelis remained blissfully ignorant that 
their fate was being decided by Kissinger and Brezhnev is Moscow. On 
16 October, Mrs Meir told the Knesset that a cease-fire would depend 
"primarily on the strength of the IDF 11 • 62 On 20 October, General Dayan 
told reporters that he saw no prospect of a cease-fire, while other 
high officials claimed that "Israel and the United States share the 
same hope - a convincing Israeli victory" 63 Those misperceptions were 
compounded by Deputy Prime Minister Allon on 21 October, when he told· 
Southern Command that they still had some three days to complete their 
missions. 64 Accordingly, these missions - an advance to Ismailia in 
the north and Suez in the south - were carried out with caution and at 
65 
a slow pace. Only on the morning of Monday, 22 October, when news 
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reached Southern Command that the Soviet-American cease-fire would go 
into effect that night, were the forces on the west bank ordered to 
speed up their encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army and their advance 
I . ·1 · 66 to smai ia .. 
Clearly, Israeli leaders had failed to understand the link between 
the IDF's success on the battlefield and the imposition of a cease-fire 
by the superpowers. However, their common belief in a two or three day 
respite from superpower pressure is puzzling given their experience of 
the causal connection between Israeli battlefield advances and Arab 
desires for a cease-fire. They were normally well aware of the need for 
quick action before the superpowers and the U.N. Security Council 
intervened. But this time Kissinger had lulled them into a false sense of 
security: he had assured Eban that the United States was not urgently 
62. Mrs Meir's Address to the Knesset, A/3. 
63. Interview with Defense Minister Mr Moshe Dayan, broadcast on 20 
October, 1973, I.G.P.O., 20 October, 1973, pp. 6-9; David Landau, "U.S. 
Won't Counter Israeli Interests", Jerusalem Post, 21 October, 1973. 
64. Herzog, The War of Atonement, p. 245; Schiff, October Earthquake, p. 270. 
Dayan notes in his autobiography that he told the Commanders on 20 October 
that they had two or three days before the cease-fire was likely to go into 
effect. The Story of My Life, p. 440. 
65. Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, p. 387. 
66. Herzog, p. 245; Schiff, p. 284; Dayan, p. 443. 
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seeking a cease-fire, and he had explained to Dinitz that his trip to 
Moscow would not result in a cease-fire agreement, but rather would buy 
Israel the two or three more days its forces needed. 67 In fact, Kissinger's 
assurances were designed to buy the superpowers time to prevent an 
Israeli victory over the Egyptian forces. 
By Sunday, 21 October, as the Israelis advanced north, south and 
west threatening conununications and supply bases in the ~ile Valley, the 
superpowers were reaching an agreement that would deny Israel victory and 
thereby reconcile their local and global int~rests. The further Israel 
advanced the greater the threat that the regional conflict would p9se to 
the superpower detente. The Soviet Union might be forced to intervene to 
prevent an Egyptian defeat, and such action could well lead to American 
intervention. Moreover, the stakes in the Arab world had suddenly been 
raised by the declaration of an Arab oil embargo on the United States and 
68 
severe cutbacks on supply to Europe. If the United States failed to 
prevent an Israeli victory it would face a severe setback to its position 
in the Arab world and a further strain on relations with its European 
allies as the oil embargo became a permanent feature of Arab policy. 
In this environment, Kissinger and Brezhnev were able to reach quick 
agreement on the terms of a cease-fire; the superpowers had a common 
interest in ending the fighting before it involved them further. The 
Soviet leaders at first sought a resolution which would connnit Israel to 
a timetable for phased withdrawal from all the occupied territories, in 
accordance with Sadat's wishes. However, they were well aware that such 
a demand was unrealistic, and soon abandoned it in favour of a cease-fire 
in place which would be followed by negotiations "under appropriate 
auspices'' to implement Resolution 242 11 in all its parts". Thus the 
superpowers had reached a compromise at the expense of their clients' 
interests: Sadat had been demanding an Israeli commitment to withdrawal; 
Meir had been expecting a three day respite as well as an Arab commitment 
to a prisoner exchange; neither Cairo nor Jerusalem were consulted. The 
responsibility now rested with each patron to gain the agreement of its client. 
67. Matti Golan, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger, Step-by-Step 
Diplomacy in the Middle East, New York, 1976, pp. 73-8; Schiff, p. 264; 
Kalbs, p. 544. 
68. On 17 October, OAPEC declared cutbacks in oil production of 5% each 
month , "until such time as the international community compels Israel 
to relinquish our occupied territories". On 20 October, total embargoes 
were placed on the United States, the Netherlands, Portugal, and South 
Africa. See "Arab Oil - Producing Countries Resolution, 17 October~ 1973", 
Survival, January/February, 1974, pp. 38-9. 
·~ 
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The Soviet Union had little trouble convincing Sadat to accept these 
terms because he was now well aware of the danger which the IDF posed 
to Egyptian forces. Nevertheless, in return, he demanded. a superpower 
guarantee to prevent Israeli violations. The problem of control rested 
with the United States, for an advancing Israeli army would have to be 
stopped in its tracks. The news of the cease-fire was broken to ~frs 
Meir on the evening of Monday, 21 October, not via Kissinger in Moscow, 
but rather via the President in Washington. The terms of the cease-fire 
were conveyed to Ambassador Dinitz, followed later by a personal message 
from the American President to the Israeli Prime Minister urging Israeli 
acceptance, pointing out that the Soviet Union had for the first time 
agreed to direct negotiations between the parties, and assuring her of 
69 
continued American support for Israel's position of strength. 
After s~veral hours of deliberation the Israeli Cabinet agreed to 
accept the superpower cease-fire resolution without reservation. This 
acceptance stood in stark contrast to the conditions which Israel had 
attached to its acceptance of the 1970 cease-fire. It might be cited as 
evidence of a complete lack of Israeli will-power to wrest assurances 
out of its patron for serving American interests in ending the fighting 
short of achieving any major objective on the west bank of the Canal. 
Given Israel's heightened sense of dependence and isolation, it would not 
be at all surprising that its decision-makers lacked the will to resist 
the concerted policy of the two superpowers. However, this decision 
appears to have had more to do with the rational application of Israel's 
will, than with its lack of sud1 determination. 
In light of the fact that the superpowers had reached agreement on 
the need for a cease-fire, defiance could prove to be a costly process 
given Israel's sole reliance on the American airlift and American political 
support in the cease-fire and settlement negotiations, as well as the 
unknown impact of the oil embargo on American policy and public opinion. 
Subversion of the cease-fire must have made better sense to the Israeli 
decision-makers. After all, Egypt had cheated on the 1970 cease-fire by 
moving the SAM sites into the canal zone and Israel had cheated on the 1967 
69. The text of the cease-fire resolution only spoke of negotiations 
under "appropriate auspices", but the President and Kissinger interpreted 
that as meaning direct negotiations. See Golan, '1.'he Secret ConveI'sations 
of Henry Kissinger, p. 85; Laqueur, Confrontation, The Middle East fvar 
and World Politics, London, 1974, pp. 171-2. 
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cease-fire by consolidating its position on the Golan Heights. Meir 
and Dayan might well have asked themselves, what is there to stop us 
from exploiting the confusion and uncertainty on the battlefield to 
improve our position while the cease-fire is implemented on the ground? 
After an attempt to gain a twenty-four hour delay, Mrs Meir accepted the 
cease-fire, with only one reservation: the Arab states would have to 
70 
accept and observe it also.· 
It is not at all clear how Kissinger expected to deal with the problem 
of stopping the Israeli army. Perhaps he believed that once the 
superpowers had reached agreement on a cease-fire, a state as dependent 
as Israel would not dare to defy or subvert that agreement: Perhaps he 
hoped to convince the Israeli government that the destruction of the 
Egyptian army would serve neither American nor Israeli interests. These 
were certainly two points which he emphasised in his discussions with. 
the Israeli leadership in Jerusalem on 22 October. He argued that if 
the United States were forced to choose between aid to Israel and 
agreement with the Arabs, it would not hesitate to dissociate itself from 
Israel. Moreover, Israel's routing of the Arab armies would not only 
destroy the basis for negotiations, it would also radicalise the Arab 
71 
world and force the Soviet Union to take extreme measures. 
However, it is also possible that Kissinger understood that neither 
of these arguments would be sufficient to convince the Israelis to 
respect the cease-fire as soon as it was announced. If anything they 
would have raised the fears of the Israeli leadership that an improvement 
in American-Arab relations would be bought at Israel's expense and that 
any extra advantage gained on the ground would improve Israel's ability 
72 to pay. Thus it is possible that Kissinger actually expected the 
Israelis to ignore the cease-fire until they had reached the Cairo-Suez 
70. Golda apparently spoke with Nixon to test his reaction to a request 
for delay. She was told quite clearly that an immediate cease-fire was 
American policy. See Insight Team, p. 386; Golan, p. 79. 
71. Dayan, p. 444; Insight Team, pp. 386-7. 
72. Dayan noted that he left the meeting with Kissinger with mixed 
feelings:" ... I was by no means certain that an improvement in Am.erica' s 
relations with the Arab states and the lifting of the Arab oil embargo 
would not be sought - at least partly - with Israeli currency, namely 
through pressure exerted on us for Arab benefit". p. 444. 
. ·; 
426 
road and had encircled the Third Army. He certainly knew that this was 
the IDF's objective, and he could not have forgotten that cease-fires in 
the Middle East were notoriously prone to violation - why else would 
Sadat want a superpower guarantee of the cease-fire? 73 Moreover, the 
cease-fire resolution made no allowance for the observation of a cease-fire 
.which would go into effect after nightfall, nor for the demarcation of the 
cease-fire lines. The curious omission of any provision for observers 
could not have gone unnoticed in Israel, but it also seems unlikely that 
Kissinger had made a mistake which the IDF then exploited •. In August 
1970, when the Egyptians violated the cease-fire by moving SAMs into the 
Canal zone, Kissinger had been furious with the American intelligence 
agencies for failing to monitor these movements; his biographers note 
that Kissinger expected cease-fire violations; and one of the State 
Department officers monitoring the IDF advance after the cease-fire 
remembers Kissinger's office continually asking him whether the IDF had 
yet reached the Cairo-Suez road. 74 
Whether a tacit understanding was reached between Kissinger and 
the Israelis, or not, the Israeli Cabinet reconvened after the meeting 
with Kissinger and decided that if the Egyptians failed to live up to 
75 the cease-fire, the IDF would "repel the enemy at the gate". The 
cease-fire went into effect at 6.52p.m. on Monday evening, 22 October. 
Two hours later, elements of the Egyptian Third Army apparently tried 
to break out of their positions and the IDF's Southern Command then 
ordered its forces to advance to Suez and encircle the city; the order 
1 d b h P · "·1 • • 76 B T d . was apparent y approve y t e rime rinister. y ues ay evening, 
23 October, the Egyptian Third Army had been completely surrounded and 
its supply lines cut. The Israelis believed that the Army, lacking 
supplies, would eventually have to surrender, and Sadat would then have 
to admit defeat? 7 For a moment it appeared that Israel had thwarted the 
aims of both superpowers . 
73. Kissinger had been briefed by the Israeli Chief-of-Staff on the IDF's 
objectives in his meeting in Jerusalem. Golan, p. 86; Schiff, p. 264. 
74. Kalbs, p. 549; Golan, p. 87; Interview with State Department Officer, 
Washington, June, 1975. 
75. Dayan, p. 444. 
76. Schiff, p. 286. 
77. See Terence Smith, "Dayan Doubts That a New War Is Imminent", New York 
Times, 26 January, 1975, p. 24, column 6. 
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However, if Egypt had been defeated militarily, it still retained 
the ability to play on the interests of the superpowers for political 
gain. By projecting the Arab-Israeli conflict onto the centre stage of 
superpower relations, Sadat could,.~n effect, force the superpowers t6 
choose between controlling Israel, or facing the consequences to their 
interests in the Middle East of an Egyptian defeat. On Wednesday, 24 
October, Sadat urgently app·ealed to Moscow and Washington for a joint 
Soviet-American peacekeeping force to police the cease-fire. He wanted 
the superpowers to force Israel to return to the 22 October lines, thereby 
releasing the stranglehold on the Third Army. 
In a way, his call was unnecessary, because both the United States 
and the Soviet Union had already decided to unravel Israel's military 
fait accompli. As soon as Kissinger learnt of the Israeli advance, and 
perhaps in expectation of it, he resolved to save the Third Army from 
surrender so as to guarentee a military stalemate, prevent the oil embargo 
from becoming a permanent feature of Arab policy, and ndemonstrate his 
impartiality11 • 78 He immediately began to pressure the Israelis to allow 
food, water and medical supplies through to the Third Army, warning that 
the airlift would be halted. However, his efforts were interrupted by a 
Soviet demarche. On Wednesday evening, Brezhnev called on Nixon to 
agree to the dispatch of Soviet and American contingents to Egypt to 
enforce the cease-fire. He added a serious warning: 
I will say it straight, that if you find it impossible 
to act together with us in this matter, we should be 
faced with the necessity urgently to consider the 
question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. 
Israel cannot be allowed to get away with the 
violations.79 
To underline his meaning the Soviet Union made overt preparations for 
intervention. The 50,000 troops of seven of its airborne divisions, which 
had been moved to staging areas in Yugoslavia during the war, were now 
placed on alert. The airlift to Syria had been slowed, thereby 
theoretically freeing the necessary planes for the transportation of these 
troops to the Middle East, and there were now indications that those planes 
were destined for Cairo, possibly carrying Soviet troops. Moreover, there 
were indications that the Soviet Union might have deployed nuclear-tipped 
78. Kalbs, p. 550. 
79. Ibid., p. 553. 
SCUDs at a base east of Cairo. It was possible that the Soviet Union 
80 intended to back its intervention with tactical nuclear weapons. 
428 
On Wednesday night, Kissinger quickly convened the Washington Special 
Action Group and together with Schlesinger, in the absence of the President, 
decided to place detente in abeyance by responding to the Soviet threat. 
American forces world-wide including the Strategic Air Command and the 
82nd Airborne Division, were placed on a Defense Condition 3 Alert. In 
the name of the President, Kissinger replied to Brezhnev that the United 
States could not accept unilateral intervention and that such a move 
81 
would jeopardise the structure of detente. Two days previously the 
superpowers had reached an agreement to preserve detente through the 
imposition of a cease-fiLe. Now, suddenly, their agreement had resulted 
in a confrontation which threatened to destroy the detente they had 
sought to preserve. 
This strange irony cannot be explained satisfactorily by arguing, 
as Coral Bell does, that the Soviet Union sought to parley detente into 
condominium in the Middle East. 82 On the contrary, the explanation lies 
in emphasising the competitive rather than co-operative nature of 
superpower relations in this crisis. As stated at the outset, both 
superpowers confronted the same problem of promoting their individual 
interests without threatening detente. However the inevitable consequence 
of promoting their own interests was a greater involvement in the regional 
crisis,which in turn increased the threat to detente. Finally, this 
contradiction in superpower aims was resolved through an agreement to 
preserve both their individual interests in the region and their mutual 
interest in detente by controlling their prot~g~s and ending the war. The 
cooperation evident in the Kissinger-Brezhnev cease-fire agreement was 
produced by the dangers of unchecked superpower competition. But the 
confrontation evident in the alerting of Soviet and American troops was 
produced by the inability of the superpowers to control their clients once 
they had decided to control their own competition. As Kissinger has stated, 
the confrontation occurred in the aftermath of a settlement and "as a 
80. See Aviation Week and Space Technology" 22 October, 1973, p. 14; 
Cecil Bronlow, "Soviets Pose Three-Front Global Drive", !tviati-on Week 
and Space Technology" 5 November, 1973, pp. 12-13; and Insight Team, 
pp. 409-413. 
81. Kalbs, p. 556. 
82. Coral Bell, "The October Middle East War, a Case Study in Crisis 
Management During Detente", International Affairs_, Volume 50, No. 4, 
October, 1974, pp. 535-6. Philip Windsor has inadvertently provided the 
counter-argument to Bell in his statement: "Detente is not a recipe for 
result of actions which could not be controlled by either of the two 
1183 
sides. 
Thus cooperation had resulted in confrontation because of the lack 
of superpower control. Because the Israelis had flouted the superpower 
agreement by encircling Suez and the Third Army, the Soviet Union found 
it necessary to threaten intervention to prevent an Egyptian defeat and 
to demonstrate its support for the Arab cause. For the United States 
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such intervention was anathema to its desire to produce an American 
settlement which would enhance its position of influence in the Arab World. 
Accordingly, American forces were placed on alert to deter the Soviet 
Union and to exercise decisive control over Israel. Moscow had threatened 
intervention to stop Israel from forcing the surrender of the Third Army 
and perhaps also to prevent it from advancing on the Second Army. Although 
significant sections of the American intelligence community doubted that 
the Soviet Union really intended to intervene, 84 if Israelwere not stopped 
circumstances might quickly change Soviet intentions. Thus Kissinger used 
the Soviet threat to deter the Israelis from further action, and used the 
American alert to convince the Israelis of the seriousness of such a threat, 
as well as to deter the Soviet Union from intervention. 
If Israel had any thoughts of further military action the nuclear 
alert certainly gave it pause. Any move on the Egyptian armies in this 
environment could result, not only in Soviet intervention, but also in 
nuclear war - the first theatre of operations would be the Canal zone. 
Thus, by Thursday, 25 October it had become clear that the Israeli forces 
had halted their advance and decided not to outface the Russians. The 
cease-fire had been enforced. In the face of the American alert the Soviet 
Union had to be satisfied with this new cease-fire and therefore dropped 
its demands for a Soviet-American peacekeeping force. Instead it backed 
a non-aligned resolution in the Security Council which provided for the 
dispatch of UN observers,but specifically excluded superpower forces. 
82. (continued) harmonious condominium; it is a recipe for competitive 
diplomacy". See Philip Windsor, "The Savior from the Sea", Foreign Policy_, 
No. 22, Spring, 1976, p. 171. 
83. Transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger's News Conference, 21 
November, 1973, in ,Jerusalem Post_, 22 November, 1973. 
84. In Cline's letter to Kissinger he complains that the Secretary did not 
consult INR about Soviet intervention: "Certainly the technical intelligence 
evidence available to INR did not support such a .Soviet intention". Cline, 
lac.cit., p. 133; Cf. Szulc, "Is He Indispensible? 0 , p. 39. 
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The Soviet Union had backed down, the superpower confrontation had ended, 
almost before it had started, and the detente had been reestablished. 
The superpowers could return to competitive diplomacy. 
Accordingly, Kissinger now staged the final act of his improvised 
American melodrama. Having stymied the Soviet Union, and having denied 
Israel the victory it sought, he resurrected his aim of delivering the 
Third Army from its fate at the hands of the IDF. He used a little carrot 
and a mighty big stick. First he tried to persuade the Israelis that their 
interests were best served by relaxing the siege: each side would have a 
'trump card' in the disposition of their forces on the east and west 
bank of the Canal and this would serve as an encouragement to Egypt to 
negotiate a settlement. 85 But the 'carrot' did not appear very 
appetising to the Israeli government. As General Dayan later revealed, 
the government believed that the surrender of the Third Army better 
served its interests: 
We might only have held them for a day and let them 
walk out without their arms, but it would have 
changed the whole Egyptian attitude about whether 
they won or lost the war. It would have given us 
more cards in the practical negotiations.86 
That view was completely divergent with Kissinger's American 
perspective. The surrender of the Army would again raise the spectre 
of Soviet intervention. It would also dash Kissinger's hopes of playing 
the role of 'honest broker' between the two sides. So Kissinger wielded 
his big stick. First he warned Israel that the Russians were threatening 
to supply the Third Army with its vital requirements if the siege were 
not broken. Israel's decision-makers were in two minds about this threat 
of Soviet intervention. Dayan claims he did not take the threat 
seriously: "The Soviets were worried about Cairo or Aswan, not the Third 
85. Nixon later explained that the American exercise of restraint on 
Israel was right "from their own self-interest". He claimed that the 
destruction of the Third Army would have brought about "a coup or worse as 
far as Sadat was concerned. Somebody would have come into power in Egypt, 
probably worse than Nasser, oriented toward the radical point of view. 
Egypt would have become a total Soviet satallite state, and Israel would have 
won a pyrrhic victory. They would have planted the seeds for a war of 
revenge such as you've never seen". Cited in Near East Report, Volume XXI, 
No. 20, 18 May, 1977, p. 79. 
86. "Dayan Doubts That a New War Is Imminent", NeuJ York Times, 
28 January, 1975. 
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87 Army". · But Shimon Peres was rather less sanguine about Soviet intentions: 
When in 1956 the Russians threatened to intervene with 
missiles I considered their threat a bluff. But when 
we were told in this war that the Russian helicopters 
would attempt to ferry supplies to the Third Army, I 88 
believed this to be a real possibility and not a bluff. 
The immediate concern, however, was not the Russian threat, but 
rather the American threat which came with it. As Nixon later explained, 
89 
"We gave them an offer that they could not refuse"; Dayan described it 
" 1 . h. h of . II 90 If I 1 d.d . h as an u timatum - not ing s ort it . srae i not permit t e 
provisioning of the Third Army, the United States would intervene and 
supply the Army using its own aircraft; Israel would find itself in 
a ~risis sit~ation with the United States. 91 Faced with the prospect 
of fighting its own patron to achieve its aim, Israel angrily submitted 
to Kissinger's demand and a corridor was opened to the Third Army. As 
Dayan later told the Knesset: 
The soldiers may not have been aware that the shells 
they fired today had not even been in Israel's 
possession a week ago .•. There is only one country .•. 
that is prepared to give us equipment, and that is 
the United States. Whoever proposes that we 
conduct this war in a split with the United 
States is ... suggesting that we will not be able tn 
win this war. We have bitter pills to swallow •.. 92 
The fate of the Third Army had developed into a test of wills between 
patron and protege, but the United States had at least as great an 
intensity of interest in saving the Army as Israel had in forcing its 
surrender. In that situation the test of wills became unequal because 
the United States could bring its far more powerful means to bear. It 
was therefore regarded as wiser, given Israel's heightened sense of 
dependence and isolation, to submit to the American ultimatum and preserve 
its patronage. As Dayan told the Knesset: 
87. Ibid. 
88. Jerusalem Post, 23 November, 1973. 
89. Frost Interview, New York TI,mes, 13 Hay, 1977. 
90. Smith Interview, New York Times, 26 January, 1975. 
91. New York Times, 20 December, 1974; 26 January, 1975; 
Dayan, p. 448. 
92. Defence Minister's Reply 1:n the Knesset to f.Jo-tion on Is1>aeli 
Prisoners of War in Enemy Hands, I.G.P.O., 30 October, 1973, pp. 1-2. 
... the provision of food to the Third Army was not 
done by us as a humanitarian gesture but because 
we had no choice in the matter. Or, to be more 
precise, the alternatives to allowing the food 
convoy through were, in our judgement, still 
worse.93 
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The United States was now in a position to claim credit from Egypt 
for maintaining the Third Army in its positions on the east bank of the 
Canal. Kissinger had demonstrated that he could achieve, through 
diplomatic pressure, what the Soviet Union had failed to achieve by the 
threat of force. Sadat was not slow in drawing the intended conclusions: 
"at least 99% of the cards in this game, if not all of them, are in the 
hands of the United States11 • 94 In November, when Kissinger made his 
first visit to Arab countries, diplomatic relations were rest.ored between 
Egypt and the United States. At the time of writing Sadat appears to 
have made his break with the Soviet Union complete by abrogating the 
1971 Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship, thus concluding a process which 
Kissinger set in motion by his denial of an Israeli victory in the 
October 1973 War. 
III - CONCLUSION 
This analysis tends to emphasise Kissinger's legerdemain in ending 
the October War in a way that both suited American. regional interests and 
provided for the re-establishment of detente. It is therefore necessary 
to condition what might appear to be disguised adulation for the 'super' 
Secretary with words of caution. If anything Kissinger was lucky that 
the actors he could not control were prepared to acquiesce in his production. 
Had the Soviet Union actually intervened, rather than threatening 
intervention, the United States would have been presented with a fait 
accompli akin to the placement of missiles in Cuba in 1962. Kissinger would 
then have had to make some very tough decisions about the intensity of 
American interests in the Middle East. In fact, he might not have even 
had the choice, since Soviet intervention while the battle was continuing 
could easily have led to clashes between Soviet and Israeli forces and 
93. Ibid. 
94. Sadat's Speech to ASU and People's Council, 4 September, 1975, 
BBC/SWB~ ME/5000/A/14. 
and that would have required a firm American response. 95 Thus, because 
the Soviet Union, at this stage in the conflict, was prepared to 
regard the preservation of detente as more important than the pursuit 
of unilateral advantage, it only threatened to intervene96 and that 
presented Kissinger with a far more manageable crisis than his 
predecessors faced in 1962. 97 
Because, at this stage, the Soviet Union played the game 
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according to the politics of detente, the United States was subsequently 
able to indulge in the politics of patronage. In this respect Kissinger 
was also lucky that Sadat understood the game of patronage better than 
his predecessor and was prepared to execute a volte-face in Egyptian 
foreign policy which opened the way for America's fence-building 
effort in the Middle East region. But perhaps Kissinger was luckiest of 
all in regard to controlling Israel. Had Israel decided to pre-empt 
the outcome might have been rather different. According to the commander 
of the IAF, General Peled, the Egyptian air defences were decimated in 
six different operations, over twelve days, 80% of them by air action, 
95. The United States apparently was not prepared for a conventional war 
against the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Thus superpower involvement 
would have escalated very quickly to the nuclear threshhold. 
96. Despite Senator Jackson's description of the Soviet note as "brutal", 
the threat of intervention was, if anything, rather half-hearted. The 
note only suggested that the Soviet Union might be forced "to consider" 
intervention. According to Lucius Battle, "the Brezhnev note of October 
24 did not strike me as threatening as earlier flares signalled it to be. 
Compared to Russian notes I have read in past years, it was relatively 
mild ... ". The Soviet troop movements had been known about five days before 
the crisis; the transport aircraft heading for Cairo could have only been 
sufficient for a symbolic intervention (they were in fact carrying cargo, 
not troops); the reports of nuclear-tipped SCUDs turned out, in fact, to 
be a report of the movement of nuclear materials through the Dardanelles 
on a Soviet ship. See Lucius D. Battle, "Peace - Inshallah", 
Foreign Policy, No. 14 , Spring, 1974, p. 121; Galia Golan, The Yom Kippur 
War and After, FP· 122-3. 
97. Coral Bell has argued that in each stage of the ·.crisis - development, 
confrontation and resolution - the Soviet Union demonstrated greater 
concern for detente than for its local interests in the Middle East. 
While certainly disputing Soviet care for detente in the development stage 
of the crisis (since I have argued that Moscow sought unilateral advantage 
during the first stage of the war) I would concur with Professor Bell's 
judgement on the confrontation phase of the crisis. However, I take issue 
with her unfounded claim that the United States accorded higher priority 
to the 'vital' interests of Israel than to detente in the confrontation 
phase. It would be more accurate, as I have tried to demonstrate, to argue 
that the United States accorded a higher priority to its own regional 
inte.rests than it accorded either to detente or to the interests of its 
client. See Coral Bell, op.cit., pp. 542-3. 
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for a loss of fewer than ten aircraft engaged in defence suppression. 98 
Pre-emption might therefore have been highly cost-effective in terms of 
air-defence suppression; this might have enabled far more effective IAF 
support for the ground forces as well as far fewer aircraft losses. 
Israel's dependence on American resupply would then not have been as 
great and its counter-attacks, in the early stages, might have been more 
successful. As suggested by the actual events, once Israel had regained 
the initiative it would have been far harder to stop its army. Moreover, 
the lessened dependence on American support, as well as the psychoLogical 
strength derived from the more successful implementation of Israel's 
security doctrine would have made Israel's decision-makers far more 
determined to resist Kissinger's control than they in fact proved to be. 
In the final analysis, the October War ended in a way which suited 
American interests, not so much because of the power wielded by the 
American Secretary of State, but rather because of Israel's much 
weakened ability and will to resist his policy, because of Soviet interest 
in avoiding a superpower confrontation, and because of Egypt's ability 
to exploit the competitive interests of the superpowers. Kissinger's 
determination to prevent an Israeli victory was an essential factor in 
the favourable outcome, but the fact that the avoidance of a superpower 
confrontation (i.e. the preservation of detente), took precedence over an 
Israeli victory, was the key determinant of the conclusion of the 
October War. 
98. USAF ~specialists 1 have estimated that had the air force been permitted 
to pre-empt, the destruction of 90% of the SAM sites could have been 
accomplished in a period of three to six hours for the loss of under ten 
aircraft. See Uri Ra'anan, "The New Technologies and the Middle East: 
'Le£?sons of the Yorn Kippur War and Anticipated Developments", in Geoffrey 
Kemp, Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Uri Ra'anan (eds.), 'I'he Other Arms 
Race: New Technologies and Non-Nuclear Conflict, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1975, p. 84; Benyamin Peled, "The Air Force in the Yon Kippur War - Hain 
Moves and Lessons", in Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict, 
p. 241; and Ronnie Hope, "A-A missiles can't save terrorists", Jerusalem 
Post Weekly Edition, 9 July, 1974. 
COHCLUSIONS 
ADVERSARIES AND PARTNERS 
... the Soviet Union and we are in a very unique 
relationship. We are at one and the same time 
adversaries and partners in the preservation of 
peace. As adversaries we often find ourselves 
drawn into potential confrontations. And each 
of us has friends that themselves pursue 
objectives that may not have been sought by 
either of us. 
- Dr Henry Kissinger, 1974. 1 
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From Metternich to Kissinger,the architects of the international 
system have pursued similar purposes: the construction of an order which 
would preserve the interests of the most powerful nations, at the expense, 
if necessary, of the interests of lesser states. Yet the ambiguity which 
has always existed for the principal powers between the desire for 
stability, tranquillity and peace, and the urge to seek unilateral 
advantage, between the avoidance of confrontation, and the pursuit of 
particular interests, has privileged those lesser states fortunate and 
adept enough to be able to exploit these contradictions for their oun 
purposes .. 
The analysis of the experiences of Israel and Egypt, in this 
regard, may thus have some heuristic value, not only for understanding 
superpower behaviour in the Middle East, but also for assessing the 
prospects for a superpower imposed settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Throughout this study, the United States and the Soviet Union have 
appeared as partners in the avoidance of superpower confrontations, and 
yet adversaries drawn into them by the determination of their proteges, 
and by their own determination, to pursue particular .interests by 
exploiting the politics of patronage. Even now, while nominally co-
sponsors of the ever-to-be-convened Geneva Peace Conference, the United 
States and the Soviet Union continue to .compete vigorously for influence. 
Horeover, Israel and Egypt, while nominally engaged in negotiating a 
peaceful settlement, continue to pursue their objectives by exploiting 
their abilities to promote or impair the influence of the superpowers. 
1. Press Conference of Secretary of State Kissinger, 25 October, 1974, 
llew York Times., 26 October, 1974. 
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Of course, the environment of patronage has changed significantly 
since 1973. Under American auspices, Israel and Egypt have concluded 
disengagement agreements which have effectively excluded the Soviet 
Union from the negotiating process and converted the contest for 
superpower patronage into a competition for American favours. Moreover, 
2 the emergence of Syria and Saudi Arabia as regional powers , and the now 
recognised importance of Arab control of the oil so crucial to the 
Western econor:iies, have made the dynamics more complex and the game more 
vital. Further, the leaders of the· United States, Israel, Egypt, Syria, 
and Saudi Arabia have changed. The personalities and predilections of 
Jimmy Carter, Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat, Hafez Assad, and King Khaled, 
are rather different to those of their immediate predecessors. Nevertheless, 
the principles and dynamics of interaction between the superpowers and 
their Middle Eastern proteges remain the same, even though the resistance 
of the weak and the influence of the great have fluctuated in line 
with these changes in the power configurations. Thus the questions posed 
at the outset of this thesis, and the answers contained in the detailed 
analysis of the interaction in the period from 1962 to 1973, are still 
germane to the prospects ~f the superpowers and the weak states alike, 
and the chances for war or peace in the Middle East. 
Five questions were posed in Part One and answered in the analysis; 
the sixth question will be answered once the findings have been summarised: 
i) How have Israel and Egypt, as weak states, been able to resist 
the inimical policies of the superpowers? 
ii) How have Israel and Egypt been able to cultivate amicable 
superpower policies or maintain patronage when their own 
policies were opposed by their patrons? 
iii) In what circumstances have Israel and Egypt prevailed over 
their superpower patrons and in what circumstances have they 
been forced to submit? 
iv) How have asymmetries in the patronage relationships affected 
the outcome of these conflicts? 
v) How has the development of relations between the superpowers 
affected the outcomes of these conflicts? 
Part Two examined four cases of patron-client interaction in the pre-
1967 environment: the Israeli-American arms relationship; Israel's decision 
2. By regional powers I mean that they are now able to affect events in 
the region rather than merely within their immediate neighbourhoods. Saudi 
Arabia was of course a regional power in the Persian Gulf, but it has now 
become a power in the Middle East region as a whole. 
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to go to war in 1967; the Egyptian-American aid relationship; and Nasser's 
brinkmanship in 1967. 
In the first two cases Israel could rightly claim to have prevailed 
over its American patron in that it succeeded in overcoming an American 
arms embargo and secured American support for a war which the United 
States would have preferred to avoid. In the third case, Egypt submitted 
only momentarily to American policy (in 1965), but the price of its 
successful resistance was the loss of American patronage. While Nasser 
neither withdrew his troops from Yemen, nor kept the Arab-Israeli conflict 
in the 'ice box', nor concentrated on economic development instead of 
pursuing his anti-Imperialist campaign, he also did not prevail over 
American policy, which found a more favourable reception from other 
regional clients. In the fourth case, Nasser also succeeded in resisting 
Soviet restraint and American attempts at compromise, but in the process 
lost both Soviet military assistance and American political support during 
the war, when he most needed them. Insofar as his brinkmanship was 
aimed at proving to the Johnson Administration that it would not succeed 
in containing his revolution, Nasser also failed to prevail over the 
United States. Instead, he was forced to submit to the defeat inflicted 
on Egypt by America's Israeli client and to accept the consequences for 
his regional policies. It has also been argued that his decisions to enter 
into the defence pact with Syria in November 1966 and to remilitarise 
Sinai in May 1967 were not cases of submission to Soviet policy, but 
rather were cases of Nasser acting in what he regarded as Egypt's interests 
while, at the same time, serving Soviet interests. 
In explaining how weak state resistance was possible during this 
period, it is necessary to distinguish between resistance which circumvented 
the patron's policy whfle securing its support, and resistance which 
defied the patron's policy and thus resulted in the loss of support. Israel 
circumvented American arms policy by skilful utilisation of the leverage 
it acquired as a result of the competition between the superpowers for 
influence in the region; the failure of the American approach to Nasser's 
Egypt; the American commitment to Israel's integrity, enhanced by domestic 
support; and Israel's development of a nuclear option. Conversely, having 
acquired American economic assistance because of his apparent willingness 
to maintain a neutral stance in the competition between the superpowers, 
Nasser then lost this patronage by defying American policy and squandering 
resources, which might have been employed in maintaining American patronage, 
on the other imperatives of his anti-imperialist, anti-Israel, and pan-
Arab foreign policy. Egypt was unable to maintain American patronage 
because of the conflict between the politics of Arab unity and the 
dictates of successful client behaviour. Although the American use 
of a 'short leash' approach to its economic assistance did encourage 
Nasser to sublimate this conflict, when events in the region confronted 
him with a new challenge, his defiance of the United States led to the 
transferral of its patronage to other clients in the region. At the 
same time, Nasser was able to mitigate the effects of this loss of 
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support by increasing his dependence upon the Soviet Union whose interests 
were served rather than debased by Nasser's regional policies. 
Asymmetries in Israeli~American and Egyptian-American relations had 
an important impact on the outcome of the pre-war interaction between 
the superpowers and their weak clients. The basic and underlying American 
commitment to support Israel's security ensured that; in the face of 
Soviet support for Israel's adversary, the United States would provide 
Israel with the arms it required to maintain its deterrent strength, 
indirectly if possible, directly if not. On the other hand, the lack 
of an underlying commitment to Egypt and the existence instead of an 
underlying conflict of interest between Nasser's regional imperatives 
and America's desire to protect his adversaries, made the securing of 
patronage a difficult task, unless Nasser was prepared to sublimate the 
conflict. The lack of an underlying commitment also made it easy for 
the United States to redefine the relationship by abandoning its 
recalcitrant client. 
Relations between the superpowers during this period also worked in 
Israel's favour, and against Egypt, in the competition for American 
support. The United States perceived that the Soviet Union was exploiting 
the tensions which existed in the Middle East to promote its 'penetration' 
of the region. At the beginning of the period the United States had 
assumed that Nasser was a nationalist opposed to all forms of foreign 
influence, but as his actions - backed by Soviet military and economic 
assistance - promoted tensions in the region and thus served Soviet 
interests; Nasser became identified in American eyes as Moscow's Middle 
Eastern agent. Consequently, the United States was less prepared to 
tolerate Nasser's behaviour than it had been at the outset of the Kennedy 
Administration. Conversely, Israel benefited from this growing polarisation 
of the region between the Soviet-backed 'forces of progress' and the 
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American-backed supporters of the status quo, since its ability to assist 
in the 'containment' of Egypt and Syria, by virtue of its deterrent 
strength, was valued by its American patron. 
Israel's success in gaining American acquiescence for its pre-emptive 
strike in June 1967, and political support for its retention of the 
occupied territories immediately thereafter, was partly a consequence 
of this new alignment with the United States, but the reasons for Israel's 
success had more to do with Israel's willingness to wait until the 
United States recognised that it was unable to fulfil its commitment to 
Israel. Once the United States realised that it could not achieve redress, 
Israel's determination to brook no compromise, and its willingness and 
capability to go to war in defence of its rights, ensured American 
acquiescence in its pre-emption. In this case the client had secured 
support by encouraging the patron to realise that its interests would be 
better served by supporting the client's policy than by attempting to 
change it. 
In this situation, success for Israel meant failure for Egypt, 
because Nasser's brinkmanship was predicated on a 'zero sum' strategy. 
The closure of the Straits gave Nasser leverage over the United States 
as long as he used it with flexibility, encouraging Washington to restrain 
Jerusalem by holding out the hope of_ a compromise. Forgoing the first 
strike showed that Nasser understood the necessity to avoid giving the 
United States a pretext for supporting Israel, but his failure to provide 
Washington with anything to work with, and his attempt to intimidate 
Israel at the same time, ensured that the United States would support 
Israel and oppose him, and that Israel would fight rather than accept the 
compromising of its rights and its deterrent strength. 
Nasser also miscalculated the importance of the asymmetry between 
the American commitment to Israel and the Soviet commitment to Egypt. 
The United States had publicly stated its opposition to the blockading 
of the Straits and had therefore committed itself to redressing the 
situation, by force of international opinion if possible, by force of 
Israeli arms if necessary. But the Soviet Union had made no such 
commitment to the defence of Egypt's closure of the Straits (Nasser's 
claims to the contrary notwithstanding). Moreover, the usual asymmetry 
between Israel's lack, and Egypt's retention, of alternat.ive patronage 
was not operative in this crisis because Nasser had alienated the 
United States: if he failed to gain Soviet support he would have no 
superpower support at all. 
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It was at this point that the asymmetries in patronage and the conduct 
of relations on the superpower level combined to undo Nasser's 
brinkmanship. He had expected to neutralise the American commitment to 
Israel by raising the spectre of superpower confrontation. Instead, he 
succeeded in intimidating his Soviet patron and neutralising its 
commitment to support him by encouraging the superpowers to seek limited 
cooperation in the form of an agreement not to intervene in the fighting. 
This agreement might have been undone had Moscow's assessment of the 
likely damage to its prestige, reputation and position of influence 
outweighed the risks of superpower confrontation. However, the sudden 
collapse of the Egyptian army enabled the Soviet Union to protect its 
competitive interests by seeking an immediate cease-fire and picking 
up the tab for the defeat, in terms of greater military an<l political 
support after the danger of confrontation had passed. Thus Nasser was 
forced to submit to Israel's military power, not because he lacked 
leverage, but because he applied it rashly and wrongly, encouraging the 
superpowers to cooperate by sublimating their competitive interests. 
The superpower adversaries had become momentary partners in the preservation 
peace (on the global level) at Egypt's expense, but to Israel's advantage. 
Part Three examined six cases of patron-client interaction in the 
post-1967 environment: Egypt's conduct of the War of Attrition; Israel's 
conflict with American settlement policy; Egypt's resistance of the effects 
of the superpower detente; Israel's reliance on the impact of the 
detente; the prevention of Egypt's defeat; and the forestalling of an 
Israeli military victory. 
In the first case, Nasser succeeded in securing and maintining Soviet 
political support, in disrupting a rapprochement between the superpowers 
on the terms of a settlement,and in prevailing over his patron. In 
addition, he gained an unprecedented Soviet military commitment to Egypt's 
defence and a notable shift in the American attitude towards a peace 
settlement. In the second case, Israel also managed to disrupt a 
superpower rapprochement on the terms of a settlement, but was forced to 
submit to the American cease-fire initiative. However, in the aftermath 
of the 1970 cease-fire, Israel was able to prevail over American settlement 
policy, gaining an unprecedented American commitment of military and 
economic support. In the third case, Egypt was forced to submit, for two 
years, to the detrimental effects of the superpower detente, but overcame 
them by expelling the Soviet personnel in 1972 and launching war in 1973. 
In the fourth case, on the other hand, Israel's reliance on the effects of 
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detente to maintain its policies forced it to submit to the Arab attack. 
In the fifth case, Sadat succeeded in securing both Soviet and American 
protection for Egypt's initial gains in the war; and in the sixth case, 
Israel was forced to submit to American demands that it not def eat Egypt 
on the battlefield. 
Nasser resisted the inimical settlement policies of the superpowers 
(which, on two occasions during the War of Attrition, approximated each 
other), cultivated an amicable Soviet policy and a more favourable American 
policy, and first maintained and then increased Soviet patronage, as a 
result of the careful orchestration of military and political pressures 
during his War of Attrition. He exploited American interest in a stable 
settlement and improved relations with the Arab world, and the Soviet· 
dependence on his survival for the maintenance of its prestige, reputation 
and position of influence, to resist the imposition of a settlement on 
Israel's terms and to force its withdrawal without concessions. Because 
Egypt's weakness after the 1967 debacle had forced him into a sober 
reappraisal of his policies, Nasser's behaviour was characterised not by 
the defiance and impulsiveness of earlier years, but rather by the caution 
and flexibility of successful weak state leadership. Whether he would 
have actually succeeded in his aim of forcing Israel to withdraw without 
concessions cannot be divined because he overplayed his hand by violating 
the cease-fire and then died before he could undo the ill-effects of that 
action. 
Israel's inability to prevent the United States from discussing, 
defining, and then publicising, an American plan for settlement of the 
conflict which fell short of Israel's demands, reflected the reduction in 
its leverage at a time when it could prevent neither Nasser from promoting 
instability, nor its American patron from wooing its adversary. 
Nevertheless, by escalating the conflict Israel did ensure that the Rogers 
Plan was rejected by all other parties. This escalation also unintentionally 
provoked Soviet intervention; a move which initially increased the American 
incentive for a settlement, but eventually provided Israel with greater 
leverage over its patron. Washington's use of the 'short leash' in 
deferring Israel's arms request in March 1970 (as well as in 1968) did help 
to persuade Israel to adopt a more flexible and compliant attitude and, 
in the face of Soviet intervention., forced Israel to accept a cease-fire 
which was linked to indirect negotiations for an Israeli withdrawal. 
However, the Soviet-Egyptian cease-fire violations, and American suspicions 
·•.: 
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of Soviet intentions in the Jordanian crisis, persuaded the United States 
to reassess its calculations of the regional balance of power and to 
bolster Israel's deterrent strength as the most appropriate means for 
combating the Soviet Union. Israel was thus able to resist further American 
attempts to negotiate a settlement which did not meet its maximum demands, 
while securing patronage at unprecedented levels, because of its increased 
contingent value to the United States. 
Both clients were able to benefit from the fact that their patrons 
were committed to supporting their respective military capabilities in 
the War of Attrition. Egypt was able to gain ever increasing Soviet 
military support because it was committed, after the 1967 defeat, not to 
allow Egypt to suffer the same fate again. On the other side, Israel 
continued to enjoy American support for its deterrent strength as a means 
for preventing all-out war, even if it could not prevent the War of 
Attrition. This commitment to Israel's deterrent strength ensured American 
consent in 1968 to supply Phantoms the following year, in response to 
Soviet arms shipments to the area. However, because the United States 
could not control the timing of the Phantom deliveries and could not 
defer them, in the face of continued Soviet supply, it could not prevent 
these offensive weapons from undermining its diplomacy. 
Asymmetries in the patron-client relationships did much to affect 
the outcome of the contests. Egypt's importance to both superpowers in 
the competition for influence and the search for a settlement which would 
preserve or improve their respective positions provided an environment 
in which, despite its losses on the battlefield, Egypt was able to succeed 
in the politics of patronage. On the other hand, Israel's increasing 
isolation and lone dependence on the United States, and the hostility it 
experienced from the Soviet Union, reduced its manoeuvrability and 
increased the need for cautious and compliant behaviour,lest it encourage 
the rapprochement between its superpower patron and its regional adversary. 
Developments in superpower relations also had a marked impact on 
t:;he outcome of these contests. The Two Power Talks symbolised the common 
understanding reached by the superpowers in the wake of the 1967 war, that 
ways would have to be found at best to settle this conflict, at least to 
contain it and prevent it from disrupting superpower relations. However, 
no matter how close the United States and the Soviet Union came to agreeing 
on a conunon formula for the settlement of the conflict, neither proved 
capable of delivering its client : not the Soviet Union, which failed to 
persuade Nasser to accept the June 1969 proposals; and not the United States, 
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which was unable to persuade Israel to accept the Rogers Plan. (In 
accepting the Rogers cease-fire initiative, Mrs Meir specifically rejected 
the Rogers Plan). And in the end, the imperatives of their adversary 
relationship put paid to their partnership in the pursuit of a peace 
settlement. The era of negotiation failed its first test because both 
Egypt and Israel were able to play on the competitive interests of the 
superpowers to sublimate their cooperative instincts. Nevertheless, while 
the Two Power Talks lasted, Egypt was able to benefit. This was because, 
on the one hand, the Soviet Union proved unable or unwilling to stray far 
from Egypt's maximum demands, while on the other hand, the United States 
was prepared to be flexible both because it wanted the negotiations to 
succeed, and because it wanted to project the image of 'evenhandedness' 
by distancing itself somewhat from the maximum demands of its Israeli 
client. By the same token, when the Two Power Talks were abandoned, 
Israel was able to benefit from the increased tension between the 
superpowers. 
Developments in superpower relations were also responsible, in large 
measure, for the tranquillity and stability which prevailed on the 
Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire lines for the next three years. The development 
of the superpower detente had found its expression in the Middle East in 
the form of "military relaxation". Since the Soviet Union no longer 
evinced an interest in tension, ·now that it was ensconced in Egypt, it 
could afford to cooperate with the United States in maintaining stability 
in the region through the agency of Israel's deterrent strength. 
Accordingly, while the United States provided Israel with the weapons 
considered necessary for the maintenance of its superiority, the Soviet 
Union refused to supply the offensive weapons which the Egyptians felt 
were necessary to mount a challenge to this superiority. However, Sadat 
was able to circumvent this policy and secure the weapons he required by 
playing on Moscow's competitive interests. The expulsion of the Soviet 
personnel and the possibility of a further loss of facilities and 
influence in Egypt, together with Sadat's skilful reassurance, in the 
form of a unilateral decision to renew the agreement granting the Soviet 
navy access to Egyptian ports, was sufficient to convince Moscow to 
supply the necessary weapons for Egypt's war. 
Because Israel had become the agent for superpower detente in the 
Middle East, it was able to secure increased American patronage while 
sublimating the American settlement policy which it had previously failed 
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to alter. The fact that Israel could have pre-empted the Arab attack in 
October 1973, but consciously chose not to, and the fact that if it had 
done so the outcome of the war might well have been different, emphasised 
both the confidence which Israel retained in its military superiority and, 
more importantly, its understanding of the fact that Israel's contingent 
value to the United States as the guardian of stability was no longer 
apparent in the face of an imminent disruption to the status quo. 
With the launching of the October War, Sadat regained much of the 
leverage which Nasser had lost after the 1970 cease-fire. Egypt's 
demonstrated !Villingness to disrupt the regional tranquillity in order 
to press its grievances recreated the imperatives of the War of Attrition 
for American policy; with the added emphasis of the oil embargo this time. 
American desires for a settlement which would increase its influence in 
the Arab world, and which would better provide the stable conditions 
necessary for the achievement of this aspiration, reemerged. And it 
was of course ironical that Kissinger, the man whose balance of power 
approach had helped the Israelis to circumvent American settlement policy, 
should have been the Secretary of State to dust off the file on the 
Rogers Plan, and that its architect, Joseph Sisco, should have still been 
there to help him. Although his strategy differed from that of his 
predecessor, the goals remained the same: a settlement which would secure 
Israel's existence but not its conquests; which would enhance America's 
position in the Arab world by strengthening the moderate rather than the 
radical regimes; which would prevent the Soviet Union from reestablishing 
itself in Egypt; and which might not make both sides equally happy, but 
would at least make them equally unhappy. 
With these goals in mind, Kissinger's first priority was to prevent 
Egypt's defeat. For rather different reasons, the Soviet Union sought 
the same aim. If it wanted to retain its position of influence in the 
Arab world it could not let Egypt be defeated yet again by Israel; if it 
wanted to avoid a superpower confrontation then it had to avoid a 
situation where it might be forced to intervene to save its client. 
Consequently, the interests of both superpowers in this war were focused 
on Egypt's fate, a fact which served to enhance immensely Egypt's value 
to both superpowers, and reduce Israel's ability to achieve a victory. 
The asymmetry between Israel and Egypt had been reasserted: once again 
Egypt possessed alternative patronage; once again Israel feared the 
consequences of a rapprochement between its patron and its adversary. 
Moreover, once again, the fear of superpower confrontation had turned the 
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superpower adversaries into partners for the preservation of peace, this 
time at Israel's expense, and to Egypt's benefit. In effect, the 
superpowers succeeded in October 1973 in imµ:ising a settlement - to the 
fighting - by preventing Israel's victory over the Egyptian IIIrd Army. 
What then are the prospects for a superpower imposed settlement of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict? To attempt to answer that question,it 
remains necessary to test the hypotheses outlined in Part One: 
i) the demands of certain weak states, which possess the 
power of resistance, cannot always or easily be 
left out of account; · 
ii) if the superpowers wish to maintain their dominance 
of the system through the promotion of tranquillity 
and stability then they will have to take account of 
the demands of these states; 
iii) while the great may indeed prevail on issues which 
directly affect the central balance of power, their 
preponderance does not mean that they will succeed 
in imposing their will on issues which affect 
relations between the weak and the great. 
It emerges from the cases studied that Israel's and Egypt's demands 
indeed have not always or easily been left out of account by the 
superpowers in their management of international order. Israel's demand 
for freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba in 1967, and Egypt's 
demand for Israeli withdrawal in 1973, could not be ignored by the super-
powers, and had to be taken into account in their attempts to prevent a 
disruption to their global relations. Although one can only cite these 
two instances in support of the first two hypotheses, the evidence is 
still compelling. For in both instances, because the weak 
states possessed the will-power and the capabilities to resist the imposition 
of an order which was inimical to their vital interests, they were able 
to take actions which threatened seriously to drag their patrons into a 
superpower confrontation. When one considers tha~ since the Cuban missile 
crisis in 1962,there have been only two crises in which the United States 
and the Soviet Union have moved towards a confrontation, and both have 
resulted from the conflict between Israel and Egypt, it is clear thatthe 
vital interests of these weak states can only be left out of account by 
the superpowers at their own peril and therefore at the peril of global 
peace. 
The third hypothesis has also been confirmed by the analysis. When 
the local conflict threatened to drag the superpowers into confrontation 
and to disrupt the central balance of power, the United States and the 
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Soviet Union were indeed able to prevail over the policies of their 
clients. Thus Egypt was abandoned by the Soviet Union in the 1967 war and 
was left to face the Israeli onslaught without military support. Again 
in 1973, Israel was forced to submit to American and Soviet demands that 
it stop its advance and relax its stranglehold on the Third Army because 
of the threat of a superpower confrontation. However, on the issues 
which affected relations between the weak and the great, and did not 
involve a threat to the 'nuclear peace', the record of influence and 
resistance was determined by the relative interdependence of the patron 
and the client, the contingent value of the weak state's resources, the 
nature of superpower commitments, the relative strengths of will brought 
to bear on the issue at hand, and the adeptness or ineptness of the 
contestants. 
In the cases studied here, excluding those which affected the 
central balance (Egypt's defeat in 1967 and Israel's 1973 submission), as 
well as the pre-1967 Egyptian-American break (in which neither submitted), 
but counting those cases where the client submitted and was then able to 
prevail (Israel's conflict with American settlement policy and Egypt's 
resistance of the effects of detente) as cases where both patron and then 
client prevailed, one finds that in the period from 1962 to 1973 the weak 
states prevailed in six cases and the superpowers prevailed in only three~ 
More significantly perhaps, because the issues may not have been of equal 
value, in no case where the vital interests of the clients were concerned, 
was the patron able to prevail. The testimony to that is the fact that 
after ten years of efforts by both superpowers to achieve a 
settlement of the conflict based on Israeli withdrawal and Egyptian 
peace concessions, Israel remains in substantially all of the occupied 
territories, while Egypt has conceded precious little in terms of 
recognition, direct negotiations or its conditions for peace. 
(Notwithstanding the fact that there has been a marginal convergence in 
that Israel has withdrawn from the Canal, the Sinai oilfields and the 
Gidi and Mitla Passes, while Egypt has committed itself to "the non 
resort to use of force" for a period of three years, to Israeli cargoes 
but not ships in the Suez Canal, and to a peace treaty in exchange for 
complete Israeli withdrawal and a Palestinian settlement). 
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Thus it seems possible to conclude that a weak state which possesses 
resources of value to its patron, which can commit its patron (either 
through a formal commitment or through the commitment of the patron's 
prestige and reputation), which can exploit the competition for influence 
between the superpowers or gain benefit from their cooperation, and which 
is adept at employing the leverage in its possession, may well succeed 
in resisting or circumventing the policy of its patron while securing 
or maintaining its support. However, such resistance would not be 
possible without a strong will, rationally applied. 
Throughout the analysis, the importance of will-power has been 
emphasised and the asymmetry which tends to exist between the will of the 
weak and the will of the great, on issues of vital importance to the 
weak, but of peripheral importance to the great, has been evident. 
Without determination, Israel would not have overcome State Department 
opposition to its arms requests, nor would it have secured American 
acquiescence in its pre-emption. Egypt could have borne neither the 
costs of defying the United States, nor the costs of the War of Attrition, 
had it lacked the will to resist. Israel would not have secured American 
support for its deterrent strength had it not been determined to resist 
the Soviet Union's intervention in Egypt and American settlement policy. 
Egypt would not have been able to disrupt the detente by launching the 
October War had it not summoned the strength of will to defy its patron 
and its adversaries. 
Yet if will-power was a necessary ingredient in weak state resistance., 
its rational application was essential if the loss of patronage was to be 
avoided. For,. maintaining patronage while resisting the inimical effects 
of the patron's policy was the essence of the power of the weak. In this 
context, the last two hypotheses, which relate to weak state behaviour, 
should be tested: 
iv) the weak state which has no alternative patronage will 
act with caution up to the point where it believes that 
it is about to be, or has been, abandoned by its patron; 
at that point it may take desperate measures to dissuade 
its patron, or to gain alternative patronage; 
v) the weak state which has alternative patrons will act 
with daring up to the point where it believes that it 
will lose, or has lost, its alternative; at this point 
it will act with caution. 
In all but one of the cases analysed, these hypotheses were confirmed. 
Lacking an alLernate patron, Israel continually acted with caution, but 
clearly possessed the potential for desperate action at times when it 
thought that America might not support it. Had the United States 
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abandoned its commitment to Israel's navigation rights in 1967 - as France 
did - Israel would probably have gone to war, regardless. Had the United 
States not combined its demands for Israeli compliance with generous 
blandishments and assurances of support in 1970, during the October 1973 
War, and indeed during the Second Sinai Disengagement negotiations in 1975, 
Israel might well have decided to act defiantly. 3 On the other hand, 
the contrast between 'Nasser's defiant behaviour before 1967 and his 
caution thereafter reflected first, his confidence in his ability to 
play one patron off against the other, and then, when Egypt was abandoned 
by the United States, his appreciation of the need to apply his will 
rationally were he to regain American support and lessen his dependence 
on the Soviet Union. And at the point where he thought the Soviet Union 
was about to abandon Egypt's political demands (in June, 1969) and 
military demands (in January, 1970) he was prepared to take desperate 
measures to dissuade Noscow. 
Similarly, Sadat was 'prepared to act with caution while he believed 
that the Soviet Union would be persuaded to support Egypt's aspirations. 
Yet at the point where he perceived that the Soviet Union had abandoned 
any intention of supporting an Egyptian military operation, he was 
prepared to take the desperate measure of expelling the Soviet personnel 
and then launching war - actions which secured Egypt the alternative 
patronage of the United States. 
However, unlike Nasser's behaviour before 1967, Sadat now appears 
to understand well the need to apply his will-power rationally. Thus, 
whereas Nasser failed to sublimate the conflict of interest between the 
United States and Egypt, and while he failed to act cautiously when it 
became clear that the United States was about to abandon him (although 
he did make the attempt in 1965), Sadat appears determined to sublimate 
the conflict of interest (by keeping the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 
'ice-box' and by promoting, rather than debasing, American interests in 
the Middle East arid in Africa) in order to secure American patronage and 
3. In fact Israel did say 'No' to Kissinger in April, 1975 in part 
because it believed that the price being offered for its compliance was 
not high enough. 
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to reduce American support for Israel's political demands. This caution is 
reinforced by his belief that he has little alternative, since Soviet 
patronage is perceived to be unable to secure his twin goals of Israeli 
withdrawal and Egyptian economic recovery. Nevertheless, should the 
Egyptian rapprochement with the United States fail to achieve these 
goals, as a result of what Egypt might perceive to be insufficient American 
support, Sadat (or his successor) is likely to take less cautious and 
more desperate measures to persuade Washington to be more forthcoming 
or to regain the Soviet patronage which has so far been spurned in favour 
of its more attractive alternative. 
Israel, on the other hand, perceiving that its American patron 
and its Egyptian protege are building their relationship, in part, on 
the assumption that the United States can pressure Israel to withdraw, 
is drawing closer to the point where it believes that its basic 
requirements will not be supported by its patron. As this fear mounts, 
the new Likud government seems more disposed than its predecessor to 
take increasingly defiant actions. The United States continues to allay 
this fear by providing Israel with generous economic and military support. 
However, should the United. States decide to withhold its patronage in 
order to force Israel to comply with its policy, the weak client is likely 
to take desperate measures to dissuade the United States from this course. 
This is not to suggest that keeping Israel on a 'short leash' in regard 
to its arms requests will not encourage compliant behaviour - as it did 
in 1970, 1973, and 1975. But it is to suggest that on matters of v~tal 
interest, where Israel believes that it cannot afford to be compliant, the 
'short leash' will not achieve its purpose, and withholding patronage will 
not achieve it either because Israel, fearing abandonment, will become 
more defiant and more prepared to take desperate measures to maintain 
what it regards as vital to its security and survival. 
In other words, since both Egypt and Israel retain the ability to 
disrupt or damage American interests, the United States must operate within 
the bounds of their basic requirements if it is to achieve a settlement 
by means of its patronage. In these circumstances, any attempt to impose. a 
settlement on these two clients which is perceived to jeopardise the 
vital interests of one or both, is likely to be counter-productive as long 
as the clients possess the will to resist and the means to do so. 
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However, as regional tranquillity and security of oil supply become 
increasingly vital to the United States and its allies, the superpowers 
will to absorb the costs of forcing its protege to comply is likely to 
be bolstered. Should the politics of patronage, in combination with other 
conflicting pressures in the region, lead to the outbreak of another war, 
then the interests of both superpowers will be engaged. And, as we have 
seen, on matters which affect the central balance between the superpowers, 
the great can indeed prevail over the weak. For, in the circumstances 
of another war, the asymmetry between the will of the weak (on matters 
vital to them) and the will of the great (on matters no longer peripheral 
to them) will disappear, while the asymmetry between the power of the patrons 
and the inherent weaknesses of the clients is likely to be reasserted. 
In these circumstances, the great are likely to prevail and the weak will 
be forced to submit. 
To conclude that the interests of both proteges would therefore be 
better served by avoiding a war which would threaten to disrupt superpower 
relations and would thereby create the necessary conditions for a 
superpower imposed settlement would, however, be misleading. For the 
1967 and 1973 experiences have taught both Israel and Egypt that, as long 
as the settlement is imposed on the adversary rather than on itself, the 
protege can in fact gain advantage from war. Thus, whether the politics 
of patronage will lead to a new era of peace and tranquillity in the 
Middle East or to yet another war remains uncertain. What is certain, 
however, is that while the superpowers may dominate the international 
system, they cannot preserve the peace by controlling the dynamics of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict unless their regional proteges comply; and Israel 
and Egypt will not comply unless their basis interests are secured. 
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